Com. v. Caiati, S.

J-A31025-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
STEVEN CAIATI
Appellant No. 559 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 28, 2012
In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-64-CR-0000063-2012
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MOULTON, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: Filed February 27, 2017
Steven Caiati appeals from the June 28, 2012 judgment of sentence
entered in the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas following his guilty
plea to three counts of arson (recklessly placing person in danger of death or
bodily injury).1 We affirm.
On April 5, 2012, Caiati entered the aforementioned guilty plea. On
June 28, 2012, the trial court sentenced Caiati to three concurrent terms of
72 to 144 months’ incarceration.2 On June 21, 2013, Caiati filed a timely
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i).
2
Caiati also pled guilty to one count of recklessly endangering another
person (“REAP”) at CP-64-CR-0000062-2012. He was sentenced to 1 to 2
years’ incarceration, consecutive to his sentence for the arson convictions.
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PCRA petition seeking reinstatement of his appeal and post-sentence rights
nunc pro tunc. Following the filing of a Turner/Finley3 letter by counsel,
the trial court denied the petition. Caiati appealed, and on December 1,
2014, this Court concluded that the PCRA court erred in dismissing Caiati’s
original petition without a hearing. Accordingly, we remanded to the PCRA
court to determine whether Caiati’s appeal and post-sentence rights should
be restored.
At Caiati’s request, on January 25, 2015, the PCRA court appointed
counsel on remand. On March 27, 2015, Caiati filed an amended PCRA
petition. On November 23, 2015, the PCRA court held a hearing. On
December 28, 2015, the PCRA court granted Caiati relief and restored his
post-sentence and appeal rights.
On January 8, 2016, Caiati filed post-sentence motions to withdraw his
guilty plea and to reconsider his sentence. The trial court denied both
motions on January 19, 2016. On February 1, 2016, Caiati filed a motion to
reconsider the denial of his motion to withdraw guilty plea.4 On February
18, 2016, Caiati filed a notice of appeal.
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3
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
4
In his motion to reconsider, Caiati also asked the trial court to
incorporate the notes of testimony from the November 23, 2015 PCRA
hearing. The trial court did not act on this motion and lost jurisdiction to
reconsider its ruling. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505; Pa.R.A.P. 1701. However, in
its opinion, the trial court specifically referenced the notes of testimony from
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Caiati raises two issues on appeal:
1. Does [Caiati]’s judgment of sentence reflect manifest
injustice where it is clear from the written guilty plea
colloquy and testimony that [Caiati] was promised a
specific sentence to induce his guilty plea where the
promised sentence was neither agreed upon by the
parties nor the court warranting the judgment of
sentence be vacated and the case remanded for trial?
2. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion
in failing to grant [Caiati]’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea where there was manifest evidence that the
guilty plea upon which he was sentenced was not
knowing, intelligent and voluntary based upon evidence
of the written guilty plea colloquy, and through
testimony, that promises outside of the guilty plea
agreement had been made with respect to sentencing
which were false and/or fabricated?
Caiati’s Br. at 5 (trial court answers omitted). Because both issues assert
that the trial court improperly denied his motion to withdraw guilty plea
because he proved a manifest injustice, we address Caiati’s issues together.
Caiati argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to withdraw guilty plea and incorrectly determined that there was no
manifest injustice. According to Caiati, his plea counsel advised him, as well
as members of his family, that if he pled guilty to REAP and three counts of
arson, the trial court would sentence him to an aggregate term of 3 to 6
years’ incarceration. Caiati’s Br. at 18. Caiati contends that plea counsel
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(Footnote Continued)
the PCRA hearing. See Statement of Reasons, 4/13/16, at 2-3 (“1925(a)
Op.”). Because the trial court incorporated these notes of testimony into its
decision and the notes of testimony are included in the certified record on
appeal, we shall consider the PCRA hearing notes of testimony.
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then led him through the written plea colloquy, instructing him “that the plea
and promised sentence could only be completed” if Caiati checked boxes
stating that no one had made promises to him outside of the plea colloquy.
Id. In support of his position, Caiati notes that he amended an answer from
“Yes” to “No” on his written colloquy, which asked whether any promises had
been made to him outside of the colloquy. Id. Caiati also argues that the
trial court failed to inquire into any such promises. Id. at 19. According to
Caiati, the PCRA court “abused its discretion in failing to grant [Caiati’s]
post-sentence request to withdraw his guilty plea given the flaws in the
colloquy and obvious lack of understanding demonstrated by [Caiati] arising
from promises made to him.” Id. at 22.
“[A] defendant who attempts to withdraw a guilty plea after
sentencing must demonstrate prejudice on the order of manifest injustice
before withdrawal is justified.” Commonwealth v. Pantalion, 957 A.2d
1267, 1271 (Pa.Super. 2008). “A plea rises to the level of manifest injustice
when it was entered into involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently.”
Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 383 (Pa.Super. 2002)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 790 (Pa.Super. 1999)).
To ascertain whether [a]ppellant acted in such manner, we
must examine the guilty plea colloquy. The colloquy must
inquire into the following areas: (1) the nature of the
charges; (2) the factual basis of the plea; (3) the right to
trial by jury; (4) the presumption of innocence; (5) the
permissible range of sentences; and (6) the judge's
authority to depart from any recommended sentence. This
Court evaluates the adequacy of the guilty plea colloquy
and the voluntariness of the resulting plea by examining
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the totality of the circumstances surrounding the entry of
that plea.
Id. at 383-84 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “We will not
disturb the decision of the [trial] court absent an abuse of discretion.”
Commonwealth v. Broaden, 980 A.2d 124, 128 (Pa.Super. 2009).
“Defendants who plead guilty are “bound by [their] statements made during
a plea colloquy, and may not successfully assert claims that contradict such
statements.” Muhammad, 794 A.2d at 384. Further, “[a] criminal
defendant who elects to plead guilty has a duty to answer questions
truthfully. We cannot permit a defendant to postpone the final disposition of
his case by lying to the court and later alleging that his lies were induced by
the prompting of counsel.” Commonwealth v. Scott, 465 A.2d 678, 680
(Pa.Super. 1983) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 363 A.2d 1249,
1253 (Pa.Super. 1976)).
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained its reasons for
denying the post-sentence motion:
At the PCRA hearing held on November 23, 2015,
[Caiati] testified that he initially answered “yes” to
Question 35 of the written guilty plea colloquy because
trial counsel promised [him] that he would receive three
(3) to six (6) years of imprisonment if he entered a plea of
guilty. Question 35 asks: Have any promises been made
to you to enter a plea of guilty other than any plea
agreement made by you or your attorney? Based on
[Caiati]’s testimony, trial counsel advised [Caiati] that his
answer to Question 35 could not be “yes.” In response,
[Caiati] testified he asked trial counsel what would happen
if the Judge decided not to give him three (3) to six (6)
years of imprisonment. Trial counsel’s response, according
to [Caiati], was that she would file an appeal.
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[Caiati]’s testimony from the PCRA hearing held on
November 23, 2015, does not support [Caiati]’s claim that
he entered the guilty plea under the manifestly false belief
that the court would impose a predetermined, certain
and/or agreed upon term of sentence in exchange for
and/or as a condition of his guilty plea. Based on [Caiati]’s
testimony, [he] was aware that sentencing was within the
discretion of the trial judge. [Caiati]’s awareness is further
supported by his answer “yes” to Question 48 of the
written plea colloquy. Question 48 asks: Has your
attorney explained to you that the plea you are entering is
considered an “open” plea, meaning that the sentence will
be determined entirely by the judge and that no
agreement has been made with the Commonwealth
concerning the duration of any possible incarceration?
Therefore, the trial court did not err by determining that
[Caiati]’s guilty plea was knowingly, intelligent and
voluntary.
1925(a) Op. at 2-3.
We conclude that Caiati’s alleged misunderstanding does not rise to
the level of manifest injustice, and, thus, the trial court properly denied the
motion. Despite attesting to the fact that the answers on his plea colloquy
form were correct to the best of his knowledge, see Written Plea Colloquy,
3/13/12, at 9, and giving sworn testimony indicating that he understood the
nature of his plea,5 see N.T. Plea at 1-11, Caiati asserts that counsel
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5
We also conclude that the trial court conducted the appropriate
inquiries through written and oral colloquy. During the trial court’s colloquy,
Caiati indicated that he understood the nature of the charges, the factual
basis of the plea, his right to a trial by jury, the presumption of innocence,
the permissible range of sentences (including the statutory maximum), and,
most importantly, the judge’s authority to depart from any recommended
sentence. See N.T., 4/5/12, at 1-11 (“N.T. Plea”); Written Plea Colloquy,
3/13/12. The trial court also inquired into Caiati’s mental health and
prescribed medication, asking him whether that medication made him
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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induced him to enter into the plea and “go along with the process” to obtain
a favorable sentence. N.T., 11/23/15, at 19, 25-26. While trial counsel
admitted that she might have used “three to six years” as an example in
order to explain that Caiati’s minimum sentence could not be greater than
half the maximum sentence, she denied promising him a specific sentence.
Id. at 34. Trial counsel also stated that she explained the nature of the
open plea and did not direct Caiati to fill out the written plea colloquy in
certain way. Id. at 34-36. Thus, the crux of Caiati’s argument balances on
the credibility of Caiati’s trial counsel versus his own credibility and that of
family members who testified on his behalf. We defer to a trial court’s
credibility determinations, as the trial court is in the best position to observe
witnesses’ demeanor.6 See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523,
539 (Pa. 2009). The trial court assessed these witness and found trial
counsel credible, a decision that we will not disturb on appeal.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that Caiati entered his guilty plea knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily, and, therefore, Caiati failed to establish a
manifest injustice.
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(Footnote Continued)
“unable to understand what [he] was doing here today,” to which Caiati
responded “no.” N.T. Plea at 8.
6
The Honorable Raymond L. Hamill heard both Caiati’s PCRA and post-
sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea; for simplicity, we refer to Judge
Hamill’s findings in the PCRA context as those of the trial court.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/27/2017
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