Com. v. Riley, D.

J-A05044-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DANIEL RILEY,
Appellant No. 212 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 16, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006088-2012
BEFORE: OLSON, J., OTT, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 26, 2016
This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence imposed after a jury
convicted Appellant of first-degree murder, robbery, conspiracy to commit
robbery, carrying a firearm on a public street in Philadelphia, and possessing
an instrument of crime.1
The trial court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history
as follows:
On September 29, 2011, into the early morning hours of
September 30, 2011, [the victim] met with friends at J’s Big
Shot Lounge, a bar at the corner of Stenton Avenue and
Narragansett Street in Philadelphia. [The victim] had recently
purchased a Buick LeSabre, which he parked on the street near
the bar.
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1
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502, 3701, 903, 6108, and 907, respectively.
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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While [the victim] was in the bar, [Appellant] was on the
street outside that bar with [Thomas] Robinson, Terell Toson,
Derick Toliver, and Markese Martin. [Appellant] stated that he
wanted to rob [the victim] who was known by the group to sell
drugs in that area. Each member of the group agreed to rob
[the victim]. While [the victim] was still inside the bar,
[Appellant] left the scene in order to obtain a firearm. Before
leaving, [Appellant] directed Robinson and Toson to break the
window of [the victim’s] car, in order to delay [the victim] should
he try to leave the bar before [Appellant] returned. Toson
attempted to break the car window with a rock, but was
unsuccessful. Robinson then took a larger rock and threw it
through the car window, breaking it. Robinson and Toson then
walked away from the car without entering it or taking anything
from it. [Appellant] returned with a gun shortly after the
window was broken. [Appellant] and Robinson stood near the
bar awaiting [the victim’s] exit, while Toson, Martin, and Toliver
stayed down the street.
[The victim] stayed in the bar until approximately 3:15
a.m. Upon leaving, he was accompanied by his friend[,] Warren
Roane, the bar manager[,] Julie Fluellen, the barmaid Mae, and
the victim’s ex-girlfriend, Missy. They were going to go eat
breakfast together after the bar closed.
After leaving the bar, [the victim] went to his car with
Mae, where he was confronted by [Appellant] and Robinson.
[Appellant] ordered [the victim] to “give it up” while pointing his
gun at [the victim’s] chest. [The victim] told [Appellant] “you
goin’ have to shoot me,” and pushed the gun away. [Appellant]
then fired multiple shots at [the victim] as [the victim] began to
flee back towards the bar. [Appellant] and Robinson then fled
down Narragansett Street, away from the bar. Surveillance
cameras captured the entire incident on video.
[The victim] was shot in the left side and leg. [The victim]
told Roane he knew who shot him, though he never stated a
name before dying. [The victim] and his friends flagged down a
police vehicle that was in the area, which transported him to
Einstein Hospital. [The victim] did not regain consciousness
while in the hospital and eventually died on October 8, 2011.
Police went to interview [Appellant’s] girlfriend on March
13, 2012, and saw [Appellant] in the home. [Appellant] refused
to come out of the kitchen and officers secured him. When
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exiting the home, [Appellant] attempted to flee but was
restrained by police. Initially, [Appellant] gave an alias at the
time of his arrest. However, upon seeing his name and picture
displayed on the computer in the police car, [Appellant] stated,
“You guys got me. I’m going away for a long time.” When
asked why [Appellant] thought he was going away for a long
time, [Appellant] replied, “I killed someone.”
Trial Court Opinion, 3/26/15, at 2-4 (citations and footnotes omitted).2
Appellant and Robinson were tried together. Appellant was found
guilty of the aforementioned crimes, and the trial court immediately
sentenced him to mandatory life in prison for his first-degree murder
conviction.3 This timely appeal follows. Both Appellant and the trial court
have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issue:
1. Did the [trial] court err by allowing a co-defendant’s
confession to be introduced at trial where it implicated
[Appellant] in violation of [Appellant’s] Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant’s claim involves application of the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968), to Robinson’s
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2
Prior to trial, Appellant successfully sought suppression of his second
statement to the police. N.T., 6/26/13, at 5.
3
Robinson was convicted on all charges, including second-degree murder.
The trial court immediately sentenced him to the mandatory life in prison.
Robinson filed an appeal, which is docketed at 269 EDA 2015 and shall be
addressed in a separate decision.
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statement to police that was introduced during their joint trial. Our
Supreme Court has recently summarized:
The general rule in a joint trial of co-defendants is that the
law presumes that the jury can follow an appropriate instruction,
which explains that evidence introduced with respect to only one
defendant cannot be considered against other defendants.
Bruton departed from this salutary general rule only by
concluding that where there are powerfully incriminating
statements made against a non-testifying co-defendant who
stands side by side with the accused, such statements can be
devastating as well as inherently suspect when they shift blame
to the accused. Following Bruton, the U.S. Supreme Court has
approved redaction and a limiting instruction as a means of
eliminating the possible spillover prejudice arising from the
admission of a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession against
that co-defendant at a joint trial. Bruton and its progeny
establish Sixth Amendment norms governing state criminal
trials, and this Court has had ample opportunity to consider and
apply the precepts. In our implementation of this federal law,
we have explained that the challenged co-defendant’s statement
must be incriminating on its face and that redactions involving
the substitution of neutral pronouns (such as [“he,” “him” or “the
other guy”]) instead of names or other obvious methods of
deletion, do not obviously identify the other co-defendant’s.
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 104 A.3d 267, 294 (Pa. 2014).
Appellant concedes that the trial court implemented Pennsylvania’s
application of Bruton, but nevertheless argues that “the use of phrase, ‘the
other guy’ was a ‘similarly obvious’ symbol of redaction that alerted the jury
to the fact that Robinson has actually implicated [Appellant] in [the victim’s]
death.” Appellant’s Brief at 8.4 In support of this claim, Appellant relies
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4
The trial court also gave the appropriate limiting instruction regarding
Robinson’s statement. See N.T., 9/15/14, at 165-66.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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upon the federal decision of the Third Circuit Untied States Court of Appeals
in Vazquez v. Wilson, 550 F.3d 270 (3rd Cir. 2008).
However, in Daniels, supra, where the two appellees raised similar
claims, our Supreme Court held:
We need not engage the parties’ reliance upon decisional
law from other jurisdictions, including the Third Circuit U.S.
Court of Appeals, because those cases do not control, and
there is ample decisional law from this Court following and
applying Bruton.
Daniels, 104 A.3d at 294 (citation omitted). Thus, the Daniels’ decision
renders Appellant’s claim without merit.5
Even if a Bruton violation occurred, our review of the record
supports the Commonwealth’s contention that the other properly admitted
evidence of Appellant’s guilt was overwhelming. Two of Appellant’s other
cohorts identified Appellant as the shooter from the incident as depicted on
video surveillance. See N.T., 9/9/14, at 218-19 (Toson); N.T., 9/11/14, at
212 (Toliver). In addition, Appellant’s actions following the shooting,
including evading police and giving an alias, evinced his consciousness of
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(Footnote Continued)
5
In fact, Appellant concedes that our Supreme Court rejected Vazquez in
Daniels. Appellant’s Brief at 9, n.1. Nevertheless, he “maintains that the
[Vazquez] approach is the proper standard under federal law, and
specifically reserves the right to pursue the Bruton violation in this case in
future federal proceedings on the basis that his Sixth Amendment rights
were violated by the introduction of Robinson’s confession.” Id.
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guilt. Therefore, even if any error occurred in redacting Robinson’s
statement, it would be harmless. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rivera,
773 A.2d 131, 138-39 (Pa. 2001) (holding that, even assuming admission of
co-defendants’ statements violated Bruton, any error was harmless in light
of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/26/2016
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