Com. v. Sutton, C.

J-A04014-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
CORNELL J. SUTTON : No. 1419 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Order April 19, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0004873-2017
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MARCH 29, 2019
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order, entered in
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on April 19, 2018,
suppressing statements made by Cornell J. Sutton during a custodial
interrogation.1 The Commonwealth argues Sutton knowingly and intelligently
waived his Miranda2 rights before being questioned by Detective Don
Suchinsky. After careful review, we reverse and remand.
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1The Commonwealth has certified in its notice of appeal that the suppression
order “terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution.”
Commonwealth Notice of Appeal, 5/16/18, at 1; see Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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On April 15, 2017, Sutton was arrested in relation to an April 6, 2017
murder. He was charged with murder,3 violations of the Uniform Firearms
Act,4 possession of an instrument of crime,5 robbery,6 and theft.7 On March
21, 2018, Sutton filed a pretrial motion challenging the admissibility of a
statement he made during an interrogation. Sutton argued that the statement
“was not given knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily, and was taken in
violation of his Constitutional rights and protections.” Sutton Motion in Limine,
3/21/18, at 2.
On April 17, 2018, the trial court held a suppression hearing. The
suppression court summarized the relevant facts of the underlying case as
follows:
Detective [Suchinsky] stated that at four minutes and two seconds
into the video, [Sutton] is shown seated in the interview room of
the Homicide Unit. At one hour, six minutes and forty-one
seconds into the video, Detective [Suchinsky] entered the room.
At one hour, eight minutes and forty-nine seconds into the video.
Detective [Suchinsky] read Miranda warnings to [Sutton].
Thereafter, [Sutton] was escorted to the restroom.
At one hour, fifty-five minutes and six seconds into the video,
[Sutton] is shown giving his biographical information. At two
hours and fourteen minutes and thirty-nine seconds into the
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3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502.
4 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106, 6108.
5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907.
6 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701.
7 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921.
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video, Detectives [Suchinsky] and Sloan resumed the
interrogation and [Sutton] gave a statement. Miranda warnings
were not repeated. At three hours[,] two minutes and 15 seconds
into the video, [Sutton] was presented with a typed version of his
statement, which he read and signed.
This court carefully studied those portions of the video presented
by the prosecutor. This court finds that at no time did either
Detective [Suchinsky] or Detective Sloan ask [Sutton] if he
understood the warnings and if he was willing to waive his rights.
This court observed that at no time did [Sutton] manifest that he
understood the warnings and that he was willing to waive his
rights.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/11/18, at 2-3.
Sutton’s interrogation was recorded and the video was entered into
evidence at the suppression hearing. At the suppression hearing, Detective
Suchinsky narrated what was occurring on the video. Judge Steven R. Geroff
granted Sutton’s suppression motion on April 19, 2017. The trial court found
Sutton “neither said anything nor gestured in any way indicating that he
understood his Miranda rights and that he was willing to waive them.” Trial
Court Opinion, 6/11/18, at 4. The Commonwealth appealed.
Our scope of review of a suppression hearing is limited to the evidentiary
record created at the suppression hearing. Commonwealth v. Neal, 151
A.3d 1068, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2016).
[T]his Court does not, nor is it required to, defer to the
suppression court’s legal conclusions that a confession or
Miranda waiver was knowing or voluntary. Instead, we examine
the record to determine if it supports the suppression court’s
findings of fact and if those facts support the conclusion that, as
a matter of law, Appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his
Miranda rights. . . .
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Regardless of whether a waiver of Miranda is
voluntary, the Commonwealth must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the waiver is also
knowing and intelligent.
Miranda holds that ‘[t]he defendant may waive
effectuation’ of the rights conveyed in the warnings
‘provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently.’ The inquiry has two distinct
dimensions. First[,] the relinquishment of the right
must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the
product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion or deception. Second, the
waiver must have been made with a full awareness
both of the nature of the right being abandoned and
the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only
if the ‘totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation’ reveal both an uncoerced choice and the
requisite level of comprehension may a court properly
conclude that Miranda rights have been waived.
Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 732, 746 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original).
We have repeatedly emphasized that the best practice is for police
officers to obtain written and oral confirmation that a defendant understands
his Miranda rights prior to interrogating him. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Cohen, 53 A.3d 882, 887 (Pa. Super. 2012). However, in cases where the
suspect was read his Miranda rights, and the totality of the circumstances
manifests his understanding and intent to waive those rights, we will not
suppress the statements simply because the actual words were not spoken.
See id.There is no formal protocol that must precede a waiver.
Commonwealth v. Clemons, 200 A.3d 441, 473 (Pa. 2019). A verbal
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expression of waiver is not necessary. Id. at 472; Commonwealth v.
Bomar, 826 A.2d 831, 843 (Pa. 2003). So long as the Miranda rights were
properly conveyed, waiver can be inferred by the defendant’s conduct. See
Clemons, 200 A.3d at 472; see also Commonwealth v. Baez, 21 A.3d
1280, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2011).
From our review of the record, it is apparent Sutton understood the
rights as he was being read them. He voluntarily waived those rights when
he began answering Detective Suchinsky’s questions. The video shows Sutton
was able to understand and follow the officers’ directions when he was first
brought into the interrogation room.8 After the officers processed Sutton, he
requested and was provided a cigarette. About an hour after entering the
interrogation room, Sutton was read his Miranda rights by Detective
Suchinsky. Sutton was making eye contact and nodding his head while the
rights were being read, similar to how he nodded his head in response to
questions when he was first brought into the interrogation room. Sutton then
went to the bathroom and, ten minutes later, Detective Suchinsky took
Sutton’s basic intake information. After that, Sutton made his statement to
the police.
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8 Sutton was directed to remove his belt and shoelaces and was given further
direction regarding his shoes, pockets, and rolled pant legs. Sutton
understood and followed each direction.
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From the interrogation room video, it is clear that Sutton was informed
of his Miranda rights and understood the warning. He knowingly waived
those rights when he chose not to remain silent. Clemons, 200 A.3d at 472.
Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/29/19
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