Com. v. Seldon, T.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
TERRENCE SELDON, :
:
Appellant : No. 49 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 27, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division, No(s): CP-51-CR-0012826-2012
BEFORE: BOWES, MOULTON and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2016
Terrence Seldon (“Seldon”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his negotiated guilty plea to two counts of murder of the
third degree, and one count each of criminal conspiracy, robbery, and
possessing an instrument of crime. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c); 903(c);
3701(a)(1)(ii); 907(a). We affirm.
On July 24, 2012, Seldon and two other men, John Gonce (“Gonce”)
and Michael Holmes (“Holmes”), conspired to commit a home invasion of
1357 Westbury Drive in Philadelphia. On that date, Seldon, Gonce and
Holmes drove to the residence, which they believed was used to sell drugs.
While Seldon waited in the car as the getaway driver, Gonce approached the
residence dressed as a salesman and knocked on the door. Seventeen-year-
old Christopher Malcolm (“Malcolm”) answered the door, and Gonce opened
fire, hitting Malcolm in the chest. Gonce also shot thirteen-year-old Rohan
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Bennett in the chest and back. Both victims died as a result of the gunshot
wounds. Gonce ran back the car, and Seldon drove the car away from the
scene. Seldon was subsequently arrested.
Seldon was charged with numerous crimes. Seldon entered into a
negotiated guilty plea wherein he agreed to plead guilty to the above-
mentioned crimes, in exchange for a prison sentence of 35 to 70 years.
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the remaining charges were to be nol
prossed. On July 27, 2015, the trial court accepted the negotiated plea, and
sentenced Seldon to the agreed-upon sentence. On August 5, 2015, Seldon,
pro se, filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. Thereafter, Seldon’s plea
counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. The trial court granted the
Motion and appointed Seldon new counsel. The trial court subsequently
denied the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. Seldon filed a timely Notice of
Appeal.
On appeal, Seldon raises the following question for our review:
Did the [] trial court err when it failed to permit [Seldon] to
withdraw his guilty plea even though [Seldon] filed his [Motion
to Withdraw] guilty plea very soon after the plea was entered
and where [Seldon’s] testimony at an evidentiary hearing clearly
demonstrated that his plea was not made in a knowing,
intelligent and voluntary fashion?
Brief for Appellant at 3 (some capitalization omitted).
Seldon contends that the trial court should have allowed him to
withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 9, 14-15. Seldon argues that he did not
knowingly and voluntarily enter the plea due to a lack of discussion about
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the plea with his plea counsel; he was surprised by the plea; he initially did
not want to accept the plea and intended to go to trial; and he was
pressured by plea counsel, the district attorney and his mother into
accepting the plea deal. Id. at 10-11, 13, 14. Seldon asserts that his plea
counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw shortly after the entry of the guilty plea
due to Seldon’s dissatisfaction with counsel’s representation. Id. at 11-12.
Seldon also claims that his plea was unknowingly entered because he did not
receive a great bargain in the sentence. Id. at 12-13; see also id. at 12
(wherein Seldon argues that he was 29-years-old at the time of the entry of
the plea and that his sentence was the equivalent of a life in prison
sentence). Seldon contends that the Commonwealth would not have
suffered any prejudice if he withdrew his plea because he filed his Motion to
Withdraw immediately after he entered the plea, and witnesses were still
available. Id. at 14.
Our law is clear that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered. There is no
absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, and the decision as to
whether to allow a defendant to do so is a matter within the
sound discretion of the trial court. To withdraw a plea after
sentencing, a defendant must make a showing of prejudice
amounting to “manifest injustice.” A plea rises to the level of
manifest injustice when it was entered into involuntarily,
unknowingly, or unintelligently. A defendant’s disappointment in
the sentence imposed does not constitute “manifest injustice.”
Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212 (Pa. Super. 2008). In
order to ensure a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent plea, trial courts are
required to ask the following questions in the guilty plea colloquy:
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1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to
which he or she is pleading guilty or nolo contendere?
2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?
3) Does the defendant understand that he or she has the right to
a trial by jury?
4) Does the defendant understand that he or she is presumed
innocent until found guilty?
5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible ranges of sentences
and/or fines for the offenses charged?
6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the
terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge
accepts such agreement?
Id.; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, cmt. “Once a defendant has entered a plea
of guilty, it is presumed that he was aware of what he was doing, and the
burden of proving involuntariness is upon him.” Commonwealth v. Stork,
737 A.2d 789, 790 (Pa. Super. 1999). “In determining whether a guilty plea
was entered knowingly and voluntarily, … a court is free to consider the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea.” Commonwealth v.
Flanagan, 854 A.2d 489, 513 (Pa. 2004).
During the oral guilty plea colloquy, Seldon indicated that at the time
of his plea, he understood the English language, that he was not under the
influence of alcohol or drugs, and that he did not suffer from any mental
illnesses. See N.T., 7/27/15, at 19-21. Seldon confirmed that he knew and
understood the nature of the charges, the factual basis for the plea, the
permissible range of sentences and fines, the negotiated sentence, and that
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the judge was not bound by the terms of the plea agreement. See id. at
30, 37-38, 40-53. Seldon also acknowledged that by pleading guilty, he
understood that he was foregoing certain rights, including, inter alia, the
presumption of innocence, the right to file pretrial motions and the right to a
jury trial. Id. at 21-30, 35-37, 38. Seldon additionally stated that while he
was not satisfied by counsel’s representation, he was not forced or
threatened to plead guilty and was satisfied with the deal. Id. at 30, 34.
Although Seldon now argues that he was coerced into entering his
plea, Seldon’s own statements during the colloquy demonstrate that he
tendered his guilty plea under his own volition. Indeed, Seldon does not
contest that he fully understood the implications of his guilty plea. See
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 5 A.3d 370, 382 n.11 (Pa. Super. 2010) (stating
that “[a] defendant is bound by the statements he makes during his plea
colloquy, and may not assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that
contradict statements made when he pled.”) (citation omitted). Based on
the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Seldon knowingly and
voluntarily entered his guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. Munson, 615
A.2d 343, 349 (Pa. Super. 1992) (stating that appellant’s guilty plea was
entered voluntarily where a full and complete guilty plea colloquy was
conducted); see also Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 384
(Pa. Super. 2002) (stating that appellant cannot claim that he involuntarily
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entered a guilty plea where he stated that no one threatened him to plead
guilty). Thus, Seldon’s claim is without merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/23/2016
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