Com. v. Randolph, J.

J-A09026-16
2016 Pa. Super. 253
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JASON ROBERT RANDOLPH
Appellant No. 1246 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 14, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0000594-2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING STATEMENT BY PLATT, J.:
FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2016
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
I concur in the learned Majority’s conclusion that Corporal Hanlon
obtained valid consent from Appellant to search the vehicle at the scene of
the traffic stop. However, I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s
conclusion that Corporal Hanlon’s affidavit in support of the application for a
search warrant did not establish probable cause. Instead, I would conclude
that the allegations contained within the four corners of the affidavit
sufficiently established probable cause, in particular, that the steel box
welded to the undercarriage of the van would contain contraband or
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A09026-16
evidence of a crime. In my view, the trial court properly denied the motion
to suppress. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.
Our standard of review for a challenge to a suppression court’s denial
of a motion to suppress is “limited to determining whether the suppression
court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v.
Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010).
Pursuant to the “totality of the circumstances” test set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in [Illinois v.
]Gates[, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)], the task of an issuing authority
is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether,
given all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before
him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place. . . .
Id. at 655 (one citation omitted).
Here, the affidavit of probable cause states that Appellant and his
passenger gave inconsistent answers concerning where they were going;
multiple cell phones were ringing in the vehicle; there was no luggage in the
vehicle and all of the rear seats had been removed; and officers observed an
aftermarket welded box on the undercarriage of the vehicle that did not
match the remainder of the undercarriage. In my view, the Majority’s focus
on the level of detail in the recitation of Corporal Hanlon’s training,
knowledge, and experience misses the big picture, and reweighs the
evidence before the suppression court. I would conclude that given the
totality of these circumstances, as set forth in the affidavit, the suppression
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J-A09026-16
court’s finding that probable cause existed that contraband or evidence of a
crime would be found in the steel box welded to the underside of the van
was supported by the record. See id. at 654-55.
Furthermore, I am constrained to disagree with the Majority’s
argument that Corporal Hanlon was required to demonstrate a fact-specific
nexus between his experience and probable cause for the search. Such
analysis exceeds the scope of our review and attempts to re-weigh rather
than review the suppression court’s determination. See Commonwealth v.
Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 935 (Pa. 2009) (holding that a police officer’s
experience may be regarded as a relevant factor, and reasoning that “[t]he
very foundation of the Gates totality test is the recognition that all relevant
factors go into the probable cause mix.”) (emphasis added); see also
Jones, supra at 654. In my opinion, the trial court properly denied the
motion to suppress.
Therefore, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
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