Com. v. Lanza, C., II

J-S41026-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CHARLES LANZA, II :
:
Appellant : No. 330 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 22, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-38-CR-0000716-2018
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 26, 2019
This case returns to this panel following remand for the appointment of
new counsel. Charles Lanza, II (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed after the trial court convicted him of disorderly conduct, 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4). Upon review, we affirm.
On February 15, 2018, Appellant was involved in an altercation with
Lebanon County Sheriff’s Department Sergeant Brad Seyfert and other
security personnel at the entrance of the Lebanon County Municipal Building.
See Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/19, at 4-7. Appellant was charged with disorderly
conduct. Following a bench trial, Appellant was found guilty and sentenced to
pay a fine of $50, with no further penalty imposed. See N.T., 1/22/19, at 41-
42.
____________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Appellant did not file post-sentence motions, but filed a notice of appeal
on February 4, 2019. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.
After reviewing Appellant’s brief, we concluded that Appellant’s previous
counsel waived all issues on appeal by filing a patently defective brief, and
remanded the case to the trial court for the appointment of new counsel. On
remand, the trial court appointed Attorney Kevin M. Richards, Esq. to
represent Appellant. On October 24, 2019, a new appellate brief was filed on
Appellant’s behalf. Appellant raises three issues for review:
[1.] Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in ruling that the Commonwealth
presented evidence at trial that was sufficient to sustain a
conviction under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(4)?
[2.] Did the [c]ourt commit prejudicial error in finding that the
County’s practice in barring public cell phones from the third floor
of the Municipal building extended to other areas of the structure?
[3.] Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit prejudicial error in finding that
Appellant’s counsel could not develop testimony as to why
Appellant said the reason he had his cell phone out in the first
place?
Appellant’s Brief at 6 (reordered for ease of review).
Appellant’s first two claims challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
We address these claims together and observe:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we
may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for [that
of] the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
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circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying
the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier
of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Leaner, 202 A.3d 749, 768 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation
omitted). To reiterate, the trial court, as the trier of fact—while passing on
the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence—is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103
A.3d 1, 39 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). In conducting review, the
appellate court may not weigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for
the fact-finder. Id. at 39-40.
Here, Appellant contends that his conviction of disorderly conduct is not
supported by the evidence. Appellant maintains that the Commonwealth
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he caused a public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly created the risk thereof
because the area immediately inside the entrance of the municipal building –
where the altercation occurred – is not a public place.
Section 5503(a)(4), disorderly conduct, provides that a person commits
the summary offense if, “with the intent to cause public inconvenience,
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annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he . . . creates a
hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves no
legitimate purpose of the actor.” Id.
Disorderly conduct “is not intended as a catchall for every act which
annoys or disturbs people[.]” Commonwealth v. Maerz, 879 A.2d 1267,
1269 (Pa. Super. 2005). Rather, “[t]he dangers and risks against which the
disorderly conduct statute are directed are the possibility of injuries resulting
from public disorders.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 574 A.2d 1161, 1164
(Pa. Super. 1990). Specifically, a “hazardous condition” under subsection
5503(a)(4) “is a condition involving danger or risk,” including a condition that
creates the risk of an altercation. Williams, 574 A.2d at 1164 (citation
omitted).
With regard to his disorderly conduct conviction, Appellant argues that
“[t]here was absolutely no evidence that there was any actual public
inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or any risk thereof.” Appellant’s Brief at
16. Appellant avers that “there was no testimony that the public was at all
disturbed or that there was any risk of a disturbance” because “there was no
evidence presented that the area immediately inside the entrance where
Appellant was tackled was ‘adjacent to the hearing rooms’ . . . .” Id. at 16,
20. Therefore, “there was no evidence that Appellant was engaging in any
illegal conduct when he was tackled by Sergeant Seyfert[.]” Id. at 20.
The disorderly conduct statute “is aimed at protecting the public from
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certain enumerated acts.” Commonwealth v. Fedorek, 946 A.2d 93, 100
(Pa. 2008) (emphasis in original). “Under the statute, whether a defendant’s
words or acts rise to the level of disorderly conduct hinges upon whether they
cause or unjustifiably risk a public disturbance. The cardinal feature of the
crime of disorderly conduct is public unruliness which can or does lead to
tumult or disorder.” Id. (citation omitted, emphasis in original). As used in
Section 5503, “the word ‘public’ means affecting or likely to affect persons in
a place to which the public or a substantial group has access; among the
places included are highways, transport facilities, schools, prisons, apartment
houses, places of business or amusement, any neighborhood, or any premises
which are open to the public.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(c).
In addressing Appellant’s sufficiency claims, the trial court opined:
Appellant entered the Municipal Building while video
recording with his cell phone. The entrance doors to the Municipal
Building are clearly marked with the applicable prohibition on
video recording and cell phones on the third floor, as well as in
the hearing rooms and those areas adjacent thereto.
Furthermore, members of the public are subject to the normal
security procedures upon entry of the Municipal Building. When
asked to stop recording and put the phone down by the security
monitor and then by Sergeant Seyfert, Appellant refused. When
Sergeant Seyfert, after several commands to Appellant, then
attempted to take the phone, Appellant resisted, moved his hands
towards his waistline and then physically struggled with Sergeant
Seyfert, whereupon Appellant landed an elbow into Sergeant
Seyfert’s chest.
The incident occurred in the lobby area of the Municipal
Building at the entrance of the Building. Sergeant Seyfert
testified, and the video recording entered in to evidence indicates,
that employees in the Building were disturbed to the point of
coming into the hallway to observe the incident. Further, there
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were members of the public who also entered and exited the
[b]uilding through the area where the incident occurred.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we find that Appellant’s
physical resistance and lack of compliance with the lawful
commands of law enforcement constitute disorderly conduct in a
public area. As the finder of fact, we discussed our findings as to
the testimony presented, indicating that the testimony of
Sergeant Seyfert and Officer Zatorski [] was credible and
unrebutted. We also viewed the video evidence presented from
Appellant’s own recording and from the security cameras in the
Municipal Building and find that they are consistent. As such, we
find Appellant’s claim lacks merit.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/19, at 11-12.
We agree with the trial court. Our review of the record reveals that on
February 15, 2018, Sergeant Seyfert observed Appellant in a verbal dispute
with personnel at the security checkpoint located at the front entrance of the
Lebanon County Municipal Building. N.T., 1/22/19, at 6, 14. Sergeant Seyfert
witnessed Appellant holding a camera “within a foot” of a security guard’s
face. Id. at 15-16, 22. Accordingly, Sergeant Seyfert commanded Appellant
to stop videoing and put down the phone; Appellant did not comply. Id. at
15. Sergeant Seyfert then asked Appellant to surrender his phone. Id. at 16.
When Appellant did not comply, Sergeant Seyfert reached for Appellant’s
phone. Id. Appellant responded by striking Sergeant Seyfert in the chest
with his elbow. Id.
Because Appellant struck him, Sergeant Seyfert placed Appellant under
arrest. N.T., 1/22/19, at 17. In response, Appellant continued to struggle,
and Sergeant Seyfert testified that it took five sheriff deputies to control
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Appellant and place him in handcuffs. Id. at 19. Sergeant Seyfert also noted
that the deputy sheriff positioned at the back door of the Municipal Building
responded to the incident because he heard Appellant shouting. Id. at 18.
Sergeant Seyfert testified that at the time of the incident, the Municipal
Building was open to the public, it was a “busy court morning,” and members
of the public were coming and going in the area surrounding the security
checkpoint. Id. at 20, 23. Sergeant Seyfert further testified that people
working in offices in the same hallway as the checkpoint were “looking out to
see what the heck was going on.” Id. at 19.
We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that “[v]iewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict
winner, . . . Appellant’s physical resistance and lack of compliance with the
lawful commands of law enforcement constitute disorderly conduct in a public
area.” Id. at 11. The evidence presented by the Commonwealth, and
unrebutted by Appellant at trial, demonstrates that Appellant: refused to
comply with the commands of security personnel and Sergeant Seyfert at the
security checkpoint of the Municipal Building; elbowed Sergeant Seyfert in the
chest, and was shouting —disrupting employees and gaining the attention of
multiple members of the public who were present. Again, Appellant’s conduct
occurred at the security checkpoint inside the front entrance of the Lebanon
County Municipal Building. Consistent with Section 5503, that area constitutes
a public location. See Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949, 962 (Pa.
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Super. 2002) (holding the security checkpoint of a county courthouse is a
public location as used in the disorderly conduct statute). Accordingly,
Appellant’s sufficiency issues lack merit.
In his final claim, Appellant contends the trial court erred in prohibiting
his counsel from questioning Sergeant Seyfert as to whether county
commissioners or media outlets are required to seek prior approval from the
sheriff’s office to record video inside the commissioners’ meeting room of the
Municipal Building. See Appellant’s Brief at 18. In particular, Appellant
challenges the trial court’s ruling relative to the following exchange:
[Appellant’s Trial Counsel]: And there was, in fact, a
commissioners’ meeting that day?
[Sergeant Seyfert]: Yes.
[Appellant’s Trial Counsel]: And those are frequently recorded,
correct?
[Sergeant Seyfert]: Yes.
[Appellant’s Trial Counsel]: Recorded by one of our commissioners
I think regularly?
[Sergeant Seyfert]: Yes.
[Appellant’s Trial Counsel]: And by various members of the public
and certain media places such as Channel 8, CBS, Fox News?
[Sergeant Seyfert]: Yes. I believe that’s covered under the
Sunshine Act or something like that.
[Appellant’s Trial Counsel]: And none of those media outlets or
even Commissioner Litz, they don’t submit a special request form
to the Sheriff’s Office in order to do that, do they?
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[Commonwealth]: Your Honor, I’m going to lodge an objection.
We aren’t actually talking about what takes place -- for this case
we aren’t talking about what occurs in the commissioners’ meeting
room. We are talking about what occurred in the front lobby of
the courthouse. There’s a very distinct difference there.
[Trial Court]: [Appellant’s Trial Counsel?]
[Appellant’s Trial Counsel]: I think it’s relevant to the point, Your
Honor, that my client is videoing for the purpose of going to the
commissioners’ meeting room, which is normally and typically a
recordable event.
[Trial Court]: Except, [Appellant’s Trial Counsel], the problem
becomes that unless there’s evidence to show that Fox and all of
them are running their cameras as they come through the security
on their way up to the room -- none of them do that, do they?
[Appellant’s Trial Counsel]: That I can’t speak to, but what --
[Trial Court]: Well, there’s a distinct difference. For example, the
[c]ourt allows videotaping, even though there is a general bar,
videotaping of adoptions, but we give permission for those.
[Appellant’s Trial Counsel]: Yes, Judge.
[Trial Court]: The commissioners may or may not. I have been to
a couple of meetings in 24 years as a Judge, but I know that
Commissioner Litz uses her recording device there, but I don’t --
I think the objection goes to the question as it pertains to the
commissioners’ room versus there. So if you want to rephrase
that. I mean, there might be some relevance to videotaping in
the commissioners’ room, but I don’t think that is what this
depicts, correct?
[Appellant’s Trial Counsel]: I’ll move on, Your Honor.
N.T., 1/22/19, at 26-28.
Appellant claims the trial court erred because “[s]uch evidence was
relevant to Appellant’s defense that he was not engaging in any illegal conduct
when he was tackled by Sergeant Seyfert, which led to the alleged disorderly
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conduct.” Appellant’s Brief at 18.
We note:
A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence
is admissible, and a trial court’s ruling regarding the admission of
evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects
manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous. In addition,
the trial court has broad discretion regarding both the scope and
permissible limits of cross-examination. The trial judge’s exercise
of judgment in setting those limits will not be reversed in the
absence of a clear abuse of that discretion, or an error of law.
Commonwealth v. Rosser, 135 A.3d 1077, 1087 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(citations omitted).
Evidence must be competent and relevant before it is admitted in a
criminal proceeding. Commonwealth v. Freidl, 834 A.2d 638 (Pa. Super.
2003). Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence; and the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401 (emphasis added).
“Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.” Pa.R.E. 402. Therefore,
“[t]he threshold inquiry with admission of evidence is whether the evidence is
relevant.” Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 577 (Pa. 2005).
As to its ruling, the trial court stated:
During Appellant’s counsel’s cross-examination of Sergeant
Seyfert, counsel referenced the fact that Appellant’s stated goal,
as he was outside the Municipal Building, was that he intended to
videotape a county commissioner’s meeting. Counsel then asked
Sergeant Seyfert if the meetings were frequently recorded, both
by certain commissioners themselves and by members of the
public and media, to which Sergeant Seyfert answered in the
affirmative. Counsel then asked whether any of those who record
the meetings are required to submit a special request form to the
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Sheriff’s Office in order to do so. The district attorney objected
on the basis of relevance to the issue of the trial. Appellant’s
[c]ounsel contended relevance on the basis that Appellant was
“videoing for the purpose of going to the commissioners’ meeting
room, which is normally and typically a recordable event.” In
ruling in favor of the objection, we stated that whether recording
is allowed in the commissioner’s meeting room is not relevant to
what occurred in the lobby of the Municipal Building unless it could
be shown that other members of the media or commissioners are
video recording in the lobby as they come through security, which
Appellant could not substantiate.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/19, at 8-9 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).
Upon review, we discern no error. As noted by the trial court, Appellant
sought to introduce testimony pertaining to the recording restrictions in the
commissioners’ meeting room of the Lebanon County Municipal Building. This
information, however, is irrelevant to whether Appellant’s actions in the
building’s lobby constituted a violation of Section 5503(a)(4) (disorderly
conduct occurs when a person “creates a hazardous or physically offensive
condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor”); see
also Pa.R.E. 401. Accordingly, the trial court properly exercised its discretion
in sustaining the Commonwealth’s objection and limiting trial counsel’s cross-
examination of Sergeant Seyfert. Rosser, 135 A.3d at 1087 (“[T]he trial
court has broad discretion regarding both the scope and permissible limits of
cross-examination. The trial judge’s exercise of judgment in setting those
limits will not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of that
discretion[.]”). Thus, Appellant’s final claim is meritless.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/26/2019
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