Com. v. Reaves, J.

J-S75021-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JOSEPH D. REAVES
Appellant No. 433 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order January 17, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1219021-1987
BEFORE: ALLEN, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUNDY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 23, 2014
Joseph D. Reaves (Reaves) appeals, pro se, from the order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing his petition
brought pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 Upon careful
review, we affirm.
The underlying facts of the case are as follows. After luring an
insurance adjuster inside his home under false pretenses, Reaves brutally
and repeatedly beat and raped the victim overnight before driving her to
another county and dumping her in a secluded area. On April 4, 1988,
Reaves pled guilty to rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,
aggravated assault, simple assault, kidnapping, and robbery. The Honorable
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1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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Jane Cutler Greenspan sentenced Reaves to an aggregate prison term of
22½ to 90 years. Reaves did not file a petition to withdraw his guilty plea
nor did he file a direct appeal from his judgment of sentence.
On September 10, 1991, Reaves filed his first PCRA petition, which
was dismissed on July 12, 1993 after his appointed counsel filed a
Finley/Turner “no merit” letter. Our Court affirmed the dismissal on
August 11, 1994. No further appeal was taken.
Reaves filed the current pro se petition on November 29, 2010. On
January 17, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely and
noted that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider the petition.
Reaves filed a timely notice of appeal on January 30, 2014. Upon receipt of
a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal, the PCRA
court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on April 29, 2014.
The PCRA requires that all petitions for relief be filed within one year of
conclusion of direct review, unless the petitioner demonstrates that his
untimely filing is excused by one or more of three statutorily enumerated
exceptions. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Compliance with the timely filing
requirement is excused only where: (i) the failure to raise the claim was the
result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or laws
of the United States; (ii) the facts forming the basis of the claim were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence (newly-discovered evidence); (iii) the right
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asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court
of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time
period provided and has been held by that court to apply retroactively. 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).2
A petition invoking one or more of these claimed exceptions must be
filed within sixty days of the date that the claim could first have been
presented. Id. Absent such an exception, the courts lack authority to
entertain an untimely petition because the PCRA’s time-bar provisions are
jurisdictional in nature. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 841 A.2d 136,
140 (Pa. Super. 2003); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999).
The petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate that the exception to the
time bar applies, Commonwealth v. Beasley, 741 A.2d 1258, 1261 (Pa.
1999), and that his petition was “filed within sixty days of the date the claim
could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
Here, Reaves’ judgment of sentence became final on August 29, 1988,
because Reaves failed to seek review within the thirty-day period available
for filing an appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Reaves sought PCRA collateral
relief in 1991, which was dismissed as untimely. Reaves waited an
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2
Pursuant to the 1995 Amendments to the PCRA, if a judgment of sentence
became final before January 16, 1996, the petitioner had until January 16,
1997 to file his petition. Reaves exhausted this option when he filed his first
untimely PCRA petition in 1991. Additionally, because this case involves
Reaves’ second petition, which he filed in 2010, the grace period has long
expired.
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additional nineteen years before filing the instant PCRA petition in 2010.
Thus, for PCRA relief to be granted, Reaves is required to prove an exception
to the time-bar.
Reaves argues that the “PCRA erred by rejecting newly discovered
evidence of military induced Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), the
same diagnosis available in 1988, yet the Court rush [sic] to sentence
Appellant.” Brief for Appellant, at 7.
To satisfy the criteria for newly-discovered evidence, a petitioner must
show that the evidence: (1) has been discovered after the trial and could not
have been obtained prior to the conclusion of trial; (2) is not merely
corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used for impeachment purposes;
and (4) is of such a nature and character that a different verdict will likely
result if a new trial is granted. Commonwealth v. Henry, 706 A.2d 313,
321 (Pa. 1997).
Here, Reaves’ diagnosis of PTSD cannot be deemed newly discovered
because the diagnosis was available in 1988 at the time of sentencing. See
Henry, supra. Additionally, at sentencing, counsel brought to the court’s
attention Reaves’ emotional problems while in the Army. N.T. Sentencing
Hearing, 7/28/88, at 8-9. Accordingly, Reaves fails to establish the newly
discovered evidence exception.
Reaves further claims that the PCRA Court erred by not granting a
hearing based on a change in the law or an alleged failure of trial counsel to
communicate a plea offer made by the prosecution. Reaves bases his
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argument on Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012) and Lafler v.
Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012), where the United States Supreme Court
found counsel’s failure to present a plea offer to a defendant constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. This
Court has concluded that neither Frye nor Lafler created a new
constitutional right. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649 (Pa.
Super. 2013). “The right to effective assistance of counsel during the plea
bargaining process has been recognized for decades,” Commonwealth v.
Lewis, 63 A.3d 1274, 1280 (Pa. Super. 2013) and cannot, therefore, be a
newly recognized constitutional right. Accordingly, Frye and Lafler do not
apply retroactively, and do not provide an exception to the time-bar set
forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Id.
Reaves also alleges that his sentence was illegal and constitutes an
exception to PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar. This claim is also without merit.
Issues concerning legality of sentence are cognizable under the PCRA.
Commonwealth v. Hockenberry, 689 A.2d 283 (Pa. Super. 1997).
However, even where petitioner alleges an illegal sentence, an untimely
PCRA petition is unreviewable. Commonwealth v. Beck, 848 A.2d 987(Pa. Super. 2004). Because Reaves’ petition is time-barred, his allegations
of an illegal sentence cannot be reviewed.
Finally, Reaves argues that he is entitled to relief because the trial
court abused its discretion when sentencing him. Claims challenging the
discretionary aspect of sentencing are not cognizable under the PCRA, which
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only permits challenges to the legality of a sentence. 42 Pa.C.S. §
9543(a)(2)(vii). Accordingly, no relief is due.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/23/2014
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