Com. v. Thomas, C.

J-S64039-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CHARLES SCOTT THOMAS
Appellant No. 863 WDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order April 7, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0005110-2002
CP-02-CR-0005111-2002; CP-02-CR-0005113-2002
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and LAZARUS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2014
Appellant, Charles Scott Thomas, appeals from the order entered in
the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition
brought pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA).1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
On February 2, 2004, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to five (5)
counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse—forcible compulsion, three
(3) counts of incest, and two (2) counts of rape—forcible compulsion.
Appellant’s guilty plea stemmed from the sexual abuse of his three biological
children, all of whom were under the age of thirteen (13) at the time of the
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1
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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abuse. The Commonwealth subsequently withdrew the rape charges in
exchange for Appellant’s agreement not to withdraw his guilty plea and to
proceed to sentencing on the remaining charges. The court sentenced
Appellant on May 27, 2004, to an aggregate term of thirty (30) to sixty (60)
years’ imprisonment. Appellant did not file any post-sentence motions or a
direct appeal.
Appellant filed a counseled PCRA petition on February 10, 2014. The
PCRA court issued on February 18, 2014, notice of its intent to dismiss
Appellant’s petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.
Appellant responded to the Rule 907 notice on March 24, 2014, and the
PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition as untimely on April 7, 2014.
Appellant timely filed a counseled notice of appeal on May 6, 2014. The
PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant filed
none.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
DOES THE COMPLETE ABSENCE OF DISCOVERY IN THIS
MATTER DEMONSTRATE NOT ONLY THE FAILURE OF
DEFENSE COUNSEL BUT ALSO A WILLFUL VIOLATION OF
BRADY BY THE COMMONWEALTH, AND DO THE NEWLY
DISCOVERED FACTS OF THE FAILURES OF COUNSEL AND
PROSECUTION OVERCOME THE JURISDICTIONAL TIME
BAR FOR [APPELLANT]?
AS A CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION, WHERE [APPELLANT’S]
PRIOR COUNSEL OBTAINED NO DISCOVERY AT TRIAL AND
THE COMMONWEALTH FAILED TO PRODUCE ANY
DISCOVERY PRE- OR POST-TRIAL, IS [APPELLANT]
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ENTITLED TO BROAD DISCOVERY TO ELUCIDATE A
POSSIBLE BRADY VIOLATION AND OTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL ERRORS IN THE CASES FILED AGAINST
HIM, OR AT LEAST TO A HEARING TO DETERMINE
WHETHER DISCOVERY IS NEEDED?
IS APPELLANT…AFTER BEING REPRESENTED BY MULTIPLE
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS, ALL OF WHOM FAILED TO REQUEST
OR REQUIRE DISCOVERY FROM THE COMMONWEALTH,
ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
OF COMPETENT DEFENSE COUNSEL, BASED ON THE LACK
OF EVIDENCE FOR HIS PLEA AND THOSE COUNSELS’
ADVICE TO PLEAD GUILTY TO SERIOUS FELONIES?
IS THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, AND SPECIFICALLY
PA.R.CRIM.P. 600, VIOLATED WHEN A PERIOD OF NON-
EXCLUDABLE TIME AND A CONFLAGRATION OF OTHER
EVENTS DEMONSTRATE INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL
AND UNDUE DELAY BY THE COMMONWEALTH?
(Appellant’s Brief at 8).
As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether Appellant timely
filed his current PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Harris, 972 A.2d 1196(Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied, 603 Pa. 684, 982 A.2d 1227 (2009).
Pennsylvania law makes clear no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely
PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 837 A.2d 1157(2003). The most recent amendments to the PCRA, effective January 16,
1996, provide that a PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent
petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment
becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Bretz, 830
A.2d 1273 (Pa.Super. 2003). A judgment is deemed final “at the conclusion
of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the
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United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of
time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
The three statutory exceptions to the timeliness provisions in the PCRA
allow for very limited circumstances under which the late filing of a petition
will be excused. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). To invoke an exception, a
petition must allege and the petitioner must prove:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result
of interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or
laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of
the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court to
apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, a petitioner asserting a
timeliness exception must file a petition within sixty (60) days of the date
the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). “As such,
when a PCRA petition is not filed within one year of the expiration of direct
review, or not eligible for one of the three limited exceptions, or entitled to
one of the exceptions, but not filed within 60 days of the date that the claim
could have been first brought, the trial court has no power to address the
substantive merits of a petitioner’s PCRA claims.” Commonwealth v.
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Gamboa-Taylor, 562 Pa. 70, 77, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (2000).
Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on or about
June 26, 2004, upon expiration of the time to file a direct appeal. Appellant
filed his PCRA petition on February 10, 2014, more than nine (9) years after
his judgment of sentence became final. Accordingly, Appellant’s petition is
patently untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant attempts to
allege governmental interference and newly discovered facts to excuse the
untimeliness of his PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(ii).
Appellant claims the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215(1963), and that this “evidence” is newly discovered and could not have
been previously discovered with due diligence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(1)(i)-(ii). Nevertheless, Appellant maintains he cannot know
specifically what the newly discovered facts are because the Commonwealth
has yet to disclose the alleged exculpatory evidence. Therefore, Appellant’s
bald assertions of governmental interference and newly discovered facts do
not meet the exceptions to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements. Moreover,
as a general rule, the “entry of a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all
defects and defenses except lack of jurisdiction, invalidity of the plea, and
illegality of the sentence.” See Commonwealth v. Main, 6 A.3d 1026,
1028 (Pa.Super. 2010). Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/19/2014
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