In The Interest of: K.C., a Minor

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2017 PA Super 42IN THE INTEREST OF: K.C., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
No. 1620 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered April 26, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at Nos.: CP-51-DP-000905-2016
FID#51-FN-000830-2016
BEFORE: MOULTON, J., RANSOM, J., and PLATT, J.*
OPINION BY PLATT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2017
Appellant, the City of Philadelphia Department of Human Services
(DHS), appeals from the order of the trial court adjudicating K.C., a minor,
dependent. The trial court adjudicated K.C. dependent, but declined to find
that DHS had made “reasonable efforts” to prevent or eliminate the need for
placement. DHS argues that the court erred by basing its conclusion of no
“reasonable efforts” solely on DHS not having a placement plan at the
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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adjudication hearing.1 Because we are constrained to agree, we reverse and
remand to the trial court.
On April 26, 2016, the court adjudicated K.C. dependent for
incorrigibility and a history of truancy. The facts underlying the adjudication
are not under dispute, so we decline to restate them fully here. For the
convenience of the reader, we note briefly that DHS received a report
regarding K.C.’s behavior at home, where he often had violent outbursts.
K.C. had been referred to programs such as Big Brothers Big Sisters, but
they did not curtail his improper and sometimes violent behavior. On April
14, 2016, DHS filed a petition requesting that the court adjudicate K.C. a
dependent child, describing the violent and destructive incidents as well as
truancy issues. In the petition, DHS also requested that K.C. be allowed to
remain at home with his mother, and that the court enter a finding that DHS
had made reasonable efforts to prevent his placement.
During a pre-hearing conference on April 26, 2016, the parties agreed
that K.C. should be adjudicated dependent. However, at the hearing, K.C.’s
mother stated, for the first time, that she did not want him to return home
with her. Therefore, the parties also agreed that he be committed to the
custody of DHS that day, and that he undergo a psychiatric evaluation.
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1
Federal funding for foster care program costs for K.C. will be denied to DHS
because of the trial court’s conclusion that it did not make reasonable efforts
to prevent the need for removal. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 672(a)(2)(ii).
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At the adjudicatory hearing, counsel for DHS presented the pre-
hearing conference agreement to the trial court. The court heard testimony
related to the basis for adjudication and heard the recommendation of DHS
“to adjudicate K.C. dependent based on present inability and incorrigibility.”
(N.T. Hearing, 4/26/16, at 6-9). DHS also stated its belief that it was
“contrary to the health, welfare and safety for [K.C.] to remain in the home
with [his] mother.” (Id. at 9). DHS conceded that it did not have a
placement for K.C. arranged on that date. (See id.). The court adjudicated
K.C. dependent based on incorrigibility and a history of truancy. (See id. at
20). It concluded that it was contrary to K.C.’s health, safety, and welfare
for him to stay in the home at the time. The court then explained:
THE COURT: . . . I’m struggling with giving DHS reasonable
efforts because it’s hard for me to believe that based on the face
of this you would not come with a placement in hand.
[DHS COUNSEL]: . . . I think it was just our impression that
mother was okay with him remaining. . . .
THE COURT: Even if that was her conversation, you guys have
to have a concurrent plan. And see, the thing about it is fair or
unfair I hold DHS to a higher standard . . . . So my whole thing
is you had to come in here with a placement. You had to. So
because of that I can’t give you reasonable efforts because it’s
put me in a situation that I feel like I have to be planning for a
child and that shouldn’t be my role here. So I can’t give you
reasonable efforts.
(Id. at 20-21).
On May 10, 2016, DHS filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the
court’s determination that it did not make reasonable efforts, alleging that
instead of applying the reasonable efforts standard applicable for required
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preplacement findings, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(b), the court erroneously
applied the standard for matters to be determined at a permanency hearing,
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f). The court denied the motion on May 24, 2016. This
timely appeal followed.2
DHS raises three issues on appeal.
1) Whether [DHS], a Pennsylvania Children and Youth Agency,
may properly appeal that portion of the trial court’s order which
denied that it made reasonable efforts to prevent a child’s
placement, where the trial court applied the incorrect legal
standard, where the facts do not support the trial court’s order
under the correct legal standard, and where DHS faces
significant financial penalties as a result of the trial court’s
order[?]
2) Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in applying
an incorrect legal standard when determining whether DHS
made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for the
placement of K.C., a minor child[?]
3) Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding
that the record evidence did not support an order finding that
DHS made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need
for the placement of K.C., where K.C. was found by the trial
court to be incorrigible and truant, and where K.C. was found to
be non-compliant with preventative services[?]
(DHS’s Brief, at 4).3
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2
On May 25, 2016, DHS filed its notice of appeal together with its concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).
The trial court entered its opinion on August 5, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(ii).
3
DHS’s first issue was not included in its statement of errors complained of
on appeal. However, because it simply addresses the rule to show cause
issued by this Court on June 28, 2016, with respect to whether DHS had
standing to appeal, we will consider the argument.
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In its first issue, DHS argues that because the court denied its request
for a finding of reasonable efforts, and such denial will result in a significant
financial burden from the loss of federal funding, it is an aggrieved party
with standing to appeal. (See DHS’s Brief, at 14-22). We agree.
Our Rules of Appellate Procedure provide:
Rule 501. Any Aggrieved Party May Appeal
Except where the right of appeal is enlarged by statute, any
party who is aggrieved by an appealable order, or a fiduciary
whose estate or trust is so aggrieved, may appeal therefrom.
Pa.R.A.P. 501. “[A] party is ‘aggrieved’ when the party has been adversely
affected by the decision from which the appeal is taken.” In re J.G., 984
A.2d 541, 546 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied, 991 A.2d 313 (Pa. 2010)
(citation omitted); see also In the Interest of W.M., 41 A.3d 618, 620
(Pa. Super. 2012) (permitting CYS appeal of no reasonable effort finding).
Here, DHS has demonstrated that it is an aggrieved party because the
trial court denied it the full relief requested, a finding of reasonable efforts,
and because that denial causes DHS to be ineligible for federal funding for
the placement of K.C. See Pa.R.A.P. 501. Therefore, we conclude DHS has
standing to pursue the instant appeal. We agree with the first claim.
In its second issue, DHS contends that the trial court erred because it
applied an incorrect legal standard when the court denied DHS’s request for
a finding that it made reasonable efforts to prevent the need for removal of
K.C. from his home. (See DHS’s Brief, at 22-37). Specifically, it argues
that the court did not properly apply the standard for preplacement findings
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set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(b), but instead applied the standard
applicable for permanency hearings set forth in § 6351(f). (See id. at 22-
25). Upon careful review, we are constrained to agree.
Our standard and scope of review in dependency cases is
well settled.
[W]e must accept the facts as found by the trial
court unless they are not supported by the record.
Although bound by the facts, we are not bound by the trial
court’s inferences, deductions, and conclusions therefrom;
we must exercise our independent judgment in reviewing
the court’s determination, as opposed to its findings of
fact, and must order whatever right and justice dictate. We
review for abuse of discretion. Our scope of review,
accordingly, is of the broadest possible nature. It is this
Court’s responsibility to ensure that the record represents
a comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge has
applied the appropriate legal principles to that record.
Nevertheless, we accord great weight to the court’s fact-
finding function because the court is in the best position to
observe and rule on the credibility of the parties and
witnesses.
In re E.P., 841 A.2d 128, 131 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 857 A.2d
679 (Pa. 2004) (citation omitted).
Here, DHS challenges the trial court’s application of 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
6351, which sets forth guidelines applicable to various aspects of disposition
of dependent children. Section 6351 provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Required preplacement findings.—Prior to entering any
order of disposition under subsection (a) that would remove a
dependent child from his home, the court shall enter findings on
the record or in the order of court as follows:
(1) that continuation of the child in his home would
be contrary to the welfare, safety or health of the child;
and
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(2) whether reasonable efforts were made prior to
the placement of the child to prevent or eliminate the need
for removal of the child from his home, if the child has
remained in his home pending such disposition; or
(3) if preventive services were not offered due to the
necessity for an emergency placement, whether such lack
of services was reasonable under the circumstances; or
(4) if the court has previously determined pursuant
to section 6332 (relating to informal hearing) that
reasonable efforts were not made to prevent the initial
removal of the child from his home, whether reasonable
efforts are under way to make it possible for the child to
return home; and
(5) if the child has a sibling who is subject to
removal from his home, whether reasonable efforts were
made prior to the placement of the child to place the
siblings together or whether such joint placement is
contrary to the safety or well-being of the child or sibling.
The court shall not enter findings under paragraph (2), (3) or (4)
if the court previously determined that aggravated circumstances
exist and no new or additional reasonable efforts to prevent or
eliminate the need for removing the child from the home or to
preserve and reunify the family are required.
* * *
(e) Permanency hearings.—
(1) The court shall conduct a permanency hearing for
the purpose of determining or reviewing the permanency
plan of the child, the date by which the goal of
permanency for the child might be achieved and whether
placement continues to be best suited to the safety,
protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the
child. . . .
* * *
(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.—At
each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of the
following:
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(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness
of the placement.
(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of
compliance with the permanency plan developed for the
child.
(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating
the circumstances which necessitated the original
placement.
(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current
placement goal for the child.
(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for
the child might be achieved.
(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to
finalize the permanency plan in effect.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(b), (e)(1), (f)(1)-(5.1).
Here, the trial court’s inquiry at the hearing with regard to whether
reasonable efforts were made focused on whether DHS had made reasonable
efforts to finalize a placement for K.C. The court did not discuss what
efforts, if any, were made to “prevent or eliminate the need for removal of
[K.C.] from his home”, nor did it determine whether this was an emergency
placement and therefore “such lack of services was reasonable under the
circumstances[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6351(b)(2), (3). Rather, it based its
determination solely on DHS’s failure to have a concurrent plan and come
into the hearing with a placement. (See N.T. Hearing, 4/26/16, at 20-21).
The court explained that its decision was based on DHS’s assumed failure “to
exhaust reasonable efforts to properly plan for placement for K.C. after
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identifying the need for removal of this child from the home.” (Trial Court
Opinion, 8/05/16, at unnumbered page 3).4
The April 26, 2016 hearing was an adjudicatory hearing where the
court found K.C. dependent and removed him from his home. Therefore,
trial court was required to apply Section 6351(b) and determine, among
other things, (1) that continuation of K.C. in his home would be contrary to
his welfare, safety or health; and (2) whether reasonable efforts were made
prior to the placement of K.C. to prevent or eliminate the need for removal
of him from his home; or (3) if preventative services were not offered due to
the necessity for an emergency placement, whether such lack of services
was reasonable under the circumstances. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6351(b)(1)-
(3). Because it appears that the trial court misapplied Section 6351, and
applied the standard set forth under subsection (f), related to permanency
hearings, instead of subsection (b), we are constrained to conclude that the
trial court did not apply the appropriate standard and therefore abused its
discretion. See In re E.P., supra at 131. DHS’s second claim merits relief.
In its third issue, DHS argues that the court erred as a matter of law in
holding that it failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent placement of K.C.
based upon the court’s finding that DHS did not have a permanent
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4
We observe that DHS could not identify the need for removal until
immediately before the hearing when Mother, for the first time, requested
that K.C. be placed outside the home because of her fear of K.C. returning
home with her.
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placement plan at the time of the adjudication hearing. (See DHS’s Brief, at
4, 37-44). We agree.
As discussed above, prior to entering an order of disposition that
removes a dependent child from his home, the court shall enter a finding
concerning “whether reasonable efforts were made prior to the placement of
the child to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his
home,” or “if preventive services were not offered due to the necessity for
an emergency placement, whether such lack of services was reasonable
under the circumstances[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(b)(2), (3).
Here, the record is clear that up until the hearing, DHS did not seek
removal of K.C. from his home. (See N.T. Hearing, at 10, 21). We observe
that DHS could not identify the need for removal until mother changed her
mind at the prehearing conference, immediately before the hearing. (See
id. at 6, 9-10). However, the trial court did not consider whether
reasonable efforts were made prior to the hearing to prevent removal of
K.C., or whether this was an emergency placement such that a lack of
services was reasonable. Rather, it based its conclusion solely on the fact
that DHS did not have a “placement in hand” during the adjudication
hearing. (Id. at 21). Therefore, we agree that the court erred as a matter
of law in making a reasonable efforts determination without considering the
criteria set forth in Section 6351(b)(2), (3). See In re E.P., supra at 131.
Order vacated in part. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/24/2017
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