Com. v. Geiss, T.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
TAMMY GEISS,
Appellant No. 1072 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 1, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-08-CR-0000931-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, J., and WECHT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 26, 2015
Tammy Geiss (Appellant) appeals from the May 1, 2014 judgment of
sentence of a minimum of 72 hours and a maximum of 6 months’
incarceration after being found guilty at a bench trial of driving under the
influence (DUI), highest rate,1 DUI, general impairment,2 and public
drunkenness.3 Appellant now challenges the trial court’s discretion in
admitting inculpatory statements against a corpus delicti objection, and the
sufficiency of the evidence regarding the degree of her intoxication. After
careful review, we affirm the judgement of sentence.
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1
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c).
2
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802 (a)(1).
3
18 Pa.C.S. § 5505.
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The trial court set forth a factual summary of this matter as follows:
Officers Hoffman and Dekar responded to a report of an
intoxicated person. Upon arrival, [Appellant] was found in her
motor vehicle parked on a public street. [Appellant] was in the
driver’s seat. The car was warm. The [o]fficer initially spoke to
her through her open window. The [o]fficer asked for drivers’
license, registration and insurance. [Appellant] gave [the
officer] the registration and insurance card and was advised she
also needed the license. [Appellant] appeared confused.
[Appellant] reached for the ignition and the police officer had to
re-direct her because she did not want [Appellant] starting the
vehicle. [Appellant] turned on the headlights of the vehicle, the
officer again redirected her to obtain her drivers’ license.
[Appellant]’s speech was extremely slurred and her eyes were
extremely bloodshot and glassy. When [Appellant] was asked to
step out of the vehicle, the police officer had to hold her up as
[Appellant] was not able to hold her own balance. [Appellant]
fell on the officer numerous times. [Appellant] had a very strong
odor of alcohol from her breath and her person. [Appellant] was
not able to do the field sobriety tests and stated same to the
officer. ….
[Appellant] told the police officer that she had taken two
oxycodone pills and began drinking at her husband’s house,
drove around while continuing to consume wine and then drove
to the place she was parked. ….
….
…[Appellant] was encountered by the police at 8:53 PM.
…. She consented to have a blood alcohol test and blood was
drawn at 9:34. Thus her blood was drawn within two hours of
her being in actual physical control of her vehicle. The BAC
results were 0.22. Although [Appellant] testified that she
consumed wine after arriving to the point where she was
encountered by the police and there were numerous empty and
some full small bottles of wine in her vehicle ….
Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 11/2014 at 2-4.
On February 28, 2014, at the conclusion of a bench trial, Appellant
was found guilty and sentenced as stated above. Appellant filed post
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sentence motions, which were denied. Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal and complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement. The trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on November,
2014. Appellant now presents the following issues for our review:
I. Whether [Appellant]’s admission to driving was
inadmissible as a result of the Commonwealth’s failure to
prove the corpus delicti of DUI?
II. Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence
that [Appellant] had consumed enough alcohol to establish
that she had a blood alcohol content exceeding 0.16% at
the time she was driving?
Appellant’s Brief, at 7.
Corpus Delicti
The corpus delicti rule requires proof that a crime occurred,
independent of self-incriminating statements made by an accused.4
Appellant’s argument is that the Commonwealth did not present sufficient
evidence to prove that she had driven her vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol. She asserts that, without such proof, her statements that she
had been drinking alcohol prior to driving were inadmissible. “Essentially,
the Commonwealth failed to prove that a traffic offense had occurred
without the benefit of [Appellant]’s inculpatory statement.” Appellant’s
Brief, at 12.
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4
See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 39 A.3d 406, 410-411 (Pa. Super.
2012).
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Our standard of review for a challenge to the corpus delicti rule is well-
settled.
The corpus delicti rule is designed to guard against the “hasty
and unguarded character which is often attached to confessions
and admissions and the consequent danger of a conviction where
no crime has in fact been committed.” The corpus delicti rule is
a rule of evidence. Our standard of review on appeals
challenging an evidentiary ruling of the trial court is limited to a
determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion.
The corpus delicti rule places the burden on the prosecution to
establish that a crime has actually occurred before a confession
or admission of the accused connecting him to the crime can be
admitted. The corpus delicti is literally the body of the crime; it
consists of proof that a loss or injury has occurred as a result of
the criminal conduct of someone. The criminal responsibility of
the accused for the loss or injury is not a component of the rule.
The historical purpose of the rule is to prevent a conviction
based solely upon a confession or admission, where in fact no
crime has been committed. The corpus delicti may be
established by circumstantial evidence. Establishing the corpus
delicti in Pennsylvania is a two-step process. The first step
concerns the trial judge's admission of the accused's
statements and the second step concerns the fact finder's
consideration of those statements. In order for the statement
to be admitted, the Commonwealth must prove the corpus delicti
by a preponderance of the evidence. In order for the statement
to be considered by the fact finder, the Commonwealth must
establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt.
Hernandez, 39 A.3d at 410-411 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
With this standard in mind, our first step in assessing Appellant’s claim
is determining the corpus delicti of DUI. The pertinent law provides that the
Commonwealth had to prove, independent of Appellant’s statement, that (1)
an individual was driving, operating, or in actual physical control of the
movement of a vehicle, (2) after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such
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that the individual was rendered incapable of safely driving. 5 If the
Commonwealth established both prongs by a preponderance of the
evidence, we shall find no abuse of discretion in the introduction of
Appellant’s inculpatory statements at trial.6
We have found actual physical control of a vehicle when a defendant
was in driver’s seat, alone in the vehicle, while the vehicle was at the bottom
of an embankment, and the hood was warm. Commonwealth v. Wilson,
660 A.2d 105, 107 (Pa. Super. 1995). In the case at bar, the hood and
fender well were warm, indicating to police that the vehicle was driven
recently. Appellant was alone in the vehicle, sitting in the driver’s seat.
When asked for her driver’s license, registration, and insurance, Appellant
reached for the ignition and turned on the vehicle’s headlights. Appellant
was away from her home, parked in front of her friend’s residence. The
vehicle was pointed in the wrong direction with the driver’s side tires next to
the curb. Finally, police were responding to a call that an intoxicated person
was causing a “problem.” As in Wilson, this evidence establishes that
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5
“An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the
movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such
that the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being
in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S. §
3802(a)(1)
6
Appellant was charged with both general impairment and highest rate DUI.
For our analysis, we have applied the general impairment corpus delicti,
however, the evidence satisfies highest rate DUI as well.
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Appellant was in actual physical control of the vehicle, thus satisfying the
first prong of analysis.
Regarding her ability to drive safely, Appellant appeared to be heavily
intoxicated with empty bottles of alcohol in the vehicle. She could not stand
without assistance and repeatedly fell on a police officer. She recognized
that she would not pass a field sobriety test and expressed that to the
police. We find this evidence satisfies the second prong of the analysis.
We conclude that the Commonwealth presented independent evidence
sufficient to establish the corpus delicti of DUI by a preponderance of the
evidence. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing testimony establishing Appellant’s inculpatory
statements.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant argues, in the alternative, that the evidence was insufficient
to prove that she was in violation of the highest rate of DUI. She contends
that the empty bottles of alcohol in her vehicle create reasonable doubt as to
whether her BAC was in excess of the limit within two hours of driving the
vehicle. Without evidence that established that she was driving under the
influence, as opposed to becoming intoxicated afterward, Appellant avers
that the verdict cannot stand.
We review Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
under the following, well-settled standard of review:
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We must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a
light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner,
support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there
is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every
element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable
doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.
The evidence established at trial need not preclude every
possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all,
part, or none of the evidence presented. It is not within the
province of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for that of the fact-finder. The Commonwealth's
burden may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence and any
doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact
finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a
matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the
combined circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Mobley, 14 A.3d 887, 889-890 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citation omitted).
Appellant’s argument relies entirely on the “driving” condition of the
offense. Because the Code provides that a violation occurs while driving,
operating, or in actual physical control of the vehicle, we will deem the
evidence sufficient if it establishes that Appellant had a BAC of 0.16% or
higher within two hours of having been in actual physical control of the
movement of the vehicle.7
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7
“An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the
movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such
that the alcohol concentration in the individual’s blood or breath is 0.16% or
higher within two hours after the individual has driven, operated or been in
actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S. §
3802(c).
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When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, the
evidence sufficiently established all of the elements of the offense. Appellant
was alone in her vehicle, sitting in the driver’s seat, reaching for the ignition,
turning on the lights, and not at her own residence. Based on reasonable
inferences drawn from this evidence, the fact-finder could have determined
that Appellant was in actual physical control of the vehicle. Further,
Appellant’s blood was drawn within two hours of her first encounter with the
police and her BAC was 0.22%. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence
was sufficient to support the verdict.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/26/2015
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