Commonwealth v. Thompson

J-S41043-14
2014 Pa. Super. 273
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MAURQUIS THOMPSON
Appellant No. 2313 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 21, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0002230-2012
BEFORE: BOWES, J., DONOHUE, J., and MUNDY, J.
OPINION BY MUNDY, J.: FILED DECEMBER 10, 2014
Appellant, Maurquis Thompson, appeals from the June 21, 2013
judgment of sentence of life imprisonment plus 36 to 72 months’
imprisonment imposed after a jury found him guilty of two counts each of
third-degree murder, homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence
(DUI), homicide by vehicle, accidents involving death, and accidents
involving death while not properly licensed; and one count each of fleeing or
attempting to elude a police officer, DUI (marijuana), DUI (metabolite of
marijuana), and possession of marijuana.1 After careful review, we vacate
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c), 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3735(a), 3732(a), 3742(a),
3742.1(a), 3733(a), 3802(d)(1)(i), 3802 (d)(1)(iii), and 35 P.S. § 780-
113(a)(31), respectively.
J-S41043-14
the judgment of sentence and remand for the limited purpose of correcting
the clerical error contained within the underlying judgment of sentence. In
all other respects, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history
of this case as follows.
On December 9, 2011[,] Officer Michael Fiocca,
an officer with the Folcroft police department, was on
duty and working patrol. At approximately 9:35 P.M.
Officer Fiocca observed a vehicle traveling
westbound on Chester Pike at a very high rate of
speed. Based upon his observations, Officer Fiocca
activated his emergency lights and siren and
attempted to stop the vehicle. The driver of the
vehicle, who was later identified as [Appellant],
stopped for several seconds, then fled the scene at a
very high rate of speed, entering the intersection of
Chester Pike and Glenolden Avenue, and failing to
stop at the steady red light. As he did so, the
Appellant struck two young boys that were then
crossing the street [on foot] in front of his vehicle’s
path. Appellant did not stop after striking these
boys.
Ashley Hochstuhl and David Macintosh were
stopped at the red light on Chester Pike at Glenolden
Avenue at the time of the incident. Ms. Hochstuhl
observed the boys in the crosswalk before []
Appellant entered the intersection. Ms. Hochstuhl
watched as the boys were hit by [Appellant’s]
vehicle. David Macintosh was seated in the
passenger seat of Ms. Hochstuhl’s vehicle and exited
the vehicle after he heard the collision. Mr.
Macintosh saw that one of the boys, [M.M.], was
moving, and he spoke to him until the paramedics
arrived on the scene. [M.T.] was not moving and
was pronounced dead on the scene. [M.M] was
transported to Crozer-Chester Medical Center and
died the next day.
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Within minutes of the accident, officers located
an unoccupied Chevy Lumina on Chester Pike near
Cleveland Avenue, which was approximately two to
three blocks from the scene of the hit and run.
Officers also located and stopped [] Appellant, who
was walking along West Winona Avenue, three
blocks from where the Lumina had been located.
Appellant was charged with several crimes related to
the hit and run and the resultant deaths of [M.M.]
and [M.T.]
Following a five day trial, a jury found
Appellant guilty of [the aforementioned offenses].
On May 17, 2013[,] the Commonwealth filed notice
of its intent to seek a life sentence pursuant to 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9715 for a second or subsequent
conviction of murder in the third degree.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/28/14, at 1-2 (citations to transcript and footnote
omitted).
On June 21, 2013,2 the trial court sentenced Appellant as follows.
Count 1 (third-degree murder) – 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment; Count 2
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2
Within its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court maintains that it sentenced
Appellant on either June 12 or June 14, 2013 and that the Notes of
Testimony from the sentencing hearing incorrectly state it sentenced
Appellant on June 21, 2013. Trial Court Opinion, 2/28/14, at 1 (reflecting
the June 14, 2013 date), 20 (reflecting the June 12, 2013 date). Upon
review of the record, we note the June 14, 2013 sentencing date is also
present within the docket entries. Yet, the following documents of record
portray that sentencing occurred on June 21, 2013: an April 18, 2013 notice
of sentencing hearing; a June 12, 2013 transport order, advising the
Superintendent of SCI Graterford to release Appellant to the Delaware
County sheriffs for a sentencing hearing on June 21, 2013; a handwritten
date and signature on the judgment of sentence, which was filed on June 22,
2013; and the Notes of Testimony. “Although the trial court docket is part
of the official record, when it is at variance with the certified record it
references, the certified record controls.” See Shelly Enters., Inc. v.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(third-degree murder) – mandatory term of life imprisonment to run
concurrent with Count 1; Count 3 (homicide by vehicle while DUI) – 42 to 84
months’ imprisonment to run concurrent with Count 2; Count 4 (homicide by
vehicle while DUI) – 42 to 84 months’ imprisonment to run consecutive to
Count 3; Count 5 (homicide by vehicle) – 18 to 36 months’ imprisonment to
run consecutive to Count 2; Count 6 (homicide by vehicle) – 18 to 36
months’ imprisonment to run consecutive to Count 2; Count 7 (fleeing or
attempting to elude) – 6 to 12 months’ imprisonment to run concurrent with
Count 2; Count 8 (accidents involving death) – 12 to 24 months’
imprisonment to run concurrent with Count 2; Count 9 (accidents involving
death) – 12 to 24 months’ imprisonment to run concurrent with Count 2;
Count 10 (accidents involving death when not properly licensed) – 12 to 24
months’ imprisonment to run concurrent with Count 2; Count 11 (accidents
involving death when not properly licensed) – 12 to 24 months’
imprisonment to run concurrent with Count 2; and Count 14 (possession of
marijuana) – 15 to 30 days’ imprisonment to run concurrent with Count 2.3
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
Guadagnini, 20 A.3d 491, 495 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, we conclude Appellant’s sentence was imposed on June 21,
2013 and the erroneous docket entry does not negate our jurisdiction.
3
The trial court merged Count 12 (DUI) and Count 13 (DUI) with Count 3
(homicide by vehicle while DUI) and Count 4 (homicide by vehicle while DUI)
for sentencing purposes. Trial Court Sentencing Order, 6/22/13, at 2.
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Accordingly, Appellant’s aggregate sentence is life imprisonment plus 36 to
72 months’ imprisonment.
On July 1, 2013, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which
the trial court denied on July 12, 2013. On August 7, 2013, Appellant filed a
timely notice of appeal.4
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review.
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying [a] Batson challenge, where [the]
Commonwealth’s rationale for striking [an]
African-American juror, was [a] mere pretext,
not [a] legitimate race[-]neutral explanation,
thereby prejudicing Appellant’s right to a fair
trial?
2. Whether [the] trial court abused its discretion
in denying Appellant’s motion for mistrial,
where the Commonwealth elicited testimony of
Detective [Lythgoe] on direct examination that
[a] recorded conversation of Appellant[,]
stating to his Uncle that he did not see [the]
victims at [the] time of [the] collision, was
acquired at Delaware County prison, [i.e.,
George W. Hill Correctional Facility,] in
violation of [an] explicit agreement that the
Commonwealth was not to elicit that Appellant
was incarcerated at [the] time of [the]
recording, as well as [the] general common
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4
The trial court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of
matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925. However, Appellant elected to file a Rule 1925(b)
statement on January 14, 2014. The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion
on February 28, 2014. As the trial court relied upon Appellant’s Rule
1925(b) statement when authoring its opinion, we will hold Appellant to the
issues raised within said statement. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 955
A.2d 391, 393 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).
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law prohibition against references to criminal
defendants involvement in other crimes?
[3.] Whether the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting [] Appellant’s text messages on the
day of the incident, where the Commonwealth
did not disclose or turn over the evidence prior
to trial, thereby prejudicing Appellant’s right to
a fair trial?
[4.] Whether there was insufficient evidence to
support Appellant’s convictions for two counts
of Third Degree Murder, where there was no
evidence that Appellant intentionally,
deliberately, or with malice ran over the
victims, and his conduct in fatally striking [the
victims] after [driving] through a red light,
while heavily under the influence of marijuana,
clearly constituted gross negligence, conduct
which is only actionable as Homicide by Vehicle
while [D]riving [U]nder the Influence,
Involuntary Manslaughter and/or Homicide by
Vehicle?
[5.] Whether the verdict finding Appellant guilty of
two counts of Third Degree Murder was against
the weight of the evidence, where the medical
examiners[,] who performed the autopsies of
both victims, concluded that the manner of
death for both victims was an accident, not
homicide, and Appellant, who was under the
influence of marijuana, clearly did not act with
malice, where he did not see either victim at
the time of the collision and was unaware that
he had struck anyone, [either] coincident with
the accident or its aftermath?
[6.] Whether the term of Life [Imprisonment]
imposed by the trial court, pursuant to the
Mandatory Life Imprisonment provision, under
42 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 9715, for Appellant’s [second]
conviction for Third Degree Murder, arising
from a single fatal automobile accident,
involving two [victims], is an illegal sentence,
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where the General Assembly clearly did not
inten[d] such an absurd and unreasonable
disposition?
[7.] Whether the term of Life [Imprisonment]
imposed by the trial court, pursuant to the
Mandatory Life Imprisonment Provision, under
42 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 9715, for Appellant’s second
conviction for Third Degree Murder, constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment, under the
Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania [] Constitution, and is therefore,
illegal?
[8.] Whether the trial court abused its discretion in
[imposing] a manifestly excessive sentence,
which violates the fundamental norms of
sentencing established in 42 Pa.C.S.A.
[§] 9721(b), where the court’s decision to
sentence to an excessive level[,] in light of the
criminal conduct at issue in the case, [caused]
the sentence [to] far exceed[] what is
necessary to protect the public or provide for
Appellant’s rehabilitative needs?
Appellant’s Brief at 10-12.5
Initially, Appellant maintains the trial court abused its discretion when
it denied his Batson6 challenge during voir dire. Id. at 26-33. Specifically,
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5
For ease of our disposition, we have elected to renumber Appellant’s
issues.
6
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause forbids a prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on
account of their race).
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Appellant, who is African American7, objected to the Commonwealth’s use of
a peremptory challenge to exclude an African American woman from the
jury, i.e., Juror 82.8 N.T., 4/5/13, at 231-234.
We review a trial court’s denial of a Batson claim for clear error.
Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 A.2d 594, 603 (Pa. 2008) (stating that the
trial court’s decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent
represents a finding of fact that is accorded great deference on appeal and
will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous).
Batson and its progeny established a three-part inquiry for evaluating
a claim of racial discrimination in jury selection.
[T]he [movant] has to initially establish a prima facie
showing that the circumstances give rise to an
inference that the [opposing party] struck one or
more prospective jurors on account of race. If the
prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the
[opposing party] to articulate a race-neutral
explanation for striking the juror(s) at issue. The
trial court ultimately makes a determination of
whether the [movant] has carried [the] burden of
proving purposeful discrimination.
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 44 (Pa. 2011), cert. denied,
Sanchez v. Pennsylvania, 133 S. Ct. 122 (2012).
The requirements for a prima facie Batson showing are well settled.
Generally, in order … to satisfy the first
____________________________________________
7
See Criminal Complaint, 12/10/11.
8
We note Appellant did not move for a mistrial when asserting this
challenge. See N.T., 4/5/13, at 231-234.
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requirement of demonstrating a prima facie Batson
claim, [the movant] must establish that [he or she]
is a member of a cognizable racial group, that the
[opposing party] exercised peremptory challenges to
remove from the venire members of [his or her]
race, and that other relevant circumstances combine
to raise an inference that the [opposing party]
removed the jurors for racial reasons. Whether the
[movant] has carried this threshold burden of
establishing a prima facie case should be determined
in light of all the relevant circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Ligons, 971 A.2d 1125, 1142 (Pa. 2009).
A showing that a number of strikes were used against venirepersons of
one race will not, without more, create the inference necessary to establish a
prima facie Batson claim. See Commonwealth v. Saunders, 946 A.2d
776, 783 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating, “the striking of a number of individuals
belonging to some cognizable minority group… is not dispositive that a
violation of Batson has occurred[]”), appeal denied, 958 A.2d 1047 (Pa.
2008). Rather, our Supreme Court has continually recognized that a moving
party must preserve a “full and complete record of the asserted [Batson]
violation, as it would otherwise be impossible to conduct meaningful
appellate review of the motivations of prosecutors in individual cases
[without such a record.]” Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 861 A.2d 898, 909
(Pa. 2004) (citation omitted), cert. denied, Fletcher v. Pennsylvania, 547
U.S. 1041 (2006). “This full and complete record requirement necessitates
that the movant make a record identifying the race of venirepersons stricken
by the Commonwealth, the race of prospective jurors acceptable to the
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Commonwealth but stricken by the defense, and the racial composition of
the final jury.” Id. at 910 (citation, footnote, and internal quotation marks
omitted). When a movant fails to make such a record, we cannot review the
trial court’s determination that a movant failed to establish a prima facie
case under Batson. Id. at 909-910, citing Commonwealth v. Holloway,
739 A.2d 1039 (Pa. 1999).
Herein, Appellant raised his Batson claim after the Commonwealth
exercised its ninth peremptory challenge as to Juror 82. N.T., 4/5/13, at
231-234. At that point, Appellant made a record identifying only the race of
Juror 82; Appellant failed to state the race of any other venirepersons. See
id.9 Likewise, Appellant neglected to identify on the record the racial
composition of the final jury. Id. at 239-241. Because Appellant failed to
make the requisite full and complete record to facilitate appellate review, we
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9
The following exchange occurred when Appellant asserted his Batson
challenge.
THE COURT: … are there any other African-
Americans on the panel?
[PROSECUTOR]: Quite frankly, Your Honor, I don’t
know. It’s…
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He didn’t strike no [sic] other
African-Americans that I know of.
N.T., 4/5/13, at 233.
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cannot address this claim. See Fletcher, supra; Holloway, supra. Thus,
Appellant is entitled to no relief on his Batson claim.10
Appellant next asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion for mistrial following the testimony of Detective Lythgoe
that implied Appellant was incarcerated prior to trial. Appellant’s Brief at 34-
46. Appellant avers Detective Lythgoe’s reference to the George W. Hill
Correctional Facility in Delaware County “raised the spectre of [Appellant’s]
involvement in another criminal activity[ and subsequent incarceration].”
Id. at 43.
The standard of review we apply when addressing a motion for mistrial
is well settled.
In criminal trials, the declaration of a mistrial
serves to eliminate the negative effect wrought upon
a defendant when prejudicial elements are injected
into the case or otherwise discovered at trial. By
nullifying the tainted process of the former trial and
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10
Assuming, arguendo, Appellant established a prima facie Batson claim,
we would ultimately deem his challenge meritless. At a sidebar conference
during voir dire, the Commonwealth explained that it struck Juror 82 based
upon her employment as a drug and alcohol caseworker. N.T., 4/5/13, at
232. The Commonwealth was worried that Juror 82 would sympathize with
Appellant, who was alleged to be under the influence of a controlled
substance at the time of the incident. Id. at 234. Upon considering this
reasoning, the trial court denied Appellant’s Batson challenge, concluding
that the Commonwealth provided a “legitimate non[-]racial reason for
striking [the] juror.” N.T., 4/5/13, at 234; Trial Court Opinion, 2/28/14, at
23-24. The trial court concluded Appellant did not establish the
Commonwealth’s “purposeful discrimination” when striking Juror 82. See
Trial Court Opinion, 2/28/14, at 24 n.7. We conclude this finding is not
clearly erroneous. See Cook, supra.
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allowing a new trial to convene, declaration of a
mistrial serves not only the defendant’s interests
but, equally important, the public’s interest in fair
trials designed to end in just judgments.
Accordingly, the trial court is vested with discretion
to grant a mistrial whenever the alleged prejudicial
event may reasonably be said to deprive the
defendant of a fair and impartial trial. In making its
determination, the court must discern whether
misconduct or prejudicial error actually occurred, and
if so, … assess the degree of any resulting prejudice.
Our review of the resulting order is constrained to
determining whether the court abused its discretion.
Commonwealth v. Hogentogler, 53 A.3d 866, 877-878 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citation omitted), appeal denied, 69 A.3d 600 (Pa. 2013).
It is also well established that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts may not be presented during trial against a criminal defendant as either
character or proclivity evidence. Pa.R.E. 404(b); Commonwealth v.
Padilla, 923 A.2d 1189, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 934 A.2d
1277 (Pa. 2007).
However, mere passing references to prior criminal
activity will not necessarily require reversal unless
the record illustrates definitively that prejudice
results. Prejudice results where the testimony
conveys to the jury, either expressly or by
reasonable implication, the fact of another criminal
offense. Determining whether prejudice has
occurred is a fact specific inquiry.
Padilla, supra at 1194-1195 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “If
evidence of prior criminal activity is inadvertently presented to the jury, the
trial court may cure the improper prejudice with an appropriate cautionary
instruction to the jury.” Commonwealth v. Hudson, 955 A.2d 1031, 1034
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(Pa. Super. 2008), appeal denied, 964 A.2d 1 (Pa. 2009). It is imperative
for the trial court’s instruction to be “clear and specific, and must instruct
the jury to disregard the improper evidence.” Id.
In the case sub judice, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of
Detective Lythgoe, the lead investigator in the underlying case. N.T.,
4/9/13, at 196-229. The portion of Detective Lythgoe’s testimony at issue
concerns a statement that he made following the playing of a taped
telephone conversation. Id. at 203. Prior to trial, the parties stipulated to
admit this telephone conversation, which was recorded while Appellant was
incarcerated. N.T., 4/5/13, at 20-25. Also at that time, the Commonwealth
agreed that its witness would not reference from where it procured the
recording. Id. However, following the playing of this recording for the jury,
Detective Lythgoe testified as follows.
[PROSECUTOR]: Detective, as the lead detective in
this case, what other duties d[id] you perform?
[DETECTIVE]: I had prepared several search
warrants. I had to prepare correspondence to the
George W. Hill Correctional Facility to get those
recordings.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Objection.
Objection.
N.T., 4/9/13, at 203. Appellant subsequently requested a mistrial, which the
trial court denied on the basis that the prosecution did not elicit the
testimony either purposefully or intentionally. Id. at 203, 213, 219. The
trial court further reasoned that Detective Lythgoe did not explicitly state
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that Appellant was incarcerated; rather, the detective stated that he had to
go to the prison to retrieve the tape recordings. Id. at 218, referencing
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-513 (1976) (concluding, “the State
cannot… compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in
identifiable prison clothes”); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 838 A.2d 663,
681 (Pa. 2002) (concluding, “the reference to Johnson’s incarcerated status
was passing, and not the type of ‘constant reminder’ proscribed by
Estelle[]”), cert. denied, Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 543 U.S. 1008 (2004).
Yet, the trial court proposed to provide the jury with a cautionary instruction
regarding this reference to the prison. N.T., 4/9/13, at 216. Appellant twice
rejected this offered instruction. Id. at 217, 219.
Upon review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when denying Appellant’s mistrial request. See Hogentogler,
supra. We agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth inadvertently
presented this testimony to the jury. In order to cure this inadvertent
disclosure, the trial court offered to administer a cautionary instruction,
which Appellant denied, twice. N.T., 4/9/13, at 216-217, 219. Appellant
cannot now chastise the trial court for not providing him with a cautionary
instruction regarding this slip-of-tongue. Appellant’s Brief at 43, 45. As the
record does not definitively illustrate that Appellant incurred prejudice from
Detective Lythgoe’s comment, Appellant’s second claim fails. See Padilla,
supra.
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Appellant’s third claim pertains to the admission of evidence.
Appellant’s Brief at 70-73. Appellant asserts the trial court abused its
discretion when it admitted a text message procured from his cell phone
because the Commonwealth did not provide the text message to him prior to
trial. Id. at 70-71. Appellant requests a new trial. Id. at 72.
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence, our
standard of review is one of deference. Commonwealth v. Selenski, 18
A.3d 1229, 1232 (Pa. Super. 2011). Questions concerning the admissibility
of evidence are within “the sound discretion of the trial court, and its
discretion will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Id.
(citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the
exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias,
prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.”
Commonwealth v. Harris, 884 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 928 A.2d 1289 (Pa.
2007). Furthermore, “if in reaching a conclusion the trial court over-rides
[sic] or misapplies the law, discretion is then abused and it is the duty of the
appellate court to correct the error.” Commonwealth v. Weakley, 972
A.2d 1182, 1188 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 986
A.2d 150 (Pa. 2009).
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Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573 outlines pretrial discovery
procedures and provides, in pertinent part, as follows.
Rule 573. Pretrial Discovery and Inspection
…
(B) Disclosure by the Commonwealth.
(1) Mandatory. In all court cases, on request by
the defendant, and subject to any protective order
which the Commonwealth might obtain under this
rule, the Commonwealth shall disclose to the
defendant’s attorney all of the following requested
items or information, provided they are material to
the instant case. The Commonwealth shall, when
applicable, permit the defendant’s attorney to
inspect and copy or photograph such items.
…
(g) [T]he transcripts and recordings of any
electronic surveillance, and the authority by which
the said transcripts and recordings were obtained.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1). “On the issue of whether or not disclosure
occurred, the trial court functions as fact-finder, and the appellate courts
generally do not substitute their judgments for those of a fact-finder in
matters of credibility.” Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 907 A.2d 477, 491
(Pa. 2006), cert. denied, Sanchez v. Pennsylvania, 551 U.S. 1106 (2007).
During the instant trial, the Commonwealth presented text messages
exchanged between Appellant and his girlfriend, Angela Potter, on the night
of the incident, through the testimony of an expert in mobile forensics. N.T.,
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4/10/13, at 12-42. At the beginning of this expert’s testimony, the following
discussion occurred at side bar.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I have not
received these documents…
[PROSECUTOR]: These documents were all
contained on the same disks that were provided and
put on the record yesterday by [Attorney] Williams[,
Appellant’s prior counsel]. They were all part of the
same group of things that were there, one of them
being the disk from the FBI[ containing these text
messages].
THE COURT: What can I say, [defense counsel]?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All right.
THE COURT: Good enough.
Id. at 20-21.
Within its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court maintains this issue is
without merit because “[Appellant] did not object to any evidence regarding
the content of text messages recovered from Appellant’s phone on the basis
that they had not been turned over by the Commonwealth prior to trial.”
Trial Court Opinion, 2/28/14, at 25. Although we disagree with the trial
court that Appellant neglected to object to the text message at issue, we
agree with the court’s conclusion that this issue lacks merit. See In re T.P.,
78 A.3d 1166, 1170 (Pa. Super. 2013) (providing, “it is a well-settled
doctrine in this Commonwealth that a trial court can be affirmed on any valid
basis appearing of record[]”), appeal denied, 93 A.3d 463 (Pa. 2014).
During trial, Appellant did not contest the Commonwealth’s assertion that it
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had provided these text messages to him prior to trial, and the trial court
concluded disclosure occurred.11 N.T., 4/10/13, at 20-21. It is axiomatic
that “[a] party may not remain silent and afterwards complain of matters
which, if erroneous, the court would have corrected.” Commonwealth v.
Strunk, 953 A.2d 577, 579 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, we refuse to
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court and find an abuse of
discretion occurred. See Selenski, supra. This issue lacks merit.
Appellant next questions the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his
third-degree murder convictions. Appellant’s Brief at 50-55. Specifically,
Appellant challenges the evidence underlying his mens rea.
In the case sub judice, there was no evidence that
[Appellant] intentionally ran over [M.T.] and [M.M.],
where he did not even see them, immediately
preceding, during or shortly after the accident,
because his perception was wholly compromised by
marijuana intoxication. However, tragically
Appellant did intentionally drive into the intersection,
because he falsely perceived due to his marijuana
intoxication that the light was changing from yellow
to red, when it was plainly red, and that the
intersection was clear of pedestrians.
Id. at 51 (emphasis omitted), citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d
778, 785 (Pa. Super. 1998) (en banc), appeal denied, 739 A.2d 1056 (Pa.
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11
At that point in the trial, Attorney Williams, Appellant’s prior counsel, had
told the trial court that the Commonwealth provided him with compact disks
(CDs) during discovery. N.T., 4/9/13, at 92-96. Following this assertion,
Appellant’s trial counsel stated to the trial court that Attorney Williams
turned over these CDs to him. Id. at 95. Trial counsel further revealed that
the CDs that he chose to review contained only photographs and videos. Id.
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1999). Appellant asserts his actions constituted gross negligence, not
maliciousness. Id., citing Commonwealth v. Matroni, 923 A.2d 444 (Pa.
Super. 2007), appeal denied, 952 A.2d 675 (Pa. 2008). Accordingly,
Appellant requests this Court vacate his murder convictions. Id. at 55.
Our standard of review is well settled.
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence
admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable
the fact-finder to find every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above
test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we
note that the facts and circumstances established by
the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder
unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly
circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying
the above test, the entire record must be evaluated
and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the trier of fact[,] while passing
upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of
the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or
none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Caban, 60 A.3d 120, 132-133 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(emphasis added), appeal denied, 79 A.3d 1097 (Pa. 2013), quoting
Commonwealth v. Quel, 27 A.3d 1033, 1037-1038 (Pa. Super. 2011).
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It is rare, but not impossible, for a death caused by a motor vehicle
accident to give rise to a third-degree murder conviction. Commonwealth
v. Pigg, 571 A.2d 438, 442 (Pa. Super. 1990), appeal denied, 581 A.2d 571
(Pa. 1990); see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215,
1219 (Pa. Super. 2011); Commonwealth v. Levin, 816 A.2d 1151, 1153
(Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 839 A.2d 351 (Pa. 2003). Pursuant to the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code, “[a] person is guilty of criminal homicide if he
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of
another human being.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(a). “Criminal homicide [is]
classified as murder, voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter.”
Id. § 2501(b). Murder is defined, in relevant part, as follows.
§ 2502. Murder
(a) Murder of the first degree. --A criminal
homicide constitutes murder of the first degree when
it is committed by an intentional killing.
(b) Murder of the second degree. --A criminal
homicide constitutes murder of the second degree
when it is committed while defendant was engaged
as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of
a felony.
(c) Murder of the third degree. --All other kinds of
murder shall be murder of the third degree. Murder
of the third degree is a felony of the first degree.
…
Id. § 2502. Accordingly, “[t]hird[-]degree murder occurs when a person
commits a killing which is neither intentional nor committed during the
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perpetration of a felony, but contains the requisite malice.”
Commonwealth v. Truong, 36 A.3d 592, 597 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc)
(citation omitted), appeal denied, 57 A.3d 70 (Pa. 2012).
Malice is defined as: wickedness of disposition,
hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of
consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty,
although a particular person may not be intended to
be injured[.] Malice may be found where the
defendant consciously disregarded an unjustified and
extremely high risk that his actions might cause
serious bodily injury. Malice may be inferred by
considering the totality of the circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2011);
accord Truong, supra at 597-598. “[F]leeing the scene may be considered
in determining if an individual acted with malice.” Dunphy, supra at 1220
n.3 (citations omitted).
Herein, the trial court opines that the Commonwealth presented
sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s third-degree murder convictions.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/28/14, at 13. Specifically, the trial court reasons,
“[t]he evidence at trial clearly established that Appellant consciously
disregarded an extremely high risk that his actions – actions which included
driving while under the influence of marijuana at a high rate of speed
through a steady red light without stopping to see if anyone or anything was
in his lane of travel – might cause death or serious bodily injury.” Id.
Viewing the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, as the verdict winner, we conclude there was sufficient
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evidence to enable the trial court to sustain Appellant’s convictions for third-
degree murder. At the time of this incident, Appellant was driving at a high
rate of speed (55-61 miles per hour in a 30-40 miles per hour zone), while
under the influence of marijuana, in an attempt to flee from Officer Fiocca’s
pursuit. Trial Court Opinion, 2/28/14, at 8-11; N.T., 4/11/13, at 192.
Appellant fled Officer Fiocca’s initial traffic stop at a high rate of speed and
proceeded through a steady red light, fatally striking two young pedestrians.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/28/14, at 8-11. Upon being struck, M.M. and M.T.
were propelled from 50 to 100 feet. N.T., 4/8/13, at 112, 137. Instead of
stopping at the scene of the accident, Appellant fled, abandoned the vehicle
involved in the accident, and hid from police. Trial Court Opinion, 2/28/14,
at 8-11. There were no adverse weather conditions during this time that
impeded Appellant’s sight or precluded him from stopping after the accident.
N.T., 4/8/13, at 57-58. These actions demonstrate a complete disregard of
the unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions would cause death or
serious bodily injury. Accordingly, we conclude the Commonwealth
presented sufficient evidence to prove that Appellant acted with the requisite
malice to support his third-degree murder convictions. See Dunphy, supra
at 1219-1220 (evidence sufficient to prove malice based upon the following
factors: intoxicated condition of driver; excessive rate of speed (60 miles per
hour in a 35 miles per hour zone); driver’s awareness of pedestrians in the
area; driver’s admission that he speeded up to make the light although he
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saw pedestrians in front of him; distance victim’s body was propelled;
absence of any physical or climate condition that would contribute to the
accident or the driver’s failure to stop immediately after; and the driver’s
flight after hitting the victim); Levin, supra (evidence sufficient to prove
malice when driver acknowledged: smoking marijuana and drinking a large
quantity of alcohol in early afternoon; knowing this combination caused him
to “black[] out[;]” and then driving down a busy residential street in the late
afternoon); Pigg, supra at 442-443 (evidence sufficient to prove malice of
intoxicated driver of eighteen-wheeled tractor trailer where: he forced
multiple other drivers off of the road prior to the fatal accident; a fellow
driver pleaded with him to stop driving prior to the fatal accident; and there
were no weather or traffic conditions that required him to continue driving).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err, and Appellant is not entitled relief on
this issue.
Appellant next challenges the weight of the evidence supporting his
third-degree murder convictions. Appellant’s Brief at 46-49; Appellant’s
Post-Sentence Motion, 7/1/13, at 4.12 Within Appellant’s brief, he essentially
reiterates his sufficiency argument, asserting “[he] did not consciously
disregard an unjustified and extremely high risk, where he never saw the
[victims] at any time immediately preceding, during, or immediately
____________________________________________
12
Appellant’s motion does not contain pagination. We have assigned each
page a sequential page number for ease of reference.
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following the collision, and his marijuana intoxication impaired his judgment
and perception to the extent that he was not aware of any risk when he
fatefully drove his vehicle into the intersection.” Appellant’s Brief at 48.
Within his question presented, Appellant also alleges the medical examiners’
testimony contradicts the jury’s convictions. Id. at 46.
This Court has long recognized that “[a] true weight of the evidence
challenge concedes that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the verdict but
questions which evidence is to be believed.” Commonwealth v. Lewis,
911 A.2d 558, 566 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). Where the trial
court has ruled on a weight claim, an appellate court’s role is not to consider
the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. Commonwealth v. Tharp, 830 A.2d 519, 528 (Pa. 2003), cert.
denied, Tharp v. Pennsylvania, 541 U.S. 1045 (2004). Rather, “[our]
review is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in
ruling on the weight claim.” Id.
It is well established that this Court is precluded from reweighing the
evidence and substituting our credibility determination for that of the fact-
finder. See Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003)
(citations omitted) (stating, “[t]he weight of the evidence is exclusively for
the finder of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and
to determine the credibility of the witnesses[]”), cert. denied, Champney v.
Pennsylvania, 542 U.S. 939 (2004). “[T]he evidence at trial need not
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preclude every possibility of innocence, and the fact-finder is free to resolve
any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn
from the combined circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Emler, 903 A.2d
1273, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2006).
A new trial should be awarded when the jury’s
verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock
one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is
imperative so that right may be given another
opportunity to prevail. In this regard, [t]he evidence
must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the
verdict shocks the conscience of the court.
Commonwealth v. Ross, 856 A.2d 93, 99 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, Ross v. Pennsylvania, 547
U.S. 1045 (2006).
The trial court found no merit to Appellant’s weight claim, stating as
follows.
It is clear the jury found the requisite malice
for third[-]degree murder despite the doctors’
testimony that the manner of death was, in their
respective professional opinions, an accident.
Respectfully, their verdict did not shock one’s sense
of justice as to require a new trial. It is not for th[e
trial c]ourt to substitute its own judgment for that of
the jury in Appellant’s case.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/28/14, at 5-7.
In finding Appellant guilty, the jury clearly believed the
Commonwealth’s evidence offered to establish Appellant’s mens rea. Upon
our review of the medical examiners’ testimony, these experts testified that
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they deemed the victims’ deaths as accidents from solely a medical-
community prospective. N.T., 4/11/13, at 51, 55-56, 190-191. It was for
the jury to decide whether these deaths were caused by Appellant’s
“conscious[] disregard[ of] an unjustified and extremely high risk that his
actions might cause serious bodily injury[,]” for third-degree murder.
Dunphy, supra. Because the evidence regarding Appellant’s malice was
not “tenuous, vague and uncertain[,]” the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion for a new trial. See
Ross, supra. Thus, Appellant’s weight claim is without merit.
Appellant’s remaining three issues challenge the sentence imposed by
the trial court. See Appellant’s Brief at 11-12. Within his sixth issue,
Appellant challenges the legality of his Section 9715 mandatory life
sentence. Id. at 56-59. Appellant asserts his sentence is illegal and should
be vacated for the following reasons.
[S]ubjecting Appellant, who had no history of
violent or criminal contacts at the time of the
incident in the case sub judice, to a Life Sentence,
for causing two deaths in a single accident, is an
absurd, unreasonable outcome, which was in no way
intended by the Legislature, in fashioning the
mandatory life provision of Section 9715. Such an
outcome is in no way consistent with protecting the
public or meeting Appellant’s rehabilitative needs,
but is solely punitive. The Legislature clearly wanted
to deter would[-]be serial killers from engaging in
separate and multiple murders, not potentially
subject persons with no criminal background to life
without parole, for a single horrific event.
Id. at 59 (emphasis omitted).
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Our standard and scope of review for such a challenge is well settled.
If no statutory authorization exists for a particular
sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to
correction. An illegal sentence must be vacated. In
evaluating a trial court’s application of a statute, our
standard of review is plenary and is limited to
determining whether the trial court committed an
error of law.
Commonwealth v. Morris, 958 A.2d 569, 577-578 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en
banc) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 991
A.2d 311 (Pa. 2010); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(a).
In the case sub judice, the trial court imposed a mandatory sentence
of life imprisonment for his second conviction of third-degree murder
pursuant to Section 9715 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 101-9913.
Trial Court Sentencing Order, 6/22/13, at 1. Section 9715 states, in
pertinent part, as follows.
§ 9715. Life imprisonment for homicide.
(a) Mandatory life imprisonment. --
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 9712
(relating to sentences for offenses committed with
firearms), 9713 (relating to sentences for offenses
committed on public transportation) or 9714
(relating to sentences for second and subsequent
offenses), any person convicted of murder of the
third degree in this Commonwealth who has
previously been convicted at any time of murder or
voluntary manslaughter in this Commonwealth or of
the same or substantially equivalent crime in any
other jurisdiction shall be sentenced to life
imprisonment, notwithstanding any other provision
of this title or other statute to the contrary.
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(b) Proof at sentencing. --Provisions of this section
shall not be an element of the crime and notice
thereof to the defendant shall not be required prior
to conviction, but reasonable notice of the
Commonwealth’s intention to proceed under this
section shall be provided after conviction and before
sentencing. The applicability of this section shall be
determined at sentencing. The sentencing court,
prior to imposing sentence on an offender under
subsection (a), shall have a complete record of the
previous convictions of the offender, copies of which
shall be furnished to the offender. If the offender or
the attorney for the Commonwealth contests the
accuracy of the record, the court shall schedule a
hearing and direct the offender and the attorney for
the Commonwealth to submit evidence regarding the
previous convictions of the offender. The court shall
then determine, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the previous convictions of the offender and, if this
section is applicable, shall impose sentence in
accordance with this section. Should a previous
conviction be vacated and an acquittal or final
discharge entered subsequent to imposition of
sentence under this section, the offender shall have
the right to petition the sentencing court for
reconsideration of sentence if this section would not
have been applicable except for the conviction which
was vacated.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9715 (emphasis added).
This Court has previously been called upon to interpret Section 9715.
In Commonwealth v. Smith, 710 A.2d 1179 (Pa. Super. 1998), the
defendant was convicted of two counts of third-degree murder, among other
charges, arising from a single incident. Id. at 1180. This Court held that,
because Smith was found guilty by the jury for two counts of third-degree
murder at the same time, “it strain[ed] the plain meaning of the statute to
interpret ‘previously convicted’ to encompass this situation.” Id. at 1181.
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We compared Section 9715 to the death penalty statute, noting that the text
in the death penalty statute included the phrase “the defendant has been
convicted of another [offense] committed either before or at the time of
the offense at issue.” Id. (emphasis in original), quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9711(d)(10), 9711(d)(11), 9711(d)(12). Based on these considerations,
the Smith Court concluded the trial court did not err in refusing to apply
Section 9715.
Subsequently, in Morris, we were confronted with an issue similar to
that presented by Appellant, to wit, “whether the trial court may sentence a
criminal defendant to life in prison under [S]ection 9715 where the two
murders were tried and sentenced together under a multiple-count criminal
complaint.” Morris, supra at 578. Following our review of the “explicitly
and unambiguously written[]” statute, we opined that the phrase “‘[a]t any
time’ … clearly means that the order of commission, or conviction, of the
offenses requiring a life sentence is immaterial so long as, at [the] time of
sentencing on a third-degree murder conviction, a defendant has been
convicted on another charge of murder or voluntary manslaughter.” Id. at
579. We further reasoned that the legislature would have included that
language within the statute if it intended for the defendant’s previous
conviction to antedate the commission of the second offense. Id. at 580.
The Morris Court explicitly overruled Smith, concluding Smith was wrongly
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decided because the Smith panel had “essentially read new requirements
into the statutory language.” Id. at 581.
Section 9715 specifically focuses upon whether, at
the time of sentencing, a defendant has been
previously convicted “at any time.” The statute does
not state that the two murders must be tried and
sentenced separately. Indeed, the plain language of
the statute requires that the trial court determine
whether a previous conviction exists at the time of
sentencing, without giving consideration to when the
conviction occurred. Further, the statute does not
make any distinction between convictions that arise
from a single criminal episode and multiple criminal
episodes. We are bound by the unambiguous
language of this statute and we cannot insert
additional requirements that the legislature has not
included. Accordingly, because the Smith Court’s
decision read requirements into the statute that
plainly do not appear, we conclude that its reasoning
is flawed and that the decision must be overruled.
Id. Thus, the Morris Court concluded “the trial court did not commit legal
error in imposing the sentence of life in prison because the plain language of
the statute specifies that the timing of the primary conviction is not relevant
as long as the defendant has been convicted of the initial murder or
manslaughter at the time of sentencing on the second murder.” Id. at 579.
Similarly, the trial court in this matter sentenced Appellant to a
mandatory term of life imprisonment for his second conviction of third-
degree murder. Trial Court Sentencing Order, 6/22/13, at 1.13 At the time
____________________________________________
13
The trial court’s sentencing order does not contain pagination. We have
assigned each page a sequential page number for ease of reference.
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of Appellant’s sentencing, Appellant had been convicted of two counts of
third-degree murder. Verdict Slip, 4/12/13, at 1. The trial court imposed a
sentence of 20-40 years’ incarceration on Appellant’s first third-degree
murder conviction. Trial Court Sentencing Order, 6/22/13, at 1. The trial
court then sentenced Appellant to a mandatory term of life imprisonment for
his second conviction of third-degree murder. Id. As Section 9715 provides
that the sentence of life imprisonment “shall be” imposed for a second third-
degree murder conviction, the trial court is divested of any discretion in
fashioning Appellant’s sentence. See Commonwealth v. Gonzales, 609
A.2d 1368, 1373 (Pa. Super. 1992) (stating that a sentence of life
imprisonment is required for a second murder or manslaughter conviction
pursuant to Section 9715). Accordingly, the trial court did not commit an
error of law when sentencing Appellant to life imprisonment, and Appellant’s
legality claim is meritless. See Morris, supra at 577-578.
Appellant next asserts his Section 9715 mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section
13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Appellant’s Brief at 61-64. Specifically,
Appellant contends that the application of the mandatory minimum sentence
in his case resulted in a sentence that was grossly disproportionate to the
conduct underlying his two third-degree murder convictions. Id. at 63.
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While we have addressed the constitutionality of other statutes that
prescribe mandatory minimum sentences, pursuant to the Eighth
Amendment and Article 1, Section 13, Appellant’s challenge to Section 9715
is an issue of first impression.14 See Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 A.3d 254
(Pa. Super. 2013) (upholding the constitutionality of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718(a),
which requires the imposition of certain mandatory minimum sentences to
offenders whose victims are less than 16-years-old), appeal denied, --- A.3d
____________________________________________
14
The Commonwealth’s assertion that we recently addressed the
constitutionality of Section 9715 against Eighth Amendment and Article 1,
Section 13 challenges is mistaken. Commonwealth’s Brief at 46, citing
Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2014). In Lawson, a
post-conviction relief petitioner contended his Section 9715 sentence of life
imprisonment violated the federal and state prohibitions against cruel and
unusual punishment because one of the predicate offenses upon which his
sentence was based was committed by him while he was a juvenile, to wit, a
third-degree murder conviction he committed when he was 17-years-old.
Lawson, supra at 3. As Lawson’s underlying sentence became final on or
about September 30, 1993, his Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition
was facially untimely. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) (providing all PCRA
petitions should be filed within one year of the date the judgment of
sentence becomes final). Lawson asserted a timeliness exception applied to
his petition based upon the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (holding “mandatory life-
without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment[]”).
Lawson, supra at 3, citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii) (timeliness
exception for constitutional rights recognized by the Supreme Court of the
United States that have been held to apply retroactively). Upon review of
Lawson’s claim, we concluded that we lacked jurisdiction over his petition.
Lawson, supra at 6, citing Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1
(Pa. 2013) (holding Miller does not apply retroactively to an inmate,
convicted as a juvenile, who is serving a life sentence without the possibility
of parole, and who has exhausted his direct appeal rights and is proceeding
under the PCRA). Accordingly, we affirmed the PCRA court’s dismissal of
Lawson’s petition and did not reach the merits of his constitutional claim.
Lawson, supra at 8.
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---, 2014 Pa. LEXIS 1609 (Pa. 2014); Commonwealth v. Baker, 78 A.3d
1044 (Pa. 2013) (upholding the constitutionality of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718.2,
which requires the imposition of certain mandatory minimum sentences for
sexual offenders); Commonwealth v. Spells, 612 A.2d 458 (Pa. Super.
1992) (en banc) (upholding the constitutionality of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712,
which requires the imposition of a five-year mandatory minimum sentence
to offenders who visibly display a firearm during the commission of certain
felonies), appeal dismissed, 643 A.2d 1078 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v.
Parker, 718 A.2d 1266 (Pa. Super. 1998) (upholding the constitutionality of
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714, which requires mandatory minimum sentences for
recidivists of certain offenses), appeal denied, 747 A.2d 899 (Pa. 1999).
As the constitutionality of a statute presents a pure question of law,
our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.
Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 759 (Pa. 2013). “We note that
duly enacted legislation carries with it a strong presumption of
constitutionality.” Id. (citation omitted). “A presumption exists ‘[t]hat the
General Assembly does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United
States or of this Commonwealth’ when promulgating legislation.” Baker,
supra at 1050, quoting 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(3).
Thus, a statute will not be found unconstitutional
unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the
Constitution. If there is any doubt as to whether a
challenger has met this high burden, then we will
resolve that doubt in favor of the statute’s
constitutionality.
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Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 611 (Pa. 2013) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Herein, Appellant contests the constitutionality of Section 9715 as to
both the federal and state constitutions. Appellant’s Brief at 61-64. It is
well-settled that “the guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment
contained in the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article 1, Section 13, provides no
broader protections against cruel and unusual punishment than those
extended under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
Spells, supra at 461; accord Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 454 A.2d
937, 967 (Pa. 1982), cert. denied, Zettlemoyer v. Pennsylvania, 461 U.S.
970 (1983); Elia, supra at 267. As these constitutional provisions are
coterminous, we need only engage in an Eighth Amendment review. See
Parker, supra at 1268.
The Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution states, “[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. viii. The Eighth
Amendment is unique in constitutional jurisprudence because it “draw[s] its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1956) (plurality).
“[T]he Eighth Amendment’s protection against excessive or cruel and
unusual punishments flows from the basic ‘precept of justice that
punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the]
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offense.’” Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008), quoting
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). “By protecting even
those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty
of the government to respect the dignity of all persons.” Hall v. Florida,
134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (citation omitted).
When attacking the constitutionality of a statute, an appellant can
raise two types of challenges: facial and as-applied. Commonwealth v.
Barnett, 50 A.3d 176, 198 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 63 A.3d 772
(Pa. 2013). Appellant attempts to assert both forms in this appeal.
Appellant’s Brief at 61-64. We recently articulated the standard for facial
constitutional challenges.
[A] plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by
establishing that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid, i.e., that the law
is unconstitutional in all of its applications. ... [A]
facial challenge must fail where the statute has a
plainly legitimate sweep.
Barnett, supra at 197 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted),
quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S.
442, 449 (2008). As was the case in Barnett, Appellant’s brief fails to
invoke any argument or suggestion that Section 9715 is “unconstitutional in
all of its applications” or that the statute fails the “plainly legitimate sweep”
test. Appellant’s brief only contains arguments that the statute is
unconstitutional in its application to the circumstances present in Appellant’s
case. See Barnett, supra at 197-198. Accordingly, we conclude Appellant
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has failed to properly develop a facial challenge of Section 9715 and has
only challenged the constitutionality of the statute as applied in the instant
case. See id. at 198.
Within Appellant’s brief, he acknowledges “the Eighth Amendment
does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather,
it forbids only extreme sentences which are grossly disproportionate to the
crime.” Appellant’s Brief at 62, quoting Commonwealth v. Hall, 701 A.2d
190, 209 (Pa. 1997), cert. denied, Hall v. Pennsylvania, 523 U.S. 1082
(1998), citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991).
Appellant likewise identifies the objective criteria courts should apply when
examining the alleged disproportionality of a statute under an Eighth
Amendment challenge.15 Appellant’s Brief at 61-62. Yet, Appellant asserts
his Section 9715 lifetime sentence is “grossly disproportionate to [his]
actionable conduct in mistakenly and accidentally running over the two
[victims]” because “[he] clearly did not act with the malice requisite for such
a conviction.” Id. at 63. He claims the actions underlying his third-degree
murder convictions are more appropriately characterized as homicide by
vehicle and homicide by vehicle while DUI and should be punished as such.
Id.
____________________________________________
15
This test was promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in Solem
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), clarified by our high Court in Harmelin,
applied first by this Court in Spells, and adopted by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Baker.
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In Spells, an en banc panel of this Court adopted the proportionality
test courts should apply when examining a statute’s constitutionality under
the Eighth Amendment. Spells, supra at 461-464. Specifically, we
concluded the following criteria should govern such an analysis: “(i) the
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Id. at
462, quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983); accord Baker,
supra at 1047. Although no single factor is dispositive, the court’s findings
relative to the first factor may determine whether a particular sentence is
constitutional. Spells, supra at 463; accord Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 1005 (1991); Solem, supra at 291 n.17; Baker, supra.
Therefore, courts should initially consider if “a sentence is grossly
disproportionate to a crime.” Spells, supra at 463, quoting Harmelin,
supra; accord Baker, supra at 1048. In other words, “[we] must examine
whether the punishment fits the crime.” Parker, supra at 1269. If the
court concludes no such gross disproportionality exists, the sentence does
not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Baker, supra at 1052; Spells,
supra at 463-464.
With respect to the first prong of the proportionality test, Appellant
argues that a comparison of the gravity of the offense with the harshness of
the penalty imposed raises an inference of gross disproportionality.
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Appellant’s Brief at 63. We cannot agree. When considering the gravity of
the offense, we reiterate Appellant drove under the influence of marijuana
and a metabolite of marijuana, while possessing marijuana, fled from a
traffic stop, proceeded through a steady red light, struck and killed two
minor pedestrians without stopping to render aid, and, thereafter, hid from
police. Trial Court Opinion, 2/28/14, at 8-11. Appellant was convicted by a
jury of his peers of two counts of third-degree murder. Verdict Slip,
4/12/13, at 1. On the night of the incident, Appellant’s actions resulted in
the loss of the lives of two minors. Although these losses occurred following
one fatal traffic accident, we cannot let that fact dilute the gravity of
Appellant’s actions.
Likewise, we cannot conclude that the punishment imposed for these
offenses raises an inference of gross disproportionality. When considering
the punishment for Appellant’s two third-degree murder convictions, we
remain cognizant of the fact “that the fixing of prison terms for specific
crimes involves a substantive penological judgment that, as a general
matter, is properly within the province of the legislatures, not courts.”
Spells, supra at 463 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting
Harmelin, supra at 998. Here, the legislature deemed the taking of two
lives by third-degree murder to be punishable by a mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9715. The language of Section 9715
clearly expresses the legislature’s intent to subject such an offender to this
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sentence. Id.; Morris, supra at 579 (describing Section 9715 as an
“explicitly and unambiguously written” statute). Here, the punishment is not
disproportionate to the crime merely because Appellant alleges he
“mistakenly” and “accidentally” killed two individuals. Appellant’s Brief at
63. As discussed supra, the Commonwealth established the proper mens
rea to support Appellant’s two third-degree murder convictions. See
Dunphy, supra; Levin, supra; Pigg, supra. As the legislature clearly
intended to punish the taking of two lives with a term of life imprisonment,
we conclude that Appellant’s mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for his
second conviction of third-degree murder is not so grossly disproportionate
that it requires further inquiry or analysis. See Spells, supra. Thus, we
need not reach the second and third prongs of the test for proportionality
review under the Eighth Amendment. See Baker, supra. Therefore,
Appellant’s sentence does not offend the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution or Article 1, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Within his final issue, Appellant challenges the excessiveness of his
sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 65-69. Herein, the crux of Appellant’s
argument is that the trial court imposed a manifestly excessive sentence by
running some of his sentences consecutively rather than concurrently.
Appellant’s Brief at 65-66; Trial Court Sentencing Order, 6/22/13, at 1
(where the trial court ordered Appellant’s convictions as to Counts 4-6 to run
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consecutive to either Count 2 or 3). Within the trial court’s Rule 1925(a)
opinion, it admits that it intended to run all of Appellant’s convictions
concurrent with his life sentence. Trial Court Opinion, 2/28/14, at 20; N.T.,
6/21/13, at 83 (where the trial court stated, “I’m making all of the
sentences concurrent to the life sentence[]”). As a result, the trial court
requests the case be remanded to correct the sentence imposed. Trial Court
Opinion, 2/28/14, at 20.
“[A] trial court has the inherent, common-law authority to correct
‘clear clerical errors’ in its orders.” Commonwealth v. Borrin, 12 A.3d
466, 471 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted), affirmed, 80 A.3d
1219 (Pa. 2013) (opinion announcing judgment). This authority exists even
after the 30-day time limitation for the modification of orders expires. Id.,
citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. We have previously concluded that a “clear
clerical error” exists on the face of the record “when a trial court's intentions
are clearly and unambiguously declared during the sentencing hearing[.]”
Borrin, supra at 473; see also Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57,
67 (Pa. 2007) (concluding the limited, inherent judicial power of the court to
correct patent errors arise in cases “involv[ing] clear errors in the imposition
of sentences that [are] incompatible with the record”). When this situation
arises, “the sentencing order [is] subject to later correction.” Borrin, supra
at 473. Accordingly, “an oral sentence which is on the record, written
incorrectly by the clerk of courts, and then corrected by the trial judge, is []
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a clerical error.” Id. at 474, quoting Commonwealth v. Kubiac, 550 A.2d
219, 231 (Pa. Super. 1988), appeal denied, 563 A.2d 496 (Pa. 1989).
In the case sub judice, the trial court clearly and unambiguously
declared during the sentencing hearing that “[it was] making all of the
sentences concurrent to the life sentence.” N.T., 6/21/13, at 83.
Accordingly, the sentencing order is subject to correction by the trial court.
See Holmes, supra; Borrin, supra at 473; Kubiac, supra.
Based upon the foregoing, we vacate Appellant’s June 21, 2013
judgment of sentence and remand to the trial court for the limited purpose
of correcting its order to reflect a concurrent sentencing scheme. We affirm
Appellant’s June 21, 2013 judgment of sentence in all other respects.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Donohue joins the opinion.
Judge Bowes files a concurring opinion in which Judge Donohue joins.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/10/2014
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