In Re: X.A.S., Appeal of: C.M.G.

J-S65037-18; J-S65046-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: X.A.S., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: C.M.G., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 1124 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered June 6, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2017-00029,
2017-00030, 2017-00031
IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO A.N.J., A : PENNSYLVANIA
MINOR :
:
:
APPEAL OF: C.M.G., MOTHER :
:
:
: No. 1125 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered June 6, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2017-00029
IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO C.A.L., A : PENNSYLVANIA
MINOR :
:
:
APPEAL OF: C.M.G., NATURAL :
MOTHER :
:
: No. 1126 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered June 6, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2017-00031
J-S65037-18; J-S65046-18
IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO C.A.L., A : PENNSYLVANIA
MINOR :
:
:
APPEAL OF: J.L., FATHER :
:
:
: No. 1127 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered June 6, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2017-00031
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: MAY 22, 2019
C.M.G. (Mother) appeals from the decree entered June 6, 2018,
terminating her parental rights to her minor children, A.N.J., X.A.S., and
C.A.L. In addition, J.L. (Father) appeals from the decree entered June 6, 2018,
terminating his parental rights to his minor child, C.A.L. We now consolidate
these appeals and affirm.1
The following facts are not in dispute. In March 2016, Mother and Father
overdosed on suboxone in the presence of their children.2 They were arrested,
and following guilty pleas, the parents were sentenced to state intermediate
punishment (SIP). They have remained incarcerated or placed in supervised
housing in a halfway house since that date. There is no date certain for their
____________________________________________
1 See Pa.R.A.P. 513.
2 A.N.J. was born December 2007; X.A.S. was born June 2009; C.A.L. was
born July 2011. Mother is the natural mother of all three children; Father is
the natural father of C.A.L.
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release from SIP, as it is contingent upon an established home plan with stable
housing and continued compliance with drug and alcohol treatment
requirements.
Following the parents’ arrest, H.G., the children’s maternal aunt,
brought the children to Huntingdon County Children and Youth Services
(HCCYS). The children were immediately placed into a foster home, and they
have remained in the same foster home since that date. In April 2016, the
orphans’ court adjudicated the children dependent and awarded legal and
physical custody to HCCYS. The parents have had minimal contact with the
children since their dependency.
HCCYS developed several goals for Mother and Father to complete prior
to reunification with the children, including: stable housing for six months;
successful completion of their SIP; drug and alcohol treatment; and individual
counseling. Both parents have completed the incarceration portion of their SIP
sentences, completed a drug rehabilitation program, and attended counseling
and parenting classes. However, they reside in separate halfway houses, and
it is unclear when they can reunite and obtain stable housing.
In August 2017, HCCYS filed petitions seeking involuntary termination
of both parents’ rights. The orphans’ court held hearings on the petitions in
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J-S65037-18; J-S65046-18
November 2017 and February 2018.3 In June 2018, the orphans’ court granted
the petitions and terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father.
Mother and Father timely appealed and filed Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statements. The orphans’ court issued a responsive opinion.
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues:
1. Whether the lower court lacked competent evidence to support
any ground for termination through 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1),
(a)(2), (a)(5) or (a)(8).
2. Whether the remainder and nature of [Mother’s] S.I.P.
sentence was so great as to preclude [Mother] from providing
permanency within a reasonable time.
Mother’s Br. at 4.4 Similarly, Father raises the following issues:
1. Whether the orphans’ court committed an abuse of discretion
or error of law when it concluded that [HCCYS] established
grounds for termination of parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8)[;]
2. Whether [F]ather’s participation in the Department of
Corrections [SIP] [p]rogram constituted good cause to not
terminate [F]ather’s parental rights[.]
Father’s Br. at 5.
We examine these issues concomitantly. Essentially, Mother asserts that
she has diligently pursued successful completion of the SIP program and has
sought to maintain contact with her children. Mother’s Br. at 12. According to
____________________________________________
3The court appointed legal counsel for the children, see Order, filed Oct. 24,
2017, who filed a Child Preference Report on March 13, 2018.
4Mother has filed identical briefs in support of her claims for relief as to each
of her children.
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J-S65037-18; J-S65046-18
Mother, the court discerned no “settled intent” to relinquish her rights. Id. at
16. Further, Mother suggests that the remainder and nature of her sentence
will permit Mother to provide permanency to her children “within a reasonable
time.” Id. at 19. Thus, she concludes, the court erred when it failed to consider
her individual circumstances or place sufficient weight on her progress to
completing her goals. Id.
As for Father, he asserts that he has made significant progress toward
alleviating the conditions that led to placement. Father’s Br. at 9, 16-17.
According to Father, the court erred when it ignored this progress. Id. at 9.
He suggests, further, that his reunification goals set “an impossible task.” Id.
at 22.
Neither parent has offered any argument suggesting there is an
emotional bond between them and the children. See Mother’s Br. at 13-22;
but see Father’s Br. at 21 (merely suggesting that “C.A.L. knew [Father]” and
that they had previously lived “as a family unit”).
We adhere to the following standard of review:
In an appeal from an order terminating [or declining to terminate]
parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the
decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. We
are bound by the findings of the trial court which have adequate
support in the record so long as the findings do not evidence
capricious disregard for competent and credible evidence. The trial
court, not the appellate court, is charged with the responsibilities
of evaluating credibility of the witnesses and resolving any
conflicts in the testimony. In carrying out these responsibilities,
the trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.
When the trial court's findings are supported by competent
evidence of record, we will affirm even if the record could also
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support an opposite result. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error
of law, or insufficient evidentiary support, the trial court's
termination order must stand.
In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 506-07 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which generally requires a
bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 850 (Pa.Super. 2015) (formatting modified; citation
omitted).
In this case, the trial court terminated the parents’ rights pursuant to
Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with the court
as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in
order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we analyze the court’s
decision to terminate under Section 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provides as
follows:
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(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
...
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
and welfare of the child.
...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a
parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.
Thus, there are three requirements for termination under Section
2511(a)(8):
(1) The child has been removed from parental care for 12 months
or more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
P.Z., 113 A.3d at 851 (citation omitted).
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J-S65037-18; J-S65046-18
In order to satisfy these statutory grounds, the party seeking
termination must provide clear and convincing evidence that termination is
warranted. In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1004 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc). In
this context, “clear and convincing evidence” is defined as “testimony that is
so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come
to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in
issue.” Id. (formatting modified; citation omitted).
There is no dispute here that the children were removed from the
parents’ care in March 2016, more than 12 months prior to HCCYS’s petitions
for termination. Thus, the first requirement under Section 2511(a)(8) has
been met.
Regarding the second requirement, the orphans’ court found that, while
both parents made admirable progress in addressing their drug addiction, they
could not remedy their ongoing incapacity quickly enough to warrant
reunification. See Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 5-6. This Court has observed previously
that “termination under Section 2511(a)(8), does not require an evaluation of
[a parent’s] willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to
placement of [their] children.” R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 511 (emphasis in original).
To the contrary, in reviewing whether termination pursuant to Section
2511(a)(8) was appropriate, we have rejected arguments highlighting the
progress a parent has made. C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1007-08 (concluding parent’s
progress addressing drug addiction did not toll indefinitely child’s need for
well-being and permanency); R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 511-13 (rejecting lower
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court’s acceptance that mother could remedy drug abuse and neglect within
reasonable time); In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 806 (Pa.Super. 2005) (rejecting
mother’s “significant life achievements” in light of “competent evidence that
the conditions [for removal] continue to exist”). Thus, the arguments from
Mother and Father that the orphans’ court failed to consider adequately their
progress toward meeting their reunification goals are not persuasive.
In March 2016, the children were removed from the care of Mother and
Father because they were unable to provide the children with a stable home
environment. The parents were required to successfully complete their SIP
and maintain stable housing for six months before reunification would be
possible. While both parents continue to make progress, they have yet to
complete their SIP and are currently unable to provide their children with
stable housing.
Both parents suggest the court erred when it cited their incarceration as
justification for terminating their rights to the children. See, e.g., Mother’s
Br. at 16 (citing Orphans’ Ct. Op., filed July 31, 2018, at 3); Father’s Br. at
17-20 (same). Nevertheless, as noted by the court, a parent’s incarceration
may be a relevant consideration. Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 4-5 (citing In re
Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 829-30 (Pa. 2012)). This is particularly true
where, as here, the parents could not provide the court with a date certain
that they would complete their SIP or secure stable housing. Thus, the
conditions that led to placement continue to exist, and we conclude that the
second requirement under Section 2511(a)(8) has been met. See S.P., 47
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A.3d at 831 (concluding parent’s uncertain parole date and questions
regarding housing established ongoing incapacity relevant to analysis of
Section 2511(a)(2)).
Finally, in order to establish the third statutory requirement of Section
2511(a)(8), the evidence must demonstrate that termination of parental
rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. C.L.G., 956 A.2d
at 1009; P.Z., 113 A.3d at 851. Here, the orphans’ court reasoned as follows:
The best interests of the children include permanency in a home
with stability, structure, and love. After being placed in foster care
in 2016, all three children were diagnosed with Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder and currently attend weekly counseling sessions.
Despite the trauma endured while in the care of Mother and
Father, the children are reported to be “thriving” in [their] foster
home. They refer to their foster parents as “mom” and “dad” and
repeatedly have expressed their desire to remain with [their foster
parents] forever. There can be no question that the best interests
of the children is to have the parental rights of their natural
parents terminated.
Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 6.
As the record supports this analysis, we conclude that the third
requirement under Section 2511(a)(8) has been met. Additionally, though it
is preferable that a court address the third requirement of Section 2511(a)(8)
and Section (b) separately, we discern no abuse of the court’s discretion in
concluding that termination would best serve the needs and welfare of the
children. See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1009 (acknowledging the third requirement
of Section 2511(a)(8) coincides with Section 2511(b) but suggesting distinct
analyses).
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For these reasons, we affirm the decrees of the orphans’ court.
Appeals consolidated; decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/22/2018
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