Com. v. Sweigart, D.

J-S51015-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DAKOTA JAMES SWEIGART :
:
Appellant : No. 1959 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 2, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0004227-2017
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., GANTMAN, P.J.E., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 20, 2019
Dakota James Sweigart appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas on November 2, 2018
following his conviction of indecent assault, unlawful contact with a minor,
corruption of minors, and aggravated indecent assault. Sweigart challenges
the denial of his pre-trial motion which sought to exclude incriminating
statements he made during a police interview. We affirm.
On April 30, 2018, a suppression hearing was held, after which the
suppression court made the following relevant findings of fact:
These charges result from an allegation that on or about April 28,
2017, [Sweigart], who was nineteen years old, digitally
penetrated the vagina of a fifteen-year old female and fondled her
breasts. On June 20, 2017, after the victim disclosed this alleged
contact, Detective Graeme Quinn from the Ephrata Police
Department interviewed [Sweigart] regarding the allegations. This
initial interview lasted approximately one hour and took place at
the Ephrata Police Department in lnterview Room 4. [Sweigart]
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was told that he was not under arrest, that he was free to leave
at any time, and Detective Quinn even provided directions on how
to exit the interview room and return to the lobby of the station.
During the interview [Sweigart] acknowledged that he was with
the alleged victim on the date in question and was aware of her
young age, but denied any inappropriate contact with her.
Detective Quinn then asked [Sweigart] if he would be willing to
take a polygraph exam to assist in the investigation and
[Sweigart] indicated that he would.
The next day [Sweigart] entered the Ephrata Police Department
to take the polygraph exam and was escorted to the polygraph
suite by polygraph examiner Detective Peter Sheppard. As a part
of the pre-test interview, the polygraph exam procedure was
explained to [Sweigart] and he signed a consent form at 10:07
a.m. that contained Miranda warnings as well as a notification
that "the polygraph examination is voluntary." The pre-test
interview lasted approximately an hour and a half.
To conduct the polygraph exam, Detective Sheppard affixed
several sensors to [Sweigart]’s body including a chest strap, an
abdominal strap, a blood pressure cuff, and two sensors that
clipped to his fingers. Detective Sheppard then went through
approximately half an hour of asking questions regarding the
alleged incident and then scoring [Sweigart]’s answers. During the
post-test interview with [Sweigart], Detective Sheppard reviewed
the results with him and told him that the results of the exam
indicated that he was being deceptive about the contact with the
victim. [Sweigart] volunteered the information that he had been
attempting to beat the polygraph exam by reciting song lyrics in
his head as a countermeasure to the exam. After the post
interview concluded[,] Detective Sheppard asked [Sweigart]
whether he believed that Detective Quinn wanted to speak with
him and [Sweigart] said that he did not know. Detective Sheppard
then excused himself, spoke with Detective Quinn about the
results of the test, and returned, telling [Sweigart] "[n]ow, he
does want to talk to you quick before you go." [Sweigart] replied
"OK". He was then escorted by Detective Sheppard to lnterview
Room 4 where he had been questioned by Detective Quinn less
than twenty-four hours before.
Detective Quinn did not give [Sweigart] Miranda warnings before
this second interview and did not specifically recall telling
[Sweigart] that he was free to leave although he testified that it
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was his usual practice to do so. Detective Quinn confronted
[Sweigart] with the results of the failed polygraph and his
attempts to beat the exam. After about fifteen minutes Detective
Quinn asked [Sweigart] if he wanted to make another statement
and "set the record straight" which [Sweigart] agreed to. At
approximately 12:38 p.m. [Sweigart] made incriminating
statements in a recorded four-minute statement. Detective Quinn
testified that at no time during the second interview was
[Sweigart] under arrest, put in handcuffs, made any promises,
and throughout their interactions he appeared calm. After the
conclusion of the interview, [Sweigart] left the station and charges
were subsequently filed on July 5, 2017.
Trial Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 7/18/2018, at 1-3
(citations and footnotes omitted). The suppression court concluded that
Sweigart’s statements “were voluntary and the police were not obligated to
re-warn [Sweigart] of his Miranda rights” and therefore denied the motion to
suppress. Id., at 1.
Following a jury trial, Sweigart was convicted of the above charges. The
trial court sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of two to five years’
imprisonment. This timely appeal follows.
On appeal, Sweigart argues the trial court erred in denying his pretrial
motion to suppress. Specifically, Sweigart contends he was in custody at the
time of his post-polygraph interview with Detective Quinn and therefore
Miranda warnings were required. He further argues the Miranda warnings
given to him prior to the polygraph examination became stale by the time of
the subsequent interview due to length of time elapsed, change of room, and
a new detective conducting the interview.
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“Once a motion to suppress evidence has been filed, it is the
Commonwealth’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant’s
rights.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047-1048 (Pa. 2012)
(citations omitted).
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s
denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are
supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
from those facts are correct. When reviewing the ruling of the
suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the
prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the
suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse
only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (Pa. 2007) (citations
omitted). “In appeals from suppression orders, our scope of review is limited
to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v.
Caple, 121 A.3d 511, 517 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).
“It is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass
on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.
The suppression court is free to believe all, some or none of the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Elmobdy, 823
A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted).
Before an individual is subjected to a custodial interrogation, he
must make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his privilege
against self-incrimination and right to counsel after adequate
warning as to those rights. Statements obtained by the police
during a custodial interrogation without prior Miranda warnings
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are presumed to be given without a knowing and intelligent
waiver, and are subject to suppression. To determine if a person
is in custody for Miranda purposes, however, depends on whether
the person is physically denied his freedom of action in any
significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably
believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by
the interrogation.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 727 A.2d 1089, 1100 (Pa. 1999).
We agree with the suppression court that during the post-polygraph
interview, Sweigart was not in custody, and therefore not subject to a
custodial interrogation, such that Miranda warnings were required. Sweigart
had arrived at the police station on his own free will to voluntarily take the
polygraph examination. See N.T., 4/30/18, at 4-9, 31. He then voluntarily
stayed after the examination and followed Detective Sheppard to Interview
Room 4 to speak with Detective Quinn. See id., at 12-14. He was not
restrained in any manner and remained calm throughout the interview. See
id., at 14, 36. There is no evidence that either detective threatened him or
otherwise made any impermissible inducements in exchange for his
confession. There was no suggestion by Sweigart that he wanted questioning
to cease or that he objected to the questioning. Sweigart was not handcuffed
or arrested at the end of the interview, and left the station on his own. See
id., at 37.
In these circumstances, we do not find Sweigart’s freedom of action was
so restricted by the police questioning that he could reasonably believe that
he was not free to terminate the interview. Because we find he was not subject
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to a custodial interrogation, no Miranda warnings were required. Similarly,
since we find there was no custodial interrogation, Sweigart is entitled to no
relief for the failure to “refresh” the Miranda warning that Detective
Sheppard, in an abundance of caution, had apprised Sweigart of in the written
agreement signed by Sweigart prior to the polygraph examination.
As we find the trial court did not err in denying suppression of Sweigart’s
motion to suppress, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/20/2019
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