Com. v. Joynes, K.

J-S10010-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KIMERLY JOYNES, :
:
Appellant : No. 765 EDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order February 10, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0305341-1980
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 22, 2018
Kimerly Joynes appeals from the February 10, 2017 order denying her
serial PCRA petition. We affirm.
On July 24, 1980, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder
and criminal conspiracy in relation to the beating death of James Martin. In
affirming the judgment of sentence, we recounted the relevant facts as
follows:
[Appellant] and her male companion, Robert Snead . . . , took
offense at remarks made to [her] by the victim, James "Poke"
Martin. [Appellant] and Snead confronted Martin, and
[Appellant] stood by while Snead beat Martin into
unconsciousness. [Appellant] then stabbed Martin several times
with a carving fork. According to testimony by the medical
examiner, these stab wounds were administ[e]red at or near the
time of death, but did not cause or contribute to the death.
[Appellant] then assisted Snead in wrapping the body in a
bundle and in attempting to remove blood and other evidence of
the beating from the room where it had taken place. The body
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was deposited in a marshy area, where it was eventually
discovered by police.
Commonwealth v. Joynes, 452 A.2d 1079 (Pa.Super. 1982) (unpublished
memorandum at 1-2).
The trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment, we affirmed
the judgment of sentence, and the Supreme Court denied allowance of
appeal on March 14, 1983. Appellant filed a petition under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act (“PCHA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9551 (Repealed April
13, 1988). Counsel was appointed, and following a hearing, the PCHA court
denied her petition. We affirmed the ordered denying PCHA relief, and our
High Court denied allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Joynes,
509 A.2d 1321 (Pa.Super. 1986).
Appellant filed the instant petition on October 21, 2016.1 She did not
assert any of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA time requirements. On
February 10, 2017, after issuing notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the
PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely and without exception to the
time bar. This appeal followed.
Appellant claims that the PCRA court erred in dismissing her petition
without a hearing. Our standard of review is well ensconced. We review an
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1 Appellant styled her petition as a notice of appeal from the January 13,
2016 order that denied her previous PCRA petition. However, the trial court
deemed the October 2016 filing to be a serial PCRA petition because (1) the
purported appeal was eight months overdue; and (2) Appellant asserted
substantive arguments regarding counsel’s ineffectiveness and the validity of
the underlying convictions.
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order dismissing a petition under the PCRA to determine whether the PCRA
court’s decision is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Weatherill, 24 A.3d 435, 438 (Pa.Super. 2011)
Further, “[i]n evaluating a PCRA court's decision, our scope of review is
limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level.” Id.
Any petition for relief under the PCRA, including second or subsequent
petitions, must be filed within one year of the date the PCRA petitioner’s
judgment of sentence becomes final unless the petitioner alleges and proves
that an exception to the one-year time limitation is met. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545.
“The PCRA's time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature.” Commonwealth
v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006). “‘[I]f a PCRA petition is
untimely, neither this Court nor the trial court has jurisdiction over the
petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to
address the substantive claims.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v.
Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 851 (Pa. 2005)); see also Commonwealth v.
Murray, 753 A.2d 201 (Pa. 2000). Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of
sentence became final on May 14, 1983, sixty days after our Supreme Court
denied allowance of appeal.2 As Appellant’s judgment of sentence became
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2Pursuant to former U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 20, which governs the pertinent period,
Appellant had sixty days to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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final prior to the 1995 enactment of § 9545, she had until January 16, 1997
to file a timely PCRA petition so long as that petition was her first. See
Weatherill, supra at 436 (citing Commonwealth v. Fenati, 748 A.2d 205
(Pa. 2000)) (“[T]here is an exception to § 9545 for a first PCRA petition filed
by a defendant whose judgment of sentence became final prior to the 1995
amendments as long as the first PCRA petition is filed by January 16,
1997.”). As the present serial petition was filed on October 21, 2016, it
satisfied neither prong of the exception. It is patently untimely.
Nevertheless, § 9545 provides three exceptions to the requirement
that a PCRA petition be filed within one year of finality of the judgment of
sentence: 1) the failure to file the PCRA petition was the result of
governmental interference; 2) discovery of previously unknown facts or
evidence if the facts or evidence could not have been ascertained by due
diligence; and 3) a newly-recognized constitutional right. 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
Appellant did not invoke any of the statutory exceptions to the § 9545
time bar in her PCRA petition. Instead, she asserted that the issue of
untimeliness was moot because the PCRA time bar did not apply to her 1980
conviction, which preceded the 1995 enactment of the PCRA. Appellant also
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
Supreme Court of the United States. The current rule, U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13,
effective January 1, 1990, grants petitioners ninety days to petition for
certiorari.
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raised a litany of claims challenging the effectiveness of trial counsel.
Appellant abandoned her mootness argument on appeal by failing to develop
any argument or cite legal authority in support of her position. In re S.T.S.,
Jr., 76 A.3d 24, 42 (Pa.Super. 2013) (“mere issue spotting without analysis
or legal citation to support an assertion precludes our appellate review of a
matter”).
Moreover, the time requirements are not moot. As we discussed
supra, the PCRA created a one-time exception to address scenarios where,
as here, the judgment of sentence became final prior to the Act’s effective
date. Unfortunately for Appellant, her petition does not fall within that
narrow exception. See Weatherill, supra.
As it relates to the argument that she actually levels, i.e., that the
time restrictions impinge her constitutional protections against the ex post
facto laws, our Supreme Court has specifically rejected this position.
Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 643 n.8 (Pa. 1998) (time
requirement is reasonable procedural restriction that does not fall within the
purview of the Ex Post Facto clause of the United States Constitution).
Appellant neglected to plead facts that would establish the existence of
an exception to § 9545. As we noted in Commonwealth v. Derrickson,
923 A.2d 466 (Pa.Super. 2007), a petition must be dismissed where it is
facially untimely and the PCRA petitioner failed to delineate in her petition
facts supporting the existence of an exception to the one-year filing
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requirement. Accordingly, the PCRA court did not err in dismissing
Appellant’s petition as untimely filed and without exception to the time
requirements.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/22/18
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