Com. v. Beech, T.

J-S88012-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
THOMAS BEECH,
Appellant No. 628 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of January 22, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0000676-2015,
CP-09-CR-0003138-2015 and CP-09-CR-0006115-2014
BEFORE: OLSON, RANSOM AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 13, 2017
Appellant, Thomas Beech, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on January 22, 2016. We affirm.
The trial court accurately summarized the factual background of this
case as follows:
On July 2, 2014, Constance Rondeau [(“Rondeau”)]. . . arrived
home [in Montgomery County] to find a blue Ford Focus parked
in her driveway. She waited in her car for her daughter to arrive,
as she did not know whose car was in her driveway or if
someone was in her home. Thereupon, Rondeau witnessed a
“slim natured man with dark hair and his arm wrapped up” exit
her home and enter the car and drive off. When Rondeau’s
daughter arrived, the two of them walked to the back of the
house and “saw the disaster.” Rondeau noticed that a bench
from her deck was moved towards her back window, and that
her back window was broken. Upon entering her house,
Rondeau observed “blood all over” the bathroom that was
connected to the broken rear window, and “blood all throughout
the different portions of the house, even the upstairs.” The DNA
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court
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extracted from the blood in Rondeau’s house matched
Appellant’s DNA. Further, the Commonwealth’s expert on
cellular technology and forensics, using Appellant’s cell phone
records, offered evidence showing that Appellant’s cell phone
was “in the vicinity of the victim’s residence” surrounding the
time of the burglary.
On July 26, 2014, Marybell Melendez [(“Melendez”)], a resident
of [Bucks County] encountered Appellant “trying to get into her
back door.” While in her home cleaning her bathroom, Melendez
heard a knock at her back door, and went and looked out her
window and saw Appellant looking around. After losing sight of
Appellant and returning to continue to clean her bathroom,
Melendez heard scratching, and then stopped what she was
doing and approached her back door where she witnessed
Appellant trying to break the screen on her back outer door.
Melendez then approached Appellant at the back door and
engaged in a face to face confrontation with him. When she
noticed he was wearing gloves, she indicated that she was going
to call the police, at which point Appellant left. . . .
On August 12, 2014, Amanda Paley [(“Paley”)], a resident of
[Bucks County], came home with her 10-month[-]old son, and
upon entering her home saw that a window and her bathroom
cabinets were left open. She initially thought her husband was
responsible for opening them before he left the house. She
proceeded to take a shower, and upon finishing, entered her
bedroom and noticed that her [closet] door was open, and some
of her belongings, including an empty jewelry box, were strewn
across the floor. Upon noticing this scene, Paley grabbed her
son, exited the house, got in her car, and called 911. Shortly
after Paley called 911, a park ranger from the adjacent
Bensalem Community Park, Kenneth Buckalew [(“Buckalew”)],
arrived and told Paley he would take a walk around the house to
check things out. While walking around the house, Buckalew
saw Appellant climb out of Paley’s window holding a bag. After
Buckalew arrived and proceeded to walk around the house, Paley
witnessed Appellant come around the side of her house, carrying
“the type of bag they normally give a patient in the hospital.”
Paley got out of her car and started yelling at Appellant, at which
point he started running towards the nearby park. Moments
later, Paley observed Appellant “pull out of the driveway of the
park in a car,” which was a blue Ford Focus. Prior to Buckalew
being aware of the incident at Paley’s residence, he took a
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photograph of a blue Ford Focus parked in the Bensalem
Community Park parking lot because he found it suspicious, and
at trial Paley identified the car in the photograph as the car in
which she saw Appellant drive away. Paley also subsequently
identified Appellant’s vehicle that was impounded by police as
the vehicle in which Appellant fled. Once again, the
Commonwealth’s expert on cellular technology and forensics,
based on Appellant’s cell phone records, proffered evidence
indicating that Appellant’s cell phone was used in close proximity
to [Paley’s] residence . . . during the time surrounding the
burglary of said residence.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/20/16, at 4-6 (honorifics, headings, internal
alterations, ellipses, footnote and internal citations omitted).
On August 28, 2014, Officer Steven Bailey stopped Appellant as he
drove behind a Target store in an area that was posted no trespassing.
After a brief investigation, Officer Bailey arrested Appellant for the burglary
of Paley’s residence. Subsequently, Melendez, Paley, and Buckalew
identified Appellant via photo arrays. Appellant was not provided counsel
during these photo arrays.
The procedural history of this case is as follows. The Commonwealth
charged Appellant, via three separate criminal informations, with two counts
of burglary,1 two counts of trespass,2 attempted burglary,3 attempted
trespass,4 criminal mischief,5 theft by unlawful taking,6 attempted theft by
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1).
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(ii).
3
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 3502.
4
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 3503.
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unlawful taking,7 receiving stolen property,8 and attempted receiving stolen
property.9
On March 30, 2015, Appellant filed a suppression motion. On July 22,
2015, the Commonwealth filed a motion to consolidate the three criminal
informations for a single trial. Prior to trial, the trial court conducted a
combined pre-trial motions hearing. During the hearing, the trial court
granted the Commonwealth’s consolidation motion and granted in part and
denied in part Appellant’s suppression motion.
On October 9, 2015, Appellant was convicted of all 11 charges. On
January 22, 2016, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 8 to
20 years’ imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.10
Appellant presents two issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court err in consolidating for trial two burglaries
and one attempted burglary where the incidents were
5
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(5).
6
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).
7
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 3921.
8
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a).
9
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 3925.
10
On February 24, 2016, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal (“concise statement”). See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On April 13, 2016, Appellant filed his concise statement.
On May 20, 2016, the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Both
issues raised on appeal were included in Appellant’s concise statement.
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factually distinct, occurred in different jurisdictions[,] and
occurred over a six-week period?
2. Did the trial court err in failing to grant Appellant’s motion to
suppress evidence obtained following: (1) a stop of
Appellant’s car that was not supported by reasonable
suspicion; (2) an arrest of Appellant that was not supported
by probable cause; and (3) the denial of counsel to Appellant
at a post-arrest photo display?
Appellant’s Brief at 5 (complete capitalization omitted).
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by
consolidating the three criminal informations for trial.11 “[T]he decision of
whether to join or sever offenses for trial is within the discretion of the trial
court, and such decision will not be reversed on appeal absent a manifest
abuse of that discretion or a showing of prejudice and clear injustice to the
defendant.” Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 975 (Pa. Super.
2016) (citation omitted).
Joinder of criminal informations for trial is governed by Pennsylvania
Rule of Criminal Procedure 582, which provides, in relevant part:
Offenses charged in separate indictments or informations may
be tried together if:
(a) the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a
separate trial for the other and is capable of separation by the
jury so that there is no danger of confusion; or
(b) the offenses charged are based on the same act or
transaction.
11
The Commonwealth contends that this issue is waived; however, our
review of the certified record indicates that Appellant properly preserved this
issue.
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Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(1). In this case, it is undisputed that the crimes were
not based upon the same act or transaction. Thus, the three criminal
informations could only be joined for trial if the requirements of Rule
582(A)(1)(a) were satisfied.
We agree with the trial court that the evidence of the other offenses
would have been admissible in separate trials under Pennsylvania Rule of
Evidence 404(b), which provides that prior bad acts evidence, while not
admissible to show mere propensity, “may be admissible for another
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal
case this evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” Pa.R.Evid. 404(b)(2). Although
not included within the enumerated list of permissible uses in Rule
404(b)(2), prior bad acts evidence may be admitted to assist in “proving the
existence of a common scheme[.]” Commonwealth v. Arrington, 86 A.3d
831, 842 (Pa. 2014).
In this case, the trial court explained that Appellant’s common scheme
included burglarizing homes in suburban Philadelphia, during the middle of
the day, and entering (or attempting to enter) at or near the rear of the
residences. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/20/16, at 11, quoting N.T., 10/5/15,
at 21. We agree that the evidence cited by the trial court proved the
existence of a common scheme.
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We find instructive this Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v.
Armstrong, 74 A.3d 228 (Pa. Super. 2013), aff’d, 107 A.3d 735 (Pa. 2014)
and Commonwealth v. Janda, 14 A.3d 147 (Pa. Super. 2011). In
Armstrong, the defendant attempted to burglarize two residences two
months apart. The two attempted burglaries were charged in separate
criminal informations and the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s
motion to consolidate the criminal informations for trial. On appeal, this
Court affirmed, explaining that “the attempted burglaries . . . took place in
close temporal and geographic proximity, [were] committed against women
who were alone in their homes late at night, by attempting to pry open a
window using a crowbar or metal tool.” Armstrong, 74 A.3d at 234. Thus,
this Court concluded that the attempted burglaries would be admissible in
the other trials under Rule 404(b) because they demonstrated a common
scheme. See id.In Janda, the defendant was charged with nine burglaries via two
separate criminal informations. The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s
motion to join the two criminal informations for trial. On appeal, this Court
found that evidence of the burglaries would have been admissible at
separate trials under Rule 404(b) in order to prove a common scheme. See
Janda, 14 A.3d at 156. This Court reasoned that the “thefts took place over
a span of several months. . . . Furthermore, the burglarized homes were
located within approximately a five mile to six mile radius of one another.
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Each of the residences was situated such that it was largely obscured from
view from the vantage point of the road.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
In the case sub judice, the similarities of the offenses were akin to the
similarities in Armstrong and Janda. The timeframe for the two burglaries
and one attempted burglary in this case was shorter than the timeframe for
the burglaries in Armstrong and Janda. Moreover, although they occurred
in separate jurisdictions, the three residences were all in close geographic
proximity. All of the burglaries were committed while women were present,
in the daytime, and entry was made at or near the rear of the residence.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that the first prong of Rule 404(b)(2) was satisfied.
As to the second prong of Rule 404(b)(2), we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of the
other crimes would outweigh any potential for unfair prejudice. Appellant
argues that prejudice would have occurred in the two cases where no DNA
was found at the crime scene. According to Appellant, the DNA evidence at
one scene bolstered the credibility of the eyewitnesses who testified that he
committed the other burglary and attempted burglary. Appellant ignores,
however, that an expert would have testified in the Paley burglary trial that
Appellant’s cellular telephone records placed him at or near the crime scene
at the time of the burglary. Moreover, the eyewitness identifications in this
case were not equivocal. Instead, they were made without hesitation. We
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ascertain a high probative value and very little risk of unfair prejudice if the
other burglaries were admitted. Thus, the second prong of Rule 404(b)(2)
was satisfied. As such, the burglaries and attempted burglary would have
been admissible at separate trials.
The second prong of Rule 582(A)(1)(a) was also satisfied. The jury
could easily separate the burglaries and attempted burglary. Each burglary
and attempted burglary occurred on a different day, at a different residence,
and involved different victims and witnesses. There was no danger that the
jury would be confused by the joinder of the offenses into a single trial.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
consolidating the three criminal informations for trial.
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
denying his suppression motion. “Once a motion to suppress evidence has
been filed, it is the Commonwealth’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of
the defendant’s rights.” Commonwealth v. Evans, 2016 WL 7369120, *3
(Pa. Super. Dec. 20, 2016) (citation omitted). “Our standard of review in
addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is
whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the
legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v.
Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 796 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). “[O]ur
scope of review is limited to the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
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[trial] court.” In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1080 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).
“Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the [trial] court, we may
consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the
evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole.” Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 145 A.3d
1156, 1159 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). “Where the [trial] court’s
factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings
and may reverse only if the [trial] court’s legal conclusions are erroneous.”
Commonwealth v. Palmer, 145 A.3d 170, 173 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation
omitted).
Appellant presents three discrete suppression challenges. In his first
suppression challenge, Appellant argues that Officer Bailey lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop him. In his second suppression challenge,
Appellant argues that Officer Bailey lacked probable cause to arrest him. In
his final suppression challenge, Appellant argues that the trial court should
have suppressed Melendez’s, Paley’s, and Buckalew’s identifications of him
as the perpetrator of the offenses.
“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” Commonwealth v. Korn, 139 A.3d
249, 258 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, 2016 WL 6107660 (Pa. Oct. 18,
2016) (citation omitted). “To safeguard these rights, courts require police to
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articulate the basis for their interaction with citizens in three increasingly
intrusive situations.” Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa.
Super. 2013) (internal alteration, quotation marks, and citation omitted).
This Court has described the three types of police/citizen interactions,
and the necessary justification for each, as follows:
The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for
information) which need not be supported by any level of
suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to
respond. The second, an “investigative detention[,]” must be
supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a
stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such
coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of
an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be
supported by probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Stilo, 138 A.3d 33, 36 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation
omitted).
It is undisputed that Officer Bailey needed reasonable suspicion to stop
Appellant. See Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 992 (Pa. Super.
2015) (citation omitted) (reasonable suspicion necessary to investigate
possible criminal activity). As this Court has explained:
To establish grounds for reasonable suspicion, the officer must
articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with
reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him
reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal
activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved
in that activity. The question of whether reasonable suspicion
existed at the time the officer conducted the stop must be
answered by examining the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the officer who initiated the stop had a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the individual
stopped. Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing
court must be an objective one, namely, whether the facts
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available to the officer at the moment of the stop warrant a
person of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken
was appropriate.
Commonwealth v. Postie, 110 A.3d 1034, 1039–1040 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(internal alterations and citation omitted).
In this case, Officer Bailey witnessed Appellant drive into an area
marked “no trespassing” behind a closed Target store. N.T., 10/5/15, at
119. This gave Officer Bailey reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant in order
to investigate whether he was casing the store,12 i.e., determining whether
he could successfully burglarize the store, or committing a defiant
trespass.13 See id. at 122. Accordingly, Officer Bailey’s stop of Appellant
was supported by reasonable suspicion.14
Next, Appellant argues that Officer Bailey lacked probable cause to
arrest him after the traffic stop. “The police have probable cause where the
facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to
12
Appellant’s citation to Commonwealth v. Williams, 429 A.2d 698 (Pa.
Super. 1981) is unpersuasive. In that case, the defendants were in an
“abandoned, private parking lot of a swimming pool which was being
salvaged.” Id. at 699. In this case, Appellant was in the parking lot of a
closed store.
13
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(1)(ii) (“A person commits an offense if,
knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains
in any place as to which notice against trespass is given by . . . posting in a
manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of
intruders[.]”).
14
Moreover, for essentially the same reasons that we conclude infra that
Officer Bailey had probable cause to arrest Appellant, we also conclude that
Officer Bailey had reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant to investigate his
involvement in the burglary of Paley’s residence.
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warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been
or is being committed.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 935 A.2d 1275,
1284 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted). “In determining whether probable cause
exists, we [look at the] totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v.
Fleet, 114 A.3d 840, 854 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).
At the time Officer Bailey arrested Appellant, he knew the following
information: (1) Appellant previously was convicted of burglary, N.T.,
10/5/15, at 128; (2) Appellant matched the general description of the
individual who burglarized Paley’s residence, id. at 123;15 (3) Appellant was
driving a vehicle which matched the color, make, and model of the vehicle
driven by the individual who burglarized Paley’s residence, id. at 109; (4)
Appellant’s vehicle had a blue emblem on the right side of the trunk which
matched the photograph of the suspect’s vehicle taken by Buckalew, id. at
105; (5) Appellant’s license plate holder was made of chain link which
matched the photograph of the suspect’s vehicle taken by Buckalew, id.;
and (6) Appellant was one and one-half miles from Paley’s residence. Id. at
114. As Appellant notes, however, other circumstances indicated that
Appellant was not the individual who burglarized Paley’s residence. For
example, he had short hair at the time of his arrest while the individual who
15
Appellant argues that the trial court found this testimony not credible.
See Appellant’s Brief at 21. His citation, however, is to the assistant district
attorney’s argument on the suppression motion.
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burglarized Paley’s residence had long hair. Furthermore, his license plate
number did not match the license plate number in the photograph.
We agree with the trial court that the totality of the circumstances
established probable cause that Appellant was the suspect who burglarized
Paley’s residence. Although Appellant’s hair was short at the time of the
arrest, it only takes minutes for an individual to cut his hair in order to
change his appearance. As to the license plate number, Officer Bailey knew
that the license plate number from the photograph was recovered using
photo enhancement techniques and, therefore, an error was possible. N.T.,
10/5/15, at 129. Detective Michael Moretti, the individual investigating the
burglary of Paley’s residence, and Officer Bailey agreed that Appellant’s
vehicle was probably the vehicle photographed by Buckalew. Id. at 128.
Thus, there were six circumstances that weighed heavily in favor of Officer
Bailey believing that Appellant burglarized Paley’s residence while the
circumstances that weighed against that inference were not weighty. As
such, we conclude that the trial court properly found that Appellant’s arrest
was supported by probable cause.
Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court should have suppressed
Melendez’s, Paley’s, and Buckalew’s in-court and out-of-court identifications
of him as the perpetrator of the offenses. “In Pennsylvania, a defendant has
a constitutional right to have counsel present during identification
procedures.” Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 67 (Pa. Super.
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2014), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). A
defendant, however, does not have a constitutional right to have counsel
present during identification procedures if he is in custody for an offense
different from that for which the photo array is compiled. Commonwealth
v. Harrell, 65 A.3d 420, 438 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 101 A.3d
785 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted); see Commonwealth v. Zabala, 456
A.2d 622, 629 (Pa. Super. 1983).
In this case, Appellant was in custody for burglarizing Paley’s residence
at the time the photo array was compiled for the attempted burglary of
Melendez’s residence. Thus, Appellant did not have the constitutional right
to have counsel present at the photo array shown to Melendez.
As to the photo array identifications by Paley and Buckalew, the trial
court granted in part and denied in part Appellant’s suppression motion.
Specifically, the trial court suppressed Paley’s and Buckalew’s out-of-court
identifications at the photo arrays because Appellant was denied counsel at
those photo arrays. The trial court, however, permitted Paley and Buckalew
to identify Appellant in court. After careful consideration, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Paley and Buckalew
to identify Appellant in court.
As this Court has explained:
When an out-of-court identification is alleged to be tainted, an
in-court identification may still stand if, considering the totality
of the circumstances, the identification had an origin sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. The factors a
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court should consider in determining whether there was an
independent basis for the identification include: (1) the
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the
crime; (2) the witness[’] degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of
the witness[’] prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness during the confrontation;
and (5) the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation.
Commonwealth v. Kendricks, 30 A.3d 499, 506 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal
denied, 46 A.3d 716 (Pa. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see Commonwealth v. Carver, 436 A.2d 1209, 1211-1212 (Pa.
Super. 1981)
As to the first factor, both Paley and Buckalew viewed Appellant for a
relatively significant period of time, i.e., more than one minute.16 See N.T.,
10/6/15, at 28, 65.17 Moreover, both Paley and Buckalew were relatively
close to Appellant when they viewed him during daylight without any
obstructions in their lines of sight. See id. at 30, 59. As to the second
factor, both Paley and Buckalew knew that they were witnessing a crime
when they viewed Appellant. Thus, their degrees of attention were at their
peak. See id. at 26; see also id. at 57. As to the fourth factor, Paley and
Buckalew expressed a high degree of certainty that Appellant was the same
person they saw fleeing Paley’s residence. See id. at 33, 66. Thus, the
16
Appellant argues that it was only a few seconds; however, the trial court
found Paley’s and Buckalew’s testimony that it was at least one minute
credible. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/20/16, at 20.
17
There are two volumes of testimony dated October 6, 2015. Our citation
is to the volume in which pre-trial matters were litigated.
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first, second, and fourth factors all weighed heavily in favor of finding that
Paley’s and Buckalew’s in-court identifications were not tainted by their
identifications at the photo arrays.
As to the fifth factor, there was an approximate 14-month gap
between the burglary of Paley’s residence and when Paley and Buckalew
identified Appellant in court. While this is not a short amount of time, it is
also not a long period of time. Thus, we conclude that the fifth factor was
neutral.
As to the third factor, both Paley and Buckalew’s physical descriptions
of Appellant after the burglary were generally accurate. Their descriptions,
however, also contained some inaccuracies. For example, Buckalew
originally told police that the burglar was 6’3” tall and Appellant is
significantly shorter than that height.
When weighing all of these factors, the trial court determined that
Paley’s and Buckalew’s in-court identifications were not tainted by their
photo array identifications. We ascertain no abuse of discretion in this
determination. The minor inconsistencies in conveying descriptions of
Appellant were outweighed by the certainty of their in-court identifications
made after viewing Appellant for a significant period of time, during daylight
hours, and at the scene of a crime. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court properly granted in part and denied in part Appellant’s motion to
suppress as it related to the uncounseled photo arrays.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/13/2017
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