Com. v. Stouter, J., Jr.

J-S51009-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JEFFREY LYNN STOUTER, JR. :
:
Appellant : No. 778 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 12, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0000225-2017
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., GANTMAN, P.J.E., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2019
Jeffrey Lynn Stouter, Jr. appeals pro se from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his open guilty plea to one count of fleeing or attempting
to elude a police officer, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a.2)(2)(iii), and related
offenses.1 The charges were based primarily on an eighteen-minute car chase
that occurred after Stouter refused to pull over. Police clocked Stouter driving
at speeds substantially over a hundred miles an hour. The sentencing court
imposed an aggregate sentence of not less than three-and-a-half nor more
____________________________________________
1The trial court permitted Stouter to represent himself, as requested, after a
Grazier hearing. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/05/18, at 1 n.1; see also
Appellant’s Brief, at 8.
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than seven years of incarceration in a state correctional institution. On appeal,
Stouter chiefly challenges his sentence as excessive. We affirm.
We derive the facts and the procedural history of this appeal from the
opinions of the trial court and our independent review of the record.2
On October 30, 2017, Stouter entered an open plea of guilty to one
count of fleeing or attempting to elude police, as a felony of the third degree,
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a); one count of flight to avoid apprehension, 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 5126(a); twenty-six summary driving offenses, including driving
while operating privilege is suspended or revoked, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543, and
one count of receiving stolen property, 18 Pa. C. S.A. § 3925(a). Notably,
this was Stouter’s twenty-second conviction for driving under suspension or
revocation.3 The trial court recounted the facts of the case as follows:
As described in the Affidavit of Probable Cause, [Stouter’s]
charges stemmed from a two-stage police pursuit begun in York
County on December 12, 2016 [at approximately 8:37 in the
evening], Lieutenant [Nicole] Palmer, [Pennsylvania State Police]
York Station Commander, was operating an unmarked patrol
vehicle on Route 30, York County, behind a white Nissan Maxima
driven [eastbound] by [Stouter], when she observed the Maxima
weave twice over the left fog line. At that point, the Maxima
accelerated, and Lt. Palmer clocked [Stouter’s] rate of speed at
____________________________________________
2 The trial court authored two opinions. The first opinion was dated June 22,
2018, and filed June 25, 2018. After this Court granted Stouter permission to
file a supplemental statement of errors, the trial court filed a supplemental
1925(a) opinion, on October 5, 2018. The trial court incorporated its original
1925(a) opinion into its supplemental opinion. See Supplemental Opinion,
10/05/18, at 2 n.2.
3 The trial court noted that Stouter’s record of motor vehicle violations
extended to thirty-six pages. See N.T. Sentence, 12/12/17, at 28.
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105 miles per hour for over three tenths of a mile. [Stouter]
crossed over into Lancaster County and then exited Route 30. Lt.
Palmer, still following, activated the patrol car’s emergency lights
and siren to initiate a traffic stop. [Stouter] did not stop, but
instead reentered Route 30 and began traveling westbound from
Lancaster County towards York County, at a speed of 117 miles
per hour. Continuing to pursue [Stouter], Lt. Palmer observed
[Stouter’s] vehicle pass both a tractor trailer and a passenger car
on the right shoulder of Route 30 and then continue on to pass
multiple vehicles on the left shoulder. The Lieutenant ultimately
discontinued the pursuit after approximately four minutes,
because of [Stouter’s] rate of speed and the threat to safety of
others.
Approximately three minutes later, Trooper Ryan
Wildermuth, who had been alerted to the existence of the
speeding Maxima and had set up a stationary patrol in a marked
vehicle at the intersection of SR 462 and Kruetz Creek Road in
York County, spotted the Maxima and immediately pulled behind
it, activating the patrol car’s emergency lights and siren. [Stouter]
once again failed to stop, swerved around another trooper
responding to assist, and then accelerated, with Trooper
Wildermuth still in pursuit.
[Stouter] drove over spike strips set up to stop him at the
intersection of SR 462 and SR 24. Despite damage to the front
passenger tire, [Stouter] fled north on SR 24, running through two
steady red lights and passing another vehicle over the double
yellow line. At the intersection of Whiteford Road and North Hills
Road, [Stouter] ran a stop sign, causing a collision with the patrol
car of a responding trooper. [Stouter’s] damaged front passenger
tire became deflated and dislodged, yet [Stouter] continued to
flee, driving on the right front tire rim, with sparks flying, against
traffic down several one way streets in the city of York. At some
point, [Stouter] stopped the vehicle to let out a female passenger,
who unsuccessfully attempted to flee on foot, but then he drove
away. The vehicular chase ended only when [Stouter], boxed in
by other marked patrol cars, crashed into two parked vehicles. At
that point, [Stouter] abandoned the car, which remained in drive,
and fled on foot, followed by four troopers. The troopers ultimately
located and apprehended [Stouter], who was hiding behind a car.
Troopers later discovered a factory-packaged Xbox and Beats
headphones in the backseat of the Maxima, which [Stouter], once
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Mirandized, admitted he had bought from an unlicensed street
dealer in the city of York for a discounted price.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/22/18, at 2-3.
The trial court sentenced Stouter on the charge of fleeing and eluding
to a term of incarceration of not less than three-and-a-half nor more than
seven years in a state correctional institution. In imposing sentence, the court
confirmed on the record that it had the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation
report. After a hearing, the court denied Stouter’s amended motion for
reconsideration of sentence. This timely appeal followed.4
On appeal, Appellant presents five overlapping compound questions,
framed as two major questions and four subordinate questions, for our review:
(1) Whether the sentencing court erred as a matter of law
and/or abused its discretion in imposing the statutory maximum
term of 3½ to 7 years imprisonment on the charge of fleeing or
attempting to elude a police officer, 75 Pa.C.S. §3733(a), graded
as a felony of the third degree pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.
§3733(a.2)(2)(iii), where:
(A) As its justification for such a sentence, the
sentencing court relied on Appellant’s 21 prior offenses of
driving while operating privilege suspended or revoked, 75
Pa.C.S. § 1543(e), thereby improperly enhancing
Appellant’s sentence the basis of prior convictions for which
appellant did not have counsel;
(B) as further justification for such a sentence, the
sentencing court relied on Appellant’s prior conviction of an
unrelated criminal offense in an unrelated case which led to
Appellant’s service of a “sentence in a state correctional
institution,” thereby improperly enhancing Appellant’s
____________________________________________
4As already noted, both Stouter and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.
1925.
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sentence based on factors already taken into account in the
applicable sentencing guideline range, particularly
Appellant’s prior record score, and amounted to
impermissible “double counting”;
(C) As additional justification for such a sentence, the
sentencing court relied on materially-untrue assumptions
and/or misinformation relating to the timing of Appellant’s
sentencing in an unrelated Snyder County case, finding
Appellant had committed the offenses in the instant case
despite having been sentenced in the Snyder County case
less than (2) months prior; and
(D) The sentencing court found aggravation in things
that “could have occurred” but did not, and which were risks
inherently attending virtually all fleeing and eluding
scenarios graded as a felony of the third degree pursuant to
75 Pa.C.S. §3733(a.2)(2)(iii)?
(2) Whether the offense of fleeing or attempting to elude a
police officer, 75 Pa.C.S. §3733(e), graded as a felony of the third
degree pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3733(8,2)(2)(iii), is
unconstitutionally vague on its face and/or as applied to appellant,
in, that the term “high speed chase” is insufficiently specific,
undefined, and susceptible to arbitrary, capricious, and/or
otherwise discriminatory application?
Appellant’s Brief, at 5-6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Appellant chiefly challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
He argues the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence by
impermissible reliance on improper factors. He maintains the sentencing court
“double counted” certain prior convictions. He also claims the term “high
speed chase” as used in the statute for the grading of the offense of fleeing
and eluding is unconstitutionally vague. See Appellant’s Brief at 11. We
disagree.
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Generally, when a defendant enters a guilty plea, he or she waives all
defects and defenses except those concerning the validity of the plea, the
jurisdiction of the trial court, and the legality of the sentence imposed. See
Commonwealth v. Stradley, 50 A.3d 769, 771 (Pa. Super. 2012).
Nevertheless, the entry of a guilty plea does not preclude a petition for
allowance of appeal of discretionary aspects of sentence subsequently
imposed. See Commonwealth v. Becker, 557 A.2d 390, 392 (Pa. Super.
1989).
However, a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing is not
automatically reviewable as a matter of right. See Commonwealth v.
Phillips, 946 A.2d 103, 112 (Pa. Super. 2008). Prior to reviewing such a claim
on its merits:
[W]e conduct a four part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) whether the issue
was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider
and modify sentence; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
defect; and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the
sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing
Code.
When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an
appellant must invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction by
including in his brief a separate concise statement demonstrating
that there is a substantial question as to the appropriateness of
the sentence under the Sentencing Code . . . .
Id. (citations and quotations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).
Here, Stouter complied with the first two requirements. He preserved
his sentencing issue by filing a petition to reconsider sentence, and after it
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was denied, he filed a timely notice of appeal. He included a separate Pa.R.A.P.
2119(f) statement in his appellate brief. Therefore, we must determine
whether he raises a substantial question.
This Court has found that a claim that the sentencing court improperly
“double-counted” an appellant’s prior criminal history when considering his
sentence (because his past criminal convictions were already taken into
account when his prior record score was calculated) raises a substantial
question. Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 732 (Pa. Super. 2000)
(en banc). Therefore, Stouter has presented a substantial question, and we
will proceed to review the merits of his claims. Nevertheless, on independent
review, we conclude that his claims lack merit.
Our standard of review for a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a
sentence is well-settled.
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must
consider the factors set out in 42 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 9721(b), that is,
the protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation to impact
on victim and community, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant. . . . Furthermore, [a] trial court judge has wide
discretion in sentencing and can, on the appropriate record and
for the appropriate reasons, consider any legal factor in
imposing a sentence in the aggravated range. The sentencing
court, however, must also consider the sentencing guidelines.
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Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
In reviewing a sentence on appeal, the appellate court shall
vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court
with instructions if it finds:
(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within
the sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines
erroneously;
(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the
sentencing guidelines but the case involves circumstances
where the application of the guidelines would be clearly
unreasonable; or
(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the
sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.
In all other cases[,] the appellate court shall affirm the
sentence imposed by the sentencing court.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781[(c)].
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 45 A.3d 405, 411 (Pa. Super. 2012).
The rationale behind such broad discretion and the
concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the
sentencing court is in the best position to determine the proper
penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the
individual circumstances before it.
* * *
When imposing a sentence, a court is required to consider
the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of
the defendant. In particular, the court should refer to the
defendant’s prior criminal record, his age, personal
characteristics and his potential for rehabilitation. Where
the sentencing court had the benefit of a presentence
investigation report (“PSI”), we can assume the sentencing court
was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s
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character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating
statutory factors.
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 169-71 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In this appeal, Stouter first argues that the sentencing court improperly
enhanced his sentence for fleeing and eluding to the statutory maximum by
relying on his twenty-one prior convictions for driving while his operating
privilege was suspended or revoked. See Appellant’s Brief, at 12-15. We
disagree.
Preliminarily, as aptly noted by the Commonwealth, Stouter failed to
raise this issue with the sentencing court. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 13
n.3.; see also N.T. Sentencing, 12/12/17; Motion for Reconsideration of
Sentence, 12/22/17; N.T. Reconsideration of Sentence, 4/12/18. Accordingly,
Stouter’s claim is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the
lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
Additionally, Stouter failed to identify in his brief where this issue was
raised with the sentencing court. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c)(1)-(4), Statement of
Place of Raising or Preservation of Issues; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e),
Statement of Place of Raising or Preservation of Issues. It is not the role of
this Court to scour the record to find evidence to support Appellant’s
arguments. See J.J. DeLuca Co. v. Toll Naval Assocs., 56 A.3d 402, 411
(Pa. Super. 2012). Accordingly, Stouter’s first issue is waived for these
reasons as well.
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Moreover, the claim would not merit relief. In both of its opinions, the
sentencing court clearly explained that it did not consider Stouter’s
twenty-one prior convictions for driving under suspension as grounds for the
enhancement of his sentence, but as evidence of his flagrant disrespect for
authority and his lack of amenability to rehabilitation. See Trial Court Opinion,
6/25/18, at 11-12; see also Supplemental 1925(a) Opinion, 10/05/18, at 2-
3. Stouter’s first issue is waived and would fail on the merits.
In his second issue, Stouter asserts the sentencing court’s supposed
“double counting” of recent offenses by reference to his latest incarceration in
a state correctional institution, even though Stouter’s conviction had been
included in his prior record score. See Appellant’s Brief, at 15-18. The
sentencing court noted that the commission of his current offenses had
occurred only a few months after his release from a state correctional
institution. See N.T. Sentence, 12/12/17, at 29-30, 33.
The sentencing court cited this recent criminal history as evidence of
Stouter’s continuing adult criminal record (which at age forty-one had
stretched over twenty years), personal characteristics, and lack of amenability
to rehabilitation. See id. This consideration was well within the discretion of
the sentencing court. See Moury, 992 A.2d at 169-71 (requiring sentencing
court to consider particular circumstances of offense and character of
defendant, including defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal
characteristics and potential for rehabilitation). Stouter offers no controlling
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authority to support his assertion that a sentencing court is prohibited from
consideration of any offense merely because it has been factored into his prior
record score. Stouter’s second issue does not merit relief.
In his third issue, Stouter asserts that his sentence was based on
“materially untrue assumptions.” Appellant’s Brief, at 19. Once again, Stouter
fails to develop an argument based on reference to the record and pertinent
authority that any such misguided reliance occurred. To the contrary, we
agree with the sentencing court that Stouter’s claim of sentencing based on
facts not admitted is “patently false.” Supplemental 1925(a) Opinion,
10/05/18, at 6. Stouter’s third issue fails.
In his fourth issue, Stouter asserts the sentencing court erred by
focusing on things that could have occurred during the chase but in fact did
not. See Appellant’s Brief, at 20-24. He maintains that the risk of injury was
inherent in any occurrence of fleeing and eluding, which, he claims, should
not have factored into a greater sentence. We disagree.
It was the duty of the sentencing court to consider, inter alia, the
protection of the public. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) (“In selecting from the
[sentencing] alternatives set forth in subsection (a), the court shall follow the
general principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that
is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as
it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and
the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”) (emphasis added).
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Moreover, Stouter’s argument fails to consider that even if the statutory
elements of a crime have been established, the sentencing court still has the
duty to fashion a sentence which properly reflects the seriousness of the actual
violation, the “gravity of the offense.” Id.
Here, Stouter not only fled to elude the police. He drove recklessly down
the highway, colliding with one police car at Whiteford Road and North Hills
Road, and placing all other fellow travelers at risk. He also drove at high
speeds the wrong way down one-way city streets in York. He exceeded over
one hundred miles an hour. See N.T., Guilty Plea Hearing, 10/30/17, at 7
(Stouter agreeing to the factual basis set forth in the information);
Information filed 2/6/17. He put the police who pursued him, as well as other
drivers and their passengers who happened to be in his path of travel, at
substantial risk of injury or death.
Stouter’s fourth argument utterly fails to develop, or even suggest, a
valid legal basis for the claim that because his reckless rampage did not result
in the actual loss of life or serious bodily injury, it was somehow improper to
factor his criminal behavior and the risks it created into his sentence.
Additionally, Stouter’s reckless behavior did cause substantial property
damage to the cars that were in the barricade, and the police car he previously
hit. Stouter’s issue lacks support in either the law or the facts. His fourth
claim is frivolous.
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Finally, in his fifth issue, Stouter claims that the term “high-speed
chase” is unconstitutionally vague.5 See Appellant’s Brief, at 25-33. We
disagree.
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law. See
Commonwealth v. Vargas, 947 A.2d 777, 780 (Pa. Super. 2008). As with
all questions of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review
is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Mauk, 185 A.3d 406, 409 (Pa. Super.
2018).
[W]e begin our analysis by recognizing that there is a strong
presumption in the law that legislative enactments do not violate
the constitution. Moreover, there is a heavy burden of persuasion
upon one who challenges the constitutionality of a statute. As a
matter of statutory construction, we presume “the General
Assembly does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United
States or of this Commonwealth.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(3). A statute
will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably,
and plainly violates the Constitution; all doubts are to be resolved
in favor of a finding of constitutionality.
* * *
[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal
statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in
a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. Due process is satisfied if the statute provides
reasonable standards by which a person may gauge his future
conduct.
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5Stouter argues that he did not waive his claim of unconstitutionality by his
guilty plea, citing Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 807 (2018).
However, we need not decide whether this argument would prevail, because,
as discussed in the text, even if we assume that Stouter’s underlying claim
survived his guilty plea, his constitutional challenge fails on the merits.
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Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 832 A.2d 418, 421 (Pa. 2003) (case citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
In this appeal, Stouter’s claim of vagueness relies chiefly on the dissent
in In re R.C.Y., 27 A.3d 227, 231-32 (Pa. Super. 2011). See Appellant’s
Brief, at 30-36.
In In re R.C.Y., the Court addressed the scope of 75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3733(a.2)(2)(iii), Fleeing or attempting to elude police officer. Subsection
(a.2)(2)(iii) of the statute, in relevant part, made the offense a third degree
felony, increasing the penalty for a violation when the actor engaged in a “high
speed chase.” The R.C.Y. Court concluded that the Legislature (which had
refrained from defining “high speed chase” in the statute) did not intend for
the term to be construed literally; rather, it intended that “high-speed chase”
be a term of art, having a practical, legal meaning “not closely bound by a
literal definition.” In re R.C.Y., 27 A.3d at 230.
The dissent disagreed, reasoning that the term “high speed chase” has
a common, usual meaning and thus should not be construed as a legal term
of art. Id. at 231 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
Here, Stouter argues, in effect, that if the R.C.Y. dissent disagreed with
the Majority on what constitutes a high-speed chase, then he has proven
vagueness that is constitutional in dimension. We disagree.
Preliminarily, Stouter’s reliance on the learned Justice Fitzgerald’s
dissent in In re R.C.Y. is misplaced, as it carries no precedential value. See,
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e.g., Commonwealth v. Davis, 17 A.3d 390, 398 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(applying the general rule that a decision lacks precedential value if it does
not garner the support of a majority of the sitting judges).
Moreover, as a practical matter, Stouter’s driving at speeds of over a
hundred miles an hour in his unsuccessful effort to elude the police would
plainly be prohibited under either the decision of the R.C.Y. majority, or
Justice Fitzgerald’s dissent.
The R.C.Y. Majority reasoned as follows:
From this history, we draw two conclusions. First, that the
legislature intended the enhanced penalties to protect the safety
of the public in general and police officers in particular. Indeed,
the first clause of the subsection is “endangers a law enforcement
officer or member of the general public....” Clearly, the “mischief
to be remedied” is the danger presented by certain methods of
fleeing or eluding police officers while driving a motor vehicle at
high speeds.
Second, we conclude that the legislature did not intend for
the term “high-speed chase” to be construed literally. Rather, it
intended that “high-speed chase” be a term of art, having a
practical, legal meaning that was not closely bound by a literal
definition. The term “high-speed chase,” far from being the
primary focus of the subsection, was intended to merely require a
different level of danger from the run-of-the-mill dangers posed
by merely failing to stop when signaled to do so by a police officer.
In other words, the legislature included this term to indicate that
the enhanced penalties applied only in cases where the
defendant’s actions created an extraordinary danger to the public
at large or to police officers.
In re R.C.Y., 27 A.3d at 230.
Justice Fitzgerald’s dissent reasoned in part as follows:
I agree with the majority that in enacting the grading
enhancement, the [Legislature] intended to remedy a mischief of
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the danger to police officers and the public posed by drivers who
attempt to flee or elude police at high speeds. It is also clear that
the legislature did not affix a minimum numerical rate of speed,
but instead allowed for court interpretation of the individual
circumstances of each case.
In re R.C.Y., 27 A.3d at 232 (Fitzgerald, J. dissenting).
[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute
define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in
a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. Due process is satisfied if the statute provides
reasonable standards by which a person may gauge his future
conduct.
Mayfield, 832 A.2d at 422 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, on independent review, we conclude that Stouter’s argument,
chiefly relying on citation to the R.C.Y. dissent, fails to meet the heavy burden
to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. Nor does it establish that
the statutory enhancement at issue is so indefinite that ordinary people cannot
understand what “high speed chase” means, or what conduct is prohibited.
None of his claims has merit. Stouter’s claim of unconstitutionality fails on
the merits.
We conclude that the sentencing court correctly considered the nature
and circumstances of Stouter’s offense, his criminal and driving history,
personal characteristics, as well as the Sentencing Guidelines. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(1). The court had the benefit of the PSI. Moreover, the court
had ample opportunity to observe Stouter at his preliminary hearing, guilty
plea hearing, and sentencing. See id.
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The court’s reasons for its sentence expressed an appropriate
consideration of the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it
related to the risks to the pursuing police and the community at large (in
particular, other travelers), as well as Stouter’s amenability to rehabilitation,
or the lack of it. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). We discern no proper basis on
which to disturb the discretion of the sentencing court.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/14/2019
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