In Re: M.G., Appeal of: R.G.

J-S34030-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: M.G., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: R.G.
No. 180 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order January 3, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans' Court at No(s): TPR 059 of 2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 1, 2014
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) (2), (5), (8), and (b).1 We affirm.
The parties first became known to the Allegheny County Office of
care for Child. N.T., 8/16/13, at 15. CYF did not open a case at that time.
N.T., 8/16/13, at 15. The trial court accurately set forth the following
procedural history:
In December 2003, CYF received reports that Mother was
ing situation was
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1
petition to terminate the parental
rights of both parents. However, Father is not a party to the current appeal,
nor has he filed a separate appeal.
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unstable. After investigation, CYF closed the case on February
25, 2004.
In August 2004, CYF received reports that Mother was
behaviors. After investigation, CYF closed [the] case in
November 2004. In November 2006, CYF received reports that
Mother did not have heat in her home, and that Mother was not
appropriately supervising Child. At that time, CYF accepted the
case for services. On March 6, 2008, CYF filed a Petition for
Dependency, alleging that Mother had housing and drug issues,
and that Child had mental health and behavioral issues. CYF
referred Mother for a drug and alcohol evaluation through
POWER. Mother underwent two POWER assessments in
November 2006 and October 2007, but Mother did not obtain the
recommended drug treatment. CYF withdrew its dependency
petition in August 2008. In October of 2009, CYF closed the
case.
On October 26, 2010, CYF received its fifth referral
involving Mother. Upon investigation, CYF discovered that:
she was being evicted due to not paying rent. CYF accepted the
case for services and the case has not closed since.
because Mother admitted to smoking marijuana. Mother
completed another POWER assessment and was recommended
to follow up with outpatient therapy and mental health services
at Mercy Behavioral Health. Mother did not obtain, or participate
with, treatment at Mercy Behavioral Health. In early December
friend, Ms. Lucille Evans. After Child alleged that Ms. Evans was
hitting him, Ms. Evans requested that Child leave her home.
Consequently, in mid-December 2010, Child began
residing with [C.H.], his half-
Mother remained in the home of Ms. Evans.
In early January 2011, Child moved, yet again, to the
home of Ms. Ann Meyers, special education teacher at his school.
While Child was in her care, Ms. Meyers observed that
Child experienced behavioral and emotional problems, including
expressed anger and aggression. Child stated he wished he
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were dead and locked himself in his locker with a lanyard around
his neck like a noose.
In January 2011, while Child was still residing with Ms.
Meyers, his school discovered a Swiss Army knife and what the
result, on January 19, 2011, Child was involuntarily committed
and transferred to Southwood Psychiatric ("Southwood").
Trial Court Opinion, 1/9/14, at 2-5.
On January 27, 2011, while Child was committed to Southwood, CYF
obtained an Emergency Custody Authorization, permitting the removal of
Child from Mother. On March 29, 2011, after an evidentiary hearing, Child
was adjudicated dependent. The trial court ordered that Child be placed in
specialized foster home for children who have severe mental health and
behavioral issues, upon his discharge from Southwood. On May 10, 2011,
Child was discharged from Southwood and entered an IRT foster home
through NHS Human Services. On March 6, 2012, and March 21, 2012,
On March 28, 2012, Child was re-admitted to Southwood due to a
in the Wesley Spectrum IRT foster home of T. C. ("Foster Mother") and D.C.
("Foster Father"). Since that time, Child has remained in this placement.
On March 14, 2013, CYF filed a petition to involuntarily terminate the
parental rights of Mother to Child. On July 19, 2013, August 16, 2013,
August 27, 2013, September 6, 2013, September 24, 2013, and October 4,
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2013, the trial court held hearings on the termination petition. At the
hearings, Grant Walker, a CYF caseworker; Jeffrey Doran, supervisor at
Wesley Spectrum Services; Eric Bernstein, Ph.D., a court-appointed
Mother; and Mother testified. On January 3, 2014, the trial court entered its
§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).
Mother timely filed a notice of appeal, along with a concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and
(b). Mother raises the following issue.
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or erred as a
parental rights would serve the needs and welfare of Child
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?
Our standard of review regarding orders terminating parental rights is
as follows:
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental
rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the
trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an
abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary
Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily
terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing
jury verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review
decision is supported by competent evidence.
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In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005). In termination cases, the
burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid.
Id. at 806. We have previously stated:
The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as
testimony
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003).
The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and
resolve conflicts in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.
Super. 2004). If competent evidence supports the trial c
will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result. In re
Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003). Additionally,
subsection In re
B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 581
Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004).
The termination of parental rights is controlled by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
Under this statute, the trial court must engage in a bifurcated process in
which it initially focuses on the conduct of the parent under Section 2511(a).
See In the Interest of B.C., 36 A.3d 601 (Pa. Super. 2012). If the trial
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Section 2511(a), it must then engage in an analysis of the best interests of
the child under Section 2511(b). See id.
In the instant case, Mother do
as it relates to her conduct under Section 2511(a); but rather, she limits her
Section 2511(b).
Section § 2511(b) provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Other considerations. The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
parent.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
Pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court must take into account
whether a natural parental bond exists between child and parent, and
whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial
relationship. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1202 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc).
In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa.Super. 2005),
and stability are involved in the inquiry into needs and welfare of
must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond,
with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently
severing that bond. Id. However, the extent of the bond-effect
analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the
particular case. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa.Super.
2008).
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major aspect of the Subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it
is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
The mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the
examine the status of the bond to determine whether its
cial
As we explained in In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483
(Pa. Super. 2010):
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have
with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated
that the trial court should consider the importance of
continuity of relationships and whether any existing
parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental
effects on the child.
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).
s
that severance of the parent-child bond would be detrimental to Child. Id.
appropriate in order to provide Child with the necessary permanence to
support the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of
Child. Trial Court Opinion, 1/3/15, at 21. Dr. Bernstein and Dr. Hindmarsh
the best
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not healthy or condu
116. Moreover, Dr. Hindmarsh testified that the relationship between
s doing okay. N.T.,
10/4/13, at 23-
be able to be count on the predictability of life at home. . . and that they
Id.
The trial court found that Foster Parents participate consistently in
clinical meetings, and are very nurturing toward Child. Trial Court Opinion,
1/9/14, at 20. The trial court also found that Child looks to Foster Parents
for security and support. Id.
required further hospitalization, he is generally doing well in school, he is
very comfortable with Foster Mother, and he has handled some difficult and
stress -
20.
Additionally, Dr. Hindmarsh testified that Child is very comfortable
with Foster Mother. N.T., 10/4/13, at 18. Dr. Hindmarsh stated that Foster
Mother will allow Child to continue to experience the predicable support that
he has been receiving and will allow Child to continue progress. Id. at 26,
49. Furthermore, Dr. Bernstein testified that foster parents provide Child
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and positive adjustment in foster care. Id. at 86. See In re T.S.M., 71
A.3d 251 (Pa. 2013) (stating that the strong parent-child bond was an
unhealthy one that could not by itself serve as grounds to prolong foster
care drift). We have stated that the mere existence of a bond or attachment
of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination
petition. See In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did
hild
pursuant to section 2511(b). We therefore affirm the termination of
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/1/2014
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