Com. v. Bodanza, A.

J-A20034-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
ANTON BRANT BODANZA :
:
Appellee : No. 1732 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered October 2, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0001656-2018
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 09, 2019
Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from the order
entered in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the motion
of Appellee, Anton Brant Bodanza, for a writ of habeas corpus and dismissed
all charges against him. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
March 29, 2018, the Commonwealth charged Appellee with criminal homicide,
in connection with the death of Appellee’s mother (“Decedent”), who died on
June 20, 2017. Special Agent Michael P. Collins of the Office of Attorney
General, Medicaid Fraud Control Section, Care-Dependent Neglect Team,
drafted the affidavit of probable cause. The affidavit of probable cause
detailed Agent Collins’ investigation and alleged, inter alia, that: (1) Appellee
was the primary caretaker for Decedent between October 10, 2016 and June
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15, 2017; (2) on June 15, 2017, police and emergency medical services
(“EMS”) responded to Decedent’s residence after Decedent’s daughter
contacted 911 and reported that Appellee had withheld Decedent’s
prescription medication, Lasix, for two weeks; (3) Appellee told police he
withheld the medication because it caused Decedent to urinate more
frequently, and Appellee was tired of cleaning up the mess; (4) Dr. Debra
Zimmerman was Decedent’s primary care physician and educated Appellee on
the importance of Decedent’s medications on several occasions; (5)
Transition-of-Care Nurse Jennifer Mott educated Appellee on the importance
of administering Lasix to Decedent to prevent swelling and edema and to help
Decedent’s heart pump efficiently; (6) Nurse-Case-Manager Nadine Herman
reviewed the importance of Decedent’s medications with Appellee on multiple
occasions, and Appellee admitted during multiple visits that he was not giving
Decedent the Lasix because it made her urinate too frequently; (7) Appellee
admitted to Agent Collins that Decedent’s doctor had discussed with Appellee
the necessity of regularly administering Decedent’s medications and the
purpose of the Lasix; (8) Registered Nurse Erica Smith treated Decedent at
Reading Hospital on June 15, 2017; Appellee told Nurse Smith he did not want
Decedent to have Lasix because Appellee was “holistic” and did not believe in
the medications the hospital was using; (9) the Berks County Office of the
Coroner reported that Appellee had withheld Lasix from Decedent, which
resulted in her hospitalization, and listed the manner of death as homicide;
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and (10) the autopsy report indicated the withholding of Lasix initiated the
continuous and unbroken sequence of events and complications, which led to
Decedent’s death on June 20, 2017. Based on the Commonwealth’s charge
of homicide generally, the district magistrate initially denied bail.
On April 10, 2018, the parties appeared before the district magistrate
for a preliminary hearing. In exchange for the Commonwealth’s agreement
to amend the criminal charges to make Appellee eligible for bail, Appellee
stipulated at his preliminary hearing to the accuracy of the averments set forth
in the criminal complaint and the affidavit of probable cause.1 The magistrate
decided the criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause established a
prima facie case against Appellee and bound over the charges for trial.
Consistent with the parties’ agreement, the Commonwealth amended the
criminal information on April 19, 2018, reducing the charges against Appellee
to the lesser offenses of third-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter.
On April 23, 2018, Appellee filed a motion to set bail, which the court set at
$150,000.00 on April 26, 2018.
On May 24, 2018, Appellee filed an omnibus pre-trial motion for, inter
alia, a writ of habeas corpus. In the motion, Appellee maintained he had
stipulated to the accuracy of the criminal complaint and affidavit of probable
cause only for the preliminary hearing, but he had preserved his right to
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1 The record confirms the parties’ agreement in this respect.
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challenge the Commonwealth’s evidence by writ of habeas corpus. Appellee
claimed the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case. The trial
court scheduled a hearing on Appellee’s motion for July 20, 2018.2
The parties appeared for a habeas corpus hearing on July 20, 2018. The
Deputy Attorney General represented the Commonwealth, marked for
admission the criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause, and
explained to the court that Appellee had stipulated at the preliminary hearing
to the accuracy of the facts set forth in the criminal complaint and affidavit of
probable cause. The Commonwealth contended the trial court’s scope of
review during the habeas corpus proceeding was limited to the stipulated
record of the preliminary hearing (the criminal complaint and affidavit of
probable cause) in deciding if the evidence before the magistrate constituted
a prima facie case.
Defense counsel countered that the customary practice in Berks County
to avoid conducting a full preliminary hearing is either to: (1) waive the
preliminary hearing (which also generally waives the defendant’s right to a
habeas corpus hearing); or (2) proceed to a stipulated preliminary hearing
based on the criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause for purposes
of the preliminary hearing only, while retaining the right to challenge the
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2 Appellee’s omnibus pre-trial motion also sought discovery and suppression
of evidence. Appellee subsequently abandoned the request for discovery,
when the Commonwealth asserted it would produce any new discovery that
arose. Appellee withdrew the suppression motion.
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Commonwealth’s evidence at a later habeas corpus hearing. Defense counsel
insisted Appellee had chosen option (2), argued that the record established at
the preliminary hearing was nonbinding, and the Commonwealth must
produce live, non-hearsay testimony on habeas corpus review. Defense
counsel also claimed the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient because
counsel was sure the Commonwealth’s witnesses would testify inconsistently
with their statements set forth in the criminal complaint and affidavit of
probable cause.
The court agreed with defense counsel regarding the “custom” in Berks
County for a defendant to proceed to a stipulated preliminary hearing, based
on the criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause, while retaining the
right to challenge the Commonwealth’s evidence anew at a habeas corpus
proceeding. Under the “custom” in Berks County, the court informed the
Commonwealth it was required to produce live, non-hearsay testimony at the
habeas corpus proceeding to establish a prima facie case. The court conceded
the habeas corpus proceeding is really a “second bite at the apple” but stated
this habeas corpus process favors both sides because the defense gets a
second chance to test the Commonwealth’s evidence and the Commonwealth
gets the opportunity to present evidence in addition to what it had produced
at the preliminary hearing. The court further indicated that the
Commonwealth could not, for habeas corpus review, rely solely on the
transcript from the preliminary hearing, even if the Commonwealth had
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produced live testimony at the preliminary hearing. Rather, the court
explained the “custom” in Berks County is to have the Commonwealth
reestablish a prima facie case on habeas corpus review. The court
acknowledged that defense counsel was very familiar with Berks County
practice and concluded it would be unfair to Appellee to interpret his
stipulation at the preliminary hearing as a limitation on the court’s scope of
review by binding Appellee to the accuracy of the criminal complaint and
affidavit of probable cause at a later habeas corpus hearing. The court offered
the Commonwealth a continuance to secure witnesses. Instead, the
Commonwealth asked to brief the issue, and the court granted the request.
The Commonwealth filed a memorandum of law on July 27, 2018, and
Appellee filed a memorandum of law on August 15, 2018. The court issued
an order on August 24, 2018, stating Appellee’s stipulation at the preliminary
hearing did not constitute a waiver of the preliminary hearing, which would
generally waive Appellee’s right to challenge the Commonwealth’s evidence in
a later habeas corpus proceeding. Likewise, the court said Appellee was not
bound by the stipulation for any other purpose or proceeding. Thus, the court
refused to deny Appellee’s motion for writ of habeas corpus and scheduled
another habeas corpus hearing.
The parties appeared for the second habeas corpus hearing on
September 21, 2018. The Commonwealth introduced Appellee’s omnibus pre-
trial motion as Exhibit 1 and the criminal complaint and affidavit of probable
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cause as Exhibit 2. The Commonwealth indicated it would not present
additional testimony. Defense counsel raised a hearsay objection to the
criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause, and the court sustained
the objection. Appellee subsequently moved to dismiss all charges, and the
court granted Appellee’s request.
The Commonwealth timely filed a notice of appeal on October 19, 2018.3
On October 24, 2018, the court ordered the Commonwealth to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Following an extension of time, the Commonwealth timely complied on
December 5, 2018. In its responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court
conceded the Commonwealth is not required to re-establish a prima facie case
at a habeas corpus proceeding, and agreed that the court’s scope of habeas
corpus review is limited to the factual basis for the magistrate’s decision.
Nevertheless, the trial court insisted habeas corpus relief was still proper in
this case because the Commonwealth could not rely on hearsay evidence
alone to establish a prima facie case at the preliminary hearing or at the
habeas corpus hearing. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed January 25, 2019, at
4-5).
The Commonwealth raises two issues for our review:
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY REFUSING TO ADJUDICATE
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3See Commonwealth v. Huggins, 575 Pa. 395, 399 n.2, 836 A.2d 862, 865
n.2 (2003) (stating: “When a charge is dismissed on a pre-trial writ of habeas
corpus, the Commonwealth may appeal”).
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[APPELLEE’S] MOTION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF BASED ON THE RECORD ESTABLISHED AT HIS
PRELIMINARY HEARING AND BY REQUIRING THE
COMMONWEALTH TO REESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE
VIA WITNESS TESTIMONY AT [APPELLEE’S] HABEAS
CORPUS HEARING?
SHOULD THIS COURT AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT
OF [APPELLEE’S] MOTION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,
DESPITE THE COURT’S ADMISSION ON APPEAL THAT IT
ERRED IN REQUIRING THE COMMONWEALTH TO
REESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE AT [APPELLEE’S]
HABEAS CORPUS HEARING, BASED ON THE COURT’S
ALTERNATIVE RATIONALE THAT A PRIMA FACIE CASE
CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED ON HEARSAY ALONE, WHEN
[APPELLEE] STIPULATED THAT THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
AND AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN SUPPORT OF SAID
COMPLAINT WOULD PROVIDE THE EVIDENTIARY BASIS AT
HIS PRELIMINARY HEARING?
(Commonwealth’s Brief at 4).
“In reviewing a trial court’s order granting a defendant’s petition for writ
of habeas corpus, we must generally consider whether the record supports
the trial court’s findings, and whether the inferences and legal conclusions
drawn from those findings are free from error.” Commonwealth v. Hilliard,
172 A.3d 5, 10 (Pa.Super. 2017) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). Further, “the evidentiary sufficiency, or lack thereof, of the
Commonwealth’s prima facie case for a charged crime is a question of law,”
and the appellate court’s review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Karetny,
583 Pa. 514, 528, 880 A.2d 505, 513 (2005).
We combine the Commonwealth’s issues. The Commonwealth asserts
Appellee stipulated to the accuracy of the criminal complaint and affidavit of
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probable cause at the preliminary hearing. The Commonwealth argues the
trial court’s scope of habeas corpus review was limited to the record
established at the preliminary hearing via the parties’ stipulation. Because
Appellee stipulated to the content of the criminal complaint and affidavit of
probable cause at the preliminary hearing (and essentially waived any
evidentiary challenges to those documents), the Commonwealth insists the
stipulation controls and any hearsay concerns are irrelevant. The
Commonwealth emphasizes Appellee made no hearsay or other objection to
the content of the criminal complaint or affidavit of probable cause at the
preliminary hearing, so he waived those objections for purposes of the habeas
corpus proceeding or on appeal. The Commonwealth highlights the trial
court’s concession in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that it should have considered
only the record from the preliminary hearing to decide Appellee’s habeas
corpus motion. The Commonwealth submits Appellee was afforded the full
panoply of rights available at his preliminary hearing, including the option of
having the Commonwealth produce live testimony through witnesses the
Commonwealth had available to testify at that time. The Commonwealth
stresses Appellee chose to proceed with a stipulated preliminary hearing, and
he could not “undo” his stipulation for purposes of habeas corpus review or
complain about the process the Commonwealth used to establish a prima facie
case, because Appellee agreed to it.
Further, the Commonwealth submits the local county customs and
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practices do not conform to or supersede Pennsylvania law. Specifically, the
Commonwealth contends it was not required to produce live testimony or re-
establish its prima facie case anew at the habeas corpus hearing. The
Commonwealth concludes the trial court improperly granted habeas corpus
relief, and this Court must reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In response, Appellee argues he expressly informed the Commonwealth
at the preliminary hearing that he was not waiving his right to a preliminary
hearing because doing so generally constitutes a waiver of the right to litigate
a later motion for a writ of habeas corpus. Appellee maintains he used the
general stipulation that is the “usual and customary practice” in Berks
County.4 Appellee contends the affidavit of probable cause contains Agent
Collins’ summary of several interviews to support probable cause. Appellee
emphasizes the Commonwealth did not call Agent Collins or any of the
individuals he interviewed to testify at the preliminary hearing or at the habeas
corpus hearing, or seek to introduce the autopsy report discussed in the
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4 Appellee states he stipulated as follows:
[Appellee] will not be signing a Waiver of the Preliminary
Hearing today and that for the sole and limited purposes of
this Preliminary Hearing only, if the Commonwealth called
the witnesses set forth in the Affidavit of Probable Cause at
the Preliminary Hearing they would testify consistently with
the contents of the Affidavit of Probable Cause. [Appellee]
specifically preserves all of his rights to challenge the
Commonwealth’s evidence at a later date.
(Appellee’s Brief at 23).
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affidavit of probable cause. Appellee submits the affidavit of probable cause
contains multiple layers of hearsay, none of which would be admissible at trial.
Appellee insists his stipulation was limited solely to the preliminary hearing.
Appellee also complains the Commonwealth cannot establish the exact
terms of the parties’ stipulation. Absent proof in the record, Appellee claims
this Court should presume no waivers or stipulations exist. Appellee avers he
would have simply waived the preliminary hearing if he did not want to
preserve his right to challenge the Commonwealth’s evidence at a habeas
corpus proceeding; and the primary purpose of going forward with a stipulated
preliminary hearing was to preserve Appellee’s rights. Appellee suggests the
Commonwealth’s attorneys were simply unfamiliar with local customs and
practices concerning stipulated preliminary hearings in Berks County.
Appellee concludes habeas corpus relief was proper, and this Court must
affirm. For the following reasons, we conclude the Commonwealth is entitled
to relief.
“The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to avoid the incarceration or
trial of a defendant unless there is sufficient evidence to establish a crime was
committed and the probability the defendant could be connected with the
crime.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 849 A.2d 1254, 1257 (Pa.Super. 2004)
(internal citation omitted). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 542(D) (stating issuing
authority shall determine from evidence presented at preliminary hearing
whether there is prima facie case that (1) offense has been committed; and
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(2) defendant has committed it).
The Commonwealth establishes a prima facie case when it
produces evidence that, if accepted as true, would warrant
the trial judge to allow the case to go to a jury. [T]he
Commonwealth need not prove the elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, the prima facie standard
requires evidence of the existence of each and every
element of the crime charged. Moreover, the weight and
credibility of the evidence are not factors at this stage, and
the Commonwealth need only demonstrate sufficient
probable cause to believe the person charged has
committed the offense. Inferences reasonably drawn from
the evidence of record which would support a verdict of
guilty are to be given effect, and the evidence must be read
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth’s case.
Commonwealth v. Marti, 779 A.2d 1177, 1180 (Pa.Super. 2001) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
Following a preliminary hearing,
A pre-trial habeas corpus motion is the proper means for
testing whether the Commonwealth has sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case. To demonstrate that a prima
facie case exists, the Commonwealth must produce
evidence of every material element of the charged
offense(s) as well as the defendant’s complicity therein. To
meet its burden, the Commonwealth may utilize the
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and also may
submit additional proof.
Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109, 1112 (Pa.Super. 2016) (en
banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also
Commonwealth v. Predmore, 199 A.3d 925 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc),
appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 208 A.3d 459 (2019) (reiterating that pretrial
motion for writ of habeas corpus is appropriate method for defendant to test
whether Commonwealth has established prima facie case; Commonwealth is
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entitled to rely on evidence presented at preliminary hearing when responding
to pretrial motion for writ of habeas corpus).
The scope of the trial court’s review in a pretrial motion for writ of
habeas corpus includes the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and
any additional evidence the Commonwealth chooses to produce to establish a
crime has been committed and the defendant is the person who committed it.
Commonwealth v. Mormon, 541 A.2d 356, 359 (Pa.Super. 1988). In other
words, the trial court accepts into evidence the record from the preliminary
hearing plus any additional evidence the Commonwealth might want to
present to support a prima facie case. Id. at 360.
A defendant has the right to waive his preliminary hearing. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 541 (discussing waiver of preliminary hearing). A defendant who
waives his right to a preliminary hearing also waives his right to test the
sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence in a later pretrial motion for writ
of habeas corpus, unless there is a transcribed oral or written agreement
expressly preserving his right. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 541(A)(1), (C), Comment.
A defendant can also proceed to a stipulated preliminary hearing,
because “parties may bind themselves by stipulations so long as they do not
affect the jurisdiction of the court, and provided that the stipulations are not
in contravention of peremptory statutory requirements.” Commonwealth v.
Mathis, 463 A.2d 1167, 1171 (Pa.Super. 1983). Stipulations have been
accepted in the context of criminal proceedings. Id. See also
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Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 588 Pa. 19, 69, 902 A.2d 430, 460 (2006),
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1169, 127 S. Ct. 1126, 166 L. Ed. 2d 897 (2007) (stating:
“A stipulation is a declaration that the fact agreed upon is proven[, and a]
valid stipulation must be enforced according to its terms”).
Stipulations to the admissibility of evidence are
common. They do not affect jurisdiction, nor interfere
with judicial business or convenience; instead, they
aid the court by saving it time which would otherwise
be spent on determining admissibility.
… The court will hold a party bound to his stipulation:
concessions made in stipulations are judicial
admissions, and accordingly may not later in the
proceeding be contradicted by the party who made
them.
Tyler v. King, 496 A.2d 16, 21-22 (Pa.Super. 1985) (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
Further, “[l]ocal rules shall not be inconsistent with any general rule of
the Supreme Court or any Act of Assembly.” Pa.R.J.A. 103(d)(2). See also
Commonwealth v. Reyes, 531 Pa. 72, 77, 611 A.2d 190, 193 (1992)
(holding defense counsel’s compliance with “routine local custom” regarding
service of suppression motion was insufficient, where local custom was
inconsistent with statewide rule of procedure; trial court erred by approving
defense counsel’s use of local “custom” over statewide rule of procedure).
Instantly, the trial court remarked in its Rule 1925(a) opinion as follows:
Despite the [c]ourt’s statements at the July 20, 2018
hearing, the [c]ourt agrees with the Commonwealth that the
trial court’s obligation at a habeas corpus hearing is to
review the factual basis upon which the magistrate made
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her decision. Therefore, the Commonwealth is correct in
stating that it was not obligated to re-establish a prima facie
case through a new record and evidentiary basis at the
habeas corpus hearing. … Nevertheless, the [c]ourt did not
err by dismissing the charges against Appellee because the
Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to prove
a prima facie case. The [c]ourt’s ruling was correct for two
reasons. First, a defendant’s right to due process forbids
the Commonwealth from using inadmissible hearsay
evidence alone to prove a prima facie case. Second, the
hearsay evidence was so unreliable such that the
Commonwealth failed to prove a prima facie case.
(Trial Court Opinion at 4-5).
Notwithstanding the court’s concession on the relevant scope of review,
the court failed to honor Appellee’s stipulation to the facts in the criminal
complaint and the affidavit of probable cause. Appellee’s stipulation
effectively removed any hearsay objections or concerns.
We further confirm the Commonwealth was not required to re-establish
a prima facie case at the later habeas corpus hearing. Rather, the
Commonwealth could rely on the evidence set forth at the stipulated
preliminary hearing, with the option to produce additional testimony/evidence
to satisfy its burden. See Predmore, supra; Dantzler, supra.
Consequently, the trial court exceeded the scope of its review at the habeas
corpus proceeding when the court required the Commonwealth to establish its
prima facie case anew and with more evidence than that presented at the
preliminary hearing. See Mormon, supra. Neither defense counsel nor the
trial court could rely on the local “custom” to override statewide law, which
limited the court’s scope of habeas corpus review to the evidence as stipulated
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at the preliminary hearing and any additional evidence the Commonwealth
chose to present its prima facie case. See Reyes, supra; Mormon, supra.
To the extent that Berks County endorses a “custom” or practice that, as a
practical matter, heightens the Commonwealth’s burden at a habeas corpus
proceeding, we expressly disavow that custom as contrary to state law. See
Pa.R.J.A. 103(d)(2); Reyes, supra.
Moreover, we cannot accept the court’s alternative hearsay concerns as
a basis to grant habeas corpus relief. Importantly, Appellee stipulated at the
preliminary hearing to the accuracy of the averments set forth in the criminal
complaint and affidavit of probable cause. On habeas corpus review, the trial
court was required to review the preliminary hearing record, based on
Appellee’s stipulation, which conceded the admissibility of the alleged hearsay
evidence. That concession bound Appellee for the preliminary hearing and
the habeas corpus review of that proceeding. See Tyler, supra. Thus,
hearsay concerns were not relevant at this juncture, in light of Appellee’s
stipulation. See id.
The affidavit of probable cause specifically detailed Agent Collins’
investigation and set forth facts demonstrating, inter alia, that: Appellee knew
Decedent needed to take certain prescription medication to reduce swelling,
Appellee withheld the medication because it caused Decedent to urinate more
frequently, and the withholding of medication initiated a continuous, unbroken
sequence of events and complications leading to Decedent’s death. These
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stipulated facts, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, without
consideration of the weight or credibility of the evidence, were sufficient to
establish a prima facie case for the crimes charged. See Dantzler, supra;
Marti, supra. See also Commonwealth v. Pigg, 571 A.2d 438 (Pa.Super.
1990), appeal denied, 525 Pa. 644, 581 A.2d 571 (1990) (explaining
defendant may be convicted of third-degree murder when killing contains
malice aforethought; malice consists of wickedness of disposition, hardness of
heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and mind regardless of social
duty; malice may be found where defendant consciously disregards unjustified
and extremely high risk that his actions might cause serious bodily injury); 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 2504 (stating person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when
as direct result from doing unlawful act in reckless or grossly negligent
manner, or doing lawful act in reckless or grossly negligent manner, he causes
death of another person).
To summarize, the Rules of Criminal Procedure allow for a preliminary
hearing or the waiver of a preliminary hearing and provide for the
consequences of each alternative. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 541; 542. Nothing in
the rules precluded a preliminary hearing by stipulation to the facts in the
affidavit of probable cause and criminal complaint. Nevertheless, the
stipulated preliminary hearing was still a preliminary hearing, and the court
was bound to accept the record from that preliminary hearing when assessing
whether the Commonwealth presented a prima facie case. See Mormon,
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supra. The habeas corpus hearing following the stipulated preliminary
hearing in this case was a not a hearing de novo; it was more in the nature of
an appeal where the trial court was required to review the magistrate’s
decision based on the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing (plus any
additional evidence the Commonwealth chose to present) in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth. See Dantzler, supra; Marti, supra. The
trial court erred as a matter of law when it elevated the local custom over
state law, thereby subjecting the Commonwealth to a complete “do over,” and
then dismissed the charges against Appellee. Accordingly, we reverse the
order granting Appellee habeas corpus relief and remand for trial.
Order reversed; case remanded. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/9/2019
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