Com. v. Boots, L.

J-S48001-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
LACEY ANN BOOTS
Appellant No. 297 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 22, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0005335-2014
BEFORE: BOWES, DUBOW AND MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J: FILED JUNE 24, 2016
Lacey Ann Boots appeals from the judgment of sentence of one year
probation that was imposed after she was convicted at a nonjury trial of
endangering the welfare of a child (“EWOC”) and leaving a child unattended
in a vehicle. We affirm.
The trial evidence was as follows. Sometime between 11:15 and
11:30 p.m. on January 19, 2014, Katie McKrell arrived at her residence on
Penn Street, Natrona Heights. She observed the car owned by Appellant,
her neighbor, parked nearby. Approximately one hour later, after hearing
crying outside, Ms. McKrell left her home and discovered a toddler, who was
between two and three years old, strapped inside Appellant’s vehicle. The
boy was unsuccessfully attempting to extricate himself from an adult seat
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belt, and also was crying and shivering. Ms. McKrell took the child inside her
home and covered him with a blanket.
Ms. McKrell’s boyfriend knocked on Appellant’s door, and, since there
was no response, Ms. McKrell contacted police. At 1:20 a.m. on January 20,
2014, Harrison Township Police Officer Scott Falkner responded to the call.
Officer Falkner testified that the toddler was crying and shivering and that
the temperature that night was around thirty degrees Fahrenheit.
Officer Falkner proceeded to Appellant’s home. He was allowed inside,
where about five other children were present. Appellant told Officer Falkner
that she had instructed her eight-year-old child to bring the toddler inside
from the vehicle and that she believed that her directive was followed.
Emergency medical personnel responded to the scene. The boy had a body
temperature that was below normal and appeared frightened. He was
transported to a hospital for treatment.
At trial, Appellant maintained that her statement to Officer Falkner
that she thought her eight-year-old child brought the toddler inside
established that she did not knowingly leave her child in the car. The trial
court rejected the proffered defense, convicted Appellant of EWOC and
leaving a child unattended in a vehicle, and sentenced her to one year
probation. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Appellant raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting her EWOC conviction. She questions whether “the
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evidence [was] sufficient to establish that Ms. Boots knowingly left her child
in the vehicle as she thought her oldest child had taken the child inside?”
Appellant’s Brief at 4. The applicable standard of review of this claim is well
settled:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we
may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
[that of] the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying
the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier
of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or
none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Irvin, 134 A.3d 67, 75-76 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation
omitted).
The offense of EWOC is defined, in pertinent part, as follows: "(1) A
parent, guardian or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18
years of age . . . commits an offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare
of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or support.” 18 Pa.C.S. §
4304(a)(1) (emphasis added). In this case, Appellant challenges that the
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Commonwealth established the intent element, i.e., that she knowingly
endangered her child’s care. She posits that, at the time of the incident, she
thought that he had been brought inside rather than left in the cold.
Our Supreme Court has noted that, while the crime in question is a
specific intent crime, the “EWOC statute is necessarily drawn broadly to
capture conduct that endangers the welfare of a child.” Commonwealth v.
Lynn, 114 A.3d 796, 819 (Pa. 2015). EWOC is committed not only when a
person takes an affirmative action that endangers a child, but also when a
person who has a duty to protect a child commits an act of omission that
endangers the victim’s welfare. Id.; Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 515
A.2d 311, 315 (Pa.Super 1986) (quoting in part 18 Pa.C.S § 4304) (“a
parent's duty to protect his or her child requires affirmative performance to
prevent harm and that failure to act may mean that the parent ‘knowingly
endangers the welfare of the child.’”). In Lynn, the Supreme Court adopted
the intent element as mandating that
(1) the accused is aware of his/her duty to protect the child; (2)
the accused is aware that the child is in circumstances that could
threaten the child's physical or psychological welfare; and (3)
the accused has either failed to act or has taken action so lame
or meager that such actions cannot reasonably be expected to
protect the child's welfare.
Lynn, supra at 819.
Appellant herein does not deny that she had a duty to protect her child
and that he was in circumstances that threatened his welfare since he was
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alone in a car for close to two hours in below-freezing temperatures. She
avers that she took an action, instructing her older child to remove him from
the car, to protect the boy and argues that, due to her reliance upon the
older child’s compliance with her instruction, she sought to protect his
welfare.
Appellant analogizes her case to that of Commonwealth v. Miller,
600 A.2d 988 (Pa.Super. 1992), wherein we reversed a conviction for EWOC.
The defendant in Miller was the mother of a young child who was left
unattended for hours. She had been informed by her child’s father that the
child was being cared for by a neighbor, and left the child believing that
proper adult care was being provided. Based upon the fact that the mother
thought the father was truthful in his representations that the neighbor was
watching the baby, we concluded that she did not knowingly leave the child
unattended and, therefore, did not endanger the welfare of the child. This
Court in Miller ruled that parental mistakes are not sufficient to support
liability for EWOC.
The facts herein are significantly different from those examined in
Miller. Mother told an eight-year-old child, not another adult, to bring in
the toddler. She did not check on whether the eight-year-old followed her
directive. Most significantly, she was inside her home for over an hour
without viewing the toddler. Under these circumstances, she cannot
plausibly profess to have been unaware that the eight-year-old had ignored
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her instruction to bring the victim inside from the freezing weather.
Therefore, viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, as the verdict winner, we conclude that there was sufficient
proof to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant knowingly
left her son in a situation that endangered him.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/24/2016
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