In Re: K.T. Appeal of: K.T.

J-S66043-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: K.R.T., a Minor, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
:
APPEAL OF: K.R.T., :
:
Appellant : No. 512 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Dispositional Order entered on January 8, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,
Juvenile Division, No. CP-67-JV-0000502-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 26, 2014
K.R.T. (d.o.b. 1/2/96) appeals from the Dispositional Order entered
after he was adjudicated delinquent of possession with intent to deliver a
controlled substance (“PWID”).1 We affirm.
The juvenile court previously set forth the facts underlying this appeal,
in its Order entered on November 8, 2013, as follows:
Officer [Jason] Dibble [of the York Area Regional Police
Department] testified that on May 5th, 2013, he was in uniform
and on duty, and at around 4:30 [p.m.,] when he came onto
duty, he was informed that there was a missing child who had a
302 warrant.[2] As a result of that information, [Officer Dibble]
went to [K.R.T.’s] residence … to speak with his mother. She
1
See 35 Pa.C.S.A. § 780-113(a)(30).
2
Pursuant to section 7302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act, 50 P.S.
§ 7302, a “302” involuntary commitment warrant may be issued “[u]pon
written application by a physician or other responsible party setting forth
facts constituting reasonable grounds to believe a person is severely
mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment[.]” Id. § 7302(a)(1).
In the instant case, K.R.T.’s mother submitted the application for a 302
warrant.
J-S66043-14
had given [Officer Dibble] a picture or [K.R.T.] and [] provided
him with some locations where [K.R.T.] may have been
[located]. It was determined that [K.R.T.] may be at an
apartment complex on South Main Street in Red Lion Borough.
[Officer Dibble] went to the location, and [K.R.T.’s] mother
was [] at the location as well. While [Officer Dibble] was
investigating, he heard [K.R.T.’s] mother yell, “K[.], stop.” As a
result, [Officer Dibble] turned and saw [K.R.T.] running down
the street. A very short foot pursuit commenced. [K.R.T.] []
threw his backpack and sat down on the grassy area next to the
sidewalk where the [backpack] was located. [Officer Dibble]
testified that the backpack was no more than ten feet from
[K.R.T.’s] location. [Officer Dibble] stated that [immediately
after K.R.T. had thrown the backpack and sat down on the grass,
the Officer] asked [K.R.T.] why he threw the backpack, at which
time [K.R.T.] stated that he was selling marijuana and that
marijuana was in the backpack. [Officer Dibble then placed
K.R.T. in handcuffs.]
[Officer Dibble] testified that he searched the backpack
incident to arrest. He stated [that] inside the backpack were
wet clothes, a cell phone, a plastic zip lock bag with ten
individual packages of marijuana, and rolled up money that was
located [] with the marijuana. … [Officer Dibble] also indicated
[that] he was concerned for his safety. He has been involved in
the military and [served] in Afghanistan[,] and is well aware of
the fact that backpacks have been used to detonate devices and
obviously had some concerns.
Juvenile Court Order, 11/8/13, at 3-4 (footnote added). Additionally, the
juvenile court stated that another officer had testified that the 28 grams of
marijuana that was found in K.R.T.’s backpack was possessed with intent to
deliver. See id. at 5.3
A few days prior to the November 8, 2013 adjudicatory hearing, K.R.T.
filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence of the marijuana and the inculpatory
3
K.R.T. does not dispute that he possessed the marijuana with intent to sell
it.
-2-
J-S66043-14
statements he made to Officer Dibble concerning the marijuana. K.R.T.
averred that the warrantless search was unconstitutional and that no
exceptions to the warrant requirement applied. At the adjudicatory hearing,
the juvenile court denied K.R.T.’s Motion to Suppress, finding that (1) the
search fell under two exceptions to the warrant requirement; and (2)
K.R.T.’s inculpatory statements did not occur during a custodial
interrogation, and, therefore, there was no violation of his Miranda4 rights.
See Juvenile Court Order, 11/8/13, at 6-7. At the close of the adjudicatory
hearing, the juvenile court determined that the evidence established beyond
a reasonable doubt that K.R.T. had committed PWID, but deferred
adjudication and disposition pending a case assessment and psychological
evaluation of K.R.T.
At a subsequent adjudicatory hearing on January 8, 2014, the juvenile
court adjudicated K.R.T. delinquent of PWID, and imposed probation. K.R.T.
timely filed a post-adjudication Motion, challenging, inter alia, the court’s
denial of the Motion to Suppress. Following a hearing, the juvenile court
denied the post-adjudication Motion, after which K.R.T. timely filed a Notice
of Appeal.
On appeal, K.R.T. presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the [juvenile] court erred in denying [K.R.T.’s]
Suppression Motion related to the search of the bag in
that:
a. The search was not done incident to arrest;
4
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
-3-
J-S66043-14
b. There were no exigent circumstances that required
the bag to be searched; and
c. The bag was not abandoned by [K.R.T.?]
2. Whether the [juvenile] court erred in denying [K.R.T.’s]
Suppression Motion related to the statements obtained
from [K.R.T.], as [] [O]fficer [Dibble] did not give [K.R.T.]
Miranda [warnings] and quiet time before his custodial
interrogation[?]
Brief for Appellant at 4 (capitalization omitted).
Our standard of review concerning a challenge to the denial of a
suppression motion is as follows:
An appellate court may consider only the Commonwealth’s
evidence and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record
as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of
the suppression court, the appellate court is bound by those
facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn
therefrom are in error. [T]he appellate court is not bound by the
suppression court’s conclusions of law.
In re V.C., 66 A.3d 341, 350-51 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted); see
also In the Interest of L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1080 n.6 (Pa. 2013) (stating
that “our standard of review is highly deferential with respect to the
suppression court’s factual findings and credibility determinations.”).
K.R.T. first argues that the juvenile court erred in denying his Motion
to Suppress the marijuana found in his backpack because Officer Dibble did
not have a warrant to search the backpack,5 and no exception to the warrant
requirement applies. See Brief for Appellant at 10-14. K.R.T. contends that
5
K.R.T. does not dispute that Officer Dibble had a valid 302 warrant to take
K.R.T. into custody for a medical evaluation or that the arrest was valid.
-4-
J-S66043-14
(1) the search was not conducted incident to arrest; (2) there were no
exigent circumstances presented in this case that required a search of the
backpack; and (3) the backpack was not abandoned by K.R.T. Id. at 10-14.
“As a general rule, for a search to be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment or Article I, Section 8, police must obtain a warrant, supported
by probable cause and issued by an independent judicial officer, prior to
conducting the search.” Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 107 (Pa.
2014). However, “[n]ot every search must be conducted pursuant to a
warrant, for the Fourth Amendment bars only unreasonable searches and
seizures. While a search is generally not reasonable unless executed
pursuant to a warrant, the Supreme Court of the United States and [the
Pennsylvania Supreme] Court have recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement.” Commonwealth v. Taylor/Mahone, 771 A.2d 1261, 1266
(Pa. 2001) (citation omitted). One well-recognized exception is a search
conducted incident to a lawful arrest. See Commonwealth v. Stem, 96
A.3d 407, 410 (Pa. Super. 2014). Additionally, a warrant is not required to
search personal property that an individual has voluntarily abandoned. See
Commonwealth v. Sodomsky, 939 A.2d 363, 366-67 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(stating, inter alia, that “when an individual evidences an intent to relinquish
control over personal property, he or she has abandoned a privacy interest
in property and cannot object to any ensuing search of the item by police.”).
In the instant case, the juvenile court determined that although Officer
Dibble did not have a warrant to search K.R.T.’s backpack, the search was
-5-
J-S66043-14
legal because it fell under the search incident to arrest exception to the
warrant requirement, and a warrant was not required because K.R.T. had
voluntarily abandoned the backpack.
We will first address the search incident to arrest exception, which
“permits an arresting officer without a warrant to search an arrestee’s
person and the area within his immediate control only for personal property
immediately associated with the arrestee.” Stem, 96 A.3d at 410 (citing,
inter alia, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (holding that
where a search is conducted pursuant to a lawful arrest, “[t]here is ample
justification … for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his
immediate control’ – construing that phrase to mean the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”)).
This Court has explained that the “search incident to a lawful arrest …
exception[] to the warrant requirement [] does not depend upon whether
there is any indication that the person arrested possesses weapons or
evidence as the fact of a lawful arrest, standing alone, authorizes a search.”
Commonwealth v. Rickabaugh, 706 A.2d 826, 836 (Pa. Super. 1997)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
In the instant case, the juvenile court discussed this exception in its
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion as follows:
As a search incident to arrest, [Officer Dibble] could
properly search [K.R.T.’s] person and containers within his
immediate control. A police officer may conduct a search of an
arrestee’s person and the area within the arrestee’s immediate
control as a matter of course because of the ever-present risk in
-6-
J-S66043-14
an arrest situation that an arrestee may seek to use a weapon.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53
L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977). To facilitate officer safety, a search incident
to a lawful arrest requires no further justification in order to be
valid. Commonwealth v. Henry, 358 Pa. Super. 306, 311, 517
A.2d 559, 564 (1986).
In the instant matter, [] [O]fficer [Dibble] testified that the
backpack was no more than ten feet from [K.R.T.] at the time it
was searched. The Officer also testified that he was concerned
for his safety based on his military background and his
familiarity with backpacks having been used to carry explosive
devices to be detonated remotely. The [juvenile c]ourt
recognizes that the backpack lies in a grey area as it relates to
the area that may be searched. However, the [c]ourt found the
Officer’s testimony compelling regarding his experiences in the
military as it relates to backpacks being used as explosive
devises. Moreover, we now live in a different time when it is
common to see backpacks being used as weapons, e.g.[, the]
Boston Marathon [bombing].[6] [K.R.T.], while being chased,
threw his backpack[,] thereby giving [O]fficer [Dibble] further
concern regarding the potential contents therein. This
heightened his concerns regarding his safety. Therefore, the
[juvenile c]ourt found that the backpack[,] which was located
within ten feet of the Officer[,] posed a potential danger to him
and others who were at the arrest scene.
Juvenile Court Opinion, 4/10/14, at 2-3 (footnote added); see also N.T.
(adjudicatory hearing), 11/8/13, at 43-44.
We must defer to the juvenile court’s credibility assessment regarding
Officer Dibble’s testimony at the adjudicatory hearing that he had reason to
be concerned for his and the public’s safety regarding the unknown contents
of K.R.T.’s backpack, based on the Officer’s prior experience with concealed
explosive devices while serving with the military in Afghanistan, and the
6
The Boston Marathon bombing on April 15, 2013, wherein a bomb
concealed inside a backpack was remotely detonated, occurred less than one
month prior to the incident involved in this case.
-7-
J-S66043-14
then-recent Boston Marathon bombing. See In the Interest of L.J., supra
(stating that “our standard of review is highly deferential with respect to the
suppression court’s factual findings and credibility determinations.”).
Moreover, the safety concern articulated by Officer Dibble
distinguishes the instant matter from the case that K.R.T. relies upon in
support of his argument: Taylor/Mahone, 771 A.2d at 1271-72 (where the
police had arrested the defendant and his codefendant while executing a
search warrant of a convenience store, placed the men in handcuffs, and
then discovered narcotics in two coats located ten feet away from the men,
holding that this evidence was not admissible under the search incident to
arrest exception because “the search of the two coats extended beyond the
area within [the defendants’] ‘immediate control[,]’” and “[t]here is no
indication in the record that the police had any reason to believe that the
men would immediately attempt to secure a weapon or destroy contraband
contained in the coats.”). Unlike the police in Taylor/Mahone, here, Officer
Dibble articulated a specific reason why the backpack was a potential safety
concern, and, as noted above, the juvenile court credited Officer Dibble’s
justification for why he thought the circumstances necessitated a protective
search of the backpack. Cf. Taylor/Mahone, 771 A.2d at 1271 (stating
that “[w]hile the coats did contain contraband, we find that the
circumstances in the present case did not necessitate a search of the
coats.”). Accordingly, the juvenile court properly determined that the search
incident to arrest exception was satisfied in this case.
-8-
J-S66043-14
Moreover, we agree with the juvenile court’s determination in its
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion that “[a]ssuming that the search of the backpack
was not a valid search incident to arrest, it would then fall within the
parameters of abandoned property.” Juvenile Court Opinion, 4/10/14, at 4.
The juvenile court reasoned as follows:
It is well settled that no one has standing to complain of a
search or seizure of property that he has voluntarily abandoned.
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S. Ct. 683, 4 L. Ed. 2d
668 (1960)[; see also Sodomsky, 939 A.2d at 367 (stating
that “a legitimate expectation of privacy is absent where an
owner or possessor meaningfully abdicates his control,
ownership, or possessory interest in his personal property.”
(citation and quotation marks omitted)]. Abandonment is
primarily a question of intent, and intent may be inferred from
words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts.
Commonwealth v. Shoatz, 469 Pa. 545, 553, 366 A.2d 1216,
1220 (1976) [(where the police responded to a report that the
defendant and his two coconspirators were acting suspiciously
and appeared to be readying to burglarize a store, and the men
fled upon seeing the police and dropped two briefcases, holding
that the warrantless search of the briefcases, which contained
illegal weapons, was lawful because the men had voluntarily
abandoned the property); s]ee also Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 431 Pa. Super. 291, 636 A.2d 656 (1994) (finding
that defendant’s placement of a bag of crack cocaine in a tree on
public property and standing 10-12 feet away constituted a
conscious attempt to distance himself from the bag in the event
of police intervention, and accordingly resulted in the loss of a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag). Police pursuit
does not of itself render abandonment involuntary. United
States v. Edwards, 5th Cir. 1971, 441 F.2d 749 (1971).
Here, [K.R.T.] voluntarily threw the backpack while being
pursued by [] Officer [Dibble]. By throwing the backpack and
continuing to flee, albeit for a short period of time, it can
reasonably be inferred that [K.R.T.] was voluntarily relinquishing
his control and any privacy interest he had in the backpack.
-9-
J-S66043-14
Juvenile Court Opinion, 4/10/14, at 4; see also N.T. (adjudicatory hearing),
11/8/13, at 44 (wherein the juvenile court judge found that “[i]t’s clear that
[K.R.T.] intended to relinquish possession [of the backpack] by throwing it
when running from the [O]fficer.”). We determine that the juvenile court’s
findings are supported by the record and the law, and discern no error in the
court’s conclusion that the marijuana seized from K.R.T.’s backpack was
admissible even though Officer Dibble did not have a warrant to search the
backpack.
In his second issue, K.R.T. argues that the juvenile court erred in
failing to suppress his inculpatory statements because, according to K.R.T.,
he was in custody when Officer Dibble questioned him as to why he threw
the backpack,7 and the Officer never read K.R.T. his Miranda rights. See
Brief for Appellant at 15-17. K.R.T. maintains that Officer Dibble had placed
him in custody at the moment that K.R.T. had stopped for the Officer while
fleeing, after the Officer yelled to K.R.T., “Stop, police.” Id. at 15. K.R.T.
contends that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave under
these circumstances, and, therefore, the questions that Officer Dibble asked
K.R.T. occurred during a custodial interrogation, requiring Miranda
warnings. Id. at 16.
7
K.R.T. also points out that after Officer Dibble placed K.R.T. in handcuffs
and found the marijuana in the backpack, the Officer asked him what he was
doing with the drugs, in response to which K.R.T. admitted he was selling it.
See Brief for Appellant at 16-17; see also N.T., 11/8/13, at 19-20.
- 10 -
J-S66043-14
This Court has stated as follows concerning custodial interrogations of
juveniles:
To safeguard an uncounseled individual’s Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, suspects subject to custodial
interrogation by law enforcement officers must be warned that
they have the right to remain silent, that anything they say may
be used against them in court, and that they are entitled to the
presence of an attorney. Juveniles, as well as adults, are
entitled to be apprised of their constitutional rights pursuant to
Miranda. If a person is not advised of his Miranda rights prior
to custodial interrogation by law enforcement officers, evidence
resulting from such interrogation cannot be used against him. A
person is deemed to be in custody for Miranda purposes when
[he] is physically denied of his freedom of action in any
significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably
believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by
the interrogation.
In re C.O., 84 A.3d 726, 731-32 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). “Interrogation is defined as police conduct calculated to,
expected to, or likely to evoke an admission.” Id. at 732 (citation and
brackets omitted).
In denying K.R.T.’s Motion to Suppress his inculpatory statements, the
juvenile court reasoned at the adjudicatory hearing as follows:
With respect to the statements made by [K.R.T.], it is clear
that those statements were not a part of custodial interrogation.
[O]fficer [Dibble] merely asked [K.R.T.] why he threw the bag in
question. This was not intensive questioning by the [O]fficer,
and [K.R.T.] had merely stated that it contained the drugs in
question.
N.T., 11/8/13, at 44. The juvenile court’s determination is supported by the
record, which reveals that Officer Dibble testified that K.R.T.’s admission
that he had marijuana in his backpack was spontaneous and not specifically
- 11 -
J-S66043-14
responsive to the Officer’s question as to why K.R.T. threw the backpack.
Id. at 15, 18. Moreover, Officer Dibble testified that he had asked K.R.T.
why he threw the backpack for safety purposes, not with the intent to elicit
incriminating evidence from K.R.T, and the juvenile court credited the
Officer’s testimony in this regard. Id. at 18, 23; see also Juvenile Court
Opinion, 4/10/14, at 3. Accordingly, we conclude that K.R.T.’s spontaneous
admission was voluntary, and did not occur during a custodial interrogation.
Therefore, Miranda warnings were not required, and the juvenile court
properly refused to suppress K.R.T.’s inculpatory statements.
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court properly
denied K.R.T.’s Motion to Suppress, and we therefore affirm the Dispositional
Order entered following K.R.T.’s adjudication of delinquency for PWID.
Dispositional Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/26/2014
- 12 -