Sanderman Family Trust v. Laurel Sword Co.

J-S70036-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
SANDERMAN FAMILY TRUST : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
LAUREL SWORD COMPANY AND :
PATRICK W. FORNEY :
:
APPEAL OF: PATRICK W. FORNEY : No. 1250 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 18, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County,
Civil Division at No(s): 6885 CV 2008
SANDERMAN FAMILY TRUST, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
LAUREL SWORD COMPANY AND :
PATRICK W. FORNEY, :
:
Appellees : No. 1293 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 18, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County,
Civil Division at No(s): 6885-CV-2008
BEFORE: LAZARUS, MUNDY, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED DECEMBER 02, 2014
Patrick W. Forney (Forney) and Sanderman Family Trust (SFT) cross-
appeal from a judgment entered on June 18, 2014. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the background underlying this matter as
follows.1
1
We have reorganized the trial court’s findings of facts into paragraphs.
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S70036-14
[Forney] and Laurel Sword Company [(LSC)],[2] a
Pennsylvania Limited Partnership of East Stroudsburg,
Pennsylvania, received a loan on July 1, 2006 in the amount of
$309,138 from [SFT] of Yonkers, New York, secured by a loan
agreement, mortgage and note. The loan was payable in full on
September 30, 2007, or upon the sale of the premises secured
by the mortgage, whichever first occurred. … The mortgagors
defaulted on their obligations under the financing documents
when they failed to repay the loan plus interest on September
30, 2007. [SFT] confessed judgment on the mortgage note in
[the lower] court on July 23, 2008 in the amount of
$402,497.68. …
A writ of execution issued on the judgment on February
23, 2009 and a levy was made on the mortgaged property. On
January 26, 2012, the mortgaged property was sold at sheriff’s
sale to [SFT].
On August 10, 2012, [SFT] filed a Petition for Deficiency
Judgment pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 8103, contending that the
balance owed on the mortgage note was $423,876.73 plus costs
and interest, and that the fair market value of the encumbered
property was $370,000. [Defendants] filed an answer to the
petition on July 10, 2013, contending that the fair market value
of the property was $720,000.
A [trial] was scheduled on the petition for August 21,
2013, and after a motion for continuance, was rescheduled for
October 22, 2013. At the [trial], Joseph C. Fisher was called as
[SFT’s] expert to establish the property’s fair market value.
Thomas G. McKeown was called as [Defendant’s] expert to
establish fair market value. …
Trial Court Opinion and Order, 1/3/2014,3 at 1-2.
2
We will refer to Forney and LSC collectively as “Defendants.”
3
The court’s opinion and order were entered on the docket on January 2,
2014, but were not served until January 3, 2014. We, therefore, must
consider the date of the entry of the opinion and order to be January 3,
2014. Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1).
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On January 3, 2014, the trial court entered an order fixing the fair
market value of the property at $492,968. Defendants and SFT timely filed
post-trial motions.4 The trial court denied the parties’ post-trial motions on
March 19, 2014. On April 16, 2014, Forney filed a notice of appeal, and SFT
filed a notice of appeal on April 23, 2014. On June 18, 2014, Defendants
filed a praecipe for entry of judgment, and judgment was entered that day.
Thus, the appeals are ripe for our review.
In the trial court’s opinion in support of its decision to deny the parties’
post-trial motions, the court stated that it fixed the fair market value of the
property at $492,968 based upon its credibility determinations regarding the
parties’ expert witnesses. Trial Court Opinion, 3/19/2014, at 1. A close
reading of the argument Forney presents to this Court 5 and of Defendants’
post-trial motion reveals that Forney seeks little more than a review of the
trial court’s credibility determinations and of the weight the court assigned to
the parties’ expert testimony. See, e.g., Defendants’ Post-Trial Motion,
1/13/2014, at ¶1 (“As a matter of fact and law the [c]ourt should have
relied on the appraisal of Thomas G. McKeown and determined the value at
$720,000.00.”); id. at ¶4 (“The Burden of Proof being on [SFT], the [c]ourt
erred in giving any credence to the Fisher appraisal ….”).
4
The trial to determine fair market value is heard by a judge in accordance
with Pa.R.C.P. 1038. See Pa.R.C.P. 3285.
5
In his brief to this Court, Forney presents three issues in his “Statement of
Questions Involved” but only offers one argument in support of those issues,
in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
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SFT frames its appellate issue by claiming that the fair market value
the court assigned to the property “is not supported by competent
evidence.” SFT’s Brief at 4. Yet, SFT’s “Statement of Both the Scope of
Review and Standard of Review” suggests that SFT is claiming that the
record lacks sufficient evidence to support the court’s order. See id. at 3
(“The scope of review in a deficiency judgment proceeding is limited to
assessing whether sufficient evidence exists to sustain the lower court’s
order, or whether the lower court committed a reversible error of law.”).
Then, in the Argument portion of its brief, SFT asserts that the trial court’s
findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence. See id. at 13
(“Instantly, the lower court’s findings are not consistent with the weight of
the evidence for the reasons that follow.”).
We conclude that, like Forney, SFT merely seeks this Court’s review of
the trial court’s credibility determinations and to have this Court reweigh the
evidence presented at trial. See, e.g., SFT’s Post-Trial Motion, 1/22/2014,
at ¶1 (“The [c]ourt erred in not accepting the appraisal of Joseph Fisher
….”); id. at ¶4 (“The [c]ourt erred by giving credence to the McKeown
appraisal ….”).
It is well settled that
[t]he weight to be given to expert testimony on valuation of land
is for the trier of fact. It is within the province of the trier of fact
to weigh the credibility of valuation witnesses’ testimony and to
determine the fair value of the land. Further, the Superior Court
must accept findings of the trial court with respect to credibility
of witnesses.
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Mellon Bank (East) Nat. Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Restaurant of A.B.E.,
Inc., 528 A.2d 654, 655 (Pa. Super. 1987) (citations omitted).
Because we must accept the trial court’s credibility determinations
and, absent an abuse of discretion, the weight the trial court assigned to the
experts’ testimony, the parties’ arguments to this Court warrant no relief.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/2/2014
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