Knapp, J. v. Citro Communications, Inc.

J-S74023-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
JOSEPH KNAPP AND DENNIS MILLER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
AND TEMPLE PLAY, LLC AND TMPLCF,
: PENNSYLVANIA
LLC, AND MILSEV, LLC AND DEN :
SEVENTH, LLC, :
:
Appellees :
:
v. :
:
CITRO COMMUNICATIONS, INC. AND :
THOMAS R. CITRO, :
:
Appellants : No. 711 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order entered February 10, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County,
Civil Division at No. 110403352 April Term 2011
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E, DONOHUE and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED DECEMBER 18, 2014
Citro Communications, Inc. and Thomas R. Citro (collectively,
“Appellants”) appeal from the order of court denying their petition to open
judgments entered against them and in favor of Joseph Knapp, Dennis
Miller, Temple Play, LLC, TMPLCF, LLC and Den Seventh, LLC (collectively,
“Appellees”) in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County. For
reasons explained below, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural
histories in this case as follows:
On April 29, 2011[,] [Appellees] filed a
complaint alleging breach of contract, fraud, and
conversion seeking a total of $153,964.00 in
damages. [Appellants] failed to answer Appellees[’]
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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[c]omplaint. Appellants aver that they submitted
Appellees’ claims to their liability insurance carrier on
May 31, 2011. Appellees sent a notice of intention to
take default judgment to Appellants on June 21,
2011. Aside from submitting an insurance claim and
attending a case management conference,
Appellants took no action to respond to the litigation
for nearly three years.
On August 11, 2011 a case management
conference was held, which Appellants aver that they
attended “pro se.” According to Appellants, an
unnamed “case manager” indicated that the case
would likely be dismissed. [H]owever, Appellants
offered nothing to substantiate this claim. That same
day, Appellees entered default judgment by praecipe
against Citro Communications, Inc. Appellees
subsequently entered default judgment against
Thomas R. Citro on October 20, 2011, and aver that
they domesticated their judgments to New Jersey in
2013, thereafter obtaining a New Jersey court order
compelling discovery in aid of execution. Appellants
filed their Petition to Open Default Judgment on
January 9, 2014, which was denied by this Court on
February 10, 2014. Appellants filed the present
appeal on February 18, 2014.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/14, at 1-2 (internal citations to documents of
record omitted).
In their appeal, Appellants present two questions for our review:
[1.] Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s [sic]
[p]etition to [o]pen [d]efault [j]udgment?
[2.] Do equitable considerations require that
Appellants receive an opportunity to have the case
decided on the merits?
Appellants’ Brief at 2.
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Our standard of review of orders denying a petition to open a default
judgment is well settled. This Court has previously explained that,
[a] petition to open a default judgment is an appeal
to the equitable powers of the court. The decision to
grant or deny a petition to open a default judgment
is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and
we will not overturn that decision absent a manifest
abuse of discretion or error of law.
***
An abuse of discretion is not a mere error of
judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion, the law is
overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised
is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the evidence
or the record, discretion is abused.
Smith v. Morrell Beer Distribs., Inc., 29 A.3d 23, 25 (Pa. Super. 2011).
In their first issue on appeal, Appellants argue that the trial court erred
in its application of the relevant test. This test provides that “a default
judgment may be opened when the moving party establishes three
requirements: (1) a prompt filing of a petition to open the default judgment;
(2) a meritorious defense; and (3) a reasonable excuse or explanation for its
failure to file a responsive pleading.” Id.The trial court determined that Appellants failed to meet the first and
third prongs of the test. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/14, at 2.
Considering the first prong, we note that
[t]he timeliness of a petition to open a judgment is
measured from the date that notice of the entry of
the default judgment is received. The law does not
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establish a specific time period within which a
petition to open a judgment must be filed to qualify
as timely. Instead, the court must consider the
length of time between discovery of the entry of the
default judgment and the reason for delay.
Kelly v. Siuma, 34 A.3d 86, 92 (Pa. Super. 2011). We further note that
historically, “[i]n cases where the appellate courts have found a ‘prompt’ and
timely filing of the petition to open a default judgment, the period of delay
has normally been less than one month. Id. (citing Duckson v. Wee
Wheelers, Inc., 620 A.2d 1206 (Pa. Super. 1993) (finding one day delay
timely); Alba v. Urology Assocs. of Kingston, 598 A.2d 57 (Pa. Super.
1991) (fourteen days is timely); Fink v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 594 A.2d
345 (Pa. Super. 1991) (period of five days is timely); US Bank N.A. v.
Mallory, 982 A.2d 986, 995 (Pa. Super. 2009) (finding eighty-two day
delay was not timely); Myers v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 986 A.2d 171(Pa. Super. 2009) (indicating delay of fourteen days in filing petition to open
was timely); Pappas v. Stefan, 304 A.2d 143 (Pa. 1973) (fifty-five day
delay was not prompt)).
In the present case, Appellants aver that they did not become aware
of the entry of the default judgment until November 11, 2013, when they
received documents from Appellees’ collection counsel in an attempt to
execute on the judgment. See Appellants’ Brief at 4-5; Memorandum in
Support of Amended Petition to Open, 1/30/14, at 3. Appellants did not file
their petition to open until almost sixty days later, on January 9, 2014. The
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only reason for the delay offered by Appellants was their need to secure
counsel and “some time to make a decision as to how to proceed[.]”
Appellants’ Brief at 7. The trial court rejected this as an adequate reason for
the delay, as “these are challenges that face all litigants.” Trial Court
Opinion, 3/21/14, at 4. It concluded that “[w]ithout any plausible
explanation or special circumstance … it is neither reasonable nor equitable
to find that the … delay was justified[.]” Id. We find no abuse of discretion
in this conclusion. Appellants have alleged only that the delay in filing their
petition to open was due to routine obstacles that all litigants face; they
have provided no compelling reason for the delay. Accordingly, we find no
error in the trial court’s determination that they failed to establish that their
petition was promptly filed.
The trial court also concluded that Appellants failed to establish the
third prong of the relevant test: a justifiable explanation for failing to
respond to the complaint. In their petition, Appellants stated that the
reason they did not file a response to the complaint was because “neither
[Appellant] is an attorney, and therefore neither [Appellant] understood the
importance of filing an [a]nswer or the repercussions of not filing an
[a]nswer.” Memorandum in Support of Amended Petition to Open, 1/30/14,
at 3. They further stated that they attended a case management
conference, at which Appellees did not appear, and that in light of a
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conversation with the “case manager” at that time, it was their belief that
the case would be dismissed. Id. at 3-4.
The trial court found that these explanations were insufficient,
especially in light of the fact that the complaint contained an explicit
advisement that they contact an attorney and contained contact information
for the Philadelphia Bar Association Referral Service. Trial Court Opinion,
3/21/14, at 5. It further found that “Appellants’ failure to obtain competent
legal advice in an appropriate time frame amounts to a deliberate decision
not to defend.” Id. (citing Mallory, 982 A.2d at 996).
Again, we find no error in the trial court’s determination. With regard
to this prong of the applicable test, “whether an excuse is legitimate is not
easily answered and depends upon the specific circumstances of the case.
The appellate courts have usually addressed the question of legitimate
excuse in the context of an excuse for failure to respond to the original
complaint in a timely fashion.” Mallory, 982 A.2d at 995 (internal citation
omitted). However, the appellate courts consistently have rejected the lack
of legal sophistication or familiarity with the legal system as justifiable
reasons for a delay in filing a response to a complaint. See id. at 996 (“The
fact [a]ppellant may be unsophisticated in legal … matters is all the more
reason she should have heeded the notices to secure legal counsel at once,
and her deliberate decision not to defend does not provide a reasonable
explanation or excuse necessary to open the default judgment.”); Sharon
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Hill Contracting Co. v. Recreational Equip. Unlimited, Inc., 425 A.2d
447, 450 (Pa. Super. 1981) (“[M]ere ignorance or inexperience with the
legal process is by itself an insufficient justification for a default[.]”);
Kilgallen v. Kunta, 310 A.2d 396, 398 n.5 (Pa. Super. 1973) (same).
On appeal, Appellants do not explain how or why the trial court’s
conclusion was in error; they simply reiterate the excuses they pled in the
trial court and assert that they constitute a reasonable justification for failing
to file a response to the complaint. See Appellant’s Brief at 8-9. However,
as discussed above, we have found that the trial court’s determination is
without error. As such, Appellants’ claim fails.1
In their second issue, Appellants claim that “equitable considerations
require that the case be decided on the merits.” Id. at 10. Appellants fail,
however, to cite or discuss even one authority in support of this claim. See
id. at 10-11. “The Rules of Appellate Procedure state unequivocally that
each question an appellant raises is to be supported by discussion and
analysis of pertinent authority. Failure to do so constitutes waiver of the
claim.” Giant Food Stores, LLC v. THF Silver Spring Dev., L.P., 959
1
Appellants also contend that they have satisfied the remaining prong of the
relevant test. Appellants’ Brief at 9. The trial court did not address this
prong in its opinion. However, a petitioner must establish all three prongs of
this test before the trial court will open a default judgment. See Schultz v.
Erie Ins. Exch., 477 A.2d 471, 472 (Pa. 1984). As the trial court correctly
concluded that Appellants failed to satisfy two of these prongs, they are
foreclosed from relief, even if they were able to satisfactorily establish the
remaining one.
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A.2d 438, 444 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citing Estate of Haiko v. McGinley, 799
A.2d 155, 161 (Pa. Super. 2002); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b)). Accordingly,
Appellants have waived this claim for failure to adequately develop it.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/18/2014
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