Johnson, T. v. Monro Muffler Brake

J-A23003-19
NON PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
TIMOTHY JOHNSON : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
MONRO MUFFLER BRAKE, INC. AND : No. 284 WDA 2019
BRIAN RADIGAN :
Appeal from the Order Dated, February 11, 2019,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County,
Civil Division at No(s): No. 12059 of 2016.
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 16, 2019
Timothy Johnson appeals from the trial court’s order denying his request
to file a third amended complaint against Monro Muffler Brake, Inc. Because
the trial court granted Monro final judgment on the merits before Mr. Johnson
tried to file a third amended complaint, the trial court no longer possessed
jurisdiction over Monro. We therefore affirm.
Mr. Johnson was an employee of Monro, where he worked as a vehicle
mechanic with Brian Radigan. According to Mr. Johnson, after he quit working
for Monro, Mr. Radigan repeatedly forged Mr. Johnson’s name and used his
Commonwealth-issued license number to conduct vehicle inspections at
Monro. Mr. Johnson initially sued Mr. Radigan in 2016 for fraud and identity
theft. In a second amended complaint, Mr. Johnson also sought damages
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from Monro under the doctrine of respondeat superior.1 After discovery
closed, Monroe and Mr. Radigan moved for summary judgment, and the trial
court granted it.
Mr. Johnson appealed to this Court, but he did not challenge the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment to Monro. This Court left the portion of
the order dismissing the respondeat superior claim intact. See Johnson v.
Monro Muffler Brake, Inc., No. 1794 WDA 2017, 2018 WL 4925651 (Pa.
Super. 2018). We did, however, reverse the grant of summary judgment as
to Mr. Radigan and remanded for further proceedings. See id.On remand, Mr. Johnson sought leave of court to file a third amended
complaint against Mr. Radigan and Monro. This new complaint claimed that
Monro’s own actions constituted direct negligence. The trial court granted Mr.
Johnson’s request to amend his complaint against Mr. Radigan, but denied the
request to amend against Monro. This appeal followed.2
Initially, we note that the appeal would have been interlocutory since
claims against Mr. Radigan remained. However, Mr. Johnson discontinued his
claims against Mr. Radigan.3 This action rendered the order denying Mr.
____________________________________________
1 Latin, literally translating to “let the higher-up answer.” “Under the doctrine
of respondeat superior recovery is sought on the basis of vicarious liability,”
from an employer, for the unlawful conduct of its employees. Brezenski v.
World Truck Transfer, Inc., 755 A.2d 36, 39 (Pa. Super. 2000).
2 Both the trial court and Mr. Johnson complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
3 Since he was dismissed, Mr. Radigan did not participate in this appeal.
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Johnson leave of court to file an amended complaint against Monro a final,
appealable order.
Mr. Johnson raises one issue in this appeal:
Whether the dismissal of the respondeat superior claim by
the Superior Court in the previous appeal bars [him] from
amending the Complaint to allege fraud directly committed
by [Monro], and conspiracy to commit fraud, against [Mr.
Johnson]?
Johnson’s Brief at 5. Before addressing that question, we must first determine
whether the trial court had jurisdiction over Monro during the remand.
Questions of jurisdiction are non-waivable, and this Court may raise
them sua sponte. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has said:
as a pure question of law, the standard of review in
determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction
is de novo, and the scope of review is plenary. Whether a
court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action is a
fundamental issue of law, which may be raised at any time
in the course of the proceedings, including by a reviewing
court sua sponte. Further, subject matter jurisdiction may
not be conferred by consent of the parties and a defect of
such jurisdiction may not be waived.
In re Administrative Order No. 1-MD-2003, 936 A.2d 1, 5-6 (Pa. 2007)
(citations omitted).
When a defendant is dismissed from a lawsuit, once the order becomes
final, the trial court loses its jurisdiction over that defendant. For example, in
Motley Crew, LLC v. Bonner Chevrolet Co., Inc., 93 A.3d 474 (Pa. Super.
2014), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 526 (Pa. 2014), this Court stated that, in such
cases, “there no longer is an action pending before the trial court.” Id. at
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476. And “if there is no action pending before a court, there is no matter over
which [that] court can or may exert jurisdiction.” Id.We have said that, if summary judgment disposes of all claims against
a defendant, that defendant is “released from litigation.” French v. United
Parcel Service, 547 A.2d 411, 414 (Pa. Super. 1988). Indeed, it is hornbook
law that a defendant who wins complete summary judgment has “thereby
terminate[d] the litigation.” 6 Standard Pa. Practice 2d § 32.8 at 152
(emphasis added). Complete summary judgment, once final, ends the case
against that defendant. As far as that defendant is concerned, there is no
longer an action pending against it in a court of competent jurisdiction.
We must therefore determine whether the summary judgment that the
trial court granted to Monro was a final judgment. Generally speaking, a
“judgment entered in adverse proceedings becomes final if no appeal
therefrom is filed within thirty days.” Ins. Co. of North Am. v. Bishop, 529
A.2d 33, 36 (Pa. Super. 1987) (some punctuation omitted) (quoting Simpson
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 504 A.2d 335, 337 (Pa. Super. 1986) (en banc)).
The trial court granted Monro summary judgment on the only claim Mr.
Johnson made against it, on November 17, 2017. See Trial Court Order and
Opinion, 11/17/18. That order also granted summary judgment on all claims
against Mr. Radigan. “A final order is any order that (1) disposes of all claims
and of all parties . . . .” Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341(a).
Because the trial court’s November 17, 2017 order disposed of all the claims
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against both Defendants, it was final and, therefore, immediately appealable.
See, e.g., Harahan v. AC & S, Inc., 816 A.2d 296, 297 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Although Mr. Johnson appealed the November 17, 2017 order as to Mr.
Radigan, he did not appeal the grant of summary judgment to Monro. Thus,
summary judgment for Monro became a final judgment on the merits 30 days
after the trial court granted it – i.e., on December 18, 2017.
When Mr. Johnson tried filing his third amended complaint against
Monro over eleven months later, Monro was no longer a party to this case.
See Johnson’s Motion to Amend Complaint, 11/30/18, at 1. Accordingly, the
Court of Common Pleas of Erie County had no jurisdiction over Monro on
remand. Simply stated, although the court denied Mr. Johnson’s motion, that
court had no authority to grant Mr. Johnson leave to file a third amended
complaint against Monro, even if it wanted to.
“[W]e may affirm the trial court’s order on any valid basis.” Plasticert,
Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 489, 492 (Pa. Super. 2007). Because
Mr. Johnson filed a motion for leave to amend against Monro in an action in
which Monro had already secured final summary judgment and dismissal, Mr.
Johnson’s appeal from the order denying his motion is meritless.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/16/2019
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