In Re: Adoption of: E.D.S., a Minor

J-S50017-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: E.D.S., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: N.M.S., MOTHER No. 2218 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order dated November 18, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Orphans’
Court, at No: 19 Adoptions 2015
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.M.S., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: N.M.S., MOTHER No. 2219 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order dated November 18, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Orphans’
Court, at No: 20 Adoptions 2015
BEFORE: MUNDY, STABILE, and FITZGERALD*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JULY 11, 2016
Appellant, N.M.S. (Mother), appeals from the November 18, 2015
decree involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her legally adopted
sons, E.D.S., born in July 2000, and A.M.S., born in May 1999. Upon careful
review, we affirm.1
On March 5, 2015, T.D.S. (Father) and his wife, C.M.S. (Stepmother),
filed petitions for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to
E.D.S. and A.M.S., biological brothers whom Mother and Father adopted
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
The Guardian ad Litem (GAL) filed a brief in this appeal in support of the
termination decree.
J-S50017-16
from Guatemala in 2005, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b). In
addition, on March 5, 2015, Stepmother filed a petition for adoption of
E.D.S. and A.M.S.
Hearings were held on the termination petitions on June 26, 2015, July
31, 2015, and October 12, 2015. Father testified on his own behalf, and he
presented the testimony of Tegan Blackbird, Ph.D.; the parties’ daughters,
T.S., age 29, and C.S., age 22; Stepmother; and Deborah L. Salem, a
clinical evaluator. Mother testified on her own behalf, and she presented the
testimony of Annette Cremo, Ph.D., and Laura Pittman, Ph.D.
In its opinion accompanying the subject decree, the orphans’ court set
forth the relevant factual and procedural history of this case, which the
testimonial and documentary evidence supports. As such, we adopt it
herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/18/15, at 2-5.
By decree dated and entered on November 18, 2015, the orphans’
court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to E.D.S. and A.M.S.
On December 17, 2015, Mother timely filed notices of appeal and concise
statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule
of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which this Court consolidated
sua sponte. The orphans’ court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on January 14,
2016.
On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review:
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1. Whether the [orphans’] court improperly denied Mother’s
request to deny Father’s petition to involuntarily terminate
parental rights?
2. Whether the [orphans’] court abused its discretion by
terminating Mother’s parental rights?
Mother’s brief at 9.
We consider Mother’s issues mindful of our well-settled standard of
review.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
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determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The
burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights
are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Instantly, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
...
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall
not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).
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We have explained:
To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(1), the moving
party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct,
sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the
termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish
parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform
parental duties.
In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 510 (Pa. Super. 2006). Notably,
with respect to the six-month period prior to filing the termination petition:
[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given case
and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision.
The court must examine the individual circumstances of each
case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing
termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the
evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly
warrants the involuntary termination.
In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). In
addition,
Section 2511 does not require that the parent demonstrate both
a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child and
refusal or failure to perform parental duties. Accordingly,
parental rights may be terminated pursuant to [s]ection
2511(a)(1) if the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose
of relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to perform
parental duties.
In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998). Further,
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental
duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the
court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s
explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment
contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the
effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to
Section 2511(b).
Id. at 92 (citation omitted).
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We have explained “parental duties” as follows:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental
duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A
child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These
needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely
passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court
has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which
requires affirmative performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
genuine effort to maintain communication and association with
the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty
requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place
of importance in the child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good
faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order
to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her
ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all
available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and
must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed
in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental
rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while
others provide the child with his or her physical and emotional
needs.
In re B.,N.M., supra at 855 (citations omitted).
Moreover,
It is incumbent upon a parent when separated from his child to
maintain communication and association with the child. This
requires an affirmative demonstration of parental devotion,
imposing upon the parent the duty to exert himself, to take and
maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.
In re G.P.−R., 851 A.2d 967, 976 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has explained the requisite
analysis as follows:
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884
A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated,
“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are
involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.”
In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern
the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost
attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that
bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a
bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no
bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super.
2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis
necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.
Id. at 63.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
In her first issue on appeal, Mother argues that the orphans’ court
improperly denied her request to dismiss Father’s involuntary termination
petition. On the first day of the termination hearing, before any evidence
was presented, Mother’s counsel made a request on the record in open court
that the court dismiss Father’s petition. See N.T., 6/26/15, at 5-6. Counsel
asserted that, within the six months immediately preceding the filing of the
termination petition, Mother filed a petition for special relief and a petition
for modification of the existing custody order. Id. The orphans’ court
denied Mother’s request, stating, in part, “Well that’s what the record may
show, the record doesn’t necessarily show yet. That’s not in the record.
You are telling me that.” Id. at 5-6.
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Mother cites In re Adoption of M.R.D., 128 A.3d 1249 (Pa. Super.
2015) (en banc), appeal granted, 133 A.3d 293 (Pa. 2016), wherein we
stated that, “All explanations considered, if the parent makes reasonable
attempts to overcome obstacles created by the party seeking termination,
then the parent’s failure to pursue legal action more promptly will not alone
justify termination.” Id. at 1262 (citing In re Adoption of L.J.B., 18 A.3d
1098, 1122 (Pa. 2011)). To the best that we can discern, Mother asserts
that, because she filed a petition to modify custody within six months before
Father filed the termination petition, the court was prohibited from
terminating her parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1).
Contrary to her assertion, M.R.D., supra, is inapplicable for the
proposition Mother asserts. Neither this Court’s decision in that case nor any
case or statutory authority holds that pursuing legal action for custody rights
within six months preceding the filing of a termination petition mandates the
dismissal of the petition. Rather, a trial court “must consider the whole
history of a given case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory
provision.” In re B.N.M., supra. Therefore, we conclude that the orphans’
court did not err in failing to summarily dismiss Father’s termination petition
and conducting an evidentiary hearing in this case. Mother’s first issue fails.
The evidence presented during the hearing demonstrated that,
following the parties’ marital separation in 2009, an agreed-upon July 15,
2010 custody order granted Father primary physical custody and Mother
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supervised partial physical custody, which she never exercised.2 Trial Court
Opinion, 11/18/15, at 2-3; Petitioner’s Exhibit 1. On December 28, 2012,
Mother filed a petition for emergency relief, wherein she alleged that Father
has alienated E.D.S. and A.M.S. from her. Mother requested joint legal
custody, partial physical custody, and counseling for E.D.S. and A.M.S. Trial
Court Opinion, 11/18/15, at 4; Respondent’s Exhibit 5. This resulted in a
second agreed-upon custody order dated June 24, 2013, which granted
Father sole legal and physical custody. Id.; Petitioners’ Exhibit 5. The order
directed Mother to participate in therapy with a professional selected by the
custody evaluator, Deborah Salem, for the purpose of preparing her to begin
the reunification process with E.D.S. and A.M.S. Trial Court Opinion,
11/18/15, at 4; Petitioners’ Exhibit 5.
The orphans’ court found that, following the June 2013 order, “Mother
demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to follow through, resulting in her
failure to see [E.D.S. and A.M.S.] to this date.” Trial Court Opinion,
11/18/15, at 5. The testimony of Dr. Blackbird, the professional selected by
Ms. Salem, supports the court’s finding. Indeed, Dr. Blackbird testified that
he met with Mother three or four times, and then she discontinued
treatment. N.T., 6/26/15, at 67.
On February 15, 2015, Mother filed a petition for modification of the
June 2013 custody order. The orphans’ court aptly noted that, “[o]ther than
2
The order also granted the parties shared legal custody. Petitioner’s
Exhibit 1.
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a text message shortly before the first [day of the termination] hearing,
Mother has not communicated with [E.D.S. and A.M.S.] since July 12, 2010.”
Trial Court Opinion, 11/18/15, at 5.
Nevertheless, Mother argues in her second issue on appeal that her
conduct did not warrant termination of her parental rights under Section
2511(a)(1). She argues that the court “completely overlooked all of
Mother’s testimony. . . . The [ ] court did not consider the hostile
environment that Father created for Mother and the minor boys while the
parties still lived in the same house.” Mother’s brief at 38. We disagree.
The court explained in its opinion accompanying the subject decree as
follows.
This is not a case where Father rebuffed Mother’s repeated,
plaintive requests to see the boys. To the contrary, the only
“roadblocks” to Mother maintaining contact with the boys and
performing parental duties were two court orders. The 2010
order was entered by stipulation in open court and gave Mother
an easy path to have immediate supervised visits. Her
explanations were hollow regarding her failure to pick up the
phone and call any of the potential supervisors or to ask the
court to name a new one. Instead of swallowing her pride and
moving forward, Mother did nothing and the boys went on with
their lives.
The 2013 order recognized Mother’s failures and set forth a step-
by-step plan. Although she arguably took one step forward by
meeting with Dr. Tegan Blackbird, Mother failed to follow
through with him, providing equally hollow excuses. After
hearing Deb[orah] Salem’s testimony and reviewing her
evaluations, Mother’s actions did not surprise us. Although
much could be said, it all boils down to Mother’s refusal to take
responsibility for any of the problems that brought the parties to
court for custody, [ ] and now the termination of her parental
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rights. The evidence in support of termination is not only clear
and convincing, it is compelling.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/18/15, at 9-10.
Upon review, we conclude that the foregoing factual findings and
credibility determinations against Mother by the court are supported by the
testimonial and documentary evidence. The record overwhelmingly
demonstrates that Mother failed to perform her parental duties since she left
the marital home in July of 2010. Since that time, Mother has neither seen
nor written to E.D.S. or A.M.S. N.T., 7/31/15, at 23, 38-39. She failed to
exercise her agreed-upon supervised partial physical custody set forth in the
July 2010 custody order. Thereafter, she failed to pursue reunification with
her sons by following the agreed-upon June 2013 custody order. Upon
careful review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the orphans’ court in
finding hollow Mother’s explanations for this conduct. Therefore, we reject
Mother’s argument with respect to Section 2511(a)(1).
With respect to Section 2511(b), Mother argues that the termination of
her parental rights does not serve the developmental and emotional needs
and welfare of E.D.S. and A.M.S. because the court “recognized that the
minor boys required continuous counsel[]ing not only for the marital discord
of the parties but because of the minor boys[’] abusive and troubling
childhood in Guatemala. Father does not believe that the minor boys require
counsel[]ing if Mother remains out of their lives.” Mother’s brief at 35. As
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such, Mother argues that, by terminating her parental rights, the court “has
ensured the minor boys will not receive counsel[]ing.” Id. at 55.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court responded as follows.
Ironically, our exchange with counsel at the close of the
proceedings was laden with our concerns that the boys would
need counseling to deal with this situation. [N.T., 10/12/15, at
80-85.] Likewise, we were concerned with the counseling the
boys received over the years. In short, we did consider this, but
the best counseling in the world would only help the boys deal
with Mother’ s actions and inactions -- it would not have changed
the end result of termination.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/14/16, at 8 (footnote omitted).
We agree with the court that, whether or not Father obtains counseling
in the future for E.D.S. and A.M.S. is irrelevant to the termination of
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). Indeed, the emphasis
in a Section 2511(b) analysis is on the nature and status of the parent-child
bond and whether severing that bond will be detrimental to the physical,
developmental, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. See In re
Adoption of J.M., supra.
The orphans’ court aptly found:
The record of this case is replete with evidence that there is no
bond between the boys and Mother. Indeed, as noted in
Deb[orah] Salem’s evaluations, to the extent there was a bond,
it was unhealthy. Additionally, Mother could not point to any
evidence that a bond still exists, and her expert failed to
convince us that reunification counseling should be pursued to
see if a bond could be forged. . . .
[W]e are eminently satisfied that [Stepmother] has been the
mother for at least the past four years and is the only one
capable of providing that nurturing relationship alongside of
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Father. In fact, we are more concerned with the impact on the
boys’ relationship with [Stepmother] if we attempted Mother’s
request for reunification counseling. That would be a travesty -
it might serve to assuage Mother’s feelings of guilt, but it would
not to be beneficial to the boys in any way, shape[,] or form.
Indeed, the mere receipt of a text from Mother sent one child
into a near tailspin.[3]
[ ] The evidence is clear, convincing and competent to
demonstrate not only that Mother has failed to perform her
parental duties, but also that termination of Mother’s parental
rights will best serve the boys’ physical, developmental, and
emotional needs and welfare.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/18/15, at 10-11 (emphasis in original).
Upon careful review of the testimonial evidence, we discern no abuse
of discretion by the court in terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to
Section 2511(b). Further, we conclude that the entirety of the court
opinions comprehensively expound on Mother’s issues, and we adopt and
incorporate the orphans’ court’s November 18, 2015 and January 14, 2016
opinions with this Memorandum in affirming the termination decree.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/11/2016
3
Father testified that, in May 2015, Mother sent a text message to E.D.S.
wishing A.M.S. a happy birthday. N.T., 6/26/15, at 10. Father testified that
A.M.S. “was so scared [Mother] was going to come and get him. It was
horrible.” Id. at 40.
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·-- Circulated 06/30/2016 11:57 AM
IN RE: ADOPTION OF : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
E.D.S., a minor : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
; 19 ADOPTIONS 2015 ./
IN RE: ADOPTION OF IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
A.M.S., a minor CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
: 20 ADOPTIONS 2015
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PENNSYLVANIA RULE OF
-~
r • )
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 1925 ,...::.,
CT>
Masland, J., January 13, 2016:-- - r -
I. Introduction a
. I 2015 Pa. Super. 32, was proven to be correct by the
December 8 en bane Superior Court opinion at 2015 Pa. Super. 255. In short,
President Judge Gantman's opinion confirms our conclusion that Father's
motivation for filing to terminate Mother's rights was not retaliatory.
8. Whether the Trial Court committed reversible error by terminating
Appellant'sparental rights?
3
Notes of Testimony July 31, 2014, at 234, (hereafter N.T., July 31, at_).
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1. The Trial Court completely overlookedall of Appellant's
testimonywhich has been Appellant'sconcern with the trial
court's handling of the custodymatter.
We did not overlook Mother's testimony in general, nor her concerns with
the handling of the custody action in particular. We found her words and her
actions, or lack thereof, regarding the custody action to be unconvincing. As we
regularly advise juries, they are free to believe "all, part or none" of the testimony
of a witness. We found very little of Mother's testimony convincing and,
therefore, rarely cited it in our opinion, except where noting our acceptance of the
obverse.
2. The Trial Courtdid not considerAppellant'stestimonyregarding
years of counsellingshe received priorto filing that petition
throughcustodycourt.
Paradoxically, we are not unsympathetic toward Mother's need for
counseling and acknowledge that the record reflects her meeting with several
counselors over the years. Unfortunately for Mother, the record reflects a failure
to follow through on the custody court's clear directions regarding counseling in
its order of June 24, 2013, which we included in our earlier opinion and excerpt
herein for ease of reference:
1. Sole legal and physical custody of A.M.S. and
E.D.S. shall be with Father.
2. Deb Salem shall select a therapist for Mother and
shall notify counsel for both parties.
3. Within 14 days, Mother shall contact the selected
therapist and schedule an appointment. She shall
then notify Deb Salem of the date of the
appointment, and Deb Salem will then discuss the
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.. .-..,
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goals and context of the therapy with the selected
therapist.
4. Mother's therapist shall contact Deb Salem when
he or she believes Mother has reached the point
where she is imminently ready to begin the
reunification process.
5. Deb Salem will then instruct Father to begin
preparatory therapy for the boys. Said therapy
shall occur for six weeks.
6. At the end of the six weeks of preparatory therapy
for the boys, a reunification strategy shall be
developed jointly by Mother's therapist, the boy's
therapist, and Deb Salem.
7. The parties shall cooperate with the selected
strategy that has been developed.
Instead of focusing on this course of counseling, which would have
provided the reunification she claims to desire, Mother wants credit for doing her
own thing. Had she abided by these directions, we might not be writing this
opinion.
3. The Trial Courtdid not identifyDeborah Salem's errorsor failures
regarding her involvementin the custodyproceedings.
We did not "identify" Ms. Salem's errors or failures because we found
none. She is not a flawless evaluator, but had we presided over the custody
action, we would have welcomed and followed her guidance. Moreover,
regardless what we might have done, the parties chose to follow her guidance in
the stipulated custody order of July 2010, and they were directed to follow her
guidance in the 2013 order as set forth above.
Mother's counsel may suggest a few errors, but our review of Ms. Salem's
testimony yielded no "smoking guns." Rather, we found confirmation of Mother's
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failures throughout Ms. Salem's testimony. We are confident Ms. Salem's
evaluations and testimony will be closely reviewed; therefore, we point to three
statements that encapsulate her efforts:
a. Her Approach - "Essentially, every custody evaluator has
one job and it is to look into and investigate the best
interests of the children. It isn't to weigh-in on
somebody's side. It isn't to proffer an opinion for any one
specific person, but rather to look directly at the
children."4
b. Her Desire - "I did not believe it was fair not to give
[Mother] another chance . . . and I thought with the right
intervention, with dad having primary, that it could be
worked out. And nothing would be better for the boys
then [sic] for them to know it wasn't going to be a repeat
performance."5
c. Her Disappointment - "And the most profound thing I
want to repeat is, there was never the need to have
therapy and pay for therapy before supervised contact
with the boys could begin. If you read the court order,
that was not at all a requirement. And I believe it was in
[Mother's] and the boys' best interest to begin to see
each other right away ... There was no - that wasn't the
restriction."6
In sum, Ms. Salem was not only credible and convincing, but was also
compassionate. Would that Mother had appreciated this.
4. The Trial Court did not considerthe PetitionerFather's failureto
complywith the Orders for Custody.
We did not operate under the delusion that Father was a paragon of virtue
throughout this saga. That was clear from his own testimony, not to mention Ms.
Salem's even-handed assessment. We recognize the need for zealous
advocacy, but this argument only confirms Mother's delusion that everyone else
4
N.T., July 31, at 149.
5
N.T., July 31, at 159.
6
N.T., July 31, at 175-6.
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20 ADOPTIONS 2015
is to blame. Further argument on our part would appear abusive and we will
yield to Father's counsel on this point.
5. The Trial Court did not considerDr. Laurie Pittman'sassessment
of Petitioner Father allowing the parties'adult daughters to
testify.
In family matters, we would rather chew tinfoil than hear a child testify
against a parent ... a parent testify against a child ... a brother testify against his
brother ... but, alas, such is the lot of family law judges. Dr. Pittman's
assessment that Father was a bad father for allowing his adult daughters to
testify is wonderful in theory; however, the record in this case would not be
complete without the testimony of the daughters. Further, if Mother could have
benefited from their testimony, as with her manipulation of the boys, she would
have placed them on the stand in an instant.
6. The Trial Court did not considerAppellant'sconcerns and issues
with Dr. Tegan Blackbird.
We found Mother's concerns with Dr. Blackbird to be appallingly
insignificant when viewed in light of what she knew she had to do for
reunification. As Ms. Salem's noted incredulously, "somehow the payment of
therapy and other things just seemed to be the reason [for not following through
with Dr. Blackbird] ... "7 We share Ms. Salem's incredulity regarding Mother's
excuses. Conversely, Dr. Blackbird was credible and, despite Mother's excuses,
offered the clearest avenue to reunification.
7
N.T., July 31, at 176.
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7. The Trial Courtdid not considerDr. Laurie Pittman'sassessment
of the minor'sneed for counsellingduringthe custody
proceedings.
Ironically, our exchange with counsel at the close of the proceedings was
laden with our concerns that the boys would need counseling to deal with this
situation.8 Likewise, we were concerned with the counseling the boys received
over the years. In short, we did consider this, but the best counseling in the
world would only help the boys deal with Mother's actions and inactions - it
would not have changed the end result of termination.
8. The Trial Courtdid not considerthe PetitionerFather's violent
conducttowards Appellant.
We are not shocked with Mother's approach to this appeal. She must take
the focus off her behavior and place it elsewhere. Father and the court are the
obvious and usual suspects. Thus, there are several claims of error dealing with
our lack of appreciation of how horrible Father was to Mother. No doubt, the
parties were the worst of spouses, but laying some blame at Father's feet does
not justify Mother's failure to be a mother. As noted, we did not accept much of
Mother's testimony as being credible. Perforce, this tempered our view of
Mother's allegations about Father's conduct.
9. The Trial Court did not considerDr. Laurie Pittman'sassessment
of Appellant.
We considered Dr. Pittman's relatively brief testimony in its entirety, and in
conjunction with all the other testimony, we formed an opinion of Mother's
behavior. The testimony of Dr. Pittman augmented our views, but given that her
8
Notes of Testimony, October 12, 2015, at 80-85, (hereafter N.T., October 12, at_).
-8-
19 ADOPTIONS 20 .
-. ·-
20 ADOPTIONS 2015
primary source of information was Mother, who was only partially credible, we did
not accept her assessment as a means to transform Mother into the victim role
she has assumed.
10. The Trial Court did not recognize Appellant'scompliance with
custody orders' recommendations.
Mother's compliance with a few aspects of the custody orders was far
outweighed by her non-compliance, which has been amply discussed already.
C. Whether the Trial Court committed reversible error in determining
that the best interestof the Children would be served by terminating
parental rights?
Although the best interest of the children was covered substantially in our
November opinion, we will briefly address Mother's specific claims of error.
1. The Trial Court did not considerDr. Tegan Blackbird'stestimony
that the minorwas receptive to reunification.
To say that the boys were receptive to reunification is an overstatement. It
was our impression that the boys were "tentatively" receptive to meeting with
Mother, not that they were receptive to the entire reunification process.
Regardless, Mother never allowed matters to proceed to even the first meeting.
We suggest that the court review Dr. Blackbird's testimony as a whole and
not an isolated statement. Taken as a whole, we concluded the following:
a. Dr. Blackbird's goal was to help Mother become
more aware of her own issues and the needs of
the boys in preparation for reunification.
b. Unlike Mother's individual therapists/counselors,
Dr. Blackbird was aware of the animosity and
hostility coming from both parents and noted that
Mother needed to work through her anger and her
feelings of victimization.
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19 ADOPTIONS 20 .
20 ADOPTIONS 2015
c. On September 17, 2013, Dr. Blackbird laid the
groundwork for an initial meeting between the
boys and Mother. Despite their strong resistance
to having any relationship with Mother, Dr.
Blackbird successfully moved the boys towards a
willingness to at least meet with Mother.
d. On September 18, 2013, Dr. Blackbird attempted
to challenge Mother to address the 2% years of no
contact with the boys. Unfortunately, because
Mother discontinued treatment after she was
confronted with her own behavior in this fourth and
final session, they never reached the point
contemplated in the 2013 order. Thus, Dr.
Blackbird never contacted Ms. Salem to inform her
that Mother was "imminently ready to begin the
reunification process."
In sum, because of Mother's failure to follow through on the second
chance afforded her, we resolved that the boys must not be forced, over two
years later, down another road of trauma and disappointment.
2. The Trial Courtdid not considerthe issuespresented by the
minor not attending counsellingthroughoutthe custody
proceedings.
There were many troubling aspects of this case. However, the nature and
frequency of the counseling received by the boys was far from determinative.
Notably, the counseling the boys received following the 2010 order, coupled with
Mother's failure to avail herself of supervised visits, resulted in a positive change
in their demeanor as recognized by Dr. Blackbird and Ms. Salem. Admittedly,
their attitudes and outlook were improved largely because of Mother's unforced
absence and the feeling that the relationship with her was over - things that may
require counseling down the road. Nevertheless, we will not fault Father for living
in a state of denial created by Mother.
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19 ADOPTIONS 20 .
20 ADOPTIONS 2015
3. The Trial Court did not consider the issues in which the minor
attended counselling with Wendy Woods.
Please see the previous response.
4. The Trial Court did not consider Stephanie Cesare, Esquire's, the
Guardian ad Litem, recommendation in her Report of the
Guardian ad Litem dated June 24, 2015.
We found the report of the GAL to be helpful and appreciated her
questions to the witnesses in our effort to ferret out the truth as the hearings
progressed. We also found her summation helpful. Notably, at no point did the
GAL state definitively whether she believed termination was appropriate. In a
very tactful and proper manner, she pointed out her concerns with both parties
and her overriding concerns for the boys. As with almost every other aspect of
this case, the information from and through the GAL confirmed the need for
termination, not reunification.
5. The Trial Court did not consider Petitioner Father's abhorrent
conduct towards Appellant in considering the well-being of the
minor.
As often happens when counsel repeatedly ask the same questions in
court, we respond with simply "asked and answered."
6. The Trial Court did not consider Dr. Laurie Pittman's testimony
regarding the necessity for counselling for the minor, the concern
for the lack of counselling and the issue with Petitioner allowing
the parties' adult children to testify.
Our concerns with the boys future needs for counseling were and are
genuine, but they do not trump Mother's failure to be a mother. Please refer to
our response to error B. 7.
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19 ADOPTIONS 20 .
20 ADOPTIONS 2015
7. The Trial Court did not address Appellant'stestimonyor Father's
failureto workwith Appellant regarding adoptingnew
supervisorsto monitorchildren.
Sadly, the error here is that Mother cannot accept responsibility for failing
to pick up the phone and contacting any of the proposed supervisors.
8. The Trial Court did not considerPetitionerFather's failures
regarding the custodyorders and the responsibilityof Father to
have the minorparticipate in counselling.
Asked and answered.
Ill. Conclusion
We regret that in responding to Mother's claims we may sound harsh and
insensitive. We hope that it was not unduly so and have tried to temper and
cleanse our remarks where possible. Nevertheless, our ultimate goal is not to
provide balm for the parties, but for the boys. Sadly, we have concluded that can
only be accomplished by termination of Mother's rights.
By the Court,
~{?
Albert H. Masland, J.
Jeanne B. Costopoulos, Esquire
For Petitioners
Damian J. Destefano, Esquire
For Nanci Mariko Samento
Stephanie Cesare, Esquire
Guardian ad /item for the Children
:sal
-12-
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
COURTOFCOMMONPLEASOF
In Re: EDS & AMS CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 19ADOPT2015&20ADOPT2015
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF ORDER
JUDGE'S INITIALS: A!...!.!..!H.!.!.M!...__ _
TIMESTAMPDATE: ~o~,1~14~n~o~1~6----------------------~
INRE: =O~P~IN~I=O~N'------------------------~
................................................................... , ,
SERVICE TO: JEANNE COSTOPOULOS. 5000 RITTER RD STE 20?. MECHANICSBURG PA 17055
DAMIAN DESTEFANO. ?331 MARKET ST. CAMP HILL PA 17011
STEPHANIE CESARE. 2 W HIGH STREET. CARLISLE PA 17013
METHOD OF MAILING: ENVELOPES PROVIDED BY:
~ USPS O PETITIONER
DRRR ~ JUDGE
O HAND DELIVERED O CLERK OF ORPHANS COURT
OOTHER __
MAILED: 01/14/2016
.............................................. , , .
SERVICE TO:
METHOD OF MAILING: ENVELOPES PROVIDED BY:
ousrs O PETITIONER
DRRR 0JUDGE
O HAND DELIVERED O CLERK OF ORPHANS COURT
OOTHER __
MAILED:
Circulated 06/30/2016 11:57 AM
IN RE: ADOPTION OF : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
E.D.S., a minor : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
: 19 ADOPTIONS 2015
IN RE: ADOPTION OF : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
A.M.S., a minor : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
faooPTIONS2015
IN RE: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this /l~ay of November, 2015, following hearings on
June 26, 2015, July 31, 2015, and October 12, 2015, the Petitions for Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights of N.S. with respect to E.D.S. (born July 2000)
and A.M.S. (born May 1999) are hereby GRANTED and her parental rights are
TERMINATED forever, with all the effects of such decree as provided in Section
2521 of the Adoption Act, including extinguishment of the power or right to object
to or receive notice of adoption proceedings.
Sole physical and legal custody of E.D.S. and A.M.S. is hereby awarded
to Petitioner, T.S.
By the Court,
• 1
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r
19 ADOPTIONS 201ti
20 ADOPTIONS 2015
Jeanne B. Costopoulos, Esquire
For Petitioners
Damian J. Destefano, Esquire
For Nanci Mariko Samento
Stephanie Cesare, Esquire
Guardian ad /item for the Children
:sal
-2-
""" __ , __
IN RE: ADOPTION OF : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
E.D.S., a minor : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
: 19 ADOPTIONS 2015
IN RE: ADOPTION OF IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
A.M.S., a minor CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
: 20 ADOPTIONS 2015
IN RE: TERMINATION OF PARENT AL RIGHTS
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Masland, J., November 18, 2015:--
I. Introduction
Before the court are the Petitions for Involuntary Termination of the
Parental Rights of N.M.S. (Mother) filed by T.S. (Father) and C.S. (Adoptive
Mother) regarding the minor children E.D.S. (born July 2000) and A.M.S. (born
May 1999). Because the parties are well aware of the tortuous procedural and
factual background of this case, we will save the full recitation for a likely 1925
opinion for the Superior Court.
As a wiser jurist than I advised me, "tough cases do not get easier with
time." This case may be simple from the perspective of what must be done;
however, doing it is far from easy. Although this matter has been prolonged far
too long by the parties themselves, my characteristic reluctance to terminate has
extended their anxiety longer than warranted.
Therefore, we will not countenance the quixotic, time-consuming
measures that would be required by Mother's last-ditch request to fan embers
19 ADOPTIONS 201 b
20 ADOPTIONS 2015
that have long since grown cold. Instead, in recognition that there are no bonds
to salvage, we will terminate Mother's parental rights - the only measure that will
provide hope for the children. Nevertheless, out of recognition for the pain this
will cause Mother, we issue this opinion with only the basic, unembellished facts
necessary to support our decision.
II. Background
Mother and Father adopted the minor children in 2005, in an international
adoption that removed them from a physically abusive home in Guatemala. The
children, natural brothers, joined a seemingly well-adjusted family that included
three now-adult sisters, B.S., Ti.S. and C.S.
Sadly, within four years the marriage had deteriorated to the point that
Father filed for divorce in November of 2009. We will not recite the myriad of
allegations that arose as to the cause of the marital problems. Suffice it to say
that neither Mother nor Father was the best of spouses. More importantly for our
purposes, the first custody order issued on July 15, 2010, not only noted the
parties' intense animus for one another, but also recognized deficits in their
parental abilities, particularly Mother's.
Significantly, the July 2010 order was the result of a comprehensive
stipulation presented in open court, which resulted primarily from a detailed
custody evaluation conducted by Deb Salem. Father was awarded legal custody
and primary physical custody, and Paragraph 2(8) 1 and 2 of the order granted
Mother partial custody of the boys as follows:
Alternating weekends, Saturdays and Sundays
from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., not overnight, and every
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19 ADOPTIONS 201 b
20 ADOPTIONS 2015
Thursday from 3:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.All contact
between mother and the boys will be supervised.
The supervisor for mother's time with the boys can be
mutually agreed upon by both parents and their
respective counsel and need not be a professionally
paid supervisor. The parties specificallyagree that
Angel Garcia or the youth leaders from either Grace
Community Church in Mechanicsburg or West Shore
Free in Mechanicsburg are acceptable supervisors.
In the event these supervisors are unwilling or
unavailable to provide supervision, and the
parties cannot agree on an alternate supervisor,
either party may request a conciliationconference
or hearing before the judge to make a final
determination without the need of additional
pleadings.
Mother's access to the boys will be limited
to the supervised schedule set forth above until
there is certaintythrough her chosen therapistin
collaborationwith the chosen therapist for the
boys that mother can carry out what is needed to
stop the alienation strategies with the boys. With
these interventions in place, it is hoped that there will
be a gradual increase in mother's time to
unsupervised alternating weekends, from Friday
through Sunday overnight, with a possible right of first
refusal to care for the boys at times when father is
working and she is not. (emphasis added)
Although there was much disagreement in our hearings regarding the
import and ramifications of the order, for background purposes it is important to
note solely that despite an agreement that awarded Mother partial custody, albeit
supervised, Mother never exercised her rights under this order. Indeed, the
custody action was dormant for over two years, with the arguable exception of
Mother's Petition for Special Relief filed on January 27, 2011. That petition
alleged, inter alia, that Father had posted derogatory remarks, photos and other
matters on Facebook, which caused Mother "great mental and physical pain
-3-
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19 ADOPTIONS 2010
20 ADOPTIONS 2015
[and] have also caused undeterrninabledamage to the minor children; but, have
now grown to such a degree that [Mother] fears for her safety." ,I 13. Mother's
prayer for relief in this Petition sought removal of the alleged defamatory postings
and expressed concern that the children "may gain access to" the materials.
Notably, Mother did not request any relief related to physical custody of the boys.
On December 28, 2012 Mother filed Petition for Emergency Relief that
expressed concern regarding alienation and requested joint legal custody, partial
physical custody and counseling for the boys. Deb Salem was again appointed
by the court to conduct an updated evaluation. The court relied upon her
recommendations, when it issued its order of June 24, 2013, which provided:
1. Sole legal and physical custody of A.M.S. and
E.D.S. shall be with Father.
2. Deb Salem shall select a therapist for Mother and
shall notify counsel for both parties.
3. Within 14 days, Mother shalt contact the selected
therapist and schedule an appointment. She shall
then notify Deb Salem of the date of the
appointment, and Deb Salem will then discuss the
goals and context of the therapy with the selected
therapist.
4. Mother's therapist shall contact Deb Salem when
he or she believes Mother has reached the point
where she is imminently ready to begin the
reunification process.
5. Deb Salem wit! then instruct Father to begin
preparatory therapy for the boys. Said therapy
shall occur for six weeks.
6. At the end of the six weeks of preparatory therapy
for the boys, a reunification strategy shall be
developed jointly by Mother's therapist, the boy's
therapist, and Deb Salem.
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19 ADOPTIONS 201b
20 ADOPTIONS 2015
7. The parties shall cooperate with the selected
strategy that has been developed.
The saddest and most salient fact in this case is that following this second
order, in which our colleague laid out the best of plans, Mother demonstrated an
inability or unwillingness to follow through, resulting in her failure to see the boys
to this date. And, as with her previous failures, Mother blames everything on
forces and individuals outside of her control. Mother's litany of culprits is
comprehensive, but, as we will discuss below, we fail to see the conspiracy to
thwart her desire to be a mother. Rather, her actions and inactions speak
volumes. Other than a text message shortly before the first hearing, Mother has
not communicated with the boys since July 12, 2010.
Three significant dates remain. On January 10, 2015, Father married his
current wife, C.S. On February 15, 2015, Mother filed a Petition for Modification
of the 2013 order. The termination petitions were filed on March 4, 2015.
A pre-trial conference was held on May 7, 2015, with counsel and the GAL
in attendance. Hearings were held on June 26, 2015, July 31, 2015, and
October 12, 2015.
Ill. Discussion
A. The Petitions for Termination - Retaliatory or Preventive?
Mother's threshold argument against termination is that the petitions for
termination were retaliatory in nature, having been filed in response to her
petition for modification of the custody order. Mother's pretrial memorandum
relied on the Superior Court opinion of In re: Adoption of: M.R.D. and T.M.D.,
Minor Children, 2015 Pa. Super. 32; however, the majority and dissenting
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19 ADOPTIONS 2015
20 ADOPTIONS 2015
opinions were withdrawn on April 1, 2015 and the court, sitting en bane, heard
argument on June 30, 2015. Although not controlling, we have reviewed the
M.R.D. opinions carefully, as well as In re Adoption of L.J.B., 18 A.3d 1098 (Pa.
2011), upon which the majority in M.R.D. relied heavily.
Because termination cases are highly fact dependent, our review of both
M.R.D. and L.J.B. satisfies us that the lives of E.D.S and A.M.S need not await
further refinement of the law from our appellate courts. Irrespective of the
outcome of M.R.D., we anticipate a Supreme Court review. Though we may
benefit from the abstract theory, if the Superior Court renders a decision before
we are called to write an opinion for that court, the concrete details of this case
defy comparison and eschew further delay.
Not surprisingly, we are more inclined toward President Judge Gantman's
dissenting opinion in M.R.D., which gave deference to the trial court, noting:
I think the majority misapplies the appropriate
standard of review. Although the majority
acknowledges the Orphans' court found Maternal
Grandfather's testimony credible, the majority
improperly reweighs the evidence and decides the
principal purpose of Mother and Maternal
Grandfather's petition for involuntary termination of
Father's parental rights was to punish or retaliate
against Father for seeking custody. I think the
majority infuses the petition with punitive intent.
Contrary to the majority's view, I maintain we should
permit the Orphans' court to sit as the fact-finder in
the case and respect the court's findings on the
credibility of the witnesses and the motivation for their
actions.
In this statement, the court made clear it believed
Mother and Maternal Grandfather's objective in filing
their petition was to protect Children and not to
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19 ADOPTIONS 201 o
20 ADOPTIONS 2015
retaliate or get even with Father. The timing of their
petition is not dispositive of punitive intent, particularly
in light of the court's conclusion otherwise. We are an
error-correcting Court, without authority to reverse
credibility determinations, which the record supports,
1
simply to reach a different conclusion.
Dissenting Opinion at 19-20 (emphasis in the original;
citations omitted)
Mother believes that the timing of the filings is determinative. We
disagree. While, in theory, it may appear that everything is "an equal and
opposite reaction" to something else, in reality such conclusions often lack the
requisite depth of analysis. Based on all the evidence, we find the termination
petitions were neither retaliatory nor punitive in nature ... or even by design.
Initially, we note that Father's marriage to C.S. occurred one month before
Mother's petition was filed. Technically, his marriage was a necessary precursor
to termination, as Father could not have filed in the absence of a prospective
step-parent's intention to adopt. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(b). Practically, its timing
was based on confirming a genuine relationship - it was not a plan to foil
Mother's then-unknown intention to file for modification.
Further, as our Supreme Court has noted, the legislative intent for
involuntary terminations:
Is not to punish an ineffective or negligent parent, or
provide a means for changing the surname of the
child. Rather, the purpose of involuntary termination
of parental rights is to dispense with the need for
parental consent to an adoption when, by choice or
neglect, a parent has failed to meet the continuing
needs of the child.
1
We are aware that this is an unreported and withdrawn opinion. Although it informs us, our
decision is independent of its analysis.
-7-
19 ADOPTIONS 201 b
20 ADOPTIONS 2015
lnre: B.E., 377 A.2d 153, 156(Pa.1977).
To be sure, at one level, Father harbors sufficient animus to want nothing
less than to punish Mother, who has been both ineffective and negligent for five
years. And, the petitions were at least a partial reaction to Mother's resurfacing.
Nevertheless, we find the overriding purpose of the termination petitions was to
provide for the boys' futures and protect them from the past. Thus, we will not
quibble over what it takes for a reaction to be punitive. We have yet to see a
litigant who is "pure in heart," perhaps because we are too tainted to perceive.
But, if that is the test we are to impose in this or any matter, precious little relief
will trickle from our spigots.
Just as the petitions sought to prevent the infliction of unnecessary
trauma, our order does likewise. Sadly, no matter how much we claim that our
intent is not to punish Mother, we recognize that from her perspective, that is the
effect. We regret that fact, but do not apologize - we are more concerned for the
boys' wellbeing.
B. Groundsfor Termination
Having passed the threshold, we find that Petitioners have proven by clear
and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights is
appropriate pursuantto 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 (a)(1 ), which provides as follows:
(a) General Rule.-The rights of a parent in
regard to a child may be terminated after a
petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a
period of at least six months immediately
preceding the filing of the petition either has
evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
-8-
19 ADOPTIONS 201 o
20 ADOPTIONS 2015
parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
Although Mother's Petition for Modification falls within the 6-month "look
back" period, in the context of the last five years of this saga, we will not accord it
an elevated status. A solitary petition in a sea of indifference is not evidence that
she has no settled purpose of relinquishing her parental claim, and it does not
counter the evidence of her refusal and failure to perform any parental duties.
This is not a case where Father rebuffed Mother's repeated, plaintive
requests to see the boys. To the contrary, the only "roadblocks" to Mother
maintaining contact with the boys and performing parental duties were two court
orders. The 2010 order was entered by stipulation in open court and gave
Mother an easy path to having immediate supervised visits. Her explanations
were hollow regarding her failure to pick up the phone and call any of the
potential supervisors or to ask the court to name a new one. Instead of
swallowing her pride and moving forward, Mother did nothing and the boys went
on with their lives.
The 2013 order recognized Mother's failures and set forth a step-by-step
plan. Although she arguably took one step forward by meeting with Dr. Tegan
Blackbird, Mother failed to follow through with him, providing equally hollow
excuses. After hearing Deb Salem's testimony and reviewing her evaluations,
Mother's actions did not surprise us. Although much could be said, it all boils
down to Mother's refusal to take responsibility for any of the problems that
brought the parties to court for custody, divorce and now the termination of her
-9-
.-.
19 ADOPTIONS 2010
20 ADOPTIONS 2015
rights. The evidence in support of termination is not only clear and convincing, it
is compelling.
C. Bond
Having found that Petitioners have satisfied the requirements of Section
2511(a), we proceed to the "best interest" analysis under Section 2511(b), as set
forth below:
(b) Other considerations.-The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis
of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if
found to be beyond the control of the parent. With
respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent
to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
The record of this case is replete with evidence that there is no bond
between the boys and Mother. Indeed, as noted in Deb Salem's evaluations, to
the extent there was a bond, it was unhealthy. Additionally, Mother could not
point to any evidence that a bond still exists, and her expert failed to convince us
that reunification counseling should be pursued to see if a bond could be forged.
That is the epitome of an exercise in futility. As painful as that summary may
sound to Mother, we will avoid further moralizing until an appeal is filed.
On the other side of the analysis, we are eminently satisfied that Adoptive
Mother has been the mother for at least the past four years and is the only one
capable of providing that nurturing relationship alongside of Father. In fact, we
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19 ADOPTIONS 2010
20 ADOPTIONS 2015
are more concerned with the impact on the boys' relationship with Adoptive
Mother if we attempted Mother's request for reunification counseling. That would
be a travesty - it might serve to assuage Mother's feelings of guilt, but it would
not be beneficial to the boys in any way, shape or form. Indeed, the mere receipt
of a text from Mother sent one child into a near tailspin.
tn conclusion, the prospects for reunification are so slim that anything
other than termination is a disservice. The evidence is clear, convincing and
competent to demonstrate not only that Mother has failed to perform her parental
duties, but also that termination of Mother's parental rights will best serve the
boys' physical, developmental, and emotional needs and welfare. Accordingly,
the following order will be entered:
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this /J'~ay of November, 2015, following hearings on
•
June 26, 2015, July 31, 2015, and October 12, 2015, the Petitions for Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights of N.S. with respect to E.D.S. (born July 2000)
and A.M.S. (born May 1999) are hereby GRANTED and her parental rights are
TERMINATED forever, with all the effects of such decree as provided in Section
2521 of the Adoption Act, including extinguishment of the power or right to object
to or receive notice of adoption proceedings.
Sole physical and legal custody of E.D.S. and A.M.S. is hereby awarded
to Petitioner, T.S.
-11-
.. -...
19 ADOPTIONS 201 b
20 ADOPTIONS 2015
Jeanne B. Costopoulos, Esquire
For Petitioners
Damian J. Destefano, Esquire
For Nanci Mariko Samento
Stephanie Cesare, Esquire
Guardian ad /item for the Children
:sal
-12-
ORPHANS' COL DIVISION
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
In Re: AMS CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 20 ADOPT2015
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF ORDER
JUDGE'S INITIALS: !..CA,.,_H,.,_,MC!...- _
TIME STAMP DATE: 2..l.,__,_l/-- '-8"/=20,,_,l-"-5-----------------------
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INRE: ~O~R~D~E~R~O=F~C=O~U~RTC!...- ~
SERVICE TO: JEANNE COSTOPOULOS, 5000 RITTER RD, STE 202. MECHANICSBURG PA 17055
STEPHANIE CESARE. 2 W HIGH ST, CARLISLE PA 17013
DAMIAN DESTEFANO, 2331 MARKET STREET, CAMP HILL PA 17011
METHOD OF MAILING: ENVELOPES PROVIDED BY:
[Zl USPS D PETITIONER
0RRR [Zl JUDGE
O HAND DELIVERED O CLERK OF ORPHANS COURT
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MAI LED: I I /18/2015
SERVICE TO:
METHOD OF MAILING: ENVELOPES PROVIDED BY:
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