Com. v. Rivera, J.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 3067 EDA 2015
:
JUAN E. RIVERA III :
Appeal from the Order, September 16, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Criminal Division at No. CP-45-CR-0001510-2005
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON AND JENKINS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 20, 2016
The Commonwealth appeals the order of September 16, 2015,
granting Juan E. Rivera, III’s (“Rivera”) motion to enforce the plea
agreement. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court has set forth the history of this case as follows:
On January 23, 2006, a Criminal Information
was filed against [Rivera] charging him with three
counts of Indecent Assault on a Person less than
13 Years of Age, Corruption of Minors, and
Endangering the Welfare of Children.[Footnote 1]
These charges arose from an incident where [Rivera]
allegedly kissed and fondled a minor. On April 20,
2006, [Rivera] entered an open guilty plea to
Indecent Assault, graded as a misdemeanor of the
first degree. This guilty plea was entered pursuant
to a negotiated plea agreement, wherein the
Commonwealth nolle prossed the remaining
charges in exchange for [Rivera] entering a guilty
plea to one count of Indecent Assault. On
August 29, 2006, [Rivera] was sentenced to a term
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of incarceration of no less than 12 months nor more
than 24 months. As a result of his conviction for
Indecent Assault, [Rivera] was required to register
as a sex offender under Megan’s Law[1] for a period
of 10 years. Megan’s Law was amended on
December 20, 2011 (SORNA -- the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act),[2] resulting in
[Rivera’s] requirement to now register for his
lifetime, as he was within his original ten year
registration period when SORNA went into effect.[3]
[Rivera] filed this Motion to Enforce a Plea
Agreement on May 4, 2015 and a hearing was held
on June 30, 2015.
[Footnote 1] 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7)
-- Indecent Assault -- Person Less than
13 Years of Age; 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6301(a)(1) -- Corruption of Minors;
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a) -- Endangering
the Welfare of Children.
Trial court opinion and order, 9/16/15 at 1-2.
On September 16, 2015, the trial court granted Rivera’s motion to
enforce the plea agreement, finding that the 10-year Megan’s Law
registration was an essential term of the negotiated plea agreement Rivera
1
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9791-9799.9.
2
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41. SORNA, the successor to
Megan’s Law II, was enacted on December 20, 2011, and became effective
on December 20, 2012.
3
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.13(3), (3.1).
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made with the Commonwealth.4 The trial court determined that, examining
the totality of the circumstances, the plea agreement was structured in such
a way that Rivera would only be subject to the 10-year Megan’s Law
registration requirement. Following this court’s decisions in
Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444 (Pa.Super. 2013)
(en banc), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 276 (Pa. 2014), and Commonwealth
v. Nase, 104 A.3d 528 (Pa.Super. 2014), holding that where registration
consequences are unequivocally part of the plea negotiations and
subsequent agreements, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of his
bargain, the trial court concluded that Rivera was not subject to the new
registration requirements under SORNA. Rather, the trial court held that
Rivera was subject to the 10-year Megan’s Law registration in effect at the
time of his plea.
The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal on October 7, 2015.
On October 8, 2015, the trial court directed the Commonwealth to file a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) within 21 days; the Commonwealth complied on
October 28, 2015, alleging, inter alia, that the trial court erred in finding
that the 10-year registration was a specifically bargained-for term of the
4
We note that Rivera’s claim does not fall within the scope of the PCRA
(Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546) and is not reviewed
under the standard applicable to PCRA petitions, nor is it subject to the
PCRA’s time constraints. Commonwealth v. Partee, 86 A.3d 245, 247
(Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 97 A.3d 744 (Pa. 2014).
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plea agreement. (Docket #8.) The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion
on November 18, 2015, reiterating that its decision is dictated by this court’s
decisions in Hainesworth and Nase, which “made it clear that the issue
now before this Court -- [Rivera’s] Megan’s Law registration requirement --
is to be analyzed under contract principles in terms of enforcing [Rivera’s]
plea agreement with the Commonwealth.” (Trial court opinion, 11/18/15
at 2.)
The Commonwealth frames the issues to be decided on appeal as
follows:
1. Did the Trial Court err in finding the 10 year
registration was a specifically bargained for
term of the plea agreement?
2. Did the Trial Court err in finding that the mere
act of advising a defendant of collateral
consequences, created a binding contractual
obligation on the part of the Commonwealth,
when such notification was required by law?
3. Did the Trial Court err in finding that specific
length of the registration, which was a
collateral consequence, was within the control
of the District Attorney, when at the time of
the plea, the only possible registration periods
allowed by law were either 10 year[s] or life?
4. Did the Trial Court err in finding that the state
cannot, in the valid exercise of its police
powers, modify the terms of an existing
contract?
5. Did the Trial Court err in modifying the period
of registration contrary to the plain language of
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.20?
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Commonwealth’s brief at 4.
With respect to plea bargains, “The reality of the
criminal justice system is that nearly all criminal
cases are disposed of by plea bargains:
[n]inety-seven percent of federal convictions and
ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result
of guilty pleas. Plea bargaining is not some adjunct
to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal
justice system. Accordingly, it is critical that plea
agreements are enforced, to avoid any possible
perversion of the plea bargaining system.”
[Hainesworth, 82 A.3d] at 449 (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). “The disposition of
criminal charges by agreement between the
prosecutor and the accused, . . . is an essential
component of the administration of justice. Properly
administered, it is to be encouraged. In this
Commonwealth, the practice of plea bargaining is
generally regarded favorably, and is legitimized and
governed by court rule . . . . A ‘mutuality of
advantage’ to defendants and prosecutors flows from
the ratification of the bargain.” Commonwealth v.
Parsons, 969 A.2d 1259, 1267-68 (Pa.Super. 2009)
(en banc), appeal denied, 603 Pa. 685, 982 A.2d
1228 (2009).
Commonwealth v. Farabaugh, A.3d , 2016 WL 1072110 at *4
(Pa.Super. March 11, 2016).
Assuming the plea agreement is legally possible to
fulfill, when the parties enter the plea agreement
and the court accepts and approves the plea, then
the parties and the court must abide by the terms of
the agreement. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 995
A.2d 1184, 1191 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied,
608 Pa. 634, 9 A.3d 626 (2010). “Specific
enforcement of valid plea bargains is a matter of
fundamental fairness.” Hainesworth, supra. “The
terms of plea agreements are not limited to the
withdrawal of charges, or the length of a sentence.
Parties may agree to--and seek enforcement of--
terms that fall outside these areas.” Id.-5-
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Although a plea agreement occurs in a
criminal context, it remains contractual
in nature and is to be analyzed under
contract-law standards. Furthermore,
disputes over any particular term of a
plea agreement must be resolved by
objective standards. A determination of
exactly what promises constitute the plea
bargain must be based upon the totality
of the surrounding circumstances and
involves a case-by-case adjudication.
Any ambiguities in the terms of the plea
agreement will be construed against the
Government. Nevertheless, the
agreement itself controls where its
language sets out the terms of the
bargain with specificity.
Commonwealth v. Kroh, 440 Pa.Super. 1, 654
A.2d 1168, 1172 (Pa.Super. 1995) (internal citations
omitted). Regarding the Commonwealth’s duty to
honor plea agreements, well-settled Pennsylvania
law states:
Our courts have demanded strict
compliance with that duty in order to
avoid any possible perversion of the plea
bargaining system, evidencing the
concern that a defendant might be
coerced into a bargain or fraudulently
induced to give up the very valued
constitutional guarantees attendant the
right to trial by jury.
Id. (internal citations omitted). Whether a particular
plea agreement has been breached depends on what
the “parties to the agreement reasonably understood
to be the terms of the agreement.”
Commonwealth v. Fruehan, 384 Pa.Super. 156,
557 A.2d 1093, 1094 (Pa.Super. 1989).
Farabaugh, 2016 WL 1072110 at *5.
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Sex offender registration:
[O]bviously has serious and restrictive
consequences for the offender, including
prosecution if the requirement is
violated. Registration can also affect the
offender’s ability to earn a livelihood, his
housing arrangements and options, and
his reputation. In fact, the requirements
of registration are so rigorously enforced,
even the occurrence of a natural disaster
or other event requiring evacuation of
residences shall not relieve the sexual
offender of the duty to register . . . .
[W]hen a defendant agrees to a guilty
plea, he gives up his constitutional rights
to a jury trial, to confrontation, to
present witness, to remain silent and to
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In
negotiating a plea that will not require
him to register as a sex offender, the
defendant trades a non-trivial panoply of
rights in exchange for his not being
subject to a non-trivial restriction.
Fundamental fairness dictates that this
bargain be enforced.
Hainesworth, supra. To summarize: (a) where a
plea bargain is structured so the defendant will not
have to register or report as a sex offender or he will
have to register and report for a specific time; and
(b) the defendant is not seeking to withdraw his plea
but to enforce it, then the “collateral consequence”
concept attributed generally to sex offender
registration requirements does not trump
enforcement of the plea bargain. Commonwealth
v. Nase, 104 A.3d 528, 532-33 (Pa.Super. 2014)
(holding appellant was entitled to benefit of his
bargain for lower registration requirement, in light of
recent plea-bargain law, which limits retroactive
application of new or increased sex offender
registration/reporting requirements, based on
specific record of case).
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Farabaugh, 2016 WL 1072110 at *5-6.
We determine that this court’s decision in Nase controls the outcome
of this case. In Nase, the appellant pled guilty to statutory sexual assault
and unlawful contact with a minor; the Commonwealth agreed to
nolle prosse additional charges including aggravated indecent assault and
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”). Nase, 104 A.3d at 528. At
the time of his plea, unlawful contact required a 10-year period of
registration under Megan’s Law. Id. Subsequently, SORNA was enacted,
which required those convicted of unlawful contact to register for 25 years.
Id. at 529. On appeal from the denial of his petition to avoid additional
sex offender registration requirements, this court reversed, finding that the
record established that a 10-year period of registration was part of the
appellant’s plea agreement. At the plea hearing, defense counsel indicated
that the appellant understood that unlawful contact carried a 10-year
reporting requirement, and was “in full agreement with that.” Id. at 534.
This court in Nase also recited the sentencing proceedings, during which the
Commonwealth related,
He was determined not to be a sexually violent
predator. No objection to the recommendation.
However, it’s an offense requiring Megan’s Law
notification, Your Honor, and I believe the Defendant
is reviewing the documents and paperwork with his
attorney right now.
Your Honor, just for the record, I have the
notification at sentencing for the Megan’s Law
requirement. It’s been initialed and signed by the
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Defendant and also signed by his attorney. And he
does acknowledge that he must register his current
address with the Pennsylvania State Police and
provide other information as required by law upon
his release from incarceration or upon his parole
from a state or county facility.
....
The period of registration shall be for ten years.
Id. The Nase court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that although
the 10-year registration period was the subject of discussion at the plea
proceeding and during sentencing, it was not one of the terms of the
negotiated plea:
To suggest that Appellant did not contemplate a
ten-year period of registration and expressly agree
to that term by pleading guilty to unlawful contact
with a minor is contrary to the record. Certainly,
Appellant did not negotiate for a period of
registration of twenty-five years. To the extent that
the Commonwealth asserts that registration was not
part of the plea agreement, such a position is belied
by the fact that Appellant expressly agreed to plead
guilty to unlawful contact with a minor so as to be
subject to the then-extant registration period. Thus,
registration consequences were unequivocally part of
the plea negotiations and arrangement. Since the
law at that time mandated registration for a period
of ten years, that period of registration was
contemplated as part of his plea agreement. See
Landay v. Rite Aid, 40 A.3d 1280, 1288 (Pa.Super.
2012), appeal granted in part on other grounds,
621 Pa. 108, 73 A.3d 577 (2013) (“the laws that are
in force at the time the parties enter into a contract
are merged with the other obligations that are
specifically set forth in the agreement.”)
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Id. See also Hainesworth, 82 A.3d at 448 (where “the plea agreement
appears to have been precisely structured so that Hainesworth would not be
subjected to a registration requirement,” he was entitled to the benefit of his
bargain); Farabaugh, 2016 WL 1072110 at *6 (where the record made
clear that Farabaugh pled guilty to an offense that had no sex offender
registration/reporting requirement and that factor was part of the negotiated
plea agreement, this court refused to allow Farabaugh’s plea bargain to be
reformed with the addition of new conditions (i.e., 25 years of sex offender
registration and reporting under SORNA), which did not exist when
Farabaugh entered the plea agreement); Partee, 86 A.3d at 249 (“While it
was not an explicit term of the negotiated plea, it is apparent that [Partee]’s
negotiated plea agreement was structured so that he would only be subject
to a ten-year rather than a lifetime reporting requirement . . .”).
In the instant case, Rivera agreed to plead guilty to Count 1, indecent
assault, graded as a first-degree misdemeanor. (Notes of testimony, plea,
4/20/06 at 6.) The Commonwealth noted that it was a Megan’s Law offense.
(Id.) In exchange for his plea, the Commonwealth agreed to drop all other
charges. At sentencing, the Commonwealth indicated that there was a 10-
year registration/reporting requirement under Megan’s Law:
Your Honor, before the Court does impose sentence,
also I do have the notification at sentencing in
regards to the Megan’s Law requirement in this case.
It requires a 10-year registration. After he
addresses the Court, I would like an opportunity just
to read that into the record.
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Notes of testimony, sentencing, 8/29/06 at 3. See also id. at 6 (“For the
offense that [Rivera] pled guilty [to], it requires a 10-year registration.”).
Rivera also completed a written sentencing notification, providing that, “The
period of registration shall be for ten (10) years from release from
incarceration.” (“Notification at sentencing,” 8/29/06 at 2, ¶8.)
The Commonwealth argues that the period of registration was not a
specific term of the agreement and, at sentencing, Rivera was merely
informed that he was required to register under Megan’s Law for a period of
10 years, which notification was required by law. (Commonwealth’s brief at
10.) The Commonwealth complains that the simple act of notifying a
defendant of his duty to register does not turn it into a bargained-for term of
a contract. (Id. at 12.)
The Commonwealth made a similar argument in Nase, and this court
rejected it, agreeing with the appellant in that case that a 10-year
registration period was an implicit term of his plea. As discussed above, the
parties in Nase never explicitly stated that a 10-year registration period was
a condition of the appellant’s plea. Nevertheless, this court held that the
10-year registration requirement was part of the appellant’s plea bargain
which must be strictly enforced, and any ambiguity was to be construed
against the Commonwealth. The record in this case supports the trial court’s
conclusion that the 10-year Megan’s Law registration period was an essential
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term of the negotiated plea agreement. As such, it was not error for the
trial court to order specific enforcement of that bargain. Hainesworth.5
The Commonwealth relies on Commonwealth v. Benner, 853 A.2d
1068 (Pa.Super. 2004), which is inapposite. In Benner, the defendant
entered a negotiated guilty plea to aggravated indecent assault, purportedly
on the representation of the district attorney that he would not be subject to
the Megan’s Law registration provisions. Benner, 853 A.2d at 1069. The
Commonwealth withdrew additional charges including rape and IDSI. Id.At the time of his guilty plea and sentencing, Megan’s Law I was in effect.
Id. Subsequently, after the repeal of Megan’s Law I and the effective date
of Megan’s Law II, which required lifetime registration, the defendant was
granted parole. Id. As a condition of his release, prison officials insisted
that he register his address with the state police in accordance with
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.1(b), the registration provision of Megan’s Law II
5
We note that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on April 8, 2015, granted
allowances of appeal to consider the following question: “Whether the
Superior Court’s application of its decision [in] Commonwealth v.
Hainesworth to the instant cases impermissibly expanded the contract
clause to bind the Commonwealth to collateral consequences over which the
Commonwealth has no control?” Commonwealth v. Martinez, 112 A.3d
1207 (Pa. 2015); see also Commonwealth v. Shower, 112 A.3d 1210(Pa. 2015). Unless and until Hainesworth is overruled by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, it remains the law of this Commonwealth. See
Commonwealth v. Martin, 727 A.2d 1136, 1141 (Pa.Super. 1999), appeal
denied, 745 A.2d 1220 (Pa. 1999) (“It is well-settled . . . that until the
Supreme Court overrules a decision of this Court, our decision is the law of
this Commonwealth.”), citing Commonwealth v. Leib, 588 A.2d 922, 932
(Pa.Super. 1991).
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applicable to his crime. Id. The defendant complied but filed a Motion for
Hearing Regarding Megan’s Law Applicability, asserting that he had crafted
his guilty plea to avoid Megan’s Law registration and had not been given a
Megan’s Law colloquy. Id. The trial court denied the motion and ordered
him to comply with the registration provisions of Megan’s Law II. Id. at
1070.
On appeal, a panel of this court affirmed, applying Commonwealth v.
Leidig, 850 A.2d 743 (Pa.Super. 2004), affirmed, 956 A.2d 399 (Pa. 2008)
(registration provisions of Megan’s Law do not constitute criminal
punishment and are properly characterized as a “collateral consequence” of
the defendant’s plea). We explained that
[b]ecause the registration requirement under either
Megan’s Law is a collateral consequence of the
defendant’s plea, the failure of the court to apprise
[Benner] of it does not invalidate his plea.
Moreover, Benner, like the defendant in Leidig,
concedes his awareness of the registration
requirement under Megan’s I, acknowledging that it
was a matter of concern when he entered his plea.
Although he contends that he relied on the
representation of the District Attorney that he would
not be required to register, the record provides no
substantiation that the District Attorney ever made
such a representation. Moreover, Benner concedes
that the law indisputably applicable on the date he
tendered his plea required registration for ten years
following release from prison. Accordingly, we
conclude that the failure of the trial court to inform
Benner of the registration requirement prior to
accepting his plea invalidates neither the plea nor
application of the registration requirement under
Megan’s I.
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Benner, 853 A.2d at 1071. The Benner court also concluded that the trial
court did not err in applying the lifetime registration provisions of Megan’s
Law II, where the increase in the length of the registration period does not
constitute punishment: “We read these cases to suggest that the collateral
effect of current legislation may be imposed on the defendant so long as he
remains in the custody of correctional authorities to discharge any part of his
sentence for the sex offense.” Id. at 1072 (citations omitted).
In Benner, there was no indication whatsoever that the 10-year
registration provision of Megan’s Law I was a term of the plea bargain. In
fact, the defendant in Benner was never informed, on the record, of the
applicable registration provisions. Id. at 1069. Therefore, this court in
Benner never analyzed whether, under contract law principles, a
registration requirement was included as a term of a negotiated plea
agreement. The Benner court found no support for the proposition that the
defendant had been promised that he would not be required to register.
Benner and Leidig, upon which Benner relied, are readily distinguishable.
See Hainesworth, 82 A.3d at 450 (“unlike the instant case, the record did
not support Benner’s contention that he had bargained for non-registration
as a term of his plea”); Nase, 104 A.3d at 533 (“The Leidig Court was not
faced with the question of whether the parties negotiated the registration
requirement as part of the plea agreement.”). Here, the Commonwealth
insists that the specific length of registration is a collateral consequence of a
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defendant’s plea that is outside the Commonwealth’s control. However, as
stated by this court in Nase, “the collateral consequence construct does not
eliminate the requirement that courts enforce bargained-for exchanges
where the parties negotiate over a collateral consequence of a plea.” Id.
For these reasons, we determine the trial court did not err in granting
Rivera’s motion to enforce the plea agreement requiring him to register
under Megan’s Law for a period of 10 years. As a matter of fundamental
fairness, Rivera is entitled to specific enforcement of his valid plea bargain
and is not required to comply with the lifetime reporting requirements of
SORNA. See Nase; Hainesworth.
Order affirmed.
Jenkins, J. joins the Memorandum.
Olson, J. concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/20/2016
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