Com. v. Stancil, W.

J-S67007-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
WILLIAM STANCIL :
: No. 821 EDA 2017
Appellant
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 5, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0011116-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUSMANNO, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 02, 2017
Appellant, William Stancil, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of
sentence of 27 to 55 years’ incarceration entered in the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia County pursuant to the terms Appellant agreed to in his
negotiated plea deal. Herein, Appellant contends his plea was involuntary
because he was not advised during his oral colloquy of the presumption of his
innocence, and he requests a remand of this matter for trial. We affirm.
The trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion sets forth the factual and
procedural history as follows:
The factual basis proffered by the Commonwealth for defendant’s
[hereinafter “Appellant”] guilty plea established the following: On
June 21, 2014, at around midnight, in the area of Rosalie Street
and Colgate Street in Philadelphia, Appellant and Darryl Plowden
approached Jose Rivera in order to rob Rivera at gunpoint. When
Rivera attempted to run away, Appellant pulled out a gun, which
he was not licensed to carry, and shot Rivera one time in the
____________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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chest. Rivera collapsed a short distance away. Appellant and
Plowden then took several items from Rivera’s person, including a
necklace that had a “J” for Jose on it. Appellant and Plowden then
fled the scene. Rivera was pronounced dead and his body taken
to the Medical Examiner’s Office. There, it was determined that
Rivera was killed by a gunshot wound to the chest. N.T. 1/5/16
at 30-31.
Based on a police investigation, Appellant was brought to the
Philadelphia Homicide Unit in August, 2014. After being given
Miranda[fn] warnings and waiving his right to remain silent as well
as his right to an attorney, Appellant confessed to the
abovementioned facts. In addition, Appellant agreed to be
videotaped and gave a confession on video. N.T. 1/5/16 at 31-
32.
[fn. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).]
***
On January 5, 2016, Appellant pled guilty, pursuant to a
negotiated guilty plea, to one count each of third degree murder
(18 Pa.C.S. § 2502), robbery (18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i)),
criminal conspiracy (18 Pa.C.S. § 903), and possessing an
instrument of crime (18 Pa.C.S. § 907)…. That day, the court
imposed the negotiated aggregate sentence of 27 to 55 years’
incarceration in state prison.
[On January 18, 2016, Appellant filed an untimely Motion to
Withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied by operation of law on
May 18, 2016. Appellant then filed an untimely Notice of Appeal
to the Superior Court, which quashed the appeal on October 3,
2016. Appellant thereafter obtained reinstatement of his post-
sentence motion and direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc through
the vehicle of the PCRA. On February 17, 2017, Appellant filed a
timely post-sentence motion seeking withdrawal of his guilty plea,
but the lower court denied the motion.]
Appellant has now appealed, raising the sole claim that “[his]
guilty plea was not voluntary because he was not orally advised
of his pretrial rights (including presumption of innocence) and
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limited appellate rights and manifest injustice has occurred as a
result of [his] not being allowed to withdraw his plea because he
maintains his innocence.” [Appellant’s Statement of Matters
Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)].
Trial Court Opinion, filed April 3, 2017, at 1-3.
Appellant presents the following question for our review:
SHOULD APPELLANT HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO WITHDRAW HIS
GUILTY PLEA WHEN HE WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE DURING HIS ORAL GUILTY PLEA
COLLOQUY AND WHEN THE PLEA CONSTITUTES MANIFEST
INJUSTICE?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
We review a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea for an
abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Miller, 748 A.2d 733, 735
(Pa.Super. 2000). This Court has stated:
[P]ost-sentence motions for withdrawal are subject to higher
scrutiny since courts strive to discourage entry of guilty pleas as
sentence-testing devices. A defendant must demonstrate that
manifest injustice would result if the court were to deny his post-
sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Manifest injustice may
be established if the plea was not tendered knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. In determining whether a plea is
valid, the court must examine the totality of circumstances
surrounding the plea. A deficient plea does not per se establish
prejudice on the order of manifest injustice.
Id. at 129 (internal citations and quotations marks omitted) (alteration in
original).
Further, this Court has stated:
The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate pleas be
taken in open court and require the court to conduct an on-the-
record colloquy to ascertain whether a defendant is aware of his
rights and the consequences of his plea. Commonwealth v.
Hodges, 789 A.2d 764, 765 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citing Pa.R.Crim.P.
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590). Under Rule 590, the court should confirm, inter alia, that a
defendant understands: (1) the nature of the charges to which he
is pleading guilty; (2) the factual basis for the plea; (3) he is giving
up his right to trial by jury; (4) and the presumption of innocence;
(5) he is aware of the permissible ranges of sentences and fines
possible; and (6) the court is not bound by the terms of the
agreement unless the court accepts the plea. Commonwealth
v. Watson, 835 A.2d 786 (Pa.Super. 2003). The reviewing
[c]ourt will evaluate the adequacy of the plea colloquy and the
voluntariness of the resulting plea by examining the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the entry of that plea.
Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378 (Pa.Super.
2002). Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant who entered a
guilty plea was aware of what he was doing, and the defendant
bears the burden of proving otherwise. Pollard, supra.
Commonwealth v. Kpou, 153 A.3d 1020, 1023–24 (Pa.Super. 2016)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d 337, 351–54 (Pa.Super.
2014), impliedly overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v.
Hvizda, 116 A.3d 1103, 1106 (Pa. 2015)).
Appellant claims that his plea was involuntary because he was not
informed during his oral colloquy that he was presumed innocent until the
finder of fact found otherwise. This claim is without merit.
Taking into consideration the totality of circumstances bearing on this
claim, we note that Appellant reviewed with counsel his written plea colloquy,
which explained his rights and included a statement on its first page stating
“I am presumed innocent. That means that I start out innocent—and stay
innocent unless the District Attorney proves I committed the crime(s).”
Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, at 1). Appellant initialed that page and signed
the written plea colloquy on the last page.
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Moreover, during the oral colloquy, Appellant was apprised that “if you
choose to go by way of jury trial, [the prosecutor] would call witnesses and
bear the burden of proving you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” N.T.
1/5/16 at 13. Appellant was also informed that only if a jury unanimously
agreed he was guilty of the charges could he be convicted. N.T. at 14.
Appellant confirmed that he understood his rights and was satisfied with his
counsel’s assistance.
Although the words “presumption of innocence” were never uttered
during Appellant’s plea hearing, such an omission did not render his plea
colloquy defective. See Commonwealth v. Best, 480 A.2d 1245, 1248
(Pa.Super. 1984) (stating failure of trial court to “specifically advise”
defendant he or she is presumed innocent does not render plea colloquy
defective where colloquy otherwise conveyed both Commonwealth’s burden
of proof and necessity of unanimous jury). Therefore, given our review of
Appellant’s written and oral plea colloquies, we agree with the trial court that
Appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered his guilty plea.
Accordingly, there was no manifest injustice in the lower court’s order denying
Appellant’s post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Judgment of sentence is AFFIRMED.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/2/2017
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