In Re: J.I.K., etc., A Minor, Appeal of: J.R.

J-S30015-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: J.I.K., A/K/A I.K., A/K/A D.J.K., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.R., NATURAL FATHER
No. 127 WDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order December 20, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-000020-2017
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STRASSBURGER, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 16, 2018
J.R. (Father) appeals from the order entered on December 20, 2017,
that granted the petition filed by the Allegheny County Office of Children,
Youth and Families (CYF) to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to
J.I.K. (Child).1 We affirm.
Father’s brief to this Court contains the following, succinct statement of
the case:
Appellant, J.R., … is the [n]atural [f]ather of the [m]inor
Child…. Child was born [i]n November [] 2015. [C]hild was
removed from Mother by Children, Youth, and Family Services[]
(CYF) at the hospital on November 22, 2015[,] because CYF had
been involved with Mother’s other children since 2012. [C]hild
was adjudicated dependent on February 3, 2016. Father was not
identified until May 2016 after he took a paternity test and two
other men were previously excluded by DNA tests. CYF
subsequently determined that [F]ather was not an appropriate
placement due to his conviction in 1999 for statutory sexual
assault of an eleven-year old child and an extensive subsequent
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 S.M.K. (Mother) voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to Child as noted
in the December 20, 2017 order. She has not appealed.
J-S30015-18
history of criminal behavior and PFA’s filed by multiple women.
Father also had a history of significant neurological and mental
health problems. In December 2016, the Juvenile Court found
aggravated circumstances against Father.
A Petition To Terminate Parental Rights (hereafter, “TPR”)
against Father[] was filed in February, 2017, based on Sections
2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). A contested TPR hearing was held
on September 22, 2017 before the Honorable Guido DeAngelis.
Judge DeAngelis entered an order dated December 20, 2017[,]
terminating the parental rights of [Father] and a Notice of Appeal
was timely filed.
Father’s brief at 2-3 (citations to the record omitted).2
In his brief, Father raises the following two issues for our review:
1. Is the trial court’s finding of grounds for involuntary termination
of [Father’s] parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)[,] (5)
and (8) proven by a showing of clear and convincing evidence?
2. Is the trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights
serves the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare of [C]hild proven by clear and convincing evidence under
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?
Id. at 1 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
We review an order terminating parental rights in accordance with the
following standard:
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating
parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the
decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence.
Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient
evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must
stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily
terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing
judge’s decision the same deference that we would give to a jury
____________________________________________
2 We note that although represented by counsel, Father himself did not attend
the September 22, 2017 TPR hearing.
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J-S30015-18
verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the
record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is
supported by competent evidence.
In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.H., 879
A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005)). Moreover, we have explained that:
The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as
testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
Id. (quoting In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented
and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts
in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004). If
competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if
the record could also support the opposite result. In re Adoption of T.B.B.,
835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003).
We are guided further by the following: Termination of parental rights
is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental
rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
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concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511,
other citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination
of parental rights are valid. R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276.
With regard to Section 2511(b), we direct our analysis to the facts
relating to that section. This Court has explained that:
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884
A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles
such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the
inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we
instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and
status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect
on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in
cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and
child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S.,
946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent
of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the
circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 763.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
The trial court here terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to
section 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b). In order to affirm, we need only agree
with the trial court as to any one subsection of section 2511(a), as well as
section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc). In his brief, Father argues that subsections (a)(5) and (a)(8) do not
apply to him because he never had physical custody of Child. Rather, he
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J-S30015-18
centers his argument on subsection (a)(2). We therefore have chosen to
address and analyze the court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights
under section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied by the parent.
...
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(2), the moving party
must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following elements:
(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal; (2) such
incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal caused the child to be without essential
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J-S30015-18
parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal
cannot or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d
1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental rights
under subsection 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be
remedied, are not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).
The thrust of Father’s argument relating to subsection 2511(a)(2) is that
CYF failed to meet its burden of proving the grounds for termination of his
parental rights because, despite his mental impairments, he “demonstrated a
willingness and the ability to perform his parental duties at a minimal level
and that he acted ‘affirmatively’ to maintain his relationship with his child.”
Father’s brief at 14. With regard to subsection 2511(b), Father asserts that
CYF failed to present sufficient evidence relating to the bond between him and
Child. Instead, he contends that the court’s finding that no such bond existed
was not supported by evidence in the record. Moreover, Father argues that
although the record evidence supports the fact that foster mother and Child
are “deeply bonded,” he complains that that is not the “required inquiry.” Id.
at 19. Rather, without evidence as to the effect the termination would have
on Child relative to the Father/Child bond, Father again contends that CYF did
not meet its burden of proof.
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We have reviewed the certified record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the comprehensive opinion authored by Judge DeAngelis
of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, dated December 20, 2017.
We conclude that Judge DeAngelis’s well-reasoned opinion correctly disposes
of the issues raised by Father in this appeal and we discern no abuse of
discretion or error of law. Accordingly, we adopt Judge DeAngelis’s opinion as
our own and affirm the December 20, 2017 order on that basis.
Order affirmed.
Judge Stabile joins this memorandum.
Judge Strassburger concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/16/2018
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Circulated 06/26/2018 09:21 AM
=,) 3 0 0 tg.-
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
FAMILY DIVISION
JUVENILE COURT SECTION
IN THE INTEREST OF: ORPHANS' COURT
11..ingssion 41 e4M-~"
stiNiaMelkippie .1; tc,) No. CP-02-AP-0020-2017
ftionsivialiendiatier, -1)
A Minor
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER OF COURT
Before the Court are Petitions for the Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights filed by Allegheny County Office of Children Youth and Families, hereafter
referred to as CYF or the County Agency against the subject named parents with
respect to the above -named subject child, and after trial conducted before the Court
on September 22, 2017 and after consideration of the testimony and evidence of
record the Court enters the following Findings:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The subject child is with a date of birth of November
4, 2015. /41 K.
2. The biological mother of the subject child is and the
subject father of the subject child is r. and said
1
subject father was subsequently established by genetic testing on or about
May 25, 2016 and subject father filed an Acknowledgement of Paternity on
June 29, 2016.
3. The subject mother consented to termination of her parental rights as to the
subject child. Prior to the birth of the subject child the County Agency was
familiar with the subject mother through dependency proceedings regarding
the subject mother's older two (2) children. Through the course of the cases
involving subject mother's older children, the County Agency had concerns
about the subject mother's intellectual capacity, her mental health, and her
general parenting ability as it relates to the subject child in this case. While
represented by legal counsel, the subject mother knowingly and voluntarily
executed a consent to termination of her parental rights to the subject child
on December 20, 2016. The testimony by the County Agency caseworker in
the trial transcript beginning on page 54 outlines the circumstances and
procedure in which the consent to adoption was procured and established by
the County Agency. As the record reflects, the applicable statutory time
period for the consent to adoption had past for confirmation and the record
supported ratification of the subject mother's consent to adoption. Based on
the record, an Order confirming subject mother's consent to termination of
her parental rights as to the subject child was entered by the Court
subsequent to the date of trial, September 22, 2017, and was made part of the
record.
4. The dependency proceedings in this case conducted by the Juvenile Court
commenced through an Emergency Custody Authorization Order which
resulted in the subject child being placed in a non -kinship foster home on
November 23, 2015 and the subject child has remained there in this pre -
adoptive home since the aforestate date.
2
5. Aggravated Circumstances Orders were entered against the subject mother
and subject father on August 17, 2016 and December 7, 2016 respectively.
6. At such time that the subject father's paternity was established, the County
Agency conducted an investigation to assess the subject father as a
placement resource for the subject child. The investigation determined that
the subject father was not fit as a placement option due to his extensive
history of violent behavior and criminal behavior, the latter including sexual
crimes and violent crimes. In September 1999, the subject father was
convicted of Statutory Sexual Assault and Corruption of a Minor for raping
an 11 year old girl. In July 2001, father was charged with Corruption of
Minors, Harassment and Stalking. He ultimately was convicted of
Harassment and Stalking in April 2002. In October 2014, father was
convicted of Resisting Arrest and Simple Assault. Father has been named
defendant in no fewer than five (5) Protection From Abuse orders. In several
of these cases, subject father was subsequently charged with indirect
criminal contempt for violating the underlying PFA orders. The earliest of
these orders dates back to August 2009 and the most recent remained in
effect until June of this year. These factual findings are corroborated both in
the testimony at trial and the exhibits entered into evidence by the County
Agency.
7. As part of the initial assessment, the County Agency learned that the subject
father was not actively receiving mental health treatment despite
experiencing paranoia and having attempted suicide. In addition, the County
Agency discovered that the subject father was not engaged in anger
management treatment even though he was court ordered to do so as a result
of his PFA violations.
3
8. The County Agency then proceeded to complete Family Service Plans
setting forth goals for the purposes of subject father's reunification with the
subject child. These goals included: 1. Securing and maintaining appropriate
housing; 2. Securing and maintaining employment; 3. Successfully
completing parenting classes and consistently attending visits with the
subject child through Achieva; 4. Completing a risk assessment and
following all resulting recommendations, particularly those relating to anger
management and domestic violence; and 5. Completing individual and
interactional psychological evaluations and following all resulting
recommendations. The subject father, consistent with the evidence of record,
did not successfully achieve or complete any of the Family Service Plan
goals nor did he attend the termination of parental rights trial which took
place on September 22, 2017. The County Agency could not verify father's
compliance concerning his housing goal due to the frequency in which he
changed residence and his refusal to provide the County Agency with his
address, therefore a home assessment could not be completed. Subject father
was unemployed when the County Agency began working with him towards
reunification, he was employed for a brief period of time and at the time of
the trial scheduled in the Instant Case, the County Agency could not confirm
the subject father's employment status. Further, the evidence of record
clearly demonstrates that the subject father never developed the capacity for
safe parenting or even a consistent, demonstrative interest in acting as a
parent for the subject child. His visitation with the subject child at the
Achieva organization for the purposes of parenting instruction was poorly
attended to where his visits were reduced to one (1) visit every other week.
In addition, subject father frequently fell asleep during his supervised visits
with the subject child and the staff at the Achieva organization had to
4
remove the mat from the reading room where father was sleeping. The
subject father, during the visits that he did attend, failed to remain engaged
enough to protect the subject child from dangers. At times he ignored the
subject child by playing on his telephone after receiving verbal prompts and
corrections from the Achieva staff. Subject father's inattentiveness resulted
in the subject child placing himself in danger such as the subject father
failing to notice the subject 'child wonder out of the room and into the
hallway. The Achieva personnel stated that the subject father often became
angry and threatening in response to their parenting directions. The subject
father attempted to intimidate the Achieva personnel and the Achieva staff
had to made arrangements for the purposes of protecting themselves. The
director of Achieva's Parenting Education Program Ms. Colleen Sokira,
testified at trial that the Achieva staff never felt comfortable enough with the
subject father's ability or attentiveness as a parent to place the subject child
in his unsupervised care.
9. The subject father did not demonstrate necessary progress or compliance
with his mental health treatment goals. A risk assessment interview with the
subject father was completed by Court Expert Dr. Robert F. Koufal on
November 18, 2016, wherein Dr. Koufal diagnosed father with a number of
diagnosis's as well as a clinical finding of border line intellectual
functioning. Dr. Koufal concluded that the subject father had limited insight
and understanding of the impact of his prior sexual offense as it relates to the
present case before the Court. Further, Dr. Koufal also concluded that the
subject father posed a medium-to-medium/high risk to reoffend in a violent
manner consistent with his past crimes. By way of recommendations in
order to mitigate the risk that the doctor concluded, it was recommended that
the subject father receive on -going mental health treatment with a
5
professional experienced in anger and violent containment and that the
subject father receive a neurological evaluation and follow any resulting
recommendations.
10.The subject father also completed an individual interactional psychological
evaluation with Dr. Patricia Pepe, Court Expert, on November 15, 2016. Dr.
Pepe diagnosed the subject father with: 1. Unspecified Neurocognitive
Disorder; 2. Intermittent Explosive Disorder; and 3. Anti -social Personality
Disorder. Dr. Pepe made further findings and observed that the subject father
appeared to perceive a distorted view of reality, and he showed an
inclination to project responsibility for his actions on to others. This
combined with subject father's history with violence led Dr. Pepe to
conclude that father remains a very high risk for committing dangerous and
aggressive behaviors. Dr. Pepe concluded that subject father failed to
demonstrate an adequate emotional stability as needed for safe parenting. As
a result of her findings, Dr. Pepe recommended that the subject father
undergo extensive neurological and neuropsychological testing for additional
diagnosis and treatment recommendations. With respect to current treatment
recommendations, this expert indicated that the subject father should
participate in mental health treatment with an emphasis on anger
management and that absent long term treatment to address the issues
concerning the subject father's needs, that the subject father would be unable
to change his pattern of behavior.
11.In furtherance of the County Agency making reasonable efforts to assist the
subject father consistent with the recommendations indicated, the County
Agency made the necessary referrals for treatment and evaluation to address
the subject father's needs, history and presentation. The County Agency
caseworker, in this case, communicated with subject father to provided him
6
with contact information for care providers and the caseworker engaged in
her own research to locate a facility capable of offering all of the
recommended services at one location. These efforts were pursued by the
County Agency with the understanding of the posture of this case, the
amount of time that the child had been out of care and giving the subject
father the opportunity for reunification. As a result of the reasonable efforts
and in reality special efforts made by the County Agency, the subject father
did not complete the recommended treatment. As this Court sees it, not only
did the subject father fail to cooperate in the necessary treatment, he also
failed to cooperate and communicate with the County Agency in order to
demonstrate his motivation and desire towards reunification. The subject
father never provided the County Agency with proof that he participated in
out -patient psycho -therapy. The subject father did not complete anger
management therapy; did not complete domestic violence therapy
subsequent to his evaluations with Dr. Pepe and Dr. Koufal and did not
pursue or obtain the neurological and neuropsychological examinations as
recommended. Most telling, was the testimony by the County Agency
caseworker of her communication with subject father who indicated to the
caseworker that he was not participating in the various treatments
recommended by the two (2) Court Experts because he believed that he did
not need the recommended treatments and that he also believed he would
never receive full custody of the subject child, so he was disinclined to
cooperate with the County Agency.
12.In making the following findings concerning the mandates of Sections
2511(a) and 2511(b) as applicable to this case particularly involving the
subject father, this Court has carefully reviewed the testimony of record as a
whole, particularly the testimony of the County Agency caseworker and has
7
reviewed all of the Exhibits and in particular County Agency Exhibit #8
replicating the reports of Dr. Koufal and Dr. Pepe.
13.The aforestated testimony and evidence, clearly and convincingly establishes
the subject father's incapacities, reasons for the subject child removal which
continued to exist and a clear indication that despite the County Agency's
best efforts, the reasons set forth will not be remedied and this is confirmed
both by the subject father's words and deeds.
14.With respect to those considerations incumbent upon the Court as outlined in
Section 2511(b), the process begins with the fact that on November 23, 2015
the subject child was placed in the care of foster mother and that the subject
child is now over two (2) years old and has been in the care of the foster
mother all but two (2) days of her life. Further, the subject child is thriving in
the care of the foster mother, is healthy and up to date medically, also is
developmentally on track and is considered to be jovial and out -going
consistent with the record testimony. It has been observed and concluded
that the subject child is deeply bonded with the foster mother and
appropriately looks to her for comfort and attention. Based on the record
evidence, the Court recognizes the position and opinion of the County
Agency caseworker that, in view of the subject child's bond with the foster
mother and the subject father's lack of progress with his parenting goals, that
the subject child's needs and welfare would be best served by termination of
the subject father's parental rights and adoption by the foster mother. The
opinions and recommendations of Dr. Pepe, serve as a foundation since they
concur with the aforestated conclusion. Dr. Pepe observed subject child
exhibit primary parental attachment to the foster mother that because the
subject child has been with foster mother for his entire life, Dr. Pepe
concluded that removing him from her care would be significantly harmful
to his psychological well-being and development. Dr. Pepe also observed
and concluded that the foster mother, based on her clinical observation,
possess excellent parenting skills and deep devotion towards the subject
child. Dr. Pepe also noted that the subject father failed to comply with his
basic recommendations for becoming a fit parent. The subject father's
paternity of the subject child was confirmed over 18 months ago and the
subject father has had ample time to rectify the issues that led the County
Agency to take protective custody of the subject child, but has failed to do
so. This Court specifically finds that a bond did not exist between the subject
father and the subject child, that it would not be detrimental to the subject
child to terminate the parental rights of the subject father and that it would
best serve the needs and welfare of the subject child for the parental rights of
the subject father to be terminated and for the child to proceed in the
permanency direction of adoption.
15.The Court finds the testimony of County Agency caseworker Stacey
Policicchio to be historic, sensible, forthright and consistent with a
caseworker making reasonable efforts to fulfill the County Agency's
obligations and attempt to reunify. Her testimony is convincing, credible and
therefore her testimony is accepted.
16.The Court finds that the testimony of witness Colleen Sokiora from the
Achieva program to be well informed, insightful, and experienced. Her
testimony is found to be credible and therefore her testimony, as well, is
accepted.
17. In reviewing the reports submitted by Exhibit of Dr. Koufal and Dr. Pepe,
the Court finds the opinions and recommendations of the Court Experts to be
scientific, methodical, sound, and factually based. The Court finds the
opinions and recommendations by both of these Experts to be clear,
9
convincing and credible. Therefore, the testimony of both Court Experts are
accepted.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The burden is upon the County Agency to establish the allegations in the
Petitions filed. The Findings of Fact set forth by the Court are supported by the
record as a whole and before the Court is manifest, competent evidence to support
the termination of the rights of the subject father. The parties seeking termination
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the conduct of the parent
satisfies the statutory grounds for termination set forth in Sections 2511(a) 2, 5, 8
and 2511(b). Once a determination is made with regards to termination, the Court
proceeds to examine the needs and welfare of the subject child considering the
nature and status of the emotional bond, if any, between the parent and child with
reflective assessment of the effect upon the child of permanently severing, if any,
such bond. (See the case of IN RE: L.M. 923 A2d 505 PA. (Super. 2007). Once
applying the statutory provisions of 2511(a) 2, 5, 8 and 2511(b) further applying
legal precepts annunciated in the relevant case law interpreting the parent's
conduct and the application of the statutory provisions set forth in these prescribed
grounds for the termination, this Court has no reservation in concluding as a matter
of law that the evidence presented is clear and convincing to establish by
competent evidence the allegations in the instant petitions and the Count Agency
has sustained its burden.
Specifically, in establishing the Court's conclusions of law which follow, when
weighing and judging the clear and convincing evidence provided by the record as
a whole, the Court, in considering the relevant case law as previously stated has
10
also considered the subject father's mental impairments as a foundation to his
incapacities to parent the subject child. IN RE: ADOPTION OF: J.J. JAMES
PHILIPS, II 511 PA. 590, 515 A2d 883 (1986). Furthermore, the Court, in
assessing and determining the needs and welfare of the subject child coupled with
the child's permanency, the Court has also considered all relevant factors as set
forth by the relevant case law. See IN RE: A.S. 11 A3d 473, (PA. Super. Ct.
2010); IN RE: K.Z.S., 946 A2d 763; IN RE: K.M., 53 A3d 781 (PA. Super Ct.
2012). Further, the Court has also considered the developmental, physical, spiritual
and emotional needs and welfare of the subject child, given the totality of the
circumstances, and need for permanency in the life of the subject child. See IN
RE: T.D., 949 A2d 910, (PA. Super. 2008).
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes as a matter of
law:
1. That, based upon the applicable statutory period, the record provides clear
and convincing evidence that subject father's repeated incapacity, abuse,
neglect, or refusal to parent has caused the subject child to be out of the
subject father's care. Despite reasonable efforts made the the County
Agency and services available to the subject father, the conditions that
brought the subject child into placement cannot or will not be remedied by
the subject father within a reasonable period of time. The subject child has
been in care for over two (2) years and the subject father having had a
reasonable period of time to correct and remedy the current circumstances
concerning the subject child has provided no evidence of compliance,
cooperation or otherwise measures of safe parenting resulting in no promise
of reunification. The subject father has failed to address the issue that led to
the subject child's removal and placement. When considering the record as a
whole, this Court concludes as a matter of law that the County Agency has
11
sustained its burden of proof and established by clear and convincing
evidence that the parental rights of the subject father should be
TERMINATED pursuant to Sections 2511(a) 2, 5, and 8.
2. That the evidence of record clearly demonstrates that it would not be
detrimental to the subject child for the parental rights of the subject father to
be terminated, that based on the record evidence including the testimony of
the Court Expert, the subject child is in need for permanency. The subject
child has obtained, in the home of the foster mother, a quality of life which
meets the subject child's needs and welfare, and the best hope for the child
to maintain a life that the subject child expects and deserves is to proceed in
the permanency direction of adoption with the foster mother pursuant to
Section 2511(b).
ORDER OF COURT
In consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is
hereby Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the parental rights of the subject father
Jr. to the subject child shall be and the same are hereby
TERMINATED pursuant to Sections 2511(a) 2, 5, and 8 and 2511(b). Further, by
way of this Order this Court proceeds to enter and incorporate that the consent to
ni EACE
termination and adoption legally executed by the subject mother
shall be acknowledged, confirmed and ratified pursuant to and consistent
with subject mother's consent. Confirmation of subject mother's Consent has been
entered by electronic Order for purposes of the record. The stated Findings,
Conclusions and Order entered herein, has been incorporated by reference as if set
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forth fully at length and made a part of the Decree attached to the respective
Petitions and incorporated into the electronically filed Orders this day with the
entry of this Order herein.
Date 49" 024-
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