Com. v. Kelty, O.

J-A29010-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
ORLANDO KELTY, : No. 3417 EDA 2016
:
Appellee :
Appeal from the Order September 26, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004674-2012
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
ORLANDO KELTY : No. 3853 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order December 6, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004674-2012
BEFORE: OTT, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED APRIL 03, 2019
In these consolidated matters, the Commonwealth appeals from orders
entered on September 26, 2016, and December 6, 2016, in the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas. Appellee, Orlando Kelty, and his co-defendant, Malik
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Martain,1 were charged with multiple offenses related to an armed robbery of
the victim, Shawn Holloway, that occurred on March 6, 2012. The court’s
September 26, 2016, order dismissed all charges against Kelty and Martain,
and the December 6, 2016, order denied the Commonwealth’s motion to
reinstate bills of information against the co-defendants. Based on the
following, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The facts and procedural history are as follows. As noted above, Kelty
and Martain were arrested and charged with multiple offenses, including
attempted murder and criminal conspiracy,2 for a robbery that took place in
March of 2012. A jury trial commenced on February 22, 2016, before the
Honorable J. Scott O’Keefe. On February 29, 2016, the victim recanted, and
the trial resulted in a mistrial. Kelty and Martain were then granted a retrial.
A new trial was listed before the Honorable Sierra Thomas Street. On
September 22, 2016, at a trial readiness conference, both the Commonwealth
and defense counsel indicated the matter was ready to proceed to trial.
However, on September 26, 2016, the date set for trial, Judge Street
dismissed the case against Kelty and Martain, finding the Commonwealth was
not ready to proceed when the case was called because a Commonwealth
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1 The Commonwealth has filed identical appeals with respect to Martain, at
Docket Nos. 3404 EDA 2016 and 3855 EDA 2016. This Court directed that
the appeals be listed consecutively.
2 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901/2501 and 903.
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witness, the victim, was absent. The Commonwealth then filed a motion to
reconsider on October 3, 2016, before Judge Street, and a notice of appeal on
October 26, 2016, which was docketed at No. 3417 EDA 2016. The motion to
reconsider was denied by operation of law on November 2, 2016.
Subsequently, the Commonwealth filed a motion to reinstate bills of
information on December 2, 2016, before the Honorable Leon W. Tucker. That
motion was denied on December 6, 2016. The Commonwealth then filed a
notice of appeal, which was docketed at No. 3853 EDA 2016.
On January 5, 2017, the Commonwealth filed an application for
consolidation of these related appeals in addition to its appeals with respect
to co-defendant Martain. On February 14, 2017, in a per curiam order, this
Court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate the appeals. See
Order, 2/14/2017.
The Commonwealth raises the following issues for our review:
1(a). Was the common pleas court’s dismissal of all charges on
the day of trial, on the ground that the evidence was insufficient
to establish a prima facie case, a final order appealable by the
Commonwealth?
1(b). If the dismissal was not a final order, but merely an
interlocutory order permitting the Commonwealth to reinstate
charges, then was the subsequent refusal to reinstate the charges
a final order appealable by the Commonwealth?
2. Did the court below lawfully terminate the prosecution where
the evidence was plainly sufficient to establish a prima facie case,
and the Rule 600 run date was still at least five months away?
Commonwealth’s Brief at 2.
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In its first issue, the Commonwealth claims:
The trial judge discharged the case on the morning of trial, on the
ground that the Commonwealth would not be able to establish a
prima facie case because the victim was not available for court
that day. Despite the judge’s after-the-fact effort to
recharacterize it, that discharge was a final order, based on the
alleged legal insufficiency of the evidence.
Id. at 8.3 Moreover, the Commonwealth states:
The trial judge’s attempt to transform her discharge order into a
dismissal “without prejudice” cannot succeed. At the time of the
order, the judge announced that the case was “discharged” and
“dismissed,” and that she was “discharging this.” The judge said
not a word indicating that her ruling was without prejudice, or
suggesting that the charges could simply be reinstated. It was
only when she issued her opinion, more than eight months later,
that the order ending the case became a mere dismissal without
prejudice. But by then it was too late. The judge lost power to
modify her order after 30 days. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505.
Id. at 8-9 (reproduced record citation omitted).
Preliminarily, we must determine whether the Commonwealth has
appealed from a final order. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(e) (“An appeal may be taken
by the Commonwealth from any final order in a criminal matter only in the
circumstances provided by law.”).
Generally, when criminal charges are dismissed, the
Commonwealth can simply refile the charges and therefore an
appeal from such an order is interlocutory. Commonwealth v.
Waller, 1996 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3180, Pa. Super. , 682 A.2d 1292
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3 The Commonwealth also argues in the alternative that “[i]f, however, the
judge was correct that her order was interlocutory, then she must also have
been correct that the Commonwealth was free to bring the case before any
other judge empowered to hold a new preliminary hearing.” Commonwealth’s
Brief at 8. Based on our disposition, we need not address this alternative
argument.
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(1996). As stated in Waller, the determination of whether a
dismissal of criminal charges is a final order for purposes of appeal
depends on the reason behind the order. If the defect which
prompted the dismissal is curable, the appeal is interlocutory. If
the defect is incurable, then the order is final and the appeal is
proper. Id.
Commonwealth v. Price, 684 A.2d 640, 641 (Pa. Super. 1996).
Here, a review of the record reveals the following: At the September
26, 2016, proceeding, before the trial was to begin, the following exchange
occurred between the court and the parties:
THE COURT: You’re ready?
[Kelty’s counsel]: I’m ready, Judge.
THE COURT: Commonwealth?
[The Commonwealth]: And I told counsel that … my complainant
is in SCI Forest. I can try to make arrangements so that he can
be brought in and we can roll this to next week. I am otherwise
ready, but I need him here, obviously. And this is a retrial
stemming from a mistrial that occurred in March.
[Martain’s counsel]: Judge, I have a homicide trial scheduled to
begin on Monday … next week.
…
THE COURT: I have another case next week as well.
[Martain’s counsel]: And I have no indication -- I have no
knowledge of whether there was a writ prepared for this man.
THE COURT: I don’t either. I don’t see anything in the docket.
[Martain’s counsel]: Yeah, I don’t either.
THE COURT: Normally I would write that on my file about the
witnesses, the witnesses’ whereabouts, and I don’t think it was
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mentioned prior to today because I don’t see it in the dockets or
on my file. I don’t -- well, I don’t’ see it, so --
THE CRIER: The Court is in chambers next week, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Oh.
THE CRIER: The Court is in chambers.
[The Commonwealth]: All right. Well, then if -- I mean, if it can’t
be rolled until next week, if we can get a short date. Obviously,
the Commonwealth is within the run date as established once the
mistrial was granted and a new trial was granted, so I’m not
looking for a date next year, but if we can figure out a time when
the rest of us are otherwise ready or otherwise able to try it --
THE COURT: No. This matter is discharged.
[The Commonwealth]: Your Honor, could you just give me a basis
for the discharge?
THE COURT: You’re not ready today. You have -- you gave no
notice to the Court that you needed a witness from state custody.
There’s no indication that you ever gave any notice about this.
We had a trial readiness last week. There’s no indication -- you
said you were ready. This is an open case from 2012.
[The Commonwealth]: Yes, but I’m just wondering if you could
give me a -- I mean, a -- a basis. I mean, we are within our run
date of 365 days.
THE COURT: I know that’s your argument, your legal argument,
but --
[The Commonwealth]: Yes, Your Honor. I’m asking for what the
legal basis is for the discharge.
THE COURT: Well, I don’t have any other basis than what I just
stated, so it’s dismissed. That’s my basis for discharging this.
[The Commonwealth]: Okay.
[Kelty’s counsel]: And, Your Honor, for purposes of the record,
just to keep it clean, I’m not going to add anything, but I just want
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to include that my arguments are the same as those [Martain’s
counsel] made earlier.
THE COURT: You want to repeat those for the record?
[Martain’s counsel]: Other than I’m ready, I don’t see any
indication that arrangements or preparations were made to have
this witness brought here. We are now, what, three or four
months since the trial readiness conference? The trial readiness
conference was last week and this case was called ready. I have
prepared for trial and I know --
THE COURT: Did the witness’s custody status change from the
last time you tried the case?
[Martain’s counsel]: No.
[The Commonwealth]: No. And that’s why I'm not sure -- I mean,
it is my -- to the best of my recollection, not only was a writ
prepared from here --
[Martain’s counsel]: No.
[The Commonwealth]: -- but I didn’t bring my box with me
because prior to coming in this morning, I checked and realized
that Mr. Holloway had not been moved from SCI Forest. Now, the
vast majority of the time that has been taken in this case -- in
fact, I don't think the Commonwealth has ever taken a date on
this case. The last listing, the notes of testimony were not done
from the trial and [Martain’s counsel] had filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel, which he subsequently withdrew that motion
to withdraw the day of trial. So --
[Martain’s counsel]: No, no. Not correct. It was withdrawn --
[The Commonwealth]: The Friday before trial.
[Martain’s counsel]: It was filed prior to the June pretrial and
withdrawn at the June pretrial date. It did not cause one minute’s
delay in this case and the notes have been available -- I received
the notes months ago. The only thing the record reflects is that I
had ordered the notes. The notes were delivered to me. I paid
for my notes probably three or four months ago, so I haven’t
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caused any delay since the mistrial in March that was occasioned
by --
[The Commonwealth]: That was not occasioned by anything the
Commonwealth --
[Martain’s counsel]: -- a Commonwealth witness blurting out
something that was not asked of him.
[The Commonwealth]: Counsel is well aware --
THE COURT: It’s not really -- this is not really about -- you two
can argue the point, but it’s really not about – I’m not doing this
because of what counsel said.
[The Commonwealth]: Right. So --
THE COURT: It’s mostly because of what I said.
[The Commonwealth]: Okay.
THE COURT: So I understand your point, [Commonwealth]. It’s
nothing personal against you, but I think this case is --
[The Commonwealth]: And I understand that. I’m just -- because
there was a mistrial and the case been tried, there is a new 365
days, so I'm wondering what it is, what basis there is to dismiss
the case otherwise because I don't think that there is one.
THE COURT: Okay.
[The Commonwealth]: And I'm not sure that the law allows you
to do that.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I just did it and I’m going to move on to
the next case on the list.
[The Commonwealth]: Okay.
N.T., 9/26/2016, at 5-11.
That same day, a “Trial Disposition and Dismissal Form” was entered by
Judge Thomas Street, indicating all counts were dismissed, and in the
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comment section, the following was noted: “Case Dismissed – Commonwealth
Not Ready.” Trial Disposition and Dismissal Form, 9/26/2016.
In her Rule 1925(a) opinion, Judge Thomas Street expounded on her
rationale as follows:
Firstly, the Commonwealth is incorrect in its claim that this
court dismissed either case “with prejudice.” (See Malik Martain
Secure Docket p. 28, Orlando Kelty Secure Docket p. 29).
Moreover, the Commonwealth may only appeal from a final order
issued by a trial court. Pa.R.A.P. 341(e). Dismissals of criminal
complaints based upon remediable, or curable defects, are
interlocutory and do not bar refiling upon dismissal.
Commonwealth v. LaBelle, 612 A.2d 418 (Pa. 1992). The
Commonwealth’s failure to make a prima facie case due to the
absence of a Commonwealth witness on the date set for trial is
one such remediable defect. Commonwealth v. Jones, 676
A.2d 251 (Pa. Super. 1996), see also Commonwealth v.
Hetherington, 331 A.2d 205 (1975). An order dismissing a case
for failure to make a prima facie case is not final because the
prosecution can bring the case before any other officer
empowered to hold a preliminary hearing. Id. Refiling a criminal
complaint is the appropriate procedure and the Commonwealth’s
only recourse where charges are dismissed upon the lack of a
prima facie case since such a determination is interlocutory in
nature and, therefore, not appealable. Jones, 676 A.2d at 252
(citing Commonwealth v. Mirarchi, 392 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1978)).
In Jones, a trial court dismissed a criminal complaint
because of the absence of the Commonwealth’s witnesses on the
date set for trial. Id. at 251. The Commonwealth did not appeal
this dismissal, but instead reinstituted the original charges in a
new criminal complaint. Id. The Pennsylvania Superior Court
held that the dismissal was permissible for the failure-to–
prosecute and that the Commonwealth’s refiling was the
appropriate remedy. Id. at 252. Similarly, in Commonwealth
v. Waller, 682 A.2d 1292, a trial court dismissed the charges
against a defendant following a denial of the Commonwealth’s
request for a one-day continuance. The charges were not
dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 1295. On appeal the
Commonwealth contended that the denial of the one-day
continuance and the dismissal of charges by the trial court were
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improper. Id. at 1294. The Superior Court held in response that
the dismissal was interlocutory and therefore review of the case
was precluded. Id. The Court subsequently quashed the appeal
by the Commonwealth and indicated that refiling the complaint
was the proper remedy. Id.
In this case, this court dismissed the criminal complaints
against Orlando Kelty and Malik Martain in light of the
Commonwealth’s failure to make a prima facie case due to the
absence of the complaining witness on the date set for trial, nearly
five years after the complaints were filed. This court did not
dismiss the complaints with prejudice. At the trial readiness
conference on September 22, 2016, the Commonwealth asserted
that it was ready to proceed to trial. (N.T. 9/22/16 p. 5). On
September 26th at trial, the Commonwealth failed to arrange for
the complaining witness’ appearance in-court from custody at SCI
Forest. (N.T. 9/26/16 p. 3). Thereupon, this court dismissed the
complaints against Mr. Kelty and Mr. Malik. (N.T. 9/26/16 p. 8).
As in Jones and Waller, this court’s dismissal was based upon
the Commonwealth’s failure to present a necessary witness to
make a prime facie case. In neither the docket nor the transcripts
did this court ever represent the dismissal to be with prejudice.
This court also notes that the dismissal of the complaints occurred
1,662 days after the complaints had originally been filed.
Therefore, the Commonwealth’s appeal is precluded from
appellate review and its sole recourse is the refiling of the criminal
charges.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/7/2017, at 2-4.4
While it appears, at first glance, the Commonwealth could simply refile
the charges as the trial judge indicated in her Rule 1925(a) opinion that these
cases were dismissed without prejudice, we note that such a clarification was
conspicuously absent from her discussion with the parties at the September
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4 We note the court incorrectly states the Commonwealth failed to make a
prime facie case “nearly five years” after the complaints were filed. Trial Court
Opinion, 6/7/2017, at 3. The appellees’ original trial resulted in a mistrial in
February of 2016. The retrial occurred on September 26, 2016.
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26, 2016, trial and in the corresponding order. Our review of the transcript
and order reveals the trial judge repeatedly stated the cases were “dismissed”
and “discharged” based on a failure to produce the complaining witness. This
conclusion is further supported by the fact that the trial judge did not grant
any period of time to the Commonwealth so that it could procure the witness,
and the court did not hold a hearing to determine if the trial could begin with
the presentation of other Commonwealth witnesses while it made
arrangements for the transportation of the complaining witness. Based on
these specific facts, we are compelled to conclude the Commonwealth acted
properly in concluding that the defect was incurable, the trial judge dismissed
the case with prejudice, and therefore, the September 26, 2016, order was
final and appealable. See Waller, supra.5
Moreover, we note the court’s reliance on Waller, supra, and Jones,
supra, is misplaced. In Waller, on the day of a hearing on pre-trial motions
and trial, the Commonwealth informed the court that it was not prepared to
proceed to trial because a witness was not present. Waller, 682 A.2d at
1293. The witness had been subpoenaed to appear, but was later informed
he was not needed at trial because a guilty plea was expected to take place.
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5 The judge’s attempts to recharacterize her ruling in her Rule 1925(a) opinion
are untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 (“Except as otherwise provided or
prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind
any order within 30 days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination
of any term of court, if no appeal from such order has been taken or
allowed.”).
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Id. While the Commonwealth requested a one-day continuance to secure the
witness’s presence, the court denied the request, but did give the
Commonwealth until the afternoon to produce the witness. Id. at 1293-1294.
When the witness failed to appear, the Commonwealth informed the court that
it was unable to proceed. The court then dismissed all charges against the
defendant. The Commonwealth appealed and a panel of this Court quashed
the appeal as interlocutory because the charges were dismissed without
prejudice and no speedy trial or statute of limitation problem existed at the
time the charges were dismissed. Id. at 1295. The panel concluded “the
defect leading to the dismissal of the charges against [the defendant] was
curable through refiling the complaint and subsequent production of the
requested witness.” Id. Turning to the present matter, the trial judge did not
dismiss the charges without prejudice and did not provide the Commonwealth
with any opportunity to procure the witness.6
Likewise, in Jones, the Commonwealth did not appeal the dismissal of
the defendant’s charges for failure to produce to witness, but rather,
reinstituted the charges in a new criminal complaint. Jones, 676 A.2d at 252.
The defendant filed a motion to quash the new complaint on the grounds that
refiling of the charges was improper, which the trial court granted. Id. The
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6 Moreover, here, while the Commonwealth informed the trial judge that it
was within the 365-day period under Pa.R.Crim.P 600, the judge never
acknowledged this fact in her decision. See N.T., 9/26/2016, at 3, 7, and 10-
11.
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appeal concerned that decision and not whether the court’s original decision
to dismiss the case for failure to present witnesses was with or without
prejudice as is the argument herein. Accordingly, we conclude Waller and
Jones are distinguishable from the present matter.
Rather, we liken the present matter to situations where the
Commonwealth has committed a discovery rule violation, and where this Court
has previously stated:
“[The] dismissal of charges is a penalty far too drastic for a
prosecutor's violation of discovery rules.” Commonwealth v.
King, 2007 Pa. Super. 271, 932 A.2d 948, 952, (Pa. Super.
2007)(citations omitted).
…
Dismissal of criminal charges punishes not only the prosecutor ...
but also the public at large, since the public has a reasonable
expectation that those who have been charged with crimes will be
fairly prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Thus, the sanction
of dismissal of criminal charges should be utilized only in the most
blatant cases. Given the public policy goal of protecting the public
from criminal conduct, a trial court should consider dismissal of
charges where the actions of the Commonwealth are egregious
and where demonstrable prejudice will be suffered by the
defendant if the charges are not dismissed.
Commonwealth v. A.G., 955 A.2d 1022, 1025 (Pa. Super. 2008).
In conclusion, the trial judge erred in determining its September 26,
2016, ruling was an interlocutory, non-appealable order as the record
demonstrates the court’s determination was a dismissal of the case with
prejudice. Moreover, the court acted improperly by failing to either grant the
Commonwealth a continuance or hold a hearing to determine if the
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Commonwealth could proceed with trial using other witnesses first. There
were no Rule 600 issues as a new trial had been granted. See Pa.R.Crim.P.
600(A)(2)(d) (“When a trial court has granted a new trial and no appeal has
been perfected, the new trial shall commence within 365 days from the date
on which the trial court’s order is filed.”). The Commonwealth’s actions were
not egregious and the co-defendants would not have suffered any prejudice
from a minor delay.
Accordingly, we find the trial court erred in dismissing all charges
against Kelty and Martain. Therefore, we reverse the September 26, 2016,
order, and remand for further proceedings. Based on our disposition, a
determination regarding the Honorable Leon W. Tucker’s December 6, 2016,
order, denying the Commonwealth’s motion to reinstate bills of information
against the co-defendants, is moot.
At Docket No. 3417 EDA 2016, order entered September 26, 2016, order
reversed. At Docket No. 3853 EDA 2016, appeal dismissed as moot. Case
remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/3/19
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