Com. v. McQuaid, T.

J-A30034-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
TYLER COOPER MCQUAID, :
:
Appellant : No. 372 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 15, 2018
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0002539-2017
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., KUNSELMAN, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 7, 2019
Tyler Cooper McQuaid (Appellant) appeals from the February 15, 2018
judgment of sentence of three to six days of incarceration following his
nonjury convictions for driving under the influence (DUI) of a controlled
substance and DUI of a controlled substance - impaired ability. Specifically,
Appellant challenges the denial of his pretrial suppression motion. Upon
review, we reverse.
At 3:08 p.m. on November 25, 2016, Officer Joseph Daransky of the
Leetsdale Borough Police Department received a 911 dispatch for an
unconscious male in the driver’s seat of a red Toyota Corolla, with a
specified license plate number, in the Wendy’s parking lot at the Quaker
Valley Village Shopping Center. N.T., 10/13/2017, at 5-7. When Officer
Daransky arrived at the Wendy’s parking lot approximately two minutes
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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later, he did not find any vehicle matching the 911 dispatch. Id. at 9-10.
However, as Officer Daransky was leaving the Wendy’s parking lot, he
observed a male driving a red Corolla, with a license plate matching the
dispatch description, making a right-hand turn out of the GetGo gas station
across the street. Id. at 10-11, 17. At that point, Officer Daransky
activated his overhead lights and siren to initiate a traffic stop for the
purpose of checking on the well-being of the driver based on the 911
dispatch. Id. at 12-13, 18.
Appellant complied with the traffic stop. At no point while Appellant
was driving did Officer Daransky observe Appellant commit any motor
vehicle violations. Id. at 13-15. After backup arrived, Officer Daransky
approached Appellant as he sat in the driver’s seat of the vehicle. Id. at 14.
Appellant’s eyes were glassy, red, and the pupils were dilated. Id. at 15.
Based on these observations, Officer Daransky believed that Appellant may
have been under the influence of a controlled substance and asked him to
perform three field sobriety tests. See Affidavit of Probable Cause at 2.1
Based on his performance of the tests and Officer Daransky’s observations,
Appellant was placed under arrest for DUI of an unknown controlled
1 At the nonjury trial, counsel for both parties stipulated to the entry of the
affidavit of probable cause, Officer Daransky’s suppression hearing
testimony, the incident report, the lab report for Appellant’s blood draw, and
photographs from the scene, to establish the elements of the crimes
charged. N.T., 2/15/2018, at 2-3.
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substance. Id. Thereafter, Appellant was subjected to a blood draw, which
revealed the presence of cannabinoids and fentanyl in his blood. N.T.,
2/15/2018, at 3.
Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress. A hearing was held
where the aforementioned facts were developed. The trial court took the
matter under advisement, and denied the motion on January 18, 2018.2
N.T., 1/18/2018, at 2. Thereafter, Appellant was convicted following a
stipulated nonjury trial and sentenced as indicated above.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.3 Appellant presents one
question for this Court’s consideration: “Whether the trial court erred in
denying [Appellant’s] motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic
stop that was predicated entirely on an uncorroborated anonymous tip, and
thus was not supported by reasonable suspicion, in violation of the federal
2 The trial court did not issue its suppression findings of fact and conclusions
of law, as mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I), until after Appellant filed this
appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/2018. See also N.T., 1/18/2018, at
2; N.T., 2/15/2018, at 3. “[T]he filing of a 1925(a) opinion is no substitute
for the failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record
at the conclusion of a suppression hearing in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P.
581(I).” Commonwealth v. Grundza, 819 A.2d 66, 68 n.1 (Pa. Super.
2003). See also Commonwealth v. Millner, 888 A.2d 680, 688–89 (Pa.
2005) (explaining the important purposes served by Rule 581(I)). However,
in light of our disposition, this error is moot.
3 Appellant complied with the trial court’s order to file a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial
court filed its previously written but unfiled findings of fact and conclusions
of law, see supra n.2, to satisfy the mandates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
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and Pennsylvania constitutions.” Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary
capitalization omitted).
We consider Appellant’s question mindful of the following.
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of
a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record
and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record
as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and
may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous.
Where ... the appeal of the determination of the suppression
court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s
legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose
duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied
the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the court[]
below are subject to our plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Perel, 107 A.3d 185, 188 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010)).
Our jurisprudence delineates interactions between police and citizens
into three levels.
The first, a “mere encounter,” does not require any level of
suspicion or carry any official compulsion to stop or respond. The
second, an “investigative detention,” permits the temporary
detention of an individual if supported by reasonable suspicion.
The third is an arrest or custodial detention, which must be
supported by probable cause.
In evaluating the level of interaction, courts conduct an
objective examination of the totality of the surrounding
circumstances. …
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Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).
In denying Appellant’s suppression motion, the trial court concluded
that Officer Daransky’s activation of his lights and siren to conduct a traffic
stop constituted a mere encounter to check on Appellant’s well-being based
on the 911 dispatch, and therefore Officer Daransky did not need reasonable
suspicion to initiate the stop. Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/2018, at 3
(unnumbered). On appeal, Appellant argues that the traffic stop amounted
to an investigative detention, requiring reasonable suspicion to justify the
stop. Appellant’s Brief at 10-11 (citing Commonwealth v. Livingstone,
174 A.3d 609 (Pa. 2017))4. The Commonwealth defers to this Court as to
whether the trial court committed legal error in concluding that the traffic
stop was a mere encounter. Commonwealth’s Brief at 7.
In Livingstone, which was decided approximately two months before
the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s suppression motion, our Supreme Court
held that the activation of a police vehicle’s lights and sirens to initiate a
traffic stop constitutes an investigative detention. In so holding, our
Supreme Court explained as follows.
It is undeniable that emergency lights on police vehicles in this
Commonwealth serve important safety purposes, including
ensuring that the police vehicle is visible to traffic, and signaling
to a stopped motorist that it is a police officer, as opposed to a
4 “While each section of the opinion garnered different votes, we note that
all sections of Livingstone obtained a majority.” Commonwealth v.
Edwards, 194 A.3d 625, 633 (Pa. Super. 2018).
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potentially dangerous stranger, who is approaching. Moreover,
we do not doubt that a reasonable person may recognize that a
police officer might activate his vehicle’s emergency lights for
safety purposes, as opposed to a command to stop.
Nevertheless, upon consideration of the realities of everyday life,
particularly the relationship between ordinary citizens and law
enforcement, we simply cannot pretend that a reasonable
person, innocent of any crime, would not interpret the activation
of emergency lights on a police vehicle as a signal that he or she
is not free to leave.
174 A.3d at 621 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, pursuant to Livingstone, once Officer Daransky activated
his vehicle’s lights and siren to initiate the traffic stop, Appellant was
subjected to an investigatory detention. Therefore, the trial court erred in
finding the interaction was a mere encounter. However, our inquiry does not
end there. We must now determine whether Officer Daransky possessed
reasonable suspicion necessary to stop Appellant’s vehicle.
An investigatory stop, which subjects a suspect to a stop
and a period of detention but does not involve such coercive
conditions as to constitute an arrest, requires a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Reasonable suspicion
depends upon both the content of the information possessed by
the police and its degree of reliability. Thus, quantity and quality
of information are considered when assessing the totality of the
circumstances. If information has a low degree of reliability,
then more information is required to establish reasonable
suspicion.
Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 750 A.2d 807, 811 (Pa. 2000) (citations
omitted). “When the police receive unverified information that a person is
engaged in illegal activity, the police may observe the suspect and conduct
an investigation. If police surveillance produces a reasonable suspicion of
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criminal conduct, the suspect may be stopped and questioned.” Id. at 811-
12.
Here, it is undisputed that Officer Daransky did not observe Appellant
commit any motor vehicle violations prior to activating his lights and siren
for a traffic stop. Rather, the traffic stop was initiated for a well-being check
based solely on the 911 dispatch. Namely, the anonymous5 call to 911
alleged that a male was unconscious behind the steering wheel of a specific
red Corolla in a specific Wendy’s parking lot. Upon arriving on scene, Officer
Daransky did not find any evidence to corroborate this anonymous tip.
Rather, he observed the driver of the identified Corolla to be conscious and
making a right-hand turn out of a GetGo gas station. Thus, there was no
corroboration of the anonymous tipster’s allegations; Officer Daransky’s brief
surveillance in fact refuted the allegations.
Although essentially abandoned on appeal, the Commonwealth argued
at the suppression hearing that the stop could be justified by Officer
Daransky’s acting pursuant to the public servant exception of the community
caretaking doctrine. Commonwealth’s Brief at 10 (citing N.T., 10/13/2017,
at 13-14). The community caretaking doctrine encompasses three
5 The Commonwealth did not establish at the suppression hearing that the
caller was identified, and on appeal it concedes that “Appellant succinctly
explains in his brief and supplemental brief why the anonymous 911 call
alone was insufficient and that Officer Daransky observed nothing to support
the information from the call.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 10 (emphasis
added; unnecessary capitalization omitted).
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exceptions: “the emergency aid exception; the automobile
impoundment/inventory exception; and the public servant exception[.]”
Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 627-28. In Livingstone, our Supreme Court
recognized that “police officers engage in a myriad of activities that ensure
the safety and welfare of our Commonwealth’s citizens. Indeed, we want to
encourage such laudable activity. However, even community caretaking
activity must be performed in accordance with Fourth Amendment
protections.” 174 A.3d at 629. As such, the Court held that “in order for the
public servant exception of the community caretaking doctrine to apply,
police officers must be able to point to specific, objective, and articulable
facts that would reasonably suggest to an experienced officer that a citizen
is in need of assistance.” Id. at 634.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that any perceived reason to
check on the well-being of an unconscious individual was nullified upon
Officer Daransky observing that Appellant was conscious and driving without
committing any motor vehicle violations. Simply stated, there were no facts
that Officer Daransky could point to suggesting that Appellant was in need of
assistance.
As well-intentioned as Officer Daransky’s motives may have been,
based upon our review of the record, we conclude that there is no evidence
to support a finding that he possessed the reasonable suspicion necessary to
stop Appellant’s vehicle. Because he did not possess such reasonable
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suspicion, the investigatory detention was illegal, and the trial court erred in
concluding otherwise. Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of
sentence and reverse the order denying the suppression motion.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Order reversed. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/7/2019
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