Com. v. Sanderson, C.

J-S48009-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee, :
:
v. :
:
CHRISTOPHER L. SANDERSON, :
:
Appellant : No. 474 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 10, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Perry County,
Criminal Division at No. CP-50-SA-0000034-2012
BEFORE: DONOHUE, JENKINS and PLATT*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED AUGUST 01, 2014
als from the judgment of
sentence entered on February 10, 2014 by the Court of Common Pleas of
Perry County, Criminal Division, following his convictions for driving while
operating privilege is suspended or revoked,1 driving without a license,2
driving an unregistered vehicle,3 and driving a vehicle with an unauthorized
transfer or use of registration.4 We affirm.
1
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a).
2
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501(a).
3
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1301(a).
4
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1372(3).
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Because Sanderson challenges only the discretionary aspects of his
sentence, a recitation of the facts underlying his convictions is not
necessary.5 The trial court summarized the procedural history as follows:
[Sanderson] appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed on February 10, 2014. On that date,
[Sanderson] appeared in court for a [s]ummary
[a]ppeal hearing with counsel and was found [g]uilty
of one count [d]riving [u]nder [s]uspension pursuant
to 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(a). The [c]ourt sentenced
[Sanderson] to a one hundred twenty (120) days
period of incarceration in the Perry County Prison, a
fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) and all
costs of prosecution. [Sanderson] filed an appeal
with the Superior Court and by [o]rder dated March
14, 2014, this [c]ourt directed that he file a [c]oncise
[s]tatement of [m]atters [c]omplained of on
[a]ppeal. On March 19, 2014, [Sanderson] filed his
[s]tatement, alleging that there was insufficient
evidence presented to support a conviction of
[d]riving [u]nder [s]uspension and arguing that the
Trial Court Opinion, 5/14/14, at 1.6
5 th
offense for driving while
operating privilege is suspended or revoked. See N.T., 2/10/14, at 20.
6
Sanderson raised a sufficiency of the evidence claim in his 1925(b)
statement, but failed to include the issue in the statement of questions
section of his appellate brief. See
be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is
erson has
waived his sufficiency claim. Waiver is further supported by the fact that
Sanderson included no argument on the issue in his appellate brief. See
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authorities nor developed any meaningful analysis, we find [the] issue
Commonwealth v. McLaurin, 45 A.3d
1131, 1139 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 65 A.3d 413 (Pa. 2013)
(citing Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915,
924 (Pa. 2009)).
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The lone issue presented by Sanderson in his appellate brief is whether
his 120-day jail sentence for driving while operating privilege is suspended
-14. Sanderson argues
that he should have only received a 30-day sentence because he claims that
the citing officer was agreeable to such a sentence. Id. at 12. Sanderson
also asserts that his ex-wife is using the system in order to keep him away
from their son. Id.
Our standard of review when considering discretionary aspects of
sentencing claims is as follows:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion
of the sentencing judge. The standard employed
when reviewing the discretionary aspects of
sentencing is very narrow. We may reverse only if
the sentencing court abused its discretion or
committed an error of law. A sentence will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of
discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is
not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the
record, that the sentencing court ignored or
misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for
reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. We
must accord the sen
weight because it was in the best position to review
and the overall effect and nature of the crime.
Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11-12 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
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considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such a
Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa.
Super. 2004), appeal denied
Id.an appellant must set forth in his brief a concise statement of the reasons
relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects
Id.substantial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under the
Id.violates either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the
Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing
Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa. Super.
sentence must be raised in a post-sentence motion or by presenting the
claim to the trial court during the sentencing proceedings. Absent such
efforts, an objection to
Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1273-74 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(citation and quotations omitted).
We conclude that Sanderson has waived his discretionary aspects of
sentence claim. Our review of the certified record reveals that Sanderson
never filed a post-sentence motion challenging the discretionary aspects of
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his sentence. Additionally, the transcript of the sentencing proceedings
reveals that Sanderson did not challenge the discretionary aspects of his
sentence during sentencing. See N.T., 2/10/14, at 28-34. Therefore,
Sanderson has waived his discretionary aspects of sentence claim. See
Shugars, 895 A.2d at 1273-74.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/1/2014
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