Com. v. Teagle, D.

J-S21030-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DERRICK TEAGLE :
:
Appellant : No. 3171 EDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 3, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0116301-1994
BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED APRIL 26, 2019
Derrick Teagle (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order dismissing as
untimely his third petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Following careful review, we affirm.
The procedural history underlying this appeal has been summarized by
this Court in a prior appeal:
[Appellant] and his co-defendant, Anthony Washington, were tried
on charges stemming from the robbery and killing of a security
guard, Tracy Lawson, at a shopping center in the Kensington
section of Philadelphia on January 23, 1993. On October 11,
1994, a jury convicted [Appellant] of the following charges:
murder of the second degree (18 Pa.C.S. §2502(b)); three counts
of robbery, (18 Pa.C.S. §3701); two counts of simple assault, (18
Pa.C.S. §2701); possessing an instrument of crime (18 Pa.C.S.
§907); and criminal conspiracy (18 Pa.C.S. §903). The trial court
denied [Appellant]’s post-verdict motions.
On December 9, 1994, the trial court sentenced [Appellant] to
serve a term of imprisonment for life for the second[-]degree
murder conviction, and three concurrent sentences of ten (10) to
J-S21030-19
twenty (20) years’ imprisonment for the robbery convictions. No
further sentence was imposed. This Court affirmed the judgment
of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Teagle, 686 A.2d 1368(Pa. Super. 1996) (unpublished memorandum). [Appellant] did
not file a petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania within thirty days of this Court’s order. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a). Consequently, [Appellant]’s judgment of
sentence became final on October 16, 1996, – thirty days after
this Court affirmed his convictions. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).
[Appellant], acting pro se, filed his first petition for relief under
the PCRA on August 24, 1998, stating that he was indigent and
requesting appointment of counsel. The petition was dismissed
as untimely on September 23, 1998, without a hearing, without
the appointment of counsel as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 1504
(now Rule 904), and without notice of the intent to dismiss the
petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1507 (now Rule 907).
[Appellant], pro se, filed an appeal.
This Court found that the first PCRA petition was untimely and that
no exception to timeliness was satisfied. See Commonwealth
v. Teagle, 747 A.2d 421 (Pa. Super. 1999) (unpublished
memorandum). However, we vacated the September 23, 1998
order and remanded the matter for a determination of whether
[Appellant] was entitled to court-appointed first PCRA counsel.
See id. This Court further rested the decision to vacate and
remand the order on the fact that [Appellant] had not been
provided with notice of the intent to dismiss the petition in
accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 1507. See id.See Commonwealth v. Teagle, 852 A.2d 1255, * 1-6 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(unpublished memorandum). Counsel was appointed on remand and filed a
Turner/Finley1 letter and accompanying motion to withdraw as counsel;
following notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, counsel was permitted to
withdraw and Appellant’s petition was dismissed without a hearing. Id.Ultimately, no appeal was taken from the dismissal. Id. at 4-6. Instead,
____________________________________________
1 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
-2-
J-S21030-19
Appellant filed a second pro se PCRA petition in February 2003. Id. at 6. After
sending notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the PCRA court dismissed
Appellant’s second petition without a hearing, as it was untimely filed. Id.
This Court affirmed the dismissal on appeal. Id. at 11.
Appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA petition, his third, on March 22,
2016. In the petition, Appellant contended that Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.
Ct. 2455 (2012) (holding that sentences of mandatory life without parole for
those under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes violated the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments), and
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (extending the relief
offered by Miller retroactively to juvenile offenders on collateral review),
entitled him to PCRA relief. See PCRA Petition, 3/22/16, at 3. Essentially,
Appellant contended that due to his life circumstances and cognitive abilities,
he was technically a juvenile eligible for the relief offered by Miller despite
the fact that he was 25 years old when he committed murder. Id.On August 20, 2018, the PCRA court sent Appellant notice pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, that his petition would be dismissed without a hearing
because it was untimely and Appellant had not satisfied a time-bar exception.
Appellant filed a pro se response to the court’s notice. On October 3, 2018,
the PCRA court formally dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely filed.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. It does not appear that the
PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). See, e.g., In re Estate of
-3-
J-S21030-19
Boyle, 77 A.3d 674, 676 (Pa. Super. 2013) (with regard to the preservation
of Appellant’s issues on appeal, it is the trial court’s order that triggers an
appellant’s obligation under the rule).
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
Did the [PCRA] court err by not applying the holding in Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) as a valid timeliness exception
given that the scientific evidence supporting the Miller decision is
present in the case sub judice?
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
This Court’s standard of review regarding an order denying a petition
under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported
by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v.
Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007). On appeal, we examine the issues
raised in light of the record “to determine whether the PCRA court erred in
concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and denying
relief without an evidentiary hearing.” See Commonwealth v. Springer,
961 A.2d 1262, 1264 (Pa. Super. 2008).
We begin by addressing the timeliness of Appellant’s petition, as the
PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be altered or
disregarded in order to address the merits of Appellant’s claims. See
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007). Under the
PCRA, any petition for relief, including second and subsequent petitions, must
be filed within one year of the date on which the judgment of sentence
becomes final. Id. There are three exceptions:
-4-
J-S21030-19
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any petition attempting to invoke these
exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been
presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2); see Commonwealth v. Gamboa-
Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000).2
Appellant’s petition is untimely. As previously noted by this Court, his
judgment of sentence became final on October 16, 1996, thirty days after this
Court affirmed his judgment of sentence and he failed to petition the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court for review. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (a
judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking the review). Accordingly, Appellant had
____________________________________________
2 Act 146 of 2018 amended 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(b)(2), effective December
2017, and now provides that a PCRA petition invoking a timeliness exception
must be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been
presented. Previously, a petitioner had 60 days from when the claim could
have been presented. See Act 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, No. 146, §2 and §3.
However, as Appellant’s petition was filed in March 2016, this change does not
impact Appellant or our analysis.
-5-
J-S21030-19
until October 1997 to timely file a PCRA petition. Appellant filed the instant
petition in March 2016, over 18 years too late. Therefore, we are without
jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s appeal unless he has plead and proved one
of the three timeliness exceptions. See Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1267.
Appellant attempts to invoke the constitutional right exception under
Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) on the basis that the relief provided by Miller and
made retroactive by Montgomery should extend to those 25 years old and
under, because such offenders are still developmentally adolescents and
possess the age-related characteristics of youth that must be considered prior
to the imposition of a sentence of life without parole. See Appellant’s Brief at
12-24. Additionally, because Appellant filed his petition within 60 days of the
Montgomery ruling, he has ostensibly satisfied the requirements of Sections
9545(b)91)(iii) and (2).
This Court recently re-examined this issue en banc in Commonwealth
v. Lee, --- A.3d ---, 2019 Pa. Super. 64 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc). In Lee,
the defendant was 18 years and nine-months old when she was involved in a
robbery that resulted in the death of the intended victim. Id. at * 1. Following
the publication of Montgomery, Lee filed a PCRA petition arguing that she
was a “virtual minor” at the time of the commission of her crime that that “the
rationale underlying the Miller holding, including consideration of
characteristics of youth and age-related facts identified as constitutionally
significant by the Miller Court, provides support for extending the benefit of
-6-
J-S21030-19
Miller to her case.” Id. at *2. Ultimately, this Court concluded that Lee had
not satisfied a time bar exception, observing:
It is not this Court’s role to override the gatekeeping function of
the PCRA time-bar and create jurisdiction where it does not exist.
The PCRA’s time limitations “are mandatory and interpreted
literally; thus, a court has no authority to extend filing periods
except as the statute permits.” Commonwealth v. Fahy, [737
A.2d 214, 222 (Pa. Super.] 1999). The period for filing a PCRA
petition “is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling.” Id.We recognize the vast expert research on this issue. If this matter
were one of first impression and on direct appeal, we might
expound differently. However, we are an error-correcting court.
Until the United States Supreme Court or the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court recognizes a new constitutional right in a non-
juvenile offender, we are bound by precedent. We conclude, as
we did in Commonwealth v. Montgomery [181 A.3d 359 (Pa.
Super. 2018)], [Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90 (Pa.
Super. 2016)], and [Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759(Pa. Super. 2013) abrogation on other grounds recognized in
Furgess, supra, at 94], that age is the sole factor in determining
whether Miller applies to overcome the PCRA time-bar and we
decline to extend its categorical holding.
Lee, at *8-9 (footnote omitted).
Accordingly, Appellant has failed to successfully plead or prove that he
meets the new constitutional right exception to the timeliness requirements
of the PCRA, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2)(iii), and the PCRA court did not err in
dismissing his petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b); Bennett, 930 A.2d at
1267; Ragan, 923 A.2d at 1170; Lee, --- A.3d --- at * 8-9.
Order affirmed.
-7-
J-S21030-19
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/26/19
-8-