Com. v. Cristo-Munoz, J.

J-S39039-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JUAN JR. CRISTO-MUNOZ :
:
Appellant : No. 937 MDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 30, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-36-CR-0001591-2017
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 2, 2023
Appellant Juan Jr. Cristo-Munoz appeals from the order denying his
timely first Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. Appellant contends
that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Appellant about the
possibility of proceeding to trial and arguing diminished capacity from
voluntary intoxication. After review, we affirm based on the PCRA court’s
opinion.
The PCRA court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history
of this matter as follows:
On February 19, 2017, [Appellant], then 18 years old, was
charged with two counts of criminal homicide, two counts of
robbery, burglary and criminal conspiracy[FN1] from an incident
involving the brutal torture-killings of two disabled brothers,
Richard Walton and Leroy Kinsey, on February 19, 2017.
[Appellant] and his co-conspirator, 19-year-old Joshua Michael
____________________________________________
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S39039-22
Proper,[FN2] forced their way into the brothers’ home in Lancaster
City, demanded money from the victims and then repeatedly
stabbed them. Kinsey was stabbed at least ten times. Walton
was stabbed 54 times with a sword taken from the home. The co-
defendants then fled to the basement of the home, where officers
ultimately found them after responding to a 911 call for a burglary
in progress placed by a third occupant of the home who had fled
to the roof.
18 Pa.C.S. § 2501(a), 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i), 18
[FN1]
Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(1)(i), and 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a),
respectively.
On April 11, 2017, the Commonwealth consolidated this
[FN2]
case with the homicide charges filed against Proper at
Information No. 1592-2017.
Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P, 802, the Commonwealth filed a notice of
intent to seek a sentence of death against [Appellant] on March
22, 2017.[FN3] However, on April 11, 2018, [Appellant] agreed to
enter a guilty plea to the charges of first-degree murder, burglary,
robbery, and conspiracy to commit burglary in exchange for the
Commonwealth dropping the death penalty.
[FN3]Specifically, the Commonwealth believed it could prove
the following statutory aggravating circumstances: (1)
defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a
felony, specifically, burglary and robbery; (2) in the
commission of the offense, the defendant knowingly created
a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the
victims of the offense (Ryan Taska); (3) the killing was
committed by means of torture (victim Leroy Kinsey); and
(4) the defendant has committed multiple murders. See 42
Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(6), (7), (8) and (11).
Pursuant to the negotiated guilty plea tendered on April 11, 2018,
the court imposed consecutive mandatory sentences of life
without the possibility of parole on the first-degree murder
convictions.[FN4] No post-sentence motions were filed.
[FN4]Pennsylvania law mandates that if a person is found
guilty of first-degree murder and does not receive the death
penalty he or she will receive a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See 18
Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(1).
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On May 10, 2018, [Appellant] filed a timely direct appeal to the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania from the judgment of sentence
imposed on April 11, 2018. A three-judge panel of the Superior
Court affirmed the judgment of sentence in an unpublished
memorandum filed on April 16, 2019, See Commonwealth v.
Cristo-Munoz, [780 MDA 2018] 2019 WL 1749210 (Pa. Super.
[filed Apr. 16,] 2019) [(unpublished mem.)].
On March 18, 2020, [Appellant], acting pro se, filed a timely
motion for post conviction collateral relief. In this pleading,
[Appellant] challenged the effective assistance of his trial counsel,
Edwin G. Pfursich. Pursuant to Rule 904(A) of the Pennsylvania
Rules of Criminal Procedure, on September 21, 2020, Christopher
P. Lyden, Esquire, was appointed to represent [Appellant] on his
collateral claims and was granted leave to file an amended [PCRA]
petition.
On December 1, 2020, Attorney Lyden mailed Petitioner a “no
merit” letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d
927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213(Pa. Super. 1988), stating that after his review of the pro se PCRA
petition and the record of the case, he found no meritorious
issues. In his pro se objections to the “no merit” letter,
[Appellant] alleged for the first time that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to advise him regarding the possibility, based
on his mental health history and use of alcohol, prescription and
illegal narcotics, of mounting a “diminished capacity” defense to
the first-degree murder charge. Upon review of all the pleadings,
the court issued an order on April 1, 2021, directing Attorney
Lyden to review and respond to the new issue raised by
[Appellant].
Thereafter, Attorney Lyden filed an amended petition on April 21,
2021, which raises the sole issue of whether defense counsel were
ineffective for failing to advise [Appellant] that a diminished
capacity defense because of voluntary intoxication could be
presented during a trial. The Commonwealth filed a response to
the amended petition on May 21, 2021, conceding the need for an
evidentiary hearing on this claim. Accordingly, a hearing was held
on November 29, 2021, at which time the court heard testimony
from defense attorneys Edwin G. Pfursich and Joseph P. McMahon
[(collectively Defense Counsel)], and [Appellant]. Proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed by [Appellant] on
December 23, 2021, to which the Commonwealth filed an answer
on January 16, 2022.
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PCRA Ct. Op., 7/5/22, at 1-4 (some footnotes omitted and formatting altered).
The PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition on June 30, 2022, and Appellant
filed a timely appeal. Both the PCRA court and Appellant complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue:
1. Did the PCRA court err by failing to find that [Appellant]
entered an invalid plea where [Defense Counsel] failed to
discuss with [Appellant] the possibility of defending the
charges at trial by claiming diminished capacity from voluntary
intoxication?
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (formatting altered).
Appellant argues that Defense Counsel knew that he had consumed
alcohol on the night of the offenses but failed to thoroughly discuss the
possibility of proceeding to trial and defending the homicide charges by
claiming voluntary intoxication. Id. at 11. Appellant contends that he would
not have plead guilty if he was aware of the possibility of presenting this
defense, and therefore, he entered an involuntary and unknowing guilty plea.
Id. at 11-12.
In reviewing Appellant’s claims, we are guided by the following
principles:
[O]ur standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition is
limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is
supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal
error. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when
supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we
apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal
conclusions.
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J-S39039-22
Furthermore, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the
circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
innocence could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant
to prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying claim
is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic
basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors
and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that
the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.
Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(citations omitted and formatting altered). “Allegations of ineffectiveness in
connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if
the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing
plea.” Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(citation omitted). “Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of
counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice
was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”
Id. (citation omitted).
The standard for post-sentence withdrawal of guilty pleas
dovetails with the arguable merit/prejudice requirements for relief
based on a claim of ineffective assistance of plea counsel, ... under
which the defendant must show that counsel’s deficient
stewardship resulted in a manifest injustice, for example, by
facilitating entry of an unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent
plea. This standard is equivalent to the “manifest injustice”
standard applicable to all post-sentence motions to withdraw a
guilty plea.
Id. (citation omitted and emphasis added).
Our law is clear that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently entered. There is no absolute right to
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J-S39039-22
withdraw a guilty plea, and the decision as to whether to allow a
defendant to do so is a matter within the sound discretion of the
trial court. To withdraw a plea after sentencing, a defendant must
make a showing of prejudice amounting to “manifest injustice.”
“A plea rises to the level of manifest injustice when it was entered
into involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently.” A defendant’s
disappointment in the sentence imposed does not constitute
“manifest injustice.”
Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 522 (Pa. Super.2003).
Thus, to establish prejudice, the defendant must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
The reasonable probability test is not a stringent one; it merely
refers to a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.
Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 192 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations
omitted and formatting altered). “A defendant is permitted to withdraw his
guilty plea under the PCRA if ineffective assistance of counsel caused the
defendant to enter an involuntary plea of guilty.” Commonwealth v.
Rathfon, 899 A.2d 365, 369 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).
Moreover, “[o]ur law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty
plea was aware of what he was doing[, and the defendant] bears the burden
of proving otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa.
Super. 2003) (citations omitted).
The longstanding rule of Pennsylvania law is that a defendant may
not challenge his guilty plea by asserting that he lied while under
oath, even if he avers that counsel induced the lies. A person who
elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes in open
court while under oath and he may not later assert grounds for
withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at
his plea colloquy.
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Id. (internal citation omitted). Further:
In order for a guilty plea to be constitutionally valid, the guilty
plea colloquy must affirmatively show that the defendant
understood what the plea connoted and its consequences. This
determination is to be made by examining the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea. Thus, even
though there is an omission or defect in the guilty plea colloquy,
a plea of guilty will not be deemed invalid if the circumstances
surrounding the entry of the plea disclose that the defendant had
a full understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea
and that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the plea.
Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citation omitted and formatting altered).
Additionally, a claim of diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication
cannot be asserted by mere evidence of intoxication, but rather the assertion
requires evidence that demonstrates the defendant was intoxicated to such
an extent that he was unable to form the requisite intent. Commonwealth
v. Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191, 1218 (Pa. 2006). Moreover, “[a] defense of
diminished capacity is only available to a defendant who admits criminal
liability but contests the degree of guilt.” Commonwealth v. Laird, 726 A.2d
346, 353 (Pa. 1999).
Instantly, the PCRA court determined that Appellant’s testimony that he
was intoxicated to the extent that he was unable to form specific intent to kill
was not credible, and continued that initially, Appellant asserted his innocence
and blamed co-defendant Joshua Proper for committing the murders alone.
Further, trial counsel, Attorney McMahon testified at the PCRA hearing that he
discussed the defense of voluntary intoxication with Appellant prior to him
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agreeing to the negotiated plea. See PCRA Ct. Op., 7/5/22, at 2, 8, 10, 11.
The trial court imposed consecutive mandatory sentences of life without the
possibility of parole on the two first-degree murder convictions, and the
Commonwealth dropped the death penalty sentence it was seeking.
On this record, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant’s claims
that he would have gone to trial and not plead guilty if he had known about
the defense of diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication are not
credible, and Appellant cannot establish prejudice as he did not enter an
involuntary or unknowing plea resulting in a manifest injustice. See Kelley,
136 A.3d at 1013; see also Rathfon, 899 A.2d at 369.
Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the well-
reasoned conclusions of the PCRA court, we affirm based on the PCRA court’s
opinion. See PCRA Ct. Op., 7/5/22, at 1-13.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 02/02/2023
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Circulated 01/09/2023 03:59 PM
July 29, 2022
Re: Juan Cristo- Munoz Jr.
Cp Cr No: 1591-2017
Superior Cr No: 937 MDA 2022
Index of Opinion
1. Index of Opinion
2. Opinion in Support of Order of June 30, 2022
3. Order Denying Amended/Petition for Post — Conviction Collateral Relief Act
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY,PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
IV. No. 1691 - 2017
.JUAN CRISTO-MUNOZ, .JR.
sanoo Aomro
OPINION IN SUPPORT OF ORDER OF JUNE 30, 2022
s
8Y: ASHWORTH, P.J_, JULY 5, 2022 0
w
Juan Cristo-Munoz, Jr., filed an amended petition pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 954146. That amended petition was denied by
order entered on June 30, 2022, following an evidentiary hearing. This opinion is filed in
support of that decision.
1. Background
The relevant facts and procedural history may be summarized as follows_ On
February 19, 2017, Cristo-Munoz, then 18 years old, was charged with two counts of
criminal homicide, two counts of robbery, burglary and criminal conspiracy' from an
incident involving the brutal torture-killings of two disabled brothers, Richard Walton and
Leroy Kinsey, on February 19, 2017. Cristo- Munoz and his co-conspirator, 19-year-old
'18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(A), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(i), 18 Pa.C.S.A_ § 3502(a)(1)(i), and 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 903(A), respectively.
Joshua Michael Proper, 2 forced their way into the brothers' home in Lancaster City,
demanded money from the victims and then repeatedly stabbed them. Kinsey was
stabbed at least ten times. Walton was stabbed 54 times with asword taken from the
home. Notes of Testimony ( N.T.), Guilty Plea/Sentencing at 25-26, The co-defendants
then fled to the basement of the home, where officers ultimately found them after
responding to a911 call for a burglary in progress placed by athird occupant of the
home who had fled to the roof. Id. at 24.
Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 802, the Commonwealth filed a Notioe of Intent to Seek
aSentence of Death against Cristo- Munoz on March 22, 2017. 3 However, on April 11,
2018, Cristo-Munoz agreed to enter aguilty plea to the charges of first-degree murder,
burglary, robbery, and conspiracy to commit burglary in exchange for the
Commonwealth dropping the death penalty. N.T., Guilty Plea/Sentencing at 30.
Pursuant to the negotiated guilty plea tendered on April 11, 2018, the court
imposed consecutive mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole on the
first-degree murder convictions. 4 N.T., Guilty Plea/Sentencing at 32, No post sentence
motions were filed.
2 On April 11, 2017, the Commonwealth consolidated this case with the homicide charges filed
against Proper at Information No. 1592-2017.
3 Specifically, the Commonwealth believed it could prove the following statutory aggravating
circumstances: ( 1) defendant committed akilling while in the perpetration of afelony,
specifically, burglary and robbery; (2) in the commission of the offense, the defendant knowingly
created agrave risk of death to another person in addition tc the victims of the offense (Ryan
Taska); (3) the killing was committed by means of torture ( victim Leroy Kinsey); and (4) the
defendant has committed multiple murders. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9711(d)(6), (7), (8) and ( 11).
4 Pennsylvania law mandates that if aperson is found guilty of first-degree murder and does not
receive the death penalty he or she will receive asentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(a)(1).
2
On May 10, 2018, Cristo-Munoz filed atimely direct appeal to the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania from the judgment of sentence imposed on April 11, 2018. 5 A three-
judge panel of the Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence in an unpublished
memorandum filed on April Z6, 2019, See Commonwealth v. Cristo-
Munoz, 216 A.3d
394, 2019 WL 1749210 (
Pa. Super. 2019).
On March 18, 2020, 6 Cristo-Munoz, acting pro se, filed atimely' motion for post
conviction collateral relief. In this pleading, Cristo-Munoz challenged the effective
assistance of his trial counsel, Edwin G. Pfursich. Pursuant to Rule 904(A) of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, on September 21, 2D20, Christopher P.
Lyden, Esquire, was appointed to represent Cristo-Munoz on his collateral claims and
was granted leave to file an amended petition.
5 Pursuant to this court's directive, Cristo-Munoz's counsel furnished aconcise statement of
errors complained of on appeal on June 8, 2018, which sets forth four bases for this appeal: ( 1)
Defendant was not provided the opportunity to speak at his sentencing hearing or testify against
his oo-defendant, Joshua Proper; (2) the facts of the case, as outlined by the Commonwealth,
were inaccurate and based upon a "corrupt source," Mr_ Proper; (3) the Assistant District
Attorney insulted Defendant and called him a " monster"; and (4) Defendant was subjected to
torture and malnourishment during his stay at Lancaster County Prison. See Statement of
Errors at ¶¶ 1-4. Counsel for Cristo-Munoz noted in the Statement of Errors that it was his
conclusion that Cristo-Munoz's issues were 'without merit," and that counsel intended to file a
brief pursuant to Anders v. Callfornla, 386 U.S. 738 ( 1967). Id. at 2.
6The pleading is deemed filed on the date of mailing rather than the date of docketing pursuant
to the °prisoner mailbox rule." Effort Main Document Only.See Commonwealth v. Crawford,
17 A.3d 1279, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2011) (" Under the prisoner mailbox rule, we deem apro se
document filed on the date it is placed in the hands of prison authorities for mailing,').
7 Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b), apetition for relief must be filed within one year of the
date the judgment of sentence becomes final. Here, Cristo-Munoz's judgment of sentence was
affirmed on April 16, 2019. As Cristo-Munoz did not file apetition for allowance of appeal with
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, his judgment of sentence became final on May 16, 2019,
when the period for filing apetition expired. Cristo-Munoz filed his pro se PCRA petition on
March 18, 2020; as aresult, it is timely.
3
On December 1, 2020, Attorney Lyden mailed Petitioner a " no merit" letter
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A. 2d 927 ( 1988), and
Commonwealth v. Finlay, 379 Pa. Super. 390, 550 A.2d 213 ( 1988), stating that after
his review of the pro se PCRA petition and the record of the case, he found no
meritorious issues. In his pro se objections to the "no merit" letter, Cristo- Munoz alleged
for the first time that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him regarding the
possibility, based on his mental health history and use of alcohol, prescription and illegal
narcotics, of mounting a "diminished capacity" defense to the first-degree murder
charge. Upon review of all the pleadings, the court issued an order on April 1, 2021,
directing Attorney Lyden to review and respond to the new issue raised by Petitioner.
Thereafter, Attorney Lyden filed an amended petition on April 21, 2021, which
raises the sole issue of whether defense counsel were ineffective for failing to advise
Cristo-Munoz that adiminished capacity defense because of voluntary intoxication
could be presented during atrial. See Amended PCRA Petition at ¶
M21-24. The
Commonwealth filed aresponse to the amended petition on May 21, 2021, conceding
the need for an evidentiary hearing on this claim. Accordingly, ahearing was held an
November 29, 2021, at which time the court heard testimony from Defense Attorneys
Edwin G. Pfursich and Joseph P. McMahon, and Petitioner Cristo-Munoz. Proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed by Petitioner on December 23, 2021,
to which the Commonwealth filed an answer on January 16, 2022.
By order filed June 30, 2022, the amended PCRA petition of Cristo-Munoz was
denied. This opinion is offered in support of that order.
4
It. Discussion
Cristo-Munoz claims that his defense attorneys provided ineffective assistance of
counsel for not explaining the defense of diminished capacity, voluntary intoxication,
and that if they had explained that defense that he would not have pleaded guilty to a
term of life imprisonment for the double homicide. For the reasons that follow, Cristo-
Munoz's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was rejected.
To prevail on aclaim of ineffective assistance of counsel made in the post
conviction context, adefendant must overcome the presumption that counsel is
effective by establishing by apreponderance of the evidence that. the underlying claim
has arguable merit; trial counsel had no reasonable basis for proceeding as he did; and
the defendant suffered prejudice. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 616 Pa, 164, 187, 47 A.3d
63, 76 (2012) ( cuing Commonwealth v, Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 158-59, 627 A.2d 973,
975-76 ( 1987)).
With respect to whether defense counsel's acts or omissions were reasonable,
counsel is accorded broad discretion to determine tactics and strategy. Commonwealth
v. Fowler, 447 Pa_ Super. 534, 540, 670 A,2d 153, 155-56 ( 1996). The applicable test
is not whether alternative strategies were more reasonable, employing a "hindsight'
evaluation of the record, but whether counsel's decision had any reasonable basis to
advance the interests of the defendant. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612 Pa. 333, 361,
30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (2011). The appellate courts will conclude that counsel's chosen
strategy lacked areasonable basis only if the petitioner proves that "an alternative not
chosen offered apotential for success substantially greater than the course actually
5
pursued." Id. at 361-62, 30 A.3d at 1127 (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 587 Pa.
304, 312, 899 A.2d 1060, 1064 (2006)).
To establish the prejudice prong, the defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different
but for counsel's ineffectiveness. Chmiel, supra at 362-63, 3Q A.3d at 1127-28. °We
stress that boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis and/or
ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy adefendant's burden to prove that counsel was
ineffective." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Paddy, 609 Pa. 272, 292, 15 A.3d 431, 443
(2011)).
Failure to establish any prong of the Pierce test will defeat an ineffectiveness
claim. Commonwealth v. Simpson, 620 Pa. 60, 73, 66 A.3d 253, 260 (2013). Thus,
where apetitioner has not met the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness standard, the
claim may be dismissed on that basis alone without adetermination of whether the
arguable merit and client's interest prongs have been met. Commonwealth v. Wright,
699 Pa. 270, 320-21, 961 A.2d 119, 148-49 (
2008); Commonwealth v. Zook, 585 Pa.
11, 26, 887 A.2d 1218, 1227 (2005).
In this case, Cristo-Munoz pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree murder. As
athreshold matter, "[g]enerally, aplea of guilty amounts to awaiver of all defects and
defenses except those concerning the jurisdiction of the court, the legality of the
sentence, and the validity of the guilty plea." Commonwealth v. Morrison, 173 A.3d
286, 290 ( Pa. Super. 2017) (
citation omitted). Cristo- Munoz has not challenged the
6
jurisdiction of this court or the legality of his sentence. Cristo-Munoz does dispute,
however, the validity of his guilty plea.
"Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of aguilty plea will
serve as abasis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an
involuntary or unknowing plea." Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa.
Super. 2002) (citation omitted). See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(iii). "Where the
defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea
depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded
of attorneys in criminal cases." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In assessing the voluntariness of aguilty plea, our Superior Court has noted that
"[t]he law does not require that [the defendant] be pleased with the outcome of his
decision to enter aplea of guilty; rather [a]II that is required is that [the defendant's]
decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made."
Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 1275, 1277 ( Pa. Super. 2012) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
With regard to the voluntariness of aplea, aguilty plea colloquy
must affirmatively demonstrate the defendant understood what the
plea connoted and its consequences. Once the defendant has
entered aguilty plea, it is presumed that he was aware of what he
was doing, and the burden of proving involuntariness is upon him.
Commonwealth v. Willis, fib A.3d 997, 1002 ( Pa. Super_ 2013) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, Cristo-Munoz contends that Attorneys Pfursich and McMahon were
ineffective for failing to thoroughly discuss with petitioner the possibility of defending
7
the criminal homicide charges by claiming voluntary intoxication." Suggested Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law at • 27. As made clear by our Supreme Court:
[A] defense of diminished capacity grounded in voluntary intoxications is avery
limited defense, which does not exculpate the defendant from criminal liability,
but, if successfully advanced, mitigates first-degree murder to third-degree
murder. The mere fact of intoxication is not adefense ;rather, the defendant
must prove that this cognitive abilities of deliberation and premeditation were
so compromised by voluntary intoxication that he was unable to formulate the
specific intent to kill. In other words, to prove avoluntary intoxication defense,
the defendant must show that he was overwhelmed to the point of losing his
faculties and sensibilities.Evidence that the defendant lacked the ability to
control his actions or acted impulsively is irrelevant to specific intent to kill,
and thus does not constitute support of avoluntary intoxication defense.
Commonwealth v. Bardo, 629 Pa, 352, 413-16, 103 A, 3d 678, 716 (2014) ( internal
citations and quotations omitted). Such adefense of diminished capacity " is only
available to adefendant who admits criminal liability but contests the degree of guilt.°
Commonwealth v. Spotz,587 Pa. 1, 46, 896 A.2d 1191, 1218 (2006) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Laird, 555 Pa. 629, 726 A.2d 346, 353 ( 1999)).
Initially, it must be noted that Cristo-Munoz first insisted that he was innocent of
the charges and that his co-defendant, Joshua Proper, committed the murders alone.
N.T_, PCRA Hearing at 63, 85, 95. Such aposition would preclude avoluntary
intoxication defense which requires an admission of criminal liability. However, when
Petitioner understood the felony murder rule, he knew he was facing asentence of life
without parole regardless of who actually committed the murders. Id. at 63 ,80. He then
admitted to counsel to participating in the killings. Id. at 57.
Further, it is uncontested that Petitioner did not tell his defense counsel that he
was intoxicated to the extent that he was unable to form the specific intent to kill. N.T.,
8
PCRA Hearing at 69. Having failed to provide counsel with this information, Cristo-
Munoz cannot now establish his attorneys were ineffective for failing to pursue a
defense that was not suggested by the evidence provided to them, Accordingly, there is
no arguable merit to Petitioner's claim that counsel should have pursued avoluntary
intoxication defense to the first-degree murder charges.
The evidence available to defense counsel did not suggest that adefense based
on voluntary intoxication was viable. Cristo-Munoz was evaluated by alicensed
psychologist, Jonathan M. Gransee, Ph.D., nine months after the murders. See
Commonwealth Exhibit No. 2. During that interview, Petitioner related very particular
details about the murders. Id.; N.7., PCRA Hearing at 36. Specifically, Cristo-Munoz told
Dr. Gransee that had he planned ahead for these murders he would have burned down
the home to destroy the evidence, he would have been more careful about touching
items on the first floor that had fallen down, and he would not have let his blood from a
cut on his hand get on the mop handle he was using to clean up the blood on the
second floor. Id. at 35-36. Petitioner evidenced avery specific recall of the events on
the night of the murders, despite his consumption of beer and prescription drugs. Id. at
16-17, 24, 37_
Attorney Pfursich and Attorney McMahon testified at the evidentiary hearing that
they did initially consider the diminished capacity defense of voluntary intoxication in this
case. 8 N.T., PCRA Hearing at 61, 77-78. However, for voluntary intoxication to be
8 Attorney Pfursich testified at the hearing that he actually considered two diminished capacity
defenses in this case. N.T., PCRA Hearing at 64. The first defense counsel considered was
diminished capacity due to mental disorders that might have affected Petitioner's cognitive
9
applicable, the person must have been so intoxicated that he lacked all control of his
faculties. Id. at 61-62. Counsel dismissed this defense after Cristo-Munoz gave his very
detailed chain of events to Dr. Gransee. Significantly, Petitioner's version of events was
different than anything that was included in the discovery. Id. at 71. Attorney Pfursich,
therefore, did not believe this was acase of Petitioner reading the discovery and
relating details not from specific recall but from the reports, as suggested by PCRA
counsel. Id. See also Id. at 29-30, 35-37; Suggested Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law at t31. As neither the facts of the case presented by Petitioner nor the
discovery supported adefense of voluntary intoxication, counsel appropriately did not
pursue it. Id. at 69.
Moreover, Petitioner's testimony at the evidentiary hearing that he was
intoxicated to the extent that he was unable to form the specific intent to kill is not
credible. He testified that at approximately 11:00 p.m. on the night of the murders he
consumed a40-ounce beer, which was atypical amount that he would consume in
order to " get [ him] feeling good! N.T., PCRA Hearing at 20, 39. Sixty to ninety minutes
after consuming the beer, Cristo-Munoz and his co-defendant entered the victims'
house_ Id. at 24. Cristo-Munoz testified, in direct contravention to his statements made
at the time of the guilty plea, that he has no recollection of being in the residence or of
what happened there due to his intoxication that night. Id. at 24-25. He stated,
ability to form the specific intent to kill. Id, Dr. Gransee did diagnose Cristo-Munoz with several
mental health disorders; however, he opined that none of them would have affected his
cognitive ability to understand what he was doing. Id, at 6x-61. Therefore, counsel did not
pursue this defense.
10
"everything went to ablur." Id, at 24, Petitioner now claims that he lied to the court, his
defense counsel, and Dr. Gransee when he admitted his complicity in the murders and
argues that he was so intoxicated that night that he has no memory of the incident. Id.
at 40, 49. Such assertions are simply not credible and are belied by the evidence.
Counsel had areasonable basis for advising Petitioner that it was in his best
interest to enter anegotiated plea to aterm of life imprisonment. Both counsel testified
at the hearing that, even if Cristo-Munoz's version of events that his co-defendant was
solely responsible for the murders was to be believed by ajury, the murders were
committed during the course of aburglary and robbery, which qualifies for second-
degree murder which carries amandatory life-without-parole sentence. N.T., PCRA
Hearing at 47, 62-63, 77. Thus, Petitioner was still facing asentence of life in prison for
felony murder. Id. at 95.
Cristo-Munoz testified at the PCRA Hearing that if the voluntary intoxication
defense had been presented to him, he would not have entered aplea of guilty to first-
degree murder but rather would have gone to that. N.T., PCRA Hearing at 33-34.
Attorney McMahon testified unequivocally that he discussed voluntary intoxication with
Cristo-Munoz prior to him agreeing to the negotiated plea. Id. at 87-88. Regardless, had
Petitioner gone to trial, he was facing the death penalty if found guilty of first-degree
murder, and counsel testified to the fact that there were significant, multiple aggravating
factors and "very little" in the way of mitigation evidence. Id. at 82. Counsel weighed the
odds at trial where Petitioner could get adeath sentence versus the benefits of aplea to
11
life in prison. Id. Counsel had areasonable basis in advising Cristo-Munoz to enter the
plea and acted in his best interests.
Finally, Petitioner did not suffer prejudice from counsel's actions_ Cristo-Munoz
must prove that there is areasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings
would have been different but for counsel's ineffectiveness; that is, that if he was
informed of the defense of voluntary intoxication that he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have gone to trial. Petitioner understood that if he went to trial and the jury
believed his version of the events he would still be found guilty of second-degree
murder because the murders happened as aresult of aburglary. N- T., PCRA Hearing at
47. He further understood that such aconviction would result in asentence of life in
prison without parole. Id. Therefore, even had Petitioner pursued avoluntary
intoxication defense to the first- degree murder charges, he would not have avoided a
life imprisonment sentence and would have faced the possible of adeath sentence — a
sentence he did not want. Id. at 47-48; 41. Accordingly, Petitioner's testimony that he
would have gone to trial and not pleaded guilty if he had known about the defense of
diminished capacity, voluntary intoxication is not credible.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Juan Cristo-Munoz's amended PCRA petition
was denied.
Accordingly, Ienter the following:
12
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
V. No. 1591 - 2017
JUAN CRISTO-MUNOZ, JR.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of July, 2022, the Court hereby submits this Opinion in
support of the Order of June 30, 2022, denying Juan Cristo-Munoz's amended petition
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-48.
BY T
AT'D L. A• - - ORTH
PRESIDENT JUDGE
Copies to: Cody L. Wade, Assistant District Attomey
Christopher P. Lyden, Esquire
Juan Cristo-Munoz, Jr., #NJ- 1102, SCI Somerset, 1590 Walters Mill Road,
Somerset, PA 15510-0001
13
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY ,PENNSYLVANIA
C R IM INA
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
No. 159'1 - 2017
V.
JUAN CRISTO-MUNOZ, JR_
ORDER
AND NOW, this 3011 day of June, 2022, upon consideration of Petitioner Juan
Cristo-Munoz's amended petition for post conviction collateral relief, and following an
evidentiary hearing in this matter, it is hereby ORDERED that said petition is DENIED.
Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim-P. 907(4), this Court advises Petitioner that he has the
right to appeal from this Order. Petitioner shall have 30 days from the date of this final
Order to appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Failure to appeal within 30 days
will result in the loss of appellate rights.
It is further ORDERED that Petitioner shall have the right, if indigent, to appeal in
forma pauperrs and to proceed with assigned appellate counsel as provided in Pa.
R.Ciim.P. 122_
BY TH
AVI s . AS FORTH
RESIDENT JUDGE
Copies to: Cory L. Wade, Esquire, Assistant District Attorney
Christopher P. Lyden, Esquire, MILLER LYDEN, 53 North Duke Street,
Suite 205, Lancaster, PA 17602
Juan Cristo-Munoz, Jr., #NJ1102, SCI Somerset, 1594 Walters Milt Road,
Somerset, PA 15514-0001 (Certified Mail)