Com. v. Hall, R.

J-S21019-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ROBERT HALL :
:
Appellant : No. 2201 EDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 11, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0409511-1997
BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MAY 06, 2019
Robert Hall (Appellant) appeals from the dismissal of his sixth petition
seeking relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§
9541-9546. Upon review, we affirm.
In April 1998, a jury convicted Appellant of second degree murder and
related crimes. The trial court—who also presided over the underlying PCRA
proceedings—sentenced Appellant to life in prison. Appellant filed a direct
appeal and this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence; the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Hall, 750 A.2d 368 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied,
759 A.2d 383 (Pa. 2000).
In the past decade, Appellant has unsuccessfully sought relief under the
PCRA. With regard to Appellant’s most recent filing, the PCRA court explained:
J-S21019-19
On November 28, 2017, [Appellant] filed his sixth pro se
Post Conviction Relief Act petition. The petition spanned 379
pages and failed to present a discernible argument suggesting it
is timely pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545. As such, this court
issued 907 Notice of Intent to Dismiss on January 3, 2018.
[Appellant] filed objections to the 907 Notice on January 18,
2018. Thereafter, he also hired an attorney, Jerome Brown,
Esquire, to file objections on his behalf. Mr. Brown contacted this
court and requested the court delay issuing an opinion until he
could file an additional set of objections on [Appellant’s] behalf.
The court granted the request, and Mr. Brown’s objections were
filed on March 12, 2018, along with a discovery request for
exculpatory evidence. A response from the Commonwealth was
submitted on June 8, 2018, which request[ed] the petition be
dismissed.
PCRA Court Opinion, 6/11/18, at 1.
The PCRA court dismissed the petition on June 11, 2018, stating:
[Appellant’s] pro se petition, and subsequent counseled
petitions, rely upon civil rights complaints filed in Federal Court as
well as the recent revelation that the Philadelphia District
Attorney’s Office previously compiled a list of “problem officers”
who it would not call to testify in criminal cases. Pet. Obj. pg. 2.
He asserts this information amounts to newly discovered
evidence; however, it does not.
Id. at 2.
Appellant filed this timely appeal. The PCRA court filed its opinion
contemporaneously with the dismissal of Appellant’s petition, and did not
order Appellant to comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellant Procedure
1925(b).
Appellant presents two issues for appellate review:
1. Where there was substantial newly discovered evidence which
would compel the grant of a new trial and the lower Court
-2-
J-S21019-19
dismissed this petition without a hearing, did the lower Court
err in dismissing this matter without holding said hearing?
2. Where it was believed that there was police misconduct in the
homicide division regarding, at least, the statement of critical
witness Jose Miller, who it was submitted was coerced to sign
a statement he could not read, did the lower Court err in
denying the motion for exculpatory evidence?
Appellant’s Brief at 2.
“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review calls
for us to determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the
record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 196 A.3d 1021,
1026-27 (Pa. 2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Washington, 927 A.2d
586, 593 (Pa. 2007)). “The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when
supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we apply a de
novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.”
Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 603 (Pa. 2013).
We first address the timeliness of Appellant’s petition, because the
PCRA’s time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be altered or
disregarded in order to address a petition’s merits; a petitioner seeking post-
conviction relief must file a petition within one year of the petitioner’s
judgment of sentence becoming final. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith,
194 A.3d 126, 132 (Pa. Super. 2018); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
Section 9545 of the PCRA requires that “[a]ny petition under this subchapter,
including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the
date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). The timeliness
-3-
J-S21019-19
requirement of the PCRA is “mandatory and jurisdictional in nature.”
Commonwealth v. McKeever, 947 A.2d 782, 784-85 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Therefore, “no court may disregard, alter, or create equitable exceptions to
the timeliness requirement in order to reach the substance of a petitioner’s
arguments.” Id. at 785.
It is well settled that a court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a
petition filed after the one-year time bar unless the petitioner pleads and
proves one of the time-bar exceptions. The exceptions include:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution
or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws
of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this Section and has been held by that court
to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
Until recently, a petition invoking an exception had to be filed within 60
days of the date the claim could have been presented. However, effective
December 2017, Act 146 of 2018 amended 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2), and
now provides that a PCRA petition invoking a timeliness exception must be
filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. See
-4-
J-S21019-19
Act 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, No. 146, § 2 and § 3. Although we note the
change in the law from 60 days to one year, the change does not impact
Appellant, who filed his petition on November 28, 2017.
Appellant acknowledges that his PCRA petition is untimely, but claims
that he satisfied the newly discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s time bar.
Under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii), Appellant must prove that (1) the fact
was unknown to him, and (2) that he could not have ascertained the fact
previously by the exercise of due diligence. Commonwealth v. Bennett,
930 A.2d 1264, 1270–72 (Pa. 2007). Due diligence requires that the
petitioner make reasonable steps to protect his own interest.
Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1168 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Appellant states that he filed the underlying petition “upon learning
about improper police misconduct by some of his homicide detectives in the
case of Commonwealth v. Anthony Wright, CP-51-CR-1131582-1991.”
See Appellant’s Brief at 3. However, Appellant never specifies when he
learned about the police conduct. Appellant references several other
unrelated Philadelphia cases and claims that evidence of police impropriety in
those cases “would have compelled a different verdict [in Appellant’s case] as
it was not character evidence.” Id. at 16. In addition, Appellant states that
he “recently discovered” – again without specifying a time – that one witness,
“Kaciena Anderson, his friend, who implicated him in the case, was testifying
under a grant of immunity,” and another witness, “Mary Graham, had been
-5-
J-S21019-19
coerced to testify about certain admissions made by [Appellant’s] co-
defendant, which implicated [Appellant].” Id. at 6. Appellant asserts “this
evidence would have demonstrated that this prosecution was flawed; based
on unreliable witness statements; and the police misconduct was so pervasive
that it infected the proceedings to the point that the trial was structurally
unfair and a denial of due process.” Id. at 16.
Upon review, we are not persuaded that Appellant has met the
requirements prescribed by § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Appellant had to prove that he
filed for PCRA relief within 60 days of learning facts that were unknown to
him, and which he could not have ascertained previously by the exercise of
due diligence. Appellant contends that “this case turns on evidence that was
manipulated by the police.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. However, Appellant has
not provided any timeframe or dates to explain when he discovered the new
evidence, and why it could not have been previously ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence. Appellant generally claims:
[Appellant], who is incarcerated, timely uncovered
significant evidence of police misconduct as described above.
Furthermore, he recently learned that Kaciena Anderson was
testifying under a grant of immunity. There is no evidence that
[Appellant] could have known any of this evidence sooner, and he
learned about this police misconduct after a civil rights complaint
was filed on Mr. Wright’s behalf. He filed this petition within 60
days of learning of that filing. Indeed, the Court below did not
find that [Appellant] failed to meet this prong of the test nor did
the Commonwealth so suggest. Hence, this prong is not at issue,
and it is respectfully submitted that [Appellant] met this prong of
the test.
Id. at 22.
-6-
J-S21019-19
We disagree that “this prong is not at issue.” We have stated:
A petitioner must explain why he could not have learned the new
fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence.
Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323, 330–31, 781 A.2d
94, 98 (2001); Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076,
1080 (Pa.Super.2010), appeal denied, 610 Pa. 607, 20 A.3d 1210(2011). This rule is strictly enforced. Id. Additionally, the
focus of this exception “is on the newly discovered facts, not on a
newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known
facts.” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 596 Pa. 587, 596, 947 A.2d
714, 720 (2008) (emphasis in original).
Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (emphasis
added).
In sum, Appellant claims that his petition meets the newly discovered
facts exception based upon Appellant’s discovery of police wrongdoing in other
cases which Appellant imputes to wrongdoing in his case; however, Appellant
fails to articulate specifics as to his dates of discovery and due diligence. As
noted, the “rule is strictly enforced.” Brown, supra. Accordingly, we find
that Appellant has failed to plead and prove an exception to the PCRA’s time
bar, and is not entitled to relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/6/19
-7-