Com. v. Paverette, M.

J. S30019/16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
ARTHUR JOHNSON, : No. 545 EDA 2015
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order, January 22, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0014152-2008
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., AND JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 06, 2016
Arthur Johnson appeals from the order entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that dismissed his petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546
(“PCRA”). We affirm.
The PCRA court set forth the following:
On May 9, 2008[,] [a]ppellant was arrested
and charged with [m]urder and weapons offenses[,]
and on February 12, 2010, following a jury trial
before this Court, he was adjudged guilty of Murder
of the First Degree and Possessing Instruments of
Crime. On March 26, 2010[,] [a]ppellant was
sentenced to an aggregate term of life
imprisonment, and on March 27, 2012[,] the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the
Judgment of Sentence. Commonwealth v. []
Johnson, 949 EDA 2010. On April 20, 2012[,]
[a]ppellant filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal in
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. On
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November 8, 2012[,] the Petition for Allowance of
Appeal was denied. Commonwealth v. []
Johnson, 200 EAL 2012.
Appellant filed the instant Petition pursuant to
the [PCRA] on November 13, 2013[,] and on
February 12, 2014[,] he filed an Amended PCRA
Petition. On April 16, 2014[,] the Commonwealth
filed a Motion to Dismiss the PCRA Petition[,] and on
September 24, 2014[,] the Commonwealth filed a
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. Appellant was sent
Notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 on December 8,
2014, and on January 22, 2015[,] the PCRA Petition
was dismissed. This timely appeal followed on
February 19, 2015.
PCRA court opinion 6/19/15 at 1-2 (footnote omitted).
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
[1.] Whether the trial court violated the
confrontation clause and abused its discretion
when it allowed the prosecution to introduce
into evidence a statement of the non-testifying
codefendant that referred to the appellant as
“the other guy” in a two defendant jury trial,
causing substantial harm to the appellant[?]
[2.] Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to object to the double hearsay in
non-testifying codefendant’s written statement
to police, causing substantial harm and undue
prejudice to the appellant[?]
[3.] Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failure
to strike reference to Baz Parker in the
[s]tatement of non-testifying codefendant,
causing substantial harm and undue prejudice
to the appellant[?]
[4.] Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to object to references to the appellant as “the
other guy” in prosecutor’s closing, causing
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substantial harm and undue prejudice to the
appellant[?]
[5.] Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to object to the trial court’s Spencer Charge,
causing substantial harm and undue prejudice
to the appellant[?]
[6.] Whether counsel for direct appeal was
ineffective for failing to raise issues to correct
the errors of trial as to the double hearsay,
and to codefendant’s counsel, who named the
appellant as the shooter in his opening,
causing substantial harm and undue prejudice
to the appellant[?]
Appellant’s brief at 5-6.
In PCRA appeals, our scope of review “is limited to the findings of the
PCRA court and the evidence on the record of the PCRA court’s hearing,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.”
Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565, 573 (Pa. 2008) (internal quotation
omitted). Because most PCRA appeals involve questions of fact and law, we
employ a mixed standard of review. Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d
875, 878 (Pa. 2009). We defer to the PCRA court’s factual findings and
credibility determinations supported by the record. Commonwealth v.
Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc). In contrast, we
review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo. Id.To be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must show, among other
things, that the claims of error have not been previously litigated.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). An issue has been previously litigated if “the
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highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have had review as a
matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue.” Id.; Commonwealth
v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63, 76 (Pa. 2012).
In his first issue on appeal, appellant complains that the trial court
abused its discretion when it permitted the prosecution to introduce a
statement of a non-testifying co-defendant that referred to appellant as
“the other guy.” Appellant raised this issue on direct appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. 949 EDA 2010, unpublished
memorandum (Pa.Super. filed March 27, 2012). Therefore, because this
issue was previously litigated, it is not properly before us.
Under the guise of ineffectiveness, appellant’s fourth issue alleging
that trial counsel failed to object to a supposed Bruton1 violation is belied
by the record, and the Bruton issue was previously litigated.
Appellant’s four remaining issues assert claims of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel and direct appeal counsel.
In evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, we presume that counsel is effective.
Commonwealth v. Rollins, 558 Pa. 532, 738 A.2d
435, 441 (Pa. 1999). To overcome this
presumption, Appellant must establish three factors.
First, that the underlying claim has arguable merit.
See Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108,
661 A.2d 352, 356 (Pa. 1995). Second, that counsel
had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction.
Id. In determining whether counsel’s action was
reasonable, we do not question whether there were
other more logical courses of action which counsel
1
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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could have pursued; rather, we must examine
whether counsel’s decisions had any reasonable
basis. See Rollins, 738 A.2d at 441;
Commonwealth v. (Charles) Pierce, 515 Pa. 153,
527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987). Finally, “Appellant
must establish that he has been prejudiced by
counsel’s ineffectiveness; in order to meet this
burden, he must show that ‘but for the act or
omission in question, the outcome of the proceedings
would have been different.’” See Rollins, 738 A.2d
at 441 (quoting Travaglia, 661 A.2d at 357). A
claim of ineffectiveness may be denied by a showing
that the petitioner’s evidence fails to meet any of
these prongs. Commonwealth v. (Michael)
Pierce, 567 Pa. 186, 786 A.2d 203, 221-22 (Pa.
2001); Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 258,
744 A.2d 717, 738 n.23 (Pa. 2000);
Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d
693, 701 (Pa. 1998) (“If it is clear that Appellant has
not demonstrated that counsel’s act or omission
adversely affected the outcome of the proceedings,
the claim may be dismissed on that basis alone and
the court need not first determine whether the first
and second prongs have been met.”). In the context
of a PCRA proceeding, Appellant must establish that
the ineffective assistance of counsel was of the type
“which, in the circumstances of the particular case,
so undermined the truth-determining process that no
reliable adjudication of guilt [or] innocence could
have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). See
also (Michael) Pierce, 786 A.2d at 221-22;
Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d
326, 333 (Pa. 1999).
Commonwealth v. Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 594 (Pa. 2007).
Having determined, after careful review, that the learned
Judge Gwendolyn N. Bright, in her June 19, 2015 Rule 1925(a) opinion, ably
and comprehensively disposes of appellant’s issues on appeal, with
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appropriate reference to the record and without legal error, we affirm on the
basis of that opinion.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/6/2016
-6-
Circulated 04/27/2016 04:40 PM
FILED
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS JUN 1 9 2015
FlRST .IUDlCIAL OISTRlCT Criminaf Appeals Unit
PHILADELPHIA COUNTY FirstJudicia\ District of PA
CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANlA CP-5J-CR-0014152-2008
CP-Sl·CR-0014152-2008 Comm. v. JQlinson, l\llh1.r
Opa'loon
v.
111111111111111 Ill I
7309673651
I IIIII
: SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ARTHUR JOHNSON 545 EDA 2015
OPINION
BRIGHT, J.
On May 9, 2008 Appellant was arrested and charged with Murder and weapons offenses,
and on February 12, 2010, following a jury trial before this Court, he was adjudged guilty of
Murder of the First Degree and Possessing Instruments of Crime. On March 26, 2010 Appellant
was sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment, and on March 27, 2012 the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Judgment of Sentence. Commonwealth v. Arthur Johnson, 949
EDA 2010. On April 20, 2012 Appellant filed a Petition for Allowance or Appeal in the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania. On November 8. 2012 the Petition for Allowance of Appeal was denied.
Commonwealth v. Arthur Johnson. 200 EAL 2012.
Appellant filed the instant Petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (hereinafter
PCRA)1 on November 13, 2013 and on February 12, 2014 he filed an Amended PCRA Petition.
On April l6, 2014 the Commonwealth filed a Motion to Dismiss the PCRA Petition and on
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September 24, 2014 the Commonwealth filed a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. Appellant was
1 42 Pa.C.S.A.§9541, et seq.
sent Notice pursuant to Pa R.Crim.P. 907 on December 8, 2014, and on January 22, 2015 the
PCRA Petition was dismissed. This timely appeal followed on February 19, 2015.
Pursuant to Pa. R .A.P. l 925(b} Appellant was instructed to file a Statement of Errors
Complained Of On Appeal. Appellant responded complaining that the Court violated the
confrontation clause to the Constitution of the United States when it allowed the prosecution to
introduce the statement of codefendant Tyrone Wright in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123 ( 196~ l; that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in multiple respects; and that
appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to raise the issue involving the alleged
Bruton violation.
FACTS
The facts are summarized in the Court's 1925(a) Opinion on direct appeal and incorporated
in the Opinion of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Commonwealth v. Arthur Johnson, No. 949
EDA 2010@ 1-3. Decedent, Donnie Skipworth, and the decedent's brother, Dion Skipworth,
lived with their family at 1328 N. Newkirk Street, Philadelphia, PA. Appellant, co-defendant
Tyrone Wright, and their accomplice, Abbas Parker (AKA, Baz), associated on a daily basis on
nearby Hollywood Street. N.T. 2/01/2010@ 151-152, 170-17l.2 Dion Skipworth testified that
from 2005 until January 2008, except for a brief period when Decedent was employed in
Lancaster, PA, he and Decedent sold drugs in the 1300 block of Newkirk Street and established
the area as their territory. Id. @ 161, 164-168.
On May 4, 2008. approximately 12:00 AM, Decedent, Dion, and their two cousins, were
selling drugs at the corner of the 1300 bJ+>ck of Newkirk Street, when Dion observed Appellant
2 "N.T.'' refers to the Notes of Testimony taken at the Motion to Suppress and jury trial before the
I lonorable Gwendolyn N. Bright on January 26, 20 l O - February 9, 2010 and the Sentencing on
May 13, 2010. The specific <'·11c to which reference is made follows the designation "N.T.''
walk toward them and Appellant began firing his gun al Decedent. Id.@ 172, 177. Dion testified
that after the first round of gunshot he and his cousins fled and five minutes later he returned to the
scene finding Decedent lying on the street with bullet holes~ in his jeans and throughout his jacket.
Id.@ 181.
Detective George Fetters later interviewed Aaron Taylor who testified at trial but was a
reluctant witness. Taylor grew up in the same neighborhood and attended school with Decedent
and the two were friends. N r. 1/28 '2010@ 81-82. Taylor explained that the murder was in
retaliation for the killing of a mutual associate who he identified as Darnell. Id.@ 82. Ile stated:
"He was killed for retaliation for what happened to Darnell. He was another friend of mine.
We all grew up together down on Newkirk and Thompson. The word was that Donnie got
him killed. This was about one and a half to two years ago on the same block. See, they
was selling drugs together out there, and Iguess that Darnell got big headed and Donnie
didn't like it. So the word was that he (Donnie) had somebody kill Darnell. I guess it was
over the money that they were making out there. You see, Donnie was always the pretty
boy type and Darnell was the muscle, and I guess they just got in each other's way."
Id. @81-82.
Taylor further testified that he was on Newkirk Street a few weeks after the shooting death
and that he heard Appellant admit that he killed Decedent. Taylor stated:
"Look, I was down there on '\;e\.\.kirk like one or two weeks after Donnie [Decedent] was
killed and I heard this young boy, Art [co-defendant Johnson], talking about how he did it,
he killed Donnie, and how nobody had to worry about what he (Donnie) had done to
Darnell. Sec, Artie is supposed to be cousins somehow with Darnell and he said he would
get Donnie for what he did to his cousin, Darnell. ... He [Appellant] from the group they
call the Body Snatchers. They from 29th and Jefferson Streets. They rap, they gangbang,
they on You Tube Anywhere Y,OU see the BS initials, that's them; it's all over that way."
Id.@ 88. In his statement to Detective Burns co-defendant Johnson likewise acknowledged that
the motive for the murder was retaliation .. N.T.213/2010 ~ 58.
Dr. Sam Gulino. Chief MeId. @ I 7.
DISCUSSION
Appellant complains that the Court committed en-or in allowing the prosecution to
introduce the statement of co-defendant Tyrone Wright. He asserts that the co-defendant did not
testify at trial and that the statement was insufficiently redacted when read to the jury by
Philadelphia Police Detective Bums. This claim is without merit.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9543 provides. in pertinent part, as follows:
"§ 9543. Eligibility for relief
(a) General rule.--To be eligible for relief under this subchapter, the petitioner must plead
and prove by a preponderance of the evidence all of the following:
(1) That the petitioner has been convicted of a crime under the laws of this Commonwealth
and is at the time relief is granted:
(i) currently serving a sentence of imprisorunent, probation or parole for the crime;
(ii) awaiting execution of a sentence of death for the crime; or
(iii) serving a sentence which must expire before the person may commence
serving the disputed sentence.
(2) That the conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the following:
(i) A violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or
laws of the United States which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so
undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
innocence could have taken place.
(ii) Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular
case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of
guilt or innocence could have taken place.
(iii) A plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the circumstances make it likely
that the inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and U1e petitioner is
innocent.
'
(iv) The improper obstruction by government officials of the petitioner's right of
appeal where a meritorious appealablc issue existed and was properly preserved in
the trial court.
(vi) The unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has
subsequently become available and would have changed the outcome of the trial if
it had been introduced.
(vii) The imposition of a sentence greater than the lawful maximum.
(viii) A proceeding in a tribunal without jurisdiction.
(3) That the allegation of error has not been previously litigated or waived.
(4) That the failure to litigate the issue prior to or during trial, during unitary review or on
direct appeal could not have been the result of any rational, strategic or tactical decision by
counsel."
The allegation of error complained of has been previously litigated or waived and
Appellant is not eligible for PCRA relief. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). Commonwealth v. Arthur
Johnson, 949 EDA 20 l O (Pa. Super. 2012) @ 9-1 l. Error was not committed.
Appellant next complains of multiple incidents of ineffective assistance of counsel. These
claims are without merit.
The standard of review when presented with a challenge to a ruling by the PCRA Court
dismissing Appellant's claims for PCRA relief is whether the PCRA Court's ruling is supported
by the record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Rios, 591 Pa. 583, 920 A.2d 790 (2007),
cited in. Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 2009 PA Super. 154, 979 A.2d 908, 910 (PA Super 2009).
Where Appellant asserts claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellate Courts of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania have instructed as follows: .
"In order to obtain relief under the PCRA premised upon a claim that counsel was
ineffective, a petitioner must establish beyond a preponderance of the evidence that
counsel's ineffectiveness so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable
adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. This requires the petitioner
demonstrate that: (I) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no
reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) petitioner was prejudiced
by counsel's act or omission. It~s presumed that counsel is effective, and places upon the
appellant the burden of proving otherwise. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for
failing to pursue a meritless claim." Commonwealth v. Payne, supra.@ 905-906 (citations
and quotations omitted). See also, Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203 (Pa. 2001).
Appellant first complains that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to
object to double hearsay contained in codefendant Tyrone Walker's statement to Detective Burns
and that appe11ate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to raise this issue on direct
appeal. These claims are without merit.
It is well settled that the decision to admit or exclude evidence is committed to the trial
court's sound discretion and that evidentiary rulings will only be reversed upon a showing that a
court abused that discretion. See, Commonwealth v. Koch, 106 A.3d 705, 2014 WL 7392238 (Pa.
2014). See also, Commonwealth v. Levanduski, 907 A.2d 3, 2006 PA Super 204, P26 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2006). In Koch, supra, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated:
"The standard of review governing evidentiary issues is settled. The decision to admit
or exclude evidence is committed to the trial court's sound discretion, and evidentiary
rulings will only be reversed upon a showing that a court abused that discretion. A finding
of abuse of discretion may not be made merely because an appellate court might have
reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.
Matters within the trial court's discretion are reviewed on appeal under a deferential
standard. and any such rulings or determinations will not be disturbed short of a finding
that the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law controlling the
outcome of the case."
Commonwealth v. Koch, supra, 2014 WL 7392238@ 9.
Pa.R.E. 802 provides that Hearsay is not admissible into evidence except as provided by
the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, by other rules prescribed by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, or by statute. Pa.R.E. 801 defines "Hearsay" as a statement the declarant does not make
while testifying at trial, and a party offers in evidence lo prove the truth of the matter asserted in
the statement. Pa.RE. 805 provides that double hearsay, or hearsay within hearsay, is not
'
excluded by the rule against hearsay if each part of the combined statements conforrns with an
exception to the hearsay rule.
.....
In the case sub Judice, the statement co-defendant Wright gave Detective Bums was
received into evidence solely against the co-defendant and the jury was instructed on two separate
occasions that the jury must not consider the statement as evidence against Appellant and in no
way to use the statement against Appellant. N.T. 2/4/20 l O @J 69-170. Trial counsel cannot be
found ineffective for failing to raise objections to evidence not offered against his client and
appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for raising the claim on direct appeal. Moreover,
Appellant has failed to demonstrate that but for counsel's failure to make such an objection the
outcome of the proceedings would be different, i.e., that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's
inaction or that appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue on direct appeal inured to his
detriment . Error was not committed.
Similarly, Appellant's complaint that the trial counsel rendered ineffective in failing to
strike references to Baz Parker in co-defendant Wright's statement to Detective Burns is without
merit Wright's statement was offered solely against Wright. The content of the statement was not
introduced into evidence for any other purpose and the jury was instructed accordingly.
Additionally, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that but for trial counsel's failure to strike
references to Baz Parker in co-defendant Wright's statement the outcome of the proceedings
would be different. He has failed lo demonstrate prejudice and is not entitled to PCRA relief. Error
was not committed.
Appellant also complains that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to
object to references to 'the other guy' in the prosecutor's closing. fhis claim is without merit.
As hereinbefore discussed, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania considered the issue of the
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prosecutor's use of 'the other guy' reference in closing argument on direct appeal and held that
Appellant's claims in connection therewith are without merit. Appellant has failed to demonstrate
•
that the allegation of error he complains of has not been previously litigated or waived. Error was
not committed.
Appellant next claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object
to the Court's Spencer charge. This claim is without merit.
In the instant case, after three days of deliberation and several requests for additional
instructions the jurors stated that they were unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the charges
against Appellant and that there was no reasonable probability of reaching a unanimous verdict as
to him. Id. @ 10-11. The Court further instructed the jury as follows:
"Obviously, you are having some difficulty resolving the issues raised. On the one hand,
that difficulty is an indication of the sincerity and objectivity with which you have
approached your duties. On the other hand, it may be the result of confusion in your minds
about the instructions that were given with regard to the law and its application to the facts
of this case ....
... I would like to explain to you or to emphasize to each of you the importance of a verdict
to Defendant Johnson, to the Commonwealth, and also take into account the time, the
anxiety, the expense of having to retry this matter, and taking that into account, you realize,
of course, that, first of all, any verdict you return must be unanimous. Secondly, you have a
duty to consult with one another and deliberate with a view towards reaching an agreement
if it can be done without violence to your individual judgment, and that each juror must
decide the case for himself or herself, but only after an impartial consideration of the
evidence with the other jurors. As jurors you should not hesitate to reexamine your own
views and change your opinion if you think it is erroneous, and, as a juror, you should not
surrender your honest convictions as to the weight or effect of the case's evidence because
of the opinion of the other jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a unanimous verdict.
Keeping these instructions in mind, I am going to send you back to deliberate further with
regard to the Defendant Johnson so that you can give further consideration to the evidence
and to the charges of the Court to see if you can arrive at a verdict."
N.T. 2/9/20 l O@ 9-1 l.
In Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299 (Pa. 1971 ), the Supreme Court of
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Pennsylvania considered proper jury instructions to be given in cases where the jury cannot reach
a unanimous verdict and there is no reasonable probability of the jury reaching a unanimous
verdict. The important factor in evaluating the supplemental jury instruction, or Spencer Charge, is
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that it not be coercive. Commonwealth v. Spencer, supra, 442 Pa. 328@ 335. See also,
Commonwealth v. Greer, 597 Pa. 373, 387, 951 A.2d 346 (Pa. 2008). In tbe instant case the
Court's instruction to the jury was in accordance with Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal
Jury Instruction 2.09 (Pa-JlCRIM 2.09); was not coercive; and was therefore not objectionable.
Trial counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim. Error was not
committed.
Finally, Appellant complains that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in
failing to raise a Bruton violation regarding the co-defendant's counsel naming Appellant as the
shooter. This claim is belied of record and is without merit.
To be eligible for relief under the PCRA a petitioner must demonstrate that the allegation
of error has not been litigated or waived. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). This allegation of error was
raised has been previously litigated on direct appeal and Appellant is not eligible for PCRA relief
based on this claim. Commonwealth v. Arthur Johnson, 949 EDA 20 l O (Pa. Super. 2012) @ 9-1 I.
Error was not committed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, error was not committed and the Judgment of Sentence should
be affirmed.
BY THE COURT
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