Gleeson, M. v. B. Zipay Contractors, Inc.

J-S53016-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MICHAEL GLEESON IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
B. ZIPAY CONTRATORS, INC.
MICHAEL GLEESON
v.
BERNARD ZIPAY AND KATHLEEN ZIPAY
APPEAL OF: MICHAEL GLEESON No. 2066 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered November 5, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Civil Division at No(s): 2008 CIV 3328
2009 CIV 2207
BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY OTT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 09, 2015
Michael Gleeson appeals from the order entered on November 5, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County denying his petition for
leave to file a certificate of readiness. Following a thorough review of the
submissions by the parties, certified record and relevant law, we quash the
appeal.
By agreement the underlying matter was submitted to arbitration. On
December 6, 2013, the arbitrator granted defendants’ (Zipay Contractors,
Inc. and Bernard and Kathleen Zipay, hereinafter “Zipay”) motion for
J-S53016-15
summary judgment. Gleeson did not appeal this decision. On July 3, 2014,
Gleeson filed a petition for leave to file a certificate of readiness. The trial
court determined the arbitrator had already granted summary judgment and
on November 5, 2014, denied the petition. The instant appeal was filed on
December 3, 2014.
The order appealed from is not a final and appealable order. See
Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1).1 As determined by the trial court, the final and
appealable order was the arbitrator’s order granting summary judgment in
favor of Zipay. An appeal lies only from a final order unless otherwise
permitted by rule or statute. See McCutcheon v. Philadelphia Electric
Co., 788 A.2d 345 (Pa. 2002). In essence, Gleeson is seeking to resurrect
his expired appellate rights through the denial of a subsequent, non-
appealable order.
Accordingly, the November 5, 2014 order denying Gleeson permission
to file a certificate of readiness is an improper appeal from a non-appealable
order.
____________________________________________
1
“A final order is any order that disposes of all claims and all parties.”
Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1).
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Appeal quashed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/9/2015
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