Com. v. Hilliker, A.

J-A29034-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
ARTHUR HILLIKER, :
:
Appellant : No. 339 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 31, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-65-CR-0001290-2012
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., ALLEN and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED DECEMBER 9, 2014
This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence entered after the trial
court convicted Appellant of driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol or
controlled substance - general impairment (2nd offense) and DUI - high rate
of alcohol (2nd offense).1 We affirm.
On February 7, 2012, Appellant was arrested and charged with
obedience to traffic control devices, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3111(a),2 as well as the
1
75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a) and 3802(b), respectively.
2
Subsection 3111(a) provides,
Unless otherwise directed by a uniformed police officer or any
appropriately attired person authorized to direct, control or
regulate traffic, the driver of any vehicle shall obey the
instructions of any applicable official traffic-control device placed
or held in accordance with the provisions of this title, subject to
the privileges granted the driver of an emergency vehicle in this
title.
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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aforementioned DUI offenses. Appellant filed a motion to suppress. After
holding a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied it.
At Appellant’s non-jury trial, he and the Commonwealth agreed to a
stipulation of facts. The stipulation of facts established that, after Patrolman
Mark Hamilton pulled over Appellant’s vehicle on February 7, 2012,
Appellant failed a series of field sobriety tests. The stipulation of facts
further established that Appellant subsequently had his blood drawn and that
his blood alcohol content was .155%. The Commonwealth dismissed the
obedience-to-traffic-control-devices charge, and the trial court found
Appellant guilty of the DUI offenses.
After he was sentenced, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. The
trial court directed Appellant to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and
Appellant then filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. In his brief to this
Court, Appellant asks us to consider one question, namely, “Whether the
stop, search and seizure of Appellant and his vehicle based upon the officer’s
incorrect and mistaken belief that the road on which [Appellant] was
traveling was one way violates the Fourth Amendment to the United
States[’] Constitution and/or Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution?”
Appellant’s Brief at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
75 Pa.C.S. § 3111(a). The Legislature has defined “official traffic-control
devices” as “[s]igns, signals, markings and devices not inconsistent with this
title placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having
jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning or guiding traffic.” 75
Pa.C.S. § 102.
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In a case such as this where the trial court denied a
suppression motion, [an appellate court’s] standard of review is
well-established.
We may consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence and
so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of
the trial court, we are bound by those facts and may
reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are
in error. An appellate court, of course, is not bound by the
suppression court's conclusions of law.
Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 106 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
The trial court’s opinion, which we quote verbatim, summarizes the
testimony received at the suppression hearing as follows.
At approximately 9:22 p.m. on February 7, 2012, Officer
Mark Hamilton with the North Huntingdon Township Police
Department testified that he observed a Ford Windstar traveling
eastbound on the right travel lane on Route 30 where the vehicle
braked suddenly, made a wide turn and turned down onto an
one-lane Route 30 eastbound on-ramp from Norwin Towne
Square. He indicated that at the Norwin Towne Square there is
an entrance and exit ramp to this Square with a “Do Not Enter”
sign facing westbound traffic.
Officer Hamilton further testified that after making the turn
onto the on-ramp versus the off-ramp, the vehicle proceeded to
the Norwin Towne [S]quare McDonald’s drive-thru lane. The
Officer pulled up next to the [Appellant and] advised him to pull
over upon receipt of his food. He testified that he initiated the
stop due to the belief that the [Appellant] came down the wrong
way on a one-way road in violation of Obedience to Traffic
Control Devices, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.[] § 3111(a).
Officer Hamilton indicated that [Appellant] did not commit
any other Motor Vehicle violations besides failing to obey the “Do
Not Enter” sign by coming down the on-ramp. He further
indicated that he believed the property in the Norwin Towne
Square to be a privately owned parcel; however, [he] was
unaware if the roadways had been adopted or accepted by the
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Township of North Huntingdon. He testified that he had no idea
whether the township or the Towne Square placed the “Do Not
Enter” sign.
Mr. Ryan Fonzi, the Associate Planning Director of the
Planning and Zoning Department, testified that the two ramps
were not maintained by the township, nor were they accepted by
ordinance. He further indicated that he did not know who placed
the sign, but assumed the sign belonged to PennDOT. Mr. Fonzi
further stated that he did not know if the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, PennDOT, had designated these two roads as
ingresses and egresses.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/14/2014, at 2-3 (citations omitted). Based upon this
evidence, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress, concluding
that “Officer Hamilton established through his testimony that he had
reasonable suspicion that section 3111(a) of the Motor Vehicle Code was
being violated.” Id. at 6.
We begin by agreeing with the parties that the trial court erroneously
applied the reasonable suspicion standard in denying Appellant’s motion to
suppress. As this Court has explained,
[a] police officer has the authority to stop a vehicle when he or
she has reasonable suspicion that a violation of the vehicle
code has taken place, for the purpose of obtaining necessary
information to enforce the provisions of the code. However, if
the violation is such that it requires no additional investigation,
the officer must have probable cause to initiate the stop.
Put another way, if the officer has a legitimate expectation
of investigatory results, the existence of reasonable
suspicion will allow the stop—if the officer has no such
expectations of learning additional relevant information
concerning the suspected criminal activity, the stop cannot
be constitutionally permitted on the basis of mere
suspicion.
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Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citations omitted; emphasis in original).
Officer Hamilton testified that he stopped Appellant’s vehicle because
he observed Appellant enter the Norwin Towne Square by driving down the
exit ramp, which was marked by a “Do Not Enter” sign. Because further
investigation would not have helped establish whether Appellant failed to
obey the “Do Not Enter” sign, Officer Hamilton was required to have
probable cause to initiate a stop due to his belief that Appellant violated
subsection 3111(a). We, however, observe that we still may affirm the
judgment of sentence despite the trial court’s erroneous application of the
reasonable suspicion standard, as long as the record supports the result
reached by the court. Brown, 64 A.3d 1105 n.3.
Appellant argues that Officer Hamilton lacked probable cause to stop
his vehicle. According to Appellant, because he was traveling eastbound on
Route 30 and the “Do Not Enter” sign was facing vehicles traveling
westbound on Route 30, he could not have violated subsection 3111(a).
Appellant insists that he legally turned into the Norwin Towne Square
Shopping Center and that Officer Hamilton illegally stopped him. He further
maintains that the illegality of the stop is not excused by any “good faith”
belief or mistake of Officer Hamilton, as this Commonwealth does not
recognize any such “good faith” exception in the context of a probable cause
analysis.
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In reviewing the trial court’s determination, we observe the following
well-settled principles of law.
The police have probable cause where the facts and
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to
warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an
offense has been or is being committed. We evaluate probable
cause by considering all relevant facts under a totality of
circumstances analysis.
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 935 A.2d 1275, 1284 (Pa. 2007)
(quotation and citations omitted).
In short, Officer Hamilton’s testimony reveals that he knew that the
ramp Appellant utilized to access the shopping center was an exit ramp for
the center. He also was aware that the ramp was posted with a “Do Not
Enter” sign facing westbound traffic. When we consider the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that Officer Hamilton’s knowledge was sufficient
to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that Appellant
violated 75 Pa.C.S. § 3111(a) by disobeying the “Do Not Enter” sign.
Appellant’s claim that he did not have to obey the “Do Not Enter” sign
because it was facing westbound may have provided him with a defense to
the charge that he violated 75 Pa.C.S. § 3111(a). However, such a claim
does not undermine the conclusion that Officer Hamilton had probable cause
to stop Appellant. See Commonwealth v. Vincett, 806 A.2d 31 (Pa.
Super. 2002) (disagreeing with the suppression court’s conclusion that a
police officer lacked probable cause to stop Vincett for driving the wrong way
down a one-way street and holding that the court should have denied
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Vincett’s suppression motion because, although there may have been
inadequate posting of traffic signs to convict Vincett of driving the wrong
way on a one-way street, the officer knew the street was one-way and,
therefore, reasonably believed Vincett was violating the Motor Vehicle Code).
We discern no error in the trial court’s decision to deny Appellant’s
motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of
sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/9/2014
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