Com. v. Dixon, S.

J-S61026-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SARAH J. DIXON
Appellant No. 2020 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-20-CR-0000778-2015
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 13, 2016
Sarah J. Dixon appeals from the order entered in the Court of Common
Pleas of Crawford County, which denied her motion to dismiss burglary and
related charges filed against her based upon double jeopardy grounds. After
careful review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedure as
follows:
[Dixon] was charged in four counts with burglary, theft by
unlawful taking, and criminal mischief, stemming from the May
2015 removal of firearms from the Hollabaugh residence in
Steuben Township. Her trial commenced on November 9, 2015,
and on direct examination, witness Brian Lee Hollabaugh was
asked by the Commonwealth inter alia whether, on or about May
16, [Dixon] told him that he owed her money, and what she
would do if he didn’t pay. He answered in the affirmative, and
the trial was halted and a mistrial declared due to the
prosecution’s failure to disclose, prior to trial, at least the
substance of [Dixon’s] apparently incriminating statements to
Mr. Hollabaugh.
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[Dixon] filed her motion [to dismiss the criminal information
based on double jeopardy] on November 10, 2015[,] the
Commonwealth answered on November 18, 2015[,] and
argument was heard on December 2, 2015.
Trial Court Opinion, December 15, 2015, at 1-2. Thereafter, on December
15, 2015, the trial court denied the motion and found it to be nonfrivolous. 1
This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Dixon raises the following issue for our review:
Should the information against [Dixon] be dismissed based on
double jeopardy when the first trial was declared a mistrial
because of the intentional actions of the prosecutor [in] denying
her access to mand[a]tory discovery until after the [trial]
started[,] prejudic[ing] [Dixon] to the point of denying her a fair
trial and forcing her to request a mistrial?
Brief for Appellant, at 7.
The scope of our review in an appeal grounded in double jeopardy is
plenary, as it raises a question of constitutional law. Commonwealth v.
Wood, 803 A.2d 217, 220 (Pa. Super. 2002). Following a mistrial due to
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1
Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 587, if the trial court judge denies a motion to
dismiss on double jeopardy grounds “but does not find it frivolous, the judge
shall advise the defendant on the record that the denial is immediately
appealable as a collateral order.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 587(B)(6). Here, the trial
court did not expressly include its finding of nonfrivolousness when it ruled
on the motion. However, the court issued an order addressing this issue on
January 27, 2016, in which it stated that the “[c]ourt intended implicitly to
find that [the motion] was not frivolous[,]” and advised Dixon of her right to
immediately appeal the denial as a collateral order. See Order, 1/27/16, at
n. 1-2.
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prosecutorial misconduct, we determine whether retrial is barred due to
double jeopardy based upon the following standard:
Under both the federal and state constitutions, double jeopardy
bars retrial where the prosecutor’s misconduct was intended to
provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. . . . [Our
Supreme Court has held] that the double jeopardy clause of the
Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits retrial of a defendant not
only when prosecutorial misconduct is intended to provoke the
defendant into moving for a mistrial, but also when the conduct
of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the
defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial.
[Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. 1992),]
. . . However, Smith did not create a per se bar to retrial in all
cases of intentional prosecutorial overreaching.
Commonwealth v. Culver, 51 A.3d 866, 882-83 (Pa. Super. 2012) (some
citations omitted). As to our review of the trial court’s findings of fact,
[w]here issues of credibility and weight of the evidence are
concerned, it is not the function of the appellate court to
substitute its judgment based on a cold record for that of the
trial court. The weight to be accorded conflicting evidence is
exclusively for the fact finder, whose findings will not be
disturbed on appeal if they are supported by the record.
Wood, supra at 220.
In Commonwealth v. Burke, 781 A.2d 1136 (Pa. 2001), our
Supreme Court clarified that prosecutorial misconduct does not warrant
dismissal of charges unless it is deliberate and egregious, such as the
conduct that occurred in Smith. In Smith, the Commonwealth intentionally
withheld information from a capital defendant, including:
(1) the existence of an agreement with its chief witness pursuant
to which he received lenient treatment at sentencing on
unrelated charges in exchange for his testimony, and (2)
material, exculpatory physical evidence that it had discovered
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mid-trial. The physical evidence consisted of grains of sand that
were found between the toes of the murder victim at her
autopsy. The sand was consistent with Smith’s defense that the
crime had been committed in Cape May, New Jersey, by others,
and not by him in Pennsylvania, as the Commonwealth had
alleged.
Burke, supra at 1144.
In Burke, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Commonwealth v.
Moose, 602 A.2d 1265 (Pa. 1992). In Moose, the prosecutor’s failure to
inform defense counsel of a witness’ police statement containing
incriminating admissions allegedly made by the defendant amounted to a
willful violation of discovery rules. Nevertheless, despite the intentional
nature of the failure to disclose the evidence, the Court remanded the
matter for a new trial. Burke, supra at 1145. See also Commonwealth
v. Strong, 825 A.2d 658, 668-70 (Pa. Super. 2003) (Commonwealth’s
failure to reveal information pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83(1963), did not warrant dismissal of charges where there was lack of
evidence demonstrating specific intent to deny defendant a fair trial).
Dixon asserts that the Commonwealth “denied [her] a fair trial by
proceeding to trial knowing that there was new discovery to provide [to her,]
but then [the Commonwealth] intentionally tried to continue the non-
disclosure.” Brief for Appellant, at 9. The new discovery to which Dixon
refers was information provided to the Commonwealth approximately fifteen
minutes prior to trial starting, involving potentially inculpatory statements.
See Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(b) (Commonwealth is required to disclose to
defendant’s attorney “the substance of any oral confession or inculpatory
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statement, and the identity of the person to whom the confession or
inculpatory statement was made that is in the possession or control of the
attorney for the Commonwealth”).
The relevant statements came to light during the following exchange
at trial:
[Direct Examination of Brian Lee Hollabaugh by Assistant District
Attorney (ADA) Douglas Ferguson:]
Q. Okay. And did you tell us how soon after you talked to
your father about the guns that you called Dixon?
A. Shortly after – within half hour probably.
Q. And what did you – what did you say to her?
A. I said, [d]id you go to my parent’s house and steal mine
and my dad’s hunting rifles[?]
Q. Okay. Was it a long conversation?
A. No.
...
Q. On May 16th or any time before that, did Mrs. Dixon ever
tell you, you owed her money?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever pay her any money?
A. I’ve paid her.
Q. Did you pay her money as a result of her saying you owed
her money?
A. No.
Q. Did she ever indicate to you what would happen if you
didn’t tell her – didn’t pay her?
A. Yes.
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N.T. Trial, 11/19/15, at 55-56. Defense counsel objected to this line of
questioning, and the court thereafter granted a mistrial because the
statements regarding Hollabaugh owing Dixon money had not been disclosed
to defense counsel.
Dixon contends that the failure to disclose the allegedly inculpatory
statements that the Commonwealth learned of immediately prior to trial was
a deliberate and intentional tactic to deny her a fair trial. There is no
dispute that the Commonwealth was required to disclose the statements
prior to trial, and we do not condone the Commonwealth’s serious failure to
uphold its obligation to provide the required discovery to defense counsel.
However, based upon the timing in which the statements were made to the
Commonwealth and the representations made by ADA Ferguson during the
sidebar discussion when defense counsel moved for a mistrial, the trial court
determined that the Commonwealth did not intend to prejudice Dixon or
force her to move for a mistrial. ADA Ferguson stated that his intent in
placing Hollabaugh on the stand was to obtain “the time frames of when he
got the call – when he made the call because it fits in . . . within minutes [of
Dixon] going over to – to Michelle Cannon’s with the guns.” Id. at 73.
Thus, the trial court’s credibility determination is supported in the record.
Wood, supra.Further, as the trial court noted, it was not “convinced that [the]
omission amounted to deliberate misconduct. Even if willful, rather than
inadvertent, it was not part of a ‘pattern of pervasive misconduct’ [quoting
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Commonwealth v. Anderson, 38 A.3d 828, 840 (Pa. Super. 2011)] . . .
nor exacerbated by attempts to hide the transgression.” Trial Court Opinion,
12/15/15, at 4. Accordingly, the trial court properly ordered a new trial
rather than dismissing the charges against Dixon. Even if the
Commonwealth willfully withheld information of the statements, a new trial
is nevertheless an appropriate remedy based upon the record in this matter.
Burke, supra. Thus, we discern no error on the part of the trial court.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/13/2016
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