Com. v. Williams, F.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
FRANKLIN DAVID WILLIAMS :
:
Appellant : No. 1173 WDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 18, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-62-CR-0000265-2015,
CP-62-CR-0000266-2015, CP-62-CR-0000343-2015
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED JUNE 21, 2019
Franklin David Williams appeals from the order denying his petition for
relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We
affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with instructions.
Williams entered three negotiated pleas in 2015 to three counts of
aggravated indecent assault without consent.1 The charges were based on
indecent assaults that occurred in 2013, 2014, and 2015, in which Williams
digitally penetrated girls aged 5, 7, and 8, one of whom was his
granddaughter. The court sentenced Williams on February 26, 2016, after a
hearing, to three consecutive aggravated sentences of 78 to 156 months’
incarceration. The court also declared Williams to be a sexually violent
predator (“SVP”) and advised Williams that he was classified as a tier three
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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A § 3125(a)(1).
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sexual offender under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act
(“SORNA”)2 and would be subject to SORNA’s registration requirements.
Williams filed a motion for post-sentence relief on the basis that his sentence
was excessive. The court denied relief, and Williams did not file a direct appeal.
On February 24, 2017, Williams filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The
PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition. The court held
a hearing, at which Williams, Williams’ trial counsel, and the detective who
had investigated the underlying charges each testified. At the close of the
hearing, the court dismissed the petition.
Williams appealed,3 and presents the following issues:
1. The application of SVP status is Unconstitutional as an increase
of punishment without finding beyond a reasonable doubt and
SHOULD [sic] apply to [Williams’] case on Collateral Review.
2. SORNA is Unconstitutional, as previous sexual offender
registration statutes, and should not be applied to [Williams].
3. SORNA is discrimination against age and gender of [Williams].
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2 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.42.
3 This Court issued a Rule to Show Cause directing Williams to explain why his
appeal should not be quashed in light of Pa.R.A.P. 341 and Commonwealth
v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 971 (Pa. 2018) (holding “where a single order
resolves issues arising on more than one docket, separate notices of appeal
must be filed for each of those cases”). Williams responded, explaining that
although he styled the notice of appeal as a single document referencing the
three docket numbers he sought to appeal, he filed a separate copy of the
notice of appeal upon each of the trial court dockets. Our review of the record
reflects that Williams filed a separate copy of the notice of appeal upon each
trial court docket. As Williams effectively filed three notices of appeal rather
than one, we are satisfied that he has complied with Rule 341 and Walker.
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4. Allowance of Appeal regarding the discretionary aspects of
sentencing is requested as appeal issue presents a substantial
question that imposition of his sentence violates the fundamental
norms underlying the sentencing process. Sentence imposed is
unreasonable, improper and malicious violating the fundamental
norms of the sentencing process as [its] imposition discriminates
against his age.
Williams’ Br. at 2 (unpaginated).
“When reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, this Court’s standard of
review is limited ‘to whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by
evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.’” Commonwealth v.
Hart, 199 A.3d 475, 481 (Pa.Super. 2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pew,
189 A.3d 486, 488 (Pa.Super. 2018)).
Williams first challenges his designation as an SVP under SORNA.
Williams argues “current precedent” has established that the SVP statute is
unconstitutional because it allows a court to make an SVP determination
without requiring the court to make that finding beyond a reasonable doubt.
Williams’ Br. at 11 (unpaginated).
In Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal
granted, 190 A.3d 581 (Pa. 2018), this Court held that the section of SORNA
under which Williams’ SVP determination was made4 violated the federal and
state constitutions because it increased a defendant’s exposure to criminal
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4 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24.
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penalty5 without requiring the fact-finder to make the SVP determination
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1218.6 We thus reversed the trial court’s
order declaring the defendant an SVP, and remanded for the trial court to
issue new notice to the defendant regarding his registration requirements
under SORNA. Id.
Butler was based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), in which the Court held that
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime must be submitted to the jury
and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, this Court recently held
that “a PCRA petitioner can obtain relief from an illegal sentence under Butler,
if the petition is timely filed, as long as the relevant judgment of sentence
became final after June 17, 2013, the date Alleyne was decided.”
Commonwealth v. Adams-Smith, ___ A.3d ____, 2019 WL 1997650, at *8
(Pa.Super. May 7, 2019) (emphasis omitted).
Williams was declared an SVP under an unconstitutional statute, his
judgment of sentence became final after the date of the Alleyne decision, and
he sought relief in a timely PCRA petition. We therefore vacate those portions
of his judgment of sentence related to his SVP status, and remand for
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5 Butler was decided in the wake of Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d
1189, 1218 (Pa. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 138
S. Ct. 925 (2018), which declared that SORNA’s registration requirements are
punitive in effect.
6 The statute required the court to determine whether the Commonwealth
proved the defendant is an SVP by clear and convincing evidence. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9799.24(e)(3).
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proceedings consistent with this memorandum. Adams-Smith, 2019 WL
1997650, at *9.
In his second issue, Williams contends that SORNA as a whole is
unconstitutional, arguing only that “[e]ach previous attempt at registration
requirements through a sexual offender statute in Pennsylvania has been
determined unconstitutional based on one aspect or another; specific wording,
overly broad language, inappropriate burden.” Williams’ Br. at 12. Williams
does not explain in what way SORNA violates the state or federal constitutions.
We find this argument wholly inadequate to merit our review, and
consider it waived. See Commonwealth v. Walter, 966 A.2d 560, 566-67
(Pa. 2009) (holding claims waived by appellant’s failure to develop them in
appellate brief); Commonwealth v. Thoeun Tha, 64 A.3d 704, 713
(Pa.Super. 2013) (same).
Similarly, in his third issue, Williams baldly contends that SORNA is
discriminatory against his age and gender. Williams presents no argument in
support of this contention. Thus, it is waived. Walter, 966 A.2d at 566-67.
Moreover, the PCRA court noted that the issue was not raised prior to Williams’
reference to it in his Rule 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on
appeal. The issue is therefore waived for that reason as well. See Pa.R.A.P.
302(a) (issues not presented to the trial court may not be raised for the first
time on appeal).
In his final issue, Williams argues that we should grant allowance of
appeal over the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Williams again fails to
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provide any argument, thus waiving his issue. Walter, 966 A.2d at 566-67.
Moreover, this issue is not cognizable under the PCRA. See Commonwealth
v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 593 (Pa.Super. 2007). Williams does not argue that
his sentence is greater than the lawful maximum, or that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to pursue a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his
sentence on direct appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(ii), (vii) (stating PCRA
provides relief for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or the imposition
of sentence greater than lawful maximum). He has therefore failed to establish
any collateral relief is due under this issue.
As Williams has raised only one issue meriting relief we affirm the
remaining portions of the order of the PCRA court denying Williams relief on
his other issues.
PCRA Order affirmed in part; SORNA requirements and SVP status
vacated; case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/21/2019
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