Chestnut, E. v. Nationwide Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co.

J-A09008-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ELMER CHESTNUT AND MARY ANN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
CHESTNUT, : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellants :
:
:
v. :
:
: No. 2671 EDA 2018
NATIONWIDE PROPERTY AND :
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY :
Appeal from the Order Entered, August 20, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County,
Civil Division at No(s): 2014-24030.
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MARCH 22, 2019
Elmer and Mary Ann Chestnut (“the Chestnuts”) appeal pro se from the
trial court’s order granting the motion to enforce the settlement agreement
filed by Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“Nationwide”).
Because the Chestnuts have not followed many of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Appellate Procedure, we quash their appeal.
The trial court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history as
follows:
[The Chestnuts] initiated a breach of contract lawsuit
against [Nationwide] by complaint dated August 20, 2014
for failure to identify [them] for a loss they allege was
covered under their insurance policy. The [Chestnuts] also
filed a Petition for a Preliminary Injunction which was
temporarily granted for 30 days by agreement, before being
withdrawn on November 13, 2014, by stipulation.
____________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Thereafter, no activity occurred on the docket, and the
prothonotary issued a Notice to Terminate on December 21,
2017. [The Chestnuts] filed their Statement of Intention to
Proceed on January 11, 2018. [They] issued numerous
discovery requests prompting [Nationwide] to file a Motion
to Enforce Settlement Agreement on April 11, 2018, and an
Emergency Motion to Stay Discovery on April 20, 2018.
[The Honorable Emanuel A.] Bertin heard the Emergency
Motion to Stay Discovery and ordered the Motion transferred
to a Discovery Master and ordered that the Discovery Master
or this Court would decide whether further discovery was
warranted. Judge Bertin’s Order was received by this Court,
a telephonic conference was held, and [the Chestnuts]
requested time to prepare a written response to the
motions. This Court granted that request, and stayed
discovery while [their] responses were pending. Thereafter,
oral argument was held on the motions, and this Court
subsequently permitted the [Chestnuts] to conduct
discovery of the notary who notarized the Settlement
Agreement at issue. A hearing on the Motion to Enforce the
Settlement Agreement was held on August 17, 2018, and
this Court subsequently granted the motion. Based on the
hearing, and this Court’s review of the record and court
documents, this Court determined that mediation on the
initial case occurred on January 7, 2015 before [former
judge, the Honorable Mason] Avrigian, Sr. A settlement
agreement was reached totaling $302,000. Due to a
disagreement with the mortgager, an interpleader action
was eventually filed and settled. However, on this case, no
Praecipe to Settle, Discontinue, and End was ever filed.
***
[The Chestnuts] personally received $206,211.00 while
the remainder of the $302,000.00 was paid to their
mortgage company and their attorney through a settlement
agreement following the interpleader action. [The
Chestnuts] clearly signed the agreement even if they failed
to read what they were signing. Additionally, Elmer
Chestnut’s signature appears on a page which clearly should
have indicated to him that he was signing an agreement
containing a release. Further, even without the signatures,
it is clear from Judge Avrigian, Sr. and the conduct of the
[Chestnuts] that there is a binding settlement agreement.
The agreement was reached by the parties per Judge
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Avrigian, Sr. This agreement was fully understood. That
agreement was accepted by [the Chestnuts] when they
accepted the funds in accordance with the settlement
following the interpleader action.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/29/18, at 1-4 (citations to record omitted). This timely
appeal follows.
We must first determine whether the Chestnuts have preserved any
claims for our review. In response to the trial court’s order, the Chestnuts
filed a five-page Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on
appeal, which the trial court reproduced verbatim in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion. Although the trial court found that the Concise Statement the
Chestnuts provided did not actually provide a concise statement of the errors
complained of on appeal, the court addressed the errors it believed the
Chestnuts raised.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/29/18, at 8. The trial court then
provided a thorough discussion of six issues it believed the Chestnuts wished
to raise and found them all to be meritless.
We note that, “A concise statement of [errors] complained of on appeal
must be specific enough to identify and address each issue the appellant
wishes to raise on appeal. Mazurek v. Russell, 96 A.3d 372, 377 (Pa. Super.
2014). An overly vague or broad statement of matters complained of on
appeal may result in waiver. Majorsky v. Douglas, 58 A.3d 1250, 1258 (Pa.
Super. 2012), appeal denied, 70 A.3d 811 (Pa. 2013). “When a court has to
guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough for meaningful
review.” Commonwealth v. McCree, 857 A.2d 188, 192 (Pa. Super. 2004)
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(citation omitted). Moreover, if the appellant filed a vague Rule 1925(b)
statement, the issues the appellant wishes to raise on appeal are still waived,
“even if the trial court guesses correctly and addresses the issue” in a Rule
1925(a) opinion. 202 Island Car Wash, L.P. v. Monridge Constr., Inc.,
913 A.2d 922, 925 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court had to guess at what issues the Chestnuts wished
to raise on appeal. Even if it guessed correctly, we could still find waiver. See
id. Absent waiver, however, we observe that the Chestnuts’ appellate brief
does not include a statement of questions involved. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116.
Indeed, the Chestnuts’ pro se brief does not even remotely comply with the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
With regard to the contents of the Chestnuts’ pro se brief, we note:
[A]ppellate briefs and reproduced records must materially
conform to the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. This Court may quash
or dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to conform to the
requirements set forth in [the] Pennsylvania Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Id. Although this Court is willing to
liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se
status confers no benefit upon the appellant. To the
contrary, an person choosing to represent himself in a legal
proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his
lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing.
Wilkins v. Marsico, 903 A.2d 1281, 1284-85 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Rule 2111 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provide
guidelines regarding the required content of an appellate brief:
Rule 2111. Brief of the Appellant
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(a) General Rule.—The brief of the appellant, except as
otherwise prescribed by these rules, shall consist of
the following matters, separately and distinctly
entitled and in the following order:
(1) Statement of Jurisdiction.
(2) Order or other determination in question.
(3) Statement of both the scope of review and the
standard of review.
(4) Statement of the questions involved.
(5) Statement of the case.
(6) Summary of argument.
(7) Statement of the reasons to allow an appeal to
challenge the discretionary aspects of a
sentence, if applicable.
(8) Argument for appellant.
(9) A short conclusion stating the precise relief
sought.
(10) The opinions and pleadings specified in
paragraphs (b) and (c) of his rule.
(11) In the Superior Court, a copy of the statement
of errors complained of on appeal, filed with the
trial court pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), or an
averment that no order requiring a statement
of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) was entered.
(12) The certificates of compliance required by
Pa.R.A.P. 127 and 2135(d).
Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a).
Additionally, Rule 2119(a) provides:
Rule 2119. Argument
(a) General rule. The argument shall be divided into
as many parts as there are questions to be argued;
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and shall have at the head of each part—in
distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed—
the particular point treated therein, followed by such
discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed
pertinent.
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Citing the above rule, this Court has explained that we
“will not consider the merits of an argument, which fails to cite relevant case
or statutory authority. Failure to cite relevant legal authority constitutes
waiver of the claim on appeal.” In re Estate of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 209
(Pa. Super. 2012).
Our review of the Chestnuts’ brief readily indicates that they
misapprehend Superior Court’s role as an appellate court. Most importantly,
as noted above, the Chestnuts’ brief contains no statement of questions
involved or argument. Indeed, the pro se filing appears more as an attempt
to relitigate their original filing against Nationwide and a further attempt to
obtain monetary relief. This court’s appellate function primarily is to correct
legal errors made by the trial court. The shortcomings in the Chestnuts’ brief
have hampered effective appellate review. Branch Banking and Trust v.
Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939, 942 (Pa. Super. 2006). Our rules provide that if
defects in the brief are substantial, the appeal may be quashed or dismissed.
Pa.R.A.P. 2101.
In sum, because the Chestnuts filed a vague 1925(b) statement of
errors complained of on appeal and failed to file a brief that complies with the
Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective appellate review is not possible.
Branch Banking and Trust v. Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939, 942 (Pa. Super.
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2006). Thus, we quash this appeal and remove the case from the oral
argument list. Given this disposition, we deny the Chestnuts’ outstanding
motion to continue oral argument as moot.
Motion to continue denied. Appeal quashed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/22/19
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