Com. v. Talley, V.

J-S23019-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
VINCENT TALLEY
Appellant No. 1784 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order May 18, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0610101-1999
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OTT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED MAY 03, 2016
Vincent Talley appeals pro se from the order entered on May 18, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, that dismissed as
untimely his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546. Talley contends 1) the PCRA court erred
by denying review on the merits of his issues on the basis that the PCRA
petition was time-barred, 2) his mandatory sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole (LWOP) violates Article I, §§ 1, 9 and 13 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution, and 3) his mandatory sentence of LWOP is
unconstitutional under Article I, §§ 1, 9, and 13 of the Pennsylvania
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S23019-16
Constitution and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution because two classes of prisoners sentenced to
mandatory LWOP are treated differently. Based upon Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), and Commonwealth v. Secreti, ___
A.3d ___ [2016 PA Super 28] (Pa. Super. 2016), we reverse the order
entered by the PCRA court, vacate the judgment of sentence, and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum.
On May 17, 2000, a jury convicted Talley of second degree murder, a
violation of the Uniform Firearms Act, and possessing an instrument of
crime.1 Talley was 17 years old when he committed the murder. The trial
court sentenced Talley to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on March 30, 2004.
Commonwealth v. Talley, 817 A.2d 1185 (Pa. Super. 2002), appeal
denied, 847 A.2d 1284 (Pa. 2004).
Talley filed a pro se PCRA petition on December 6, 2004. Counsel was
appointed, and an amended petition was filed on October 27, 2006. The
PCRA court dismissed the petition on May 11, 2007.
Talley filed the present, second, PCRA petition on July 6, 2010, raising
a claim pursuant to Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). On August
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(b), 6106, and 907, respectively.
-2-
J-S23019-16
15, 2012, Talley amended his petition to assert a new constitutional right
recognized on June 25, 2012, in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)
(prohibiting mandatory sentences of LWOP for juvenile offenders). On
December 24, 2013, Talley filed a second amendment to his petition,
alternatively seeking habeas corpus relief on the basis of Miller.
On June 18, 2014, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the PCRA court filed
a notice of intent to dismiss Talley’s PCRA petition and request for habeas
corpus relief. On May 18, 2015, the PCRA court concluded that the request
for habeas corpus relief was cognizable under the PCRA, and denied the
PCRA petition as untimely based on Commonwealth v. Cunnningham, 81
A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013) (holding Miller did not create a new constitutional right
that applies retroactively). See PCRA Court Order and Memorandum,
5/18/2015. On June 12, 2015, Talley filed this appeal.
This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a
petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is
supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth
v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 799 n.2 (Pa. 2005). The PCRA court’s findings will
not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified
record. Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa. Super. 2001).
We apply a de novo standard of review and a plenary scope of review to
challenges involving questions of law. Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d
1177, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2012).
-3-
J-S23019-16
The PCRA’s time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be
altered or disregarded in order to address the merits of a petition. See
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.3d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007). Under the
PCRA, any petition for post-conviction relief, including a second or
subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of
sentence becomes final, unless one of the exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies.2 Any petition attempting to invoke one of these
exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have
been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
Talley’s judgment of sentence became final in 2004. As Talley filed the
present petition in 2010, this petition is patently untimely unless he pleads
____________________________________________
2
Specifically, the exceptions to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement are:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result
of interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution
or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws
of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court
to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(i)-(iii).
-4-
J-S23019-16
and proves an exception to the PCRA’s time bar. Talley claims that his
petition is timely under the newly-recognized constitutional rights exception
set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). To properly invoke this exception,
Tallley must show that he filed his petition within 60 days of the date on
which the court filed the new decision. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). Here,
Talley satisfied the 60-day prerequisite since he filed his amended petition
on August 15, 2012, and the United States Supreme Court issued its
decision in Miller on June 25, 2012.
Talley’s claims based on Miller implicate the holding of the United
States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136
S. Ct. 718 (2016), which was filed January 25, 2016, while Talley’s appeal
was pending in this Court. In Montgomery, the United States Supreme
Court held that its decision in Miller applies retroactively in cases on
collateral review. In view of Montgomery, we conclude that Talley has
satisfied the newly-recognized constitutional rights exception found in §
9545(b)(1)(iii).
Accordingly, we reverse the order dismissing Talley’s petition, vacate
the judgment of sentence, and remand this matter for re-sentencing. See
Secreti, supra (holding that where a PCRA petitioner properly raised a
Miller claim within 60 days of that decision, Miller applies retroactively; the
petitioner’s sentence is unconstitutional under Miller; and the petitioner is
entitled to a new sentencing hearing). See also Commonwealth v. Batts,
-5-
J-S23019-16
66 A.3d 286, 295-297 (Pa. 2013) (identifying factors to be considered in
sentencing juvenile homicide defendants).
Order reversed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for
further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/3/2016
-6-