Com. v. Taylor, A.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ALEXANDER THOMAS TAYLOR :
:
Appellant : No. 663 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 4, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0017134-2009
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2019
Alexander Thomas Taylor (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed after the trial court revoked his probation. Upon review,
we affirm.
The trial court recounted the factual and procedural background at
length:
At a [s]entencing [h]earing held on August 10, 2010, . . . it
was stipulated that the Affidavit of Probable Cause and relevant
police reports and any lab reports in this matter formed a
sufficient basis for Appellant’s guilty plea [to] causing a minor to
have indecent contact with him, when the minor was less than 13
years old and not married (Count II) and corruption of a child
under the age of 18 by inappropriate sexual contact when
Appellant was over 18 (Count IV).[1] Counts I, III, and V were
withdrawn. Details of the serious sexual offenses were not
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(7), 6301(a)(1).
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disclosed in open [c]ourt. At the time of the sentencing, Appellant
was 20 years old.
By agreement, Appellant was sentenced to a period of
incarceration for time served with a period of probation of five
years to follow. He was required to register under the auspices of
Megan’s Law for a period of ten years. He was to be paroled within
48 hours and begin his period of five years probation, effective
August 10, 2010.
On December 9, 2015, Appellant attended a Probation
Violation Hearing before this [c]ourt. A pre-sentence report had
been provided to the [c]ourt. Appellant had established residency
in the state of Maryland three years earlier and his probation was
transferred to the Maryland Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services. On June 30, 2014, during a maintenance
polygraph, Appellant admitted to improper contact with a minor.
On August 21, 2014, Maryland Officials submitted a Probation
Violation Report. Appellant was charged, but pled not guilty and
later adjudicated so. A new Probation Violation warrant was
issued for Appellant due to his technical violation and he was
extradited and transferred to the Allegheny County Jail. Probation
requested that Appellant’s probation be revoked and a new period
of supervision with electronic monitoring be imposed. During
open [c]ourt, the only reference to the probation violation was in
the context that Appellant had been sent back from Maryland.
Appellant was released from [c]ounty jail on November 21,
2015, and placed on electronic monitoring. Probation reviewed
the special conditions with Appellant and on December 1, 2015,
he reported to the probation office. Again, the specific conditions
were reviewed, and Appellant was also instructed to call and make
an appointment with any of the sex offender treatment providers
on a list given [to] him during this meeting. By December 9,
2015, Appellant had made no calls to anyone. This [c]ourt warned
Appellant that his next hearing would be his last, because he
would be put into state time for any further violation.
The [c]ourt then declared the Probation Violation Hearing a
Stage 2 hearing and imposed zero tolerance. Probation was
instructed that [if] Appellant violated the terms of his probation,
to notify the [c]ourt and another hearing would be scheduled.
Appellant’s probation was revoked and he was given another five
years probation, nine months on electronic monitoring, and
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specific conditions, which [h]is counsel assured the court she had
reviewed with Appellant twice.
Appellant’s final Probation Violation Hearing was held before
this [c]ourt on April 4, 2018. A pre-sentence report was provided
to the [c]ourt. Appellant had appeared on January 10, 2018 for a
Gagnon I violation hearing.[2] He had been cited for violations
including being unsuccessfully discharged from sex offender
treatment due to lack of progress and continued denial of the
offenses and lack of motivation. Noting that this was not
Appellant’s first violation, as he was in violation of his supervision
back in 2015, due to violations including out-of-state for sexual
offenses on children. He had two years treatment in Allegheny
County and failed to make necessary adjustments and progress
needed to comply with the terms of his probation. The [p]robation
department recommended that Appellant’s probation be revoked
and that this time he be sentenced to a period of incarceration.
Defense counsel argued that Appellant did not violate his
probation because he was mentally ill, but trying, and he believed
he was making progress. Probation countered that he had been
receiving lack of progress reports from Appellant’s therapist since
June of 2017, and that issue was discussed with Appellant on a
monthly basis. In November of 2017, Appellant was confronted
by group members and admitted to having inappropriate thoughts
and feelings. Appellant was discharged from treatment also
because he was denying that any sexual advances occurred in the
underlying Pennsylvania case.
This [c]ourt quoted from the pre-sentence report the
following:
“The goal of sex offender treatment is to rehabilitate the
Defendant and to prevent further victimization. These goals
cannot be attained if the Defendant continues to minimize the
severity of his offenses and his deviant behavior.”
Appellant was reminded that he had multiple occasions to
make a positive adjustment and had not complied with community
supervision, that the victims in this case were ages five and seven,
and that in 2017 he had admitted having past victims in this case,
but still did not make any progress.
____________________________________________
2 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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Accordingly, Appellant’s probation was revoked and he was
sentenced to 3½ to 7 years incarceration with credit for time
served.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/19, at 2-5 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).
On April 16, 2018, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion. The
trial court denied the motion and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.
Appellant presents two issues for review:
[1.] WHETHER THE TESTIMONY FAILED TO ESTABLISH, BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, THAT [APPELLANT]
COMMITTED A VIOLATION OF HIS PROBATION?
[2.] IN REVOKING [APPELLANT’S] PROBATION AND RE-
SENTENCING HIM, IN THE AGGREGATE, TO 2½-6[3] YEARS’ TOTAL
STATE CONFINEMENT, WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY IGNORING [APPELLANT’S] REHABILITATIVE
NEEDS AND THE NEEDS OF THE COMMUNITY, AS REQUIRED BY
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)?
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
In his first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
produced at his Gagnon II hearing, claiming that the Commonwealth “failed
to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he committed a
violation of his probation.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. Appellant does not dispute
____________________________________________
3 Appellant’s April 4, 2018 sentencing order reflects a sentence of 3½ to 7
years of incarceration. See Trial Court Order of Sentence, 4/4/18, at *1. It
appears Appellant subtracted the credit for time served in calculating his
aggregate sentence, which may explain the discrepancy in the length of his
incarceration in his question presented.
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that sex offender treatment was a condition of his probation and that he was
“unsuccessfully discharged from sex offender treatment.” N.T., 4/4/18, at 2.
Rather, Appellant argues that because he was discharged for progressing “too
slowly,” the trial court erred in finding him in violation of his probation.
Appellant’s Brief at 16 (“In other words, [Appellant] was not discharged
because he failed to attend treatment or failed to participate in the program;
rather, [Appellant] was discharged because he was progressing too slowly.”).
He further states:
In order to sufficiently prove that [Appellant] willfully and
flagrantly disregarded his duties and obligations of sex offender
treatment, the Commonwealth needed to present testimony
explaining how and to what extent [Appellant] performed in
treatment. The Commonwealth simply did not do that here.
Instead, the record demonstrates only that, although his progress
may have been slow in coming, [Appellant] nevertheless was
making a good-faith effort to participate in, and successfully
complete, sex offender treatment. Given these circumstances,
the trial court’s finding of a violation cannot, as a matter of law,
be sustained, and Appellant’s judgment of sentence must be
vacated.
Appellant’s Brief at 28-29. We disagree.
“Revocation of a probation sentence is a matter committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court and that court’s decision will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.”
Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 888 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation
omitted).
Relevant to the revocation of a probationary sentence, Section 9771 of
the Sentencing Code provides:
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(a) General rule.--The court may at any time terminate
continued supervision or lessen or increase the conditions upon
which an order of probation has been imposed.
(b) Revocation.--The court may revoke an order of probation
upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation.
Upon revocation the sentencing alternatives available to the court
shall be the same as were available at the time of initial
sentencing, due consideration being given to the time spent
serving the order of probation.
(c) Limitation on sentence of total confinement.--The court
shall not impose a sentence of total confinement upon revocation
unless it finds that:
(1) the defendant has been convicted of another
crime; or
(2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is
likely that he will commit another crime if he is not
imprisoned; or
(3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the
authority of the court.
(d) Hearing required.--There shall be no revocation or increase
of conditions of sentence under this section except after a hearing
at which the court shall consider the record of the sentencing
proceeding together with evidence of the conduct of the defendant
while on probation. Probation may be eliminated or the term
decreased without a hearing.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771.
We recognize:
The first step in a Gagnon II revocation decision involves a wholly
retrospective factual question: whether the parolee or probationer
has in fact acted in violation of one or more conditions of his parole
or probation. It is this fact that must be demonstrated by
evidence containing probative value. Only if it is determined that
the parolee or probationer did violate the conditions does the
second question arise: should the parolee or probationer be
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recommitted to prison or should other steps be taken to protect
society and improve changes of rehabilitation?
Commonwealth v. Moriarty, 180 A.3d 1279, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(citation omitted). “Unlike a criminal trial where the burden is upon the
Commonwealth to establish all of the requisite elements of the offenses
charged beyond a reasonable doubt, at a revocation hearing the
Commonwealth need only prove a violation of [] probation by a preponderance
of the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth
v. Foster, 214 A.3d 1240 (Pa. 2019), addresses when a defendant may be
found to have violated probation. In Foster, the defendant was on probation
when he was detained by his probation officer for posting photographs to his
social media accounts “depict[ing] guns, drugs, large amounts of money and
his sentencing sheet from his plea agreement[.]” Id. at 1243. At defendant’s
revocation hearing, the Commonwealth argued that posting the photos was a
violation of probation because the photos depicted contraband belonging to
the defendant. The Commonwealth asserted that the defendant “was using
his social media accounts as an ad agency to sell the drugs.” Id. However,
“[o]ther than the photographs in question, the Commonwealth presented no
evidence at either [violation of probation] hearing in support of its
contentions. At no time did the Commonwealth mention the conditions of
[defendant’s] current probation, or suggest that his conduct violated a specific
condition.” Id. at 1244.
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At the conclusion of the defendant’s Gagnon II hearing, the trial court
found him in violation of his probation and resentenced him to a period of
incarceration. Foster, 214 A.3d at 1244. The defendant appealed, and this
Court affirmed. Our Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to address
the following issue:
Did not the Superior Court err by ignoring the governing statute
and due process protections that permit revocation only for a
violation of specified conditions of probation, and by holding that
[defendant’s] inappropriate offensive social media posting, that
violated no condition of probation, warranted revocation?
Id. at 1245-46.
In reversing this Court, the Supreme Court held that a court may find a
defendant in violation of probation only if the defendant has violated one of
the “specific conditions” of probation or committed a new crime. Id. at 1250.
Therefore, in order to revoke probation:
The [] court must find, based on the preponderance of the
evidence, that the probationer violated a specific condition of
probation or committed a new crime to be found in violation.
Absent such evidence, a violation of probation does not occur
solely because a judge believes the probationer’s conduct
indicates that probation has been ineffective to rehabilitate or to
deter against antisocial conduct.
Id. at 1243.
Instantly, Appellant’s case is distinguishable from Foster because the
trial court found Appellant to have violated “a specific condition” of his
probation. In its December 9, 2015 sentencing order, the trial court specified:
Sex Offender Court - Special Conditions: [Appellant] is to comply
with the Special Conditions of the Sex Offender Court. Other:
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[Appellant] is placed on ZERO TOLERANCE, per SOC Review
Hearing on 12/9/15.
Trial Court Order, 12/9/15, at 1. As noted above, Appellant does not argue
that sex offender treatment was not part of the “Special Conditions of Sex
Offender Court.”
On December 27, 2017, the Commonwealth filed a Gagnon I Probation
Violation Report in which Appellant’s probation officer requested a Gagnon II
hearing. The report states:
[Appellant’s] Charge Specific Special Conditions include:
“[Appellant] shall attend and participate in a mental health
treatment program and/or sex offender treatment
program as approved and directed by the probation/parole
officer . . .”
[Appellant] is currently in violation of PROBATION by reason of
the following:
Following his previous revocation hearing in December of 2015,
[Appellant] started attending sex offender treatment with Mercy
Behavioral Health-The Gatehouse. Unfortunately, despite having
attended regularly for approximately two years and multiple
warnings regarding his treatment progress, [Appellant] was
unsuccessfully discharged from his Court ordered sex
offender treatment program on 12-6-17, due to “Failure to
follow through with your recommended treatment plan”
and “Continued denial of the offense(s) and lack of
motivation.” . . .
The goals of sex offender treatment are to rehabilitate [Appellant]
and prevent further victimization. These goals cannot be attained
if [Appellant] continues to minimize the severity of his offense and
deviant behaviors. [Appellant] has been provided multiple
opportunities to make positive adjustments and comply with
community supervision, namely his Court ordered sex offender
treatment program.
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It is respectfully recommended a Gagnon II Violation Hearing be
held; at which time the Probation Department will recommend
that [Appellant’s] probation be revoked, and a period of
incarceration be imposed.
Gagnon I Probation Violation Report, 12/27/17, at 2 (headings omitted,
emphasis added).
The trial court convened a Gagnon II hearing at which Appellant’s
probation officer, Pedro Hersan, testified that Appellant was “unsuccessfully
discharged from sex offender treatment due to lack of progress and continued
denial of the offense and lack of motivation.” N.T., 4/4/18, at 2. Further
noting that Appellant was two years into treatment and failed “to make the
necessary adjustments and progress needed to comply,” Mr. Hersan
recommended that the trial court revoke Appellant’s probation and resentence
him to a period of incarceration. Id. at 2-3. On April 4, 2018, the court
revoked Appellant’s probation and resentenced him to incarceration. Id. at
9-10.
Our review confirms that Appellant’s probation officer filed a probation
violation report because Appellant failed to meet the specific condition
requiring him to attend and participate in sex offender treatment. Appellant
concedes that he was discharged from sex offender treatment. See e.g.,
Appellant’s Brief at 16. Thus, based on a preponderance of the evidence, the
trial court concluded that Appellant violated his probation. Foster, 214 A.3d
at 1243; see also N.T., 4/4/18, at 10. Appellant’s first issue challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence lacks merit.
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In his second issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of
his sentence. We recognize:
The imposition of sentence following the revocation of probation
is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, which,
absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal.
An abuse of discretion is more than an error in judgment — a
sentencing court has not abused its discretion unless the record
discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Commonwealth v. Simmons, 56 A.3d 1280, 1283-84 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citations omitted). “Also, upon sentencing following a revocation of
probation, the trial court is limited only by the maximum sentence that it could
have imposed originally at the time of the probationary sentence.” Id. at
1286-87 (citation omitted).
Further, “[t]he right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of
a sentence is not absolute, and must be considered a petition for permission
to appeal.” Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265 (Pa.
Super. 2014). “An appellant must satisfy a four-part test to invoke this Court’s
jurisdiction when challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Id.We conduct this four-part test to determine whether:
(1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at the
time of sentencing or in a post[-]sentence motion; (2) the
appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth
a concise statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the appellant raises
a substantial question for our review.
Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted). “A defendant presents a substantial question when he sets forth a
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plausible argument that the sentence violates a provision of the sentencing
code or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process.”
Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations
omitted).
Appellant has complied with the first three prongs of this test by raising
his sentencing claim in a timely post-sentence motion, filing a timely notice of
appeal, and including in his brief a Rule 2119(f) concise statement. See
Appellant’s Brief at 30-36. Therefore, we examine whether Appellant presents
a substantial question.
Appellant’s discretionary claim alleges the trial court, “ignor[ed
Appellant’s] rehabilitative needs and the needs of the community, as required
by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 6; see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9721(b) (sentencing court shall follow general principle that sentence imposed
should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public,
gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and
on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant). This claim
presents a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d
987, 994-95 (Pa. Super. 2016) (claim that a VOP sentencing court failed to
consider the factors under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) raises a substantial
question).
Appellant also claims that the trial court relied upon an impermissible
factor in imposing an excessive sentence. See Appellant’s Brief at 33-34.
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This claim also raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v.
Simpson, 829 A.2d 334, 338 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“This Court has held that a
claim that the sentence is excessive because the trial court relied on
impermissible factors raises a substantial question.”) (citation omitted).
Turning to the merits, we reiterate:
Upon revoking probation, a sentencing court may choose from any
of the sentencing options that existed at the time of the original
sentencing, including incarceration. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b).
However, the imposition of total confinement upon revocation
requires a finding that either “(1) the defendant has been
convicted of another crime; or (2) the conduct of the defendant
indicates that it is likely that he will commit another crime if he is
not imprisoned; or (3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate
the authority of the court.” 42 Pa.C.S. 9771(c).
Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 338 (Pa. Super. 2015) (footnote
omitted). Further:
In selecting from the alternatives set forth in subsection (a), the
court shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed
should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection
of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact
on the life of the victim and on the community, and the
rehabilitative needs of the defendant. . . . In every case in which
the court imposes a sentence for a felony or misdemeanor . . . the
court shall make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court
at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons
for the sentence imposed.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).
Following revocation, a sentencing court need not undertake a lengthy
discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence of total confinement, but the
record as a whole must reflect the sentencing court’s consideration of the facts
of the crime and character of the offender. Commonwealth v. Crump, 995
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A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2010). Also, “[w]hen a sentencing court has
reviewed a pre-sentence investigation report, we presume that the court
properly considered and weighed all relevant factors in fashioning the
defendant’s sentence.” Baker, 72 A.3d at 663 (citing Commonwealth v.
Fowler, 893 A.2d 758, 767 (Pa. Super. 2006)).
Here, the trial court stated that it had read and considered Appellant’s
pre-sentence investigation report. N.T., 4/4/18, at 2. “Our Supreme Court
has determined that where the trial court is informed by a [pre-sentence
investigation report], it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate
sentencing factors and considerations, and that where the court has been so
informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v.
Edwards, 194 A.3d 625, 637-38 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted), appeal
denied, 202 A.3d 41. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court considered
the required factors and considerations, including those delineated in Section
9721(b) of the Sentencing Code, in sentencing Appellant.
Appellant further claims that the trial court “improperly considered
conduct for which [Appellant] went to trial on in Maryland, and was fully
acquitted by a jury of his peers.” Appellant’s Brief at 45. Appellant contends
it was error for the trial court to make the following statement:
But [Appellant] did fail the polygraph regarding sexual contact
with the two-year-old girl in Maryland. In that case he was found
not guilty, although [Appellant] did admit that the offense had
occurred.
N.T., 4/4/18, at 7-8.
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With respect to the consideration of impermissible sentencing factors,
we have explained:
It is an abuse of discretion, as a denial of due process of law, for
the sentencing court to consider irrelevant factors during
sentencing. Thus, previous sentences have been vacated
because, in imposing sentence, the sentencing court relied upon,
e.g.: the defendant’s decision to stand trial rather than plead
guilty, Commonwealth v. Bethea, [] 379 A.2d 102, 106, 107
([Pa.] 1977); prior constitutionally infirm convictions,
Commonwealth v. Calvert, [] 344 A.2d 797 ([Pa.] 1975); the
defendant’s political ideology, Commonwealth v. Berrigan, []
535 A.2d 91 ([Pa. Super.] 1987) (en banc) . . .; unverified
hearsay, id.; and the defendant’s status as a naturalized citizen,
Commonwealth v. Dugan, [] 483 A.2d 965 (Pa. Super. 1984).
Commonwealth v. Smithton, 631 A.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Pa. Super. 1993).
Likewise, “[i]t is beyond peradventure that when a defendant has been
exonerated in the legal system, either by a jury or on constitutional grounds,
with respect to a criminal act, that act cannot be used to enhance a sentence.”
Commonwealth v. P.L.S., 894 A.2d 120, 130 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations
omitted). However, “[i]t is not enough that a trial court simply entertained
impermissible evidence in its deliberations.” Smithton, 631 A.2d at 1057(emphasis in original). “A court is ordinarily presumed to be capable of
identifying and properly disregarding all but the most prejudicial and
inflammatory evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). “Thus, a sentence must be
vacated only where it reasonably appears from the record that the trial court
relied in whole or in part upon such an impermissible factor.” Id. (emphasis
in original, citation omitted).
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After careful consideration, we conclude the trial court did not rely on
an impermissible factor in imposing Appellant’s sentence. In reviewing the
record, including the notes of testimony from Appellant’s hearing, it is clear
that while the trial court made a passing reference to an impermissible factor,
i.e., Appellant’s case in Maryland, the trial court did not rely on that factor in
sentencing Appellant. The trial court articulated its reasoning as follows:
Okay. I do find that it’s some mitigation, that you have
been employed and that there were times when you were in
compliance. However - - and I’m going to quote from the
presentence report.
“The goal of sex offender treatment is to rehabilitate
[Appellant] and to prevent further victimization. These goals
cannot be attained if [Appellant] continues to minimize the
severity of his offenses and his deviant behaviors.”
You have been provided with multiple occasions to make a
positive adjustment and have not complied with community
supervision. I would also add that you -- in 2007 you admitted
having passed [sic] victims in the case, but still did not make any
progress. I would also add that the victims in the case which are
before me were ages five and seven. For these reasons I find
it is not appropriate for County supervision. And I’m going to at
Count 2 revoke and order you to serve three and a half to seven
years with credit for time served. . . .
N.T., 4/4/18, at 9-10 (emphasis added).
Consistent with the foregoing, we find no merit to Appellant’s claim that
the trial court relied on an impermissible factor in imposing his sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge McLaughlin joins the memorandum.
Judge Colins files a dissenting memorandum.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/14/2019
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