Com. v. Wilson, T.

J-S74013-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
TYREEK WILSON,
Appellant No. 3075 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 30, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0001718-2012
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DONOHUE, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.003A FILED DECEMBER 23, 2014
Appellant, Tyreek Wilson, appeals from the judgment of sentence of a
term of life imprisonment. Appellant challenges the admission of testimony
introduced at his trial, which he alleges was irrelevant, or, in the alternative,
unfairly prejudicial. We affirm.
Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on February 3, 2013. The facts
adduced at trial were as follows:
Dwayne Smith was murdered on October 16, 2011, near the
intersection of Kent Street and Hyatt Street in the Sun Village
section of Chester, Pennsylvania. At trial, the victim's wife,
Yvette Smith, testified that the victim left his primary residence
in order to finish removing personal effects from his former
residence, located at 1009 Hyatt Street, at approximately 7:30
a.m. on the morning of October 16, 2011. Officer Doug
Staffelbach of the City of Chester Police Department testified
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S74013-14
that, on the morning of October 16, at approximately 8:15 a.m.,
he responded to two dispatches. The first reported shots fired in
the area near the intersections of 10th Street and Hyatt Street,
and 10th Street and McDowell Avenue. The second dispatch
indicated that there was a subject down in the same area.
Officer Staffelbach then discovered the victim, Dwayne Smith,
dead at the scene. The post-mortem report, supported by the
testimony of Medical Examiner Frederick Hellman, confirmed the
official cause of death as multiple gunshot wounds.
An acquaintance of [Appellant], Rondale Van, testified that
on the day of the murder, he saw [Appellant] standing near an
alleyway behind Van's property, with the victim approaching in
the same direction from across the street. When Van turned to
reenter his home, he heard three to four gunshots and
immediately spotted [Appellant] running through the alleyway.
Steven Couch, another acquaintance of [Appellant], testified that
he conversed with [Appellant] following the murder of their
mutual friend, Marvin Fitzgerald, which occurred approximately
two weeks prior to the murder of Dwayne Smith. According to
Couch, [Appellant] made several remarks indicating his desire to
seek revenge on Fitzgerald's killer. Additionally, following
Smith's murder, [Appellant] suggested he was responsible for
Smith's death, stating that he did not want his friend Fitzgerald
to "die alone."
To rebut the testimony of the Commonwealth's witnesses,
[d]efense counsel called Edna Wilson, the grandmother of
[Appellant], as an alibi witness. On the morning of October 16,
Wilson was in her home at 1026 McDowell Avenue, located a few
hundred yards from the scene of the shooting. After taking a
shower, Wilson entered her bedroom and briefly seated herself
on the bed before hearing the gunshots. Wilson then testified
that she immediately checked the time on her television, noted it
was 8:15 a.m., and walked to her hallway. Wilson then shouted
downstairs that she heard gunshots, and was answered by an
unseen individual who she claimed to be [Appellant]. Prior to
trial, the Commonwealth administered an interview of Wilson in
preparation for her testimony as an alibi witness. According to
her statement to police, Wilson has a rule in her home, of which
all her grandchildren were aware. Wilson was adamant that
nothing illegal, whether firearms or drugs, were allowed in her
home at any time.
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Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 7/2/14, at 2 – 3 (citations to the record omitted).
Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and possessing an
instrument of crime on February 8, 2013. On April 20, 2013, Appellant was
sentenced to a term of life imprisonment, and a consecutive term of 2½ to 5
years’ incarceration. He filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as a timely
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b).
Appellant now presents the following question for our review:
I. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred when it denied
[Appellant’s] motion in limine to preclude references made
by his grandmother, Edna Wilson, regarding her general
rule that guns and drugs are not permitted in her house
since any probative value it may have had was outweighed
by the prejudice it would cause by implying to the jury that
[Appellant] had previously brought these items into her
home?
Appellant’s brief at 5.
We review claims of evidentiary error under the following standard:
The admission of evidence is solely within the province of the
trial court, and a decision thereto will not be disturbed absent a
showing of an abuse of discretion. “An abuse of discretion is not
merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the
law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
bias[,] or ill-will discretion ... is abused.”
Commonwealth v. Murray, 83 A.3d 137, 155-56 (Pa. 2013) (internal
citations omitted).
Appellant first argues the trial court erred in permitting Wilson to
testify about her “house rule” barring guns and drugs from her residence,
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because that testimony was not relevant. He also contends it was
impermissible evidence regarding alleged prior bad acts. See Pa.R.E.
404(b)(1) (providing that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with that character”).
Wilson described her “house rule” to the police during an interview
conducted as part of their homicide investigation. Prior to trial, Appellant
filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude testimony regarding Wilson’s
“house rule.” The trial court denied this motion. Appellant’s counsel then
introduced Wilson as a defense witness at trial. During his questioning of
Wilson, he solicited testimony about the “house rule.” The Commonwealth
did not inquire about the “house rule” on-cross examination.
Even if the statement were admitted in error, we believe the harmless
error doctrine applies.
Error is considered to be harmless where: 1) the error did not
prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; or 2)
the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of
other, untainted evidence which was substantially similar to
{ "pageset": "S2d
the erroneously admitted evidence; or 3) the
properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so
overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so
insignificant by comparison that the error could not have
contributed to the verdict.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 573 A.2d 536, 538-539 (Pa. 1990).
First, we note that it was Appellant, and not the Commonwealth, who
introduced evidence to the jury regarding this rule. Moreover, Wilson
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unequivocally testified that she had never seen Appellant bring contraband
into her home. N.T., 2/7/13, at 191. Consequently, even assuming the trial
court admitted this evidence in error, that error did not prejudice Appellant.
Moreover, as observed by the trial court,
Overall, [] Wilson's testimony regarding her house rules was not
pivotal to [Appellant’s] case as a whole. The concern of unfair
prejudice caused by the existence of a house rule was
overshadowed by the testimony placing [Appellant] near the
scene of the crime. In this sense, the testimony of the alibi
witness corroborated the testimony of the Commonwealth's
witnesses, a risk of which [Appellant] was very aware. Taken as
a whole, it is likely the jury's attention was not focused on the
existence of a house rule, but rather on [Appellant’s] being
placed only one hundred yards from the murder.
TCO at 8. We agree the properly admitted evidence of Appellant’s guilt was
so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of any error so insignificant by
comparison, that any testimony about the “house rule” could not have
contributed to the jury’s verdict.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/23/2014
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