In the Interest of: B.N.R., a Minor

J-A01044-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: B.N.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.R., FATHER :
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: No. 2297 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered June 29, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000137-2017,
CP-51-DP-0000502-2014
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.A.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.R., FATHER :
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: No. 2299 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered June 29, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000138-2017,
CP-51-DP-0001592-2014
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OTT, J., and PLATT*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2018
J.R. (“Father”) appeals from the decrees entered on June 29, 2017, in
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, involuntarily terminating
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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his parental rights to his daughter, B.N.R., and his son, J.A.R. (collectively,
“Children”).1 Upon careful review, we affirm.2
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court thoroughly set forth the
factual and procedural history of this case, which the documentary evidence
supports. As such, we adopt it herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/30/17, at
2-17.
By way of background, B.N.R. was born in July of 2013, with opiates,
cocaine, and methadone in her system. Id. at 2. The Philadelphia
Department of Human Services (“DHS”) placed her in Father’s custody upon
discharge from the hospital. N.T., 6/29/17, at 17-18. DHS removed B.N.R.
from Father’s custody in January of 2014, after he told DHS that he was unable
to care for her on a full-time basis. Trial Court Opinion, 8/30/17, at 5. The
trial court adjudicated B.N.R. dependent on March 7, 2014.
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1 By separate decrees entered on June 29, 2017, the trial court involuntarily
terminated the parental rights of the Children’s mother, C.S. (“Mother”).
Mother did not file notices of appeal.
2 During the subject proceedings, the Children were represented by the Child
Advocate, Lindsay Palmer, Esquire, and by the Guardian ad litem (“GAL”),
Marie Charles-Asar, Esquire. See In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172
(Pa. 2017) (holding that 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a) requires that trial courts appoint
legal counsel for a child in a contested involuntary termination proceeding,
and that the failure to do so constitutes structural error, which can never be
harmless in nature). In these appeals, the Child Advocate filed an appellee
brief in support of the involuntary termination decrees. Although the GAL did
not file an appellee brief, she recommended the termination of Father’s
parental rights in her closing argument to the trial court. N.T., 6/29/17, at
64-65.
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J.A.R. was born in July 2014, with methadone and opiates in his system.
Id. at 6-7. DHS never placed J.A.R. in Father’s custody. The trial court
adjudicated him dependent on August 15, 2014. The Children were placed in
the kinship care of M.R., their maternal grandmother, who, along with their
maternal grandfather, is a pre-adoptive resource. Id. at 6, 9-10; N.T.,
2/7/17, at 16.
Since the Children’s adjudications, Father has resided with Mother
and/or maintained contact with her. Father and Mother engaged in domestic
violence throughout their relationship. N.T., 6/29/17, at 21. Further, Mother
has an extensive history of illegal drug use, and she has repeatedly, and
unsuccessfully, attended inpatient and outpatient drug and alcohol treatment
programs. In addition, Mother has a drug-related criminal conviction from
2012, for which she was sentenced to twelve months of probation. In 2013,
2014, and 2015, Mother was convicted of violating the terms of her probation.
She was sentenced to an additional twelve months of probation each time.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/30/17, at 5, 8, 11.
Mother’s family service plan (“FSP”) granted her supervised visitation
with the Children. Father’s FSP granted him unsupervised visits twice weekly
to occur within the maternal grandmother’s community. By permanency
review orders dated August 19, 2015, Father’s visits with the Children were
changed to supervised due to his allowing Mother to have contact with the
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Children.3 Order, 8/19/15; see also N.T., 2/7/17, at 28-29. The orders also
referred Father for a parenting capacity evaluation and for services at the
Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”). Order, 8/19/15.
In September of 2015, DHS referred Father for a parenting capacity
evaluation (“PCE”) at Forensic Mental Health Services, LLC, to assess his
ability to provide permanency and safety to the Children. See DHS Exhibit 1.
The PCE was performed by Erica G. Williams, Psy.D., and Samantha Peterson,
M.A. By report dated April 22, 2016, Dr. Williams and Ms. Peterson opined
that Father did not have the capacity to provide the Children with safety
and/or permanency due to his failure to acknowledge his role in the Children’s
placement and his relationship and contact with Mother. DHS Exhibit 1, at
10-11. The PCE resulted in recommendations that Father participate in
individual therapy with a focus on the issues necessitating the Children’s
placement and abstain from contact with Mother, inter alia. Id. at 11. The
FSP dated September 8, 2015, required Father to follow the PCE
recommendations.4
On February 3, 2017, DHS filed petitions for the involuntary termination
of Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8),
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3By the time of the termination hearing, Father’s supervised visits occurred
weekly, for a total of eight hours per month. N.T., 2/7/17, at 20.
4In addition, the FSP objectives required Father to participate and successfully
complete the parenting services at ARC; maintain supervised visits with the
Children; locate suitable housing; and maintain employment. Trial Court
Opinion, 8/30/17, at 13.
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and (b). The first day of the hearing occurred on February 7, 2017, during
which DHS presented the testimony of Volieda Hamm, the Community
Umbrella Association (“CUA”) case manager. Father testified on his own
behalf. Father did not acknowledge his parental incapacity that resulted in
the Children’s placement. N.T., 2/7/17, at 33-36. Rather, he testified that
the Children were in placement due to Mother’s drug problem. Id. at 33-34.
Father admitted that he had not participated in individual therapy as required
by the PCE, but that he planned to do so. N.T., 2/7/17, at 30-31. Father
testified that he has been renting a house since November of 2016, which is
suitable for the Children. N.T., 2/7/17, at 32, 41.
At the completion of the hearing, the trial court ordered, on the record
and in open court, a bonding evaluation with respect to Father and the
Children. In addition, the court ordered DHS to make three unannounced
visits to Father’s home and evaluate it for suitability. N.T., 2/7/17, at 42-43.
The second day of the hearing occurred on June 29, 2017, during which
DHS presented the testimony of Erica Williams, Psy.D., who conducted the
PCE. She testified that Father started individual therapy only one month ago,
in May of 2017. N.T., 6/29/17, at 29. Dr. Williams also conducted the court-
ordered bonding evaluation. In addition, DHS presented the testimony of
Patience Kpodi, DHS caseworker. The Child Advocate presented the testimony
of M.R., the Children’s maternal grandmother. Father testified again on his
own behalf and stated that he is employed at a casino that offers day care
services for employees’ children. N.T., 6/29/17, at 57. The record does not
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provide any evidence with respect to when Father secured employment or his
work schedule.
By decrees dated and entered on June 29, 2017, the trial court
terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2),
(5), (8), and (b). Father timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements
of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b),
which this Court consolidated sua sponte. The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a)
opinion on August 30, 2017.
On appeal, Father presents the following issues for our review:
1. Did the court err or abuse its discretion when terminating
Father’s parental rights under § 2511(a) when Father has proven
ready to be a parent having fully performed his duties such as
required by his plan, met all of his goals under the plan and
satisfied the requirements of § [2511](a)(1), (2), (5), and (8)
under the totality of the circumstances; and, therefore,
terminating Father’s parental rights on non[-]competent or
insufficient evidence?
2. Did the court err or abuse its discretion when terminating
Father’s parental rights under § 2511(b) with incomplete analyses
of the emotional needs of the Children, and therefore, terminating
Father’s parental rights on non[-]competent or insufficient
evidence?
Father’s brief at 2.
We review Father’s issues according to the following standard.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
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unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
We need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of
Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. See In re
B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). In this case, we
conclude that the certified record supports the decrees pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2) and (b), which provides as follows.5
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5Based on this disposition, to the extent Father argues that the trial court
abused its discretion in terminating his parental rights pursuant to Section
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(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied by the parent.
...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
This Court has explained that the moving party must produce clear and
convincing evidence with respect to the following elements to terminate
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2): (1) repeated and continued
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2511(a)(1), (5), and (8), we need not review those sections. Nevertheless,
we observe that termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(5) and (8) was not
proper with respect to J.A.R. because he was not removed from Father’s care.
See In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (stating that
Section 2511(a)(5) and (8) did not provide a basis for terminating the father’s
parental rights when he was incarcerated at the time of the child’s removal
from the mother’s care).
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incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super.
2003).
Pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), parents are required to make diligent
efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
responsibilities. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa. Super. 2002). A
parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding
the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely
or disingenuous. Id. Further, the grounds for termination of parental rights
under Section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied,
are not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may
include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. Id. at
337.
With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has stated that,
“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the
inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284,
1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further, the trial court “must also
discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention
to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” Id. (citation
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omitted). However, “[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any bond
between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.
The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the
circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-763
(Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
On appeal, Father contends that the evidence is insufficient to support
termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) because he complied with his FSP
objectives to maintain supervised visits with the Children, and he has secured
housing and employment. With respect to his failure to timely follow the PCE
recommendations, Father contends, in effect, that it is of no consequence to
his ability to keep the Children safe. See Father’s brief at 17. Specifically, he
asserts that he can request a “stay away” order to keep Mother away from
the Children. Father further asserts that the testimony of Dr. Williams and
the CUA case manager, Ms. Hamm, was not credible. Father’s arguments are
without merit.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary record on June 29, 2017, the trial
court set forth its rationale for terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant
to Section 2511(a) as follows, in relevant part.
Throughout the history of the case, the clear goals and
objectives were laid out for [F]ather. There were many resources
made available to [F]ather to assist him with completing these
goals, and only lately did [F]ather come to the realization that
these goals had to be accomplished. . . .
. . . So, the late efforts of [F]ather are part of the evidentiary
record, but they’re given very little weight by the [c]ourt because
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of the lateness in the untimeliness of these efforts, and what I
believe to be disingenuous effort by the [F]ather to avoid the
termination of his parental rights when for the life of this case, he
had an opportunity to do exactly what he purports to have done
on or about May of this year.
But the record prior to May is clear that [F]ather did not
remedy the issues that brought [C]hildren into care. He made no
realistic effort to remedy those issues.
The idea that he would be able to keep these [C]hildren safe
I think is not borne out by the record because the history shows
that [F]ather repeatedly exposed these [C]hildren to the [M]other,
and there’s no doubt in the [c]ourt’s mind that if we were to
somehow return these [C]hildren to his care based upon the
historical record these [C]hildren would again be exposed to
[M]other. And that would be a very valid and important safety
concern for these [C]hildren going forward.
...
Doctor Williams[’] testimony [I] gave great weight[.] I
believe she had great insight into [F]ather, great insight with
respect to whether or not [F]ather had the capacity to appreciate
the factors that placed the [C]hildren in jeopardy[,] to appreciate
what he needed to do to put himself in a position to parent for
these [C]hildren.
. . . The failure [of Father] to remedy the issues and the
length of time of placement for the [C]hildren, the evidence is
clear that [F]ather has not remedied nor will he likely remedy
these issues going forward. . . .
N.T., 6/29/17, at 68-70. We discern no abuse of discretion.
Dr. Williams testified that during her interview with Father he “projected
all of the blame onto the other adults” with respect to the Children’s
placement. N.T., 6/29/17, at 18-19. She explained, “It’s significant in a
parenting capacity evaluation to understand the reasons that your children
are placed at risk and why they were removed. If you don’t see yourself as
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having a role [in the child’s removal], [then] you’re not able to see yourself in
a role [of] keeping them safe or making any changes if they are to be returned
to your care.” Id. at 19. In addition, Dr. Williams testified that it was clear
from her interview with Father and the reports provided to her by DHS that
he was allowing Mother contact with the Children. Id. at 19-21. Father
defended his conduct by stating that Mother would show up uninvited, and
that he was not able to control Mother’s actions in this regard. Id. at 20.
However, Ms. Hamm, the CUA case manager, testified she learned that Father
lived with Mother as recently as January of 2017, shortly before the first day
of the termination hearing, when Mother left her a voicemail that she and
Father were being evicted. N.T., 2/7/17, at 18-19.
In addition, Dr. Williams testified that Father began individual therapy
as recommended by the PCE only in May of 2017. N.T., 6/29/17, at 29.
However, she testified that the records from Father’s therapist indicate,
“they’re not addressing the concerns [set forth in the PCE].” Id.
Based on the foregoing testimonial and documentary evidence, we
discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in concluding that Father’s
untimely efforts to comply with the PCE and his FSP’s are disingenuous.
Indeed, Father failed to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt
assumption of his full parental responsibilities. See In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d at
340. In fact, Father fails to acknowledge his parental incapacity and/or refusal
to provide proper parental care in the Children’s initial placement in January
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of 2014, and in July of 2014, respectively. Further, he fails to take personal
responsibility for the Children’s continuing placement. In his brief, Father
even asserts that he “believes he has the right and should try to reform
Mother, using his own efforts, by trying to work with her and her side of the
family until it is proved [sic] not working.” Father’s brief at 23. To the best
that we can discern, Father justifies his continuing contact with Mother during
the Children’s dependencies as his “approach of accommodating all parties,
including DHS, and getting everyone involved in the cure of Mother. . . .” Id.
As such, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court in finding that
Father’s repeated and continued incapacity or refusal have caused the
Children to be without essential parental care, control, or subsistence
necessary for their physical or mental well-being, and that the causes of
Father’s incapacity or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.
With respect to Section 2511(b), Father contends that the Child
Advocate did not advocate for the Children’s legal interests but for their best
interests.6 Father contends, in fact, that the Child Advocate failed to ascertain
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6 In In re Adoption of L.B.M., supra, our Supreme Court explained that a
child’s legal interests are distinct from his or her best interests, in that a child’s
legal interests are synonymous with the child’s preferred outcome, while a
child’s best interests must be determined by the court. A plurality of the Court
held that the appointment of a guardian ad litem who is a licensed attorney
does not satisfy the statutory mandate in 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a) for legal
counsel. Four justices disagreed and opined in concurring and dissenting
opinions that separate representation would be required only if a child’s best
interests conflicted with his or her legal interests.
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the Children’s legal interests. Father refers us to the Child Advocate’s direct
examination of the maternal grandmother, as follows.
Q. Did you have a chance to witness a conversation between
myself and the [C]hildren about this case?
A. Yes.
Q. And did they say that they’re happy living with you?
A. Yes.
Q. And did they say whether they would like to continue living with
you?
A. Yes.
N.T., 6/29/17, at 48. On cross-examination by Father’s counsel, the maternal
grandmother testified:
Q. But the [C]hildren were never asked [by the Child Advocate] if
they were going to live with dad, correct?
A. I don’t think so.
Id. at 50. Father argues that the trial court “should have recessed [the
hearing] right then so as to afford the [Child Advocate] another opportunity
to ascertain the Children’s wish regarding their legal interests.” Father’s brief
at 25.
Upon review, we conclude Father’s argument is without merit. The
Children were three and four years old at the time of the subject proceedings,
and they lacked the capacity to articulate their preferences regarding the
involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights. To the extent the Child
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Advocate argued both the legal and best interests of the Children, we do not
find a conflict.
In addition, Father argues that the court abused its discretion in relying
on the bonding assessment conducted by Dr. Williams. Specifically, he
contends that Dr. Williams’ conclusions are general in nature and not based
on observing the relationship between Father and the Children.
In analyzing the decrees pursuant to Section 2511(b), we are mindful
of the following settled case law.
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
In re K.K.R.S., 958 A.2d 529, 533-536 (Pa. Super. 2008). The
mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the
termination of parental rights. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate parents’ parental
rights was affirmed where court balanced strong emotional bond
against parents’ inability to serve needs of child). Rather, the
orphans’ court must examine the status of the bond to determine
whether its termination “would destroy an existing, necessary and
beneficial relationship.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387,
397 (Pa. Super. 2003). As we explained in In re A.S., 11 A.3d
473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010),
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should
also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort,
security, and stability the child might have with the foster
parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court
should consider the importance of continuity of
relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond
can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011).
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Furthermore, our Supreme Court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense
dictates that courts considering termination must also consider whether the
children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their
foster parents.” In re T.S.M., supra at 268. The Court directed that, in
weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must
keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M.
Court observed that, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and
we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When
courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted
children.” Id.
In this case, Dr. Williams performed the bonding evaluation in June of
2017, which included her personal observation of Father and the Children.
N.T., 6/29/17, at 31. Dr. Williams testified that her observations were
consistent with the documentation provided to her regarding supervised visits,
that he and the Children have “a healthy comfortable relationship during those
visits. The children are happy to see him. He is verbally and physically
affectionate; the children seek that affection; they return that affection. And
throughout the visit he’s able to manage his time between the two as well as
redirect them and keep them on task and engage with them.” Id. at 32.
Nevertheless, Dr. Williams opined that a parent-child bond does not exist
between them. Id. She explained that Father does not serve in a parental
role for the Children. Id. Specifically, Dr. Williams testified:
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[Father] does not meet their daily needs. He does not have
continuous contact or understanding with them. [H]e is not their
identified caregiver, or attachment figure.
Rather, this is an individual that they know to be their father that
they get to visit with every week. And at that visit they have
snacks, they watch movies, they play games and there’s no care
provided to the children outside of that supervised setting.
Id. at 32-33. Moreover, Dr. Williams testified that the Children will not suffer
irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights are terminated “based on the lack
of a caregiver parent relationship.” Id. at 33. She continued as follows.
It is noted in the [bonding evaluation] that [the Children] will
experience a loss, they’ll understand that the visit no longer
happens, but much like with a family friend or a cousin or
somebody that is briefly in their life for a finite period of time
without a definitive role[.] [C]hildren[,] [generally speaking,] are
very resilient, if they have a healthy attachment, if they have a
permanent place, if they feel secure where they are and they very
easily can move past that.
So it’s important to allow them to grieve if they experience grief
but no way will they suffer irreparable harm by having that
sadness or that grief.
Id. at 33-34.
It is important to note that the Children’s maternal grandmother, who
is a pre-adoptive resource, has been B.N.R.’s caregiver since she was five and
a half months old, and J.A.R.’s caregiver since he was three months old. Id.
at 50. Based on the testimonial evidence, we discern no abuse of discretion
by the trial court in concluding that the Children would not suffer irreparable
harm by the termination of Father’s parental rights “and whatever harm might
exist would be remedied through the love and care and continued devotion to
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these children by the grandmother and the grandfather.” Id. at 71. The
record supports the court’s decision pursuant to Section 2511(b) in that
terminating Father’s parental rights will serve the Children’s developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare. Accordingly, we affirm the
decrees.
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/27/18
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