Bastin, L. v. Bassi, K.

J-A26039-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
LEE A. BASTIN AND CONNIE J. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
BASTIN, HUSBAND AND WIFE : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellants :
:
:
v. :
:
: No. 682 WDA 2019
KEITH A. BASSI AND BASSI :
MCCUNE, AND VREELAND & :
ASSOCIATES P.C., A PENNSYLVANIA :
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION :
Appeal from the Order Entered April 9, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Civil Division at
No(s): No. 2017-3582
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and OLSON, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED DECEMBER 16, 2019
Appellants, Lee A. Bastin and Connie J. Bastin, appeal from the order
entered on April 9, 2019, which granted the motion for summary judgment
filed on behalf of Keith A. Bassi (“Attorney Bassi”) and Bassi, McCune, and
Vreeland and Associates, P.C. (“Law Firm”). We affirm.
The facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
November 2, 2007, Appellants entered into an agreement of sale to purchase
13.329 acres of unimproved land (the “Property”) in Washington County,
Pennsylvania, for $90,000.00. Agreement of Sale, 11/2/07, at 1-2. Prior to
closing the purchase transaction, Appellants, through Attorney Bassi, obtained
title insurance from Fidelity National Title Insurance (“Fidelity”). Owner’s
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Policy of Title Insurance, 3/31/08, at 1-7. Subsequently, on March 28, 2008,
the deed to the Property was delivered to Appellants.
In September 2013, Appellants and Rice Drilling B, LLC (“Rice Drilling”)
executed a lease (“Rice Lease”) for the oil and gas rights associated with the
Property. Rice Drilling Paid Up Oil and Gas Lease, 9/4/13, at 1-14. The Rice
Lease, however, was subject to Appellants holding exclusive title to the
Property’s oil and gas rights. Id. On May 19, 2014, Rice Drilling informed
Appellants that, on July 29, 2007, their predecessors in title executed an oil
and gas lease with Penneco Oil Company (“Penneco Lease”). Rice Drilling
Notice of Title Defect, 5/19/14, at 1; Penneco Oil and Gas Lease, 7/27/07, at
1-4. As a result, Rice Drilling released and surrendered its lease with
Appellants. In 2014, Penneco Oil Company assigned its lease to Range
Resources-Appalachia, LLC, which began paying Appellants royalties in July
2016.
Upon discovery of the title defect, Appellants filed a claim against
Fidelity. On June 29, 2017, Fidelity paid Appellants the total purchase price
of $90,000.00. Fidelity National Title Insurance Company Letter, 7/14/17, at
1. Less than a month later, on July 21, 2017, Appellants commenced the
instant action by filing a praecipe for writ of summons directed to Attorney
Bassi and Law Firm. Appellants’ Praecipe for Writ of Summons, 7/27/17, at
1. On February 8, 2018, Appellants filed their original complaint. Appellants’
Complaint, 2/8/18, at 1-4. Within Appellants’ complaint, they alleged that
Attorney Bassi committed legal malpractice. Id. Specifically, Appellants
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asserted that Attorney Bassi was “negligent in failing to discover the existence
of the Penneco Lease and/or report it to [Appellants].” Id. at ¶ 17. As such,
Appellants claimed that they were entitled to damages “measured by[,] (a)
the amount of the signing bonus that Rice Drilling would have paid to them
under the Rice Lease . . . and (b) the difference between the [] royalties [paid
pursuant to the Penneco Lease] and the larger amount of royalties which
would have been paid . . . under the Rice Lease.” Id. at ¶ 18.
On December 27, 2018, following the close of discovery, Bassi and Law
Firm filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Appellants could not
prove that Attorney Bassi’s alleged negligence was the proximate cause of
Appellants’ damages. Motion for Summary Judgment, 12/27/18, at 1-13.
Appellants filed a response on January 30, 2019. Response to Motion for
Summary Judgment, 1/30/18, at 1-14. The trial court granted Attorney
Bassi’s and Law Firm’s motion on April 9, 2019. Trial Court’s Order, 4/9/19,
at 1-2. This timely appeal followed.1
Appellants raise the following issue on appeal:
Whether the trial court erred as a matter of fact and law when it
granted [Attorney Bassi’s and Law Firm’s] motion for summary
judgment where the record . . . when considered in a light most
favorable to [A]ppellants, demonstrate[s] that the trier of fact
could have reasonably concluded that [Attorney Bassi’s]
negligence was a substantial factor in causing [A]ppellants harm?
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1 Appellants filed a notice of appeal on May 1, 2019. The trial court did not
order Appellants to file a concise statement of matters complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(1). The trial court issued an opinion
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on June 10, 2019.
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Appellants’ Brief at 4.
We note:
Our scope of review of a trial court's order granting or denying
summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of review is clear:
the trial court's order will be reversed only where it is established
that the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record clearly
shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
reviewing court must view the record in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts as to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party. Only
when the facts are so clear that reasonable minds could not differ
can a trial court properly enter summary judgment.
Englert v. Fazio Mech. Serv.'s, Inc., 932 A.2d 122, 124 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(internal citations omitted).
Herein, Appellants claim that the trial court erred by granting the
summary judgment motion filed by Attorney Bassi and Law Firm. Specifically,
Appellants contend that, but for Attorney Bassi’s “erroneous title report” they
“would not have purchased the Property.” Appellants’ Brief at 11. Therefore,
per Appellants, Attorney Bassi’s “negligence was a substantial cause of [their]
harm.” Id.Preliminarily, we note that Appellants’ contention that Attorney Bassi
provided an “erroneous title report” is inconsistent with the record. Id. at 11.
Indeed, upon review, we conclude that Attorney Bassi did not, in fact, conduct
a title examination of the Property or issue a title report to Appellants. To the
contrary, it is apparent that Attorney Bassi simply obtained title insurance
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from Fidelity on behalf of Appellants. See Owner’s Policy of Title Insurance,
3/31/08, at 1-7. Accordingly, Appellants’ claim that they retained Attorney
Bassi “to examine title to the Property” and he, in turn, provided a negligent
title report, is belied by the record. Appellants’ Brief at 7.
Next, we turn to the merits of Appellants’ claim. Previously, this Court
explained that,
[t]here are three essential elements which must be established to
bring a cause of action for professional negligence. These are:
1) [E]mployment of the attorney or other basis for a duty;
2) the failure of the attorney to exercise ordinary skill and
knowledge; and
3) that such negligence was the proximate cause of damage
to the plaintiff.
Schenkel v. Monheit, 405 A.2d 493, 494 (Pa. Super. 1979), quoting R.
Mallen & V. Levit, Legal Malpractice 123 (1977).
The central issue in the present action is the third of these factors, i.e.,
whether Appellants can establish “a causal connection between [Attorney
Bassi’s alleged] negligent conduct and [their] injur[y].” McPeake v. William
T. Cannon, Esquire, P.C., 553 A.2d 439, 441 (Pa. Super. 1989).
‘Proximate’ or ‘legal’ causation [] is defined as [t]hat which, in a
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any sufficient
intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. Moreover, [Professor] Prosser has
noted that the question of ‘proximate’ causation,
[] becomes essentially a question of whether the policy of
the law will extend the responsibility for the conduct to the
consequences which have in fact occurred. Quite often this
has been stated, and properly so, as an issue of whether the
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defendant is under any duty to the plaintiff, or whether his
duty includes protection against such consequences.
Thus, a defendant will not be found to have had a duty to prevent
a harm that was not a reasonably foreseeable result of the prior
negligent conduct. The rationale behind this rule is that it would
be unfair to impose a duty upon persons to prevent a harm that
they could not foresee or avoid.
Id. at 441-442 (internal citations omitted).
Herein, we agree that, even if we assume Attorney Bassi was negligent
and failed to advise Appellants of the existence of the Penneco Lease, this
failure did not cause Appellants’ alleged injury. See Trial Court Opinion,
6/10/19, at 2. Indeed, Rice Drilling terminated the lease with Appellants
because of the existence of the Penneco Lease, which pre-dated Attorney
Bassi’s and the Law Firm’s involvement with the Property. Thus, Attorney
Bassi’s alleged omission did “not result in Rice [Drilling’s] refusal to pursue an
[o]il and [g]as lease with [Appellants].” Id. at 2. Accordingly, Appellants
“cannot establish the element of proximate cause.” Id. As such, the trial
court correctly granted Attorney Bassi and Law Firm’s motion for summary
judgment and we affirm that decision.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/16/2019
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