S.R.G. v. D.D.G.

J-S36014-19
2019 PA Super 355S.R.G. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
D.D.G. : No. 313 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered January 16, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Domestic Relations at No(s): 0267 DR 2018
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 10, 2019
The trial court denied S.R.G.’s (“Grandmother”) petition seeking child
support payments from D.D.G. (“Grandfather”) for their daughter’s child.
Grandmother argues the trial court erred in denying her petition as
Grandfather has an extensive history of relentlessly litigating his claims for
custody of the child. While the trial court found that Grandmother made a
compelling argument, it ultimately concluded that the parties did not
aggressively assert their custody claims against child’s parents; rather, the
court concluded that the parties “stepped into the parental void” caused by
child’s parents. After careful review, we can find no error of law in the trial
court’s conclusions, and therefore affirm.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S36014-19
Prior to their pending divorce, the parties were granted legal and
primary physical custody of the child through an agreed custody order. The
parties’ daughter, the child’s mother, has a history of mental illness and the
parties agree that she is not capable of raising the child. The parties also agree
that the child’s father has never been involved in child’s life, and is currently
serving a lengthy prison sentence. However, neither of the child’s parents’
parental rights have ever been terminated or relinquished.1
After Grandfather filed for divorce from Grandmother, and Grandmother
relocated to Florida, the parties agreed to numerous modifications to their
custody agreement. Ultimately, the agreement provided for a split schedule
of primary physical custody whereby Grandfather exercises partial physical
custody of child during summers, spring break, and a two-week period during
the fall. Grandmother exercises primary physical custody at all other times.
Grandmother had sole legal custody of the child, however grandparents later
entered an agreed order providing they would share legal custody, with
Grandfather having sole decision-making authority on health and education
issues (though not religion) during his period of physical custody only.
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1 Child’s mother and father have been granted visitation rights, as agreed to
by grandparents, in the custody agreements. It does not appear that father
has ever exercised this right. Mother has spent brief periods of time living with
grandparents and the child, and subsequently Grandfather and child,
intermittently over the years.
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As noted, Grandmother subsequently sought child support payments
from Grandfather. Whether a third party2 may be held liable for child support
to another third party is a question of law, which we review de novo. See A.S.
v. I.S., 130 A.3d 763, 768 (Pa. 2015).
Pennsylvania law is clear that parents of a child have a duty to support
that child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4321(2). On the other hand, there is no explicit
statutory requirement that a grandparent has any duty to support a
grandchild. See id.
Grandmother claims Grandfather has a legal duty to pay child support
to her for their grandchild since grandparents stand in loco parentis to the
child. Grandmother asserts grandparents have taken proactive steps to
establish themselves as the legal parents of the child and that mother and
father have never, and never will, assume parental duties.
Initially, we have previously held that in loco parentis status alone is
insufficient to create a support obligation for a nonparent. See
Commonwealth ex rel. McNutt v. McNutt, 496 A.2d 816, 817 (Pa. Super.
1985).
If we were to hold that a stepparent acting in loco parentis would
be held liable for support even after the dissolution of the marriage
then all persons who gratuitously assume parental duties for a
time could be held legally responsible for a child's support. It is
not uncommon for a grandparent, an aunt or uncle or an older
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2“Persons other than natural or biological parents are deemed to be ‘third
parties’ for purposes of custody disputes.” Cardamone v. Elshoff, 659 A.2d
575, 579-80 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citations omitted).
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sibling to assume responsibilities for parenting when the natural
parents are absent. These acts of generosity should not be
discouraged by creating a law which would require anyone who
begins such a relationship to continue financial support until the
child is eighteen years old.
Id.Acknowledging this precedent, Grandmother cites to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision in A.S., for the proposition that a duty of child support
can arise where a nonparent has taken “affirmative steps to act as a legal
parent so that he or she must be treated as a legal parent.” See Appellant’s
Brief, at 12.
In A.S., the child’s stepfather “haled a fit [biological mother] into court,
repeatedly litigating to achieve the same legal and physical custodial rights as
would naturally accrue to any biological parent.” Id., at 770. The court
described the case as not a typical one “of a stepparent who has grown to love
his stepchildren and wants to maintain a post-separation relationship with
them.” Id. Instead, the stepfather “ha[d] litigated and obtained full legal and
physical custody rights, and ha[d] also asserted those parental rights to
prevent a competent biological mother from relocating with her children.” Id.
Our Supreme Court held that, because the stepfather had “taken
sufficient affirmative steps legally to obtain parental rights,” he “should share
in parental obligations, such as paying child support.” Id., at 770-71. Our
Supreme Court added, “[e]quity prohibits [the] [s]tepfather from disavowing
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his parental status to avoid a support obligation to the children he so
vigorously sought to parent.” Id., at 771.
Here, the trial court distinguished A.S. from the circumstances in this
case. The court found that there was no evidence that the parties had ever
taken any affirmative steps to be parents of the child; rather, it found the
record could not support a finding that the child thinks of the parties as
anything other than his grandparents.
Further, the court found that the parties’ claims for custody have not
been aggressive or hostile to the rights of the child’s parents:
Both grandparents initially became full time de facto custodians of
[the child] shortly after his birth due to the parents’ inability to
fulfill their parental roles. Grandparents continued to act as [the
child’s] de facto custodians for the next nineteen months before
they formally initiated a custody action. Though the record
supplied by the parties does not directly address why
grandparents sought formal custody rights when they did, such
would have become necessary at some point in order for them to
legally act on [the child’s] behalf (for instance, to obtain medical
care for him and enroll in him in school). What is clear, however,
is that grandparents never sought court-ordered custody in an
effort to assert custodial rights as against either or both parents.
They never affirmatively, assertively, aggressively or otherwise
sought out a parental role. Instead, they gratuitously and
generously filled the parental void. This is a fundamental
distinction between this situation and that in A.S. The Supreme
Court in A.S. went out of its way to stress the somewhat litigiously
aggressive posture by stepfather in “relentless pursuit” of full
parental rights “at the cost of interfering with the rights of a fit
parent.” The grandparents in this case are fundamentally acting
as grandparents, not as parents, and have never sought to usurp
the parental rights of mother and father.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 9-10.
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We agree with the trial court that the circumstances of this case present
a close call. On the one hand, as the trial court notes, neither party has sought
to usurp the parental rights of the child’s mother and father. On the other
hand, Grandfather has sought, and been awarded, periods of physical and
partial legal custody of the child.
Despite this, we also agree with the trial court that the circumstances
presented by this case are readily distinguishable from A.S. The third party
stepfather in A.S. did not fall into the category of a third party who merely
desired a continuing post-separation relationship with his stepchildren. See
A.S., 130 A.3d 763, 770. Rather, the Court observed that the stepfather had
“insisted upon and became a full parent in every sense of that concept,” and
had done so at the expense of a fit natural parent. Id.Here, Grandfather has not insisted upon or become a full parent to the
child, but rather gratuitously assumed the burdens of custody. Furthermore,
the record supports the trial court’s determination that Grandfather is merely
a grandparent who desires to maintain a relationship with his grandchild.
Finally, Grandfather has not asserted custody rights against a fit biological
parent, but rather another third party. There is simply no statutory
authorization presently in Pennsylvania extending the duty of child support
between two third parties, where neither party has adopted the child, and the
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natural parents have not had their parental rights terminated. 3 Under these
circumstances, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in denying
Grandmother’s petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/10/2019
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3 Such a question is matter for the legislature, not the courts, to decide.
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