Com. v. Gonzalez-Padilla, E.

J-S04006-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
EFRAIN GONZALEZ-PADILLA,
Appellant No. 744 MDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order April 3, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0001755-2011
BEFORE: BOWES, ALLEN, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JANUARY 28, 2015
Efrain Gonzalez-Padilla appeals from the April 3, 2014 order denying
him PCRA relief. We affirm.
On August 8, 2012, Appellant was found guilty of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver. We summarize the facts
underlying Appellant’s conviction of the offense in question. At
approximately 11:30 p.m. on November 1, 2011, Sergeant Brett Hopkins,
Detective Ryan Mong, and Detective Adam Saul, all of whom were assigned
to the Lebanon County Drug Task Force, were conducting an undercover
investigation of the 9th and Mifflin Street area in Lebanon City. The
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S04006-15
operation was initiated in response to complaints about open-air drug
dealing.
Sergeant Hopkins was in plain clothes and was standing on the corner
of 9th and Mifflin Streets, which were lit by streetlights, when Appellant
nodded at him. Detectives Mong and Saul were observing the interaction
from a vehicle. Sergeant Hopkins approached Appellant and said that he
wanted to purchase $50 worth of cocaine. He handed Appellant pre-
recorded currency consisting of two twenty-dollar bills and two five-dollar
bills.
Appellant crossed the street, spoke with a group of men, returned to
Sergeant Hopkins, and told him that he would have to wait for the cocaine.
After about one-half hour, Appellant motioned for the officer to follow him
onto Partridge Street, a dark alley. After arriving in a secluded area,
Appellant handed Sergeant Hopkins a knotted plastic bag containing what
appeared to be crack cocaine. A chemical field test of the substance
confirmed that the substance was cocaine.
After the transaction, Appellant left the alley. Sergeant Hopkins
radioed the other detectives to arrest Appellant and provided a description.
Appellant was apprehended by Detectives Mong and Saul immediately
thereafter. At the scene, Sergeant Hopkins identified Appellant as the male
who sold him the crack cocaine. Police testified that they recovered two
five-dollar bills from Appellant, and the bills matched the serial numbers of
the two five-dollar bills used as the buy money by Sergeant Hopkins.
-2-
J-S04006-15
After his conviction, Appellant was sentenced on September 26, 2012,
to two to four years imprisonment. Appellant did not file a direct appeal, but
he did file a timely PCRA petition. Counsel was appointed, and after a
hearing, relief was denied. Appellant presents these issues on appeal from
the denial of PCRA relief.
A. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct
appeal as requested by defendant?
B. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-
examine the police officer regarding the denomination of
currency found on defendant’s person at the of arrest where
[the] testimony differed from [the police] report?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
Initially, we outline the applicable principles regarding our review of
the PCRA court’s determinations herein:
An appellate court reviews the PCRA court's findings of fact to
determine whether they are supported by the record, and reviews
its conclusions of law to determine whether they are free from
legal error. The scope of review is limited to the findings of the
PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level.
Commonwealth v. Freeland, 2014 WL 6982658, 4 (Pa.Super. 2014)
(citation omitted). “The PCRA court's credibility determinations, when
supported by the record, are binding” for purposes of appellate review.
Commonwealth v. Watkins, 2014 WL 7392224, 3 (Pa. 2014).
Additionally,
To establish trial counsel's ineffectiveness, a petitioner
must demonstrate: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit;
(2) counsel had no reasonable basis for the course of action or
-3-
J-S04006-15
inaction chosen; and (3) counsel's action or inaction prejudiced
the petitioner. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Commonwealth v.
Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987).
Freeland supra 2014 WL 6982658 at 4.
Appellant initially argues that he should have been afforded PCRA relief
in the form of an appeal nunc pro tunc since “Defendant expressly requested
Trial Counsel to file an appeal on his behalf. However, Trial Counsel failed to
do so.” Appellant’s brief at 7. We observe that counsel is deemed ineffective
per se if counsel fails to file an appeal requested by a defendant, and, in
such circumstance, a defendant is automatically entitled to reinstatement of
his appellate rights. Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999).
The PCRA court, however, expressly rejected Appellant’s testimony at
the PCRA hearing that he asked trial counsel to file a direct appeal. The
PCRA court concluded that trial counsel credibly testified that Appellant did
not ask him to file an appeal. The PCRA court noted that trial counsel stated
at the PCRA hearing that he had a specific recollection of discussing the
matter with Appellant after Appellant expressed unhappiness at sentencing.
Counsel told Appellant that the jury verdict was unassailable and that the
sentence was the only viable issue to appeal. Appellant then responded that
he did not want to appeal his two-year sentence.
Counsel also testified that after he received Appellant’s sentencing
order, he sent Appellant a copy of it with a cover letter, written in Spanish,
which explained Appellant’s appellate rights. Although Appellant stated at
-4-
J-S04006-15
the PCRA hearing that he sent a letter to counsel asking for an appeal,
counsel testified that he never received a letter from Appellant requesting a
direct appeal. Counsel further testified that, if he had received such a letter
from Appellant, he would have filed an appeal. The trial court specifically
found trial counsel’s testimony to be credible. Trial Court Opinion, 6/17/14,
at 9.
The record supports the trial court’s decision to credit trial counsel’s
testimony that Appellant did not request a direct appeal instead of
Appellant’s contrary testimony. That credibility determination therefore is
binding on this Court. In light of this credibility determination, we must
conclude that an appeal was not requested and that the PCRA court correctly
denied reinstatement of Appellant’s direct appeal rights. Commonwealth
v. Markowitz, 32 A.3d 706 (Pa.Super. 2011).
Appellant’s second contention is that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance in failing to explore the fact that there was an
inconsistency between the trial testimony, wherein police indicated that they
recovered the two pre-recorded five-dollar bills from Appellant at the time of
his arrest, and the police report, which stated that a ten-dollar bill was found
on Appellant. As noted by the PCRA court, trial counsel was aware of this
discrepancy. The assistant district attorney had informed trial counsel that
the reference to a $10.00 bill in the police report was a typographical error,
and that the officers actually recovered the two five-dollar bills that were
-5-
J-S04006-15
entered into evidence as exhibits. After consideration of the facts,
argument, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of PCRA relief as to this
allegation based upon pages nine through twelve of the trial court opinion
authored on June 17, 2014 by the Honorable Bradford H. Charles.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/28/2015
-6-
Circulated 01/13/2015 02:01 PM
ENTE~N[)"FHElCOURT OF COMMON PLEAS LEBANON COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
lOI~ JUN ! 8 P. 3: Oll
CRIMINAL DIVISION
CLERK OF COUli-
LtBAN(l~1. Pt.
COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA
NO. CP·38·CR·1755·2011
v.
EFRAIN GONZALEZ·PADILLA
APPEARANCES
Nichole Eisenhart, Esquire For Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
Erin Zimmerer, Esquire For Efrain Gonzalez·Padilia
MONTGOMERY & ZIMMERER
OPINION BY CHARLES, J., June 17, 2014
Efrain Gonzalez·Padilia (hereafter "DEFENDANT") filed a Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief (PCRA) on September 13, 2013, alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel at his jury trial held on August 8, 2012.
After hearing testimony from DEFENDANT, his trial counsel, and the
arresting officers, we concluded that DEFENDANT's arguments simply
had no merit. We therefore denied hi~ Petiti~n 'on Ap~iI ~,2014. For the
. .,
reasons that follow, we affirm our decision to deny DEFENDANT's PCRA
Petition.
1
Circulated 01/13/2015 02:01 PM
I. FACTS
On November 1, 2011 around 11 :30 p.m., Sergeant Brett Hopkins,
Detective Ryan Mong, and Detective' Adam Saul of the Lebanon County
Drug Task Force Were conducting an undercover investigation of the 9th
and Mifflin Street area in Lebanon City in response to complaints about
open air drug dealing. (8/8/2012 N.T. 17). Sgt. Hopkins was standing on
the northwest corner of 9th and Mifflin Streets across from the Liberty
Bar in civilian clothes when DEFENDANT nodded to him from across the
street. (8/8/2012 N.T. 17). Det. Mong and Det. Saul remained in the
vehicle as surveillance officers. Sgt. Hopkins crossed the street and told
DEFENDANT that he was looking for $50.00 worth of "hard". (8/8/2012
N.T. 17). DEFENDANT asked in broken English, "rock?" (8/8/2012 N.T.
17-18). Sgt. Hopkins replied, "Yes," and DEFENDANT requested money.
(8/8/2012 N.T. 18-19).
Sgt. Hopkins explained at trial that the officers typically photocopy
and pre-record the serial numbers of each of the bills they intend to use
for their undercover purchases. They do so in the event that they are
able to recover the buy money within a short period of time after the
undercover sale so that they can link the sale to the defendant.
(8/8/2012 N.T. 19). Exhibit 3 at trial identified the photograph of the
$50.00 that Sgt. Hopkins possessed the night of November 1,2011. This
$50.00 consisted of two $20.00 bills and two $5.00 bills.
2
Circulated 01/13/2015 02:01 PM
After Sgt. Hopkins gave DEFENDANT the pre-recorded buy money,
DEFENDANT crossed the street and began speaking with a group of
men. (8/8/2012 N.T. 21). He returned fifteen minutes later and informed
sgt. Hopkins that he would have to wait another 20 minutes. (8/8/2012
N.T.21). When he returned, he motioned for Sgt. Hopkins to follow him
west on Mifflin Street to Partridge Street - a nearby dark alley.
(8/8.12012 N. T. 21-22).. After· traveling; south on Partridge Street,
DEFENDANT handed Sgt. Hopkins a knotted plastic bag containing what
Sgt. Hopkins suspected to be crack cocaine. (8/8/2012 N.T. 22).
DEFENDANT torE) open the bag and sprinkled the substance into Sgt.
Hopkins' hand. (8/8/2012 N.T. 22). A chemical field test of the
substance confirmed the presence of cocaine.
A local bar is located at the 9th and Mifflin Street intersection, and
there were several people walking around in the area. (8/8/2012 N.T.
26). However, there are several streetlights in front of the bar, and Sgt.
Hopkins explained at t(ial that the lighting at the corner of 9th and Mifflin
Streets was very good -at the time he was ·interacting With' DEFENDANT.
(8/8/2012 N.T. 25). He explained that he was able to observe and talk to
DEFENDANT for at least a half an hour. (8/8/2012 N.T. 25). Det. Mong
explained that he was unable to identify DEFENDANT from his
surveillance position while he was interacting with Sgt. Hopkins, but he
was able to get a general idea of his clothing and build. (8/8/2012 N.T.
30-31, 37).
3
Circulated 01/13/2015 02:01 PM
After DEFENDANT provided Sgt. Hopkins with the cocaine,
DEFEN DANT traveled south on Partridge Street and turned left onto
Monument Street back towards 9th Street. (8/8/2012 N.T. 24). Sgt.
Hopkins immediately contacted the surveillance officers to describe
DEFENDANT and his location. (8/8/2012 N.T. 24, 36). Det. Mong and
Det. Saul were positioned in an area where they could observe
DEFittiNDANJ.exit.MonumentStreet onto 9th Street. (8/8/2012 N.T. 31);
After the surveillance unit apprehended DEFENDANT and took him into
custody, Sgt. Hopkins identified him as the same man who sold him
cocaine on Partridge Street. (8/8/2012 N.T. 18, 25). Similarly, Det.
Mong identified the man he took into custody as the same individual who
he saw walk down Mifflin Street with Sgt. Hopkins and then return into
his field of view from Monument Street. (8/8/2012 N.T. 37-38). Det.
Mong testified that he did not see any other individuals in that area at
the time DEFENDANT emerged from Monument Street. (8/8/2012 N.T.
38). He explained that there was no possibility that he arrested any of
the other rn-diliiduals on the ;street corner by mistake. (8/8/2:012N:-r.·
38).
After the officers arrested DEFENDANT, they transported him to
Central Booking and searched him. (8/8/2012 N.T. 33). The officers
recovered two $5.00 bills from DEFENDANT. These bills matched the
serial numbers of the pre-recorded money that Sgt. Hopkins used to
purchase the cocaine. (8/8/2012 N.T. 34). The police report mistakenly
4
Circulated 01/13/2015 02:01 PM
states that the officers recovered a $10.00 bill from DEFENDANT. Prior
to Trial, Assistant District Attorney Nichole Eisenhart spoke with
DEFENDANT's trial counsel, Attorney John Gragson (hereafter "TRIAL
COUNSEL"). She explained to him that the reference to a $10.00 bill in
the police report was a typographical error, and that the officers actually
recovered the two $5.00 bills entered as Exhibit 3. (4/3/2014 N.T. 15).
As a res\Jlt of th~ abo've episode, DEFENDANT was charged with
one count of -Delivery of a Controlled Substance and one count of
PO'ssession of Drug Paraphernalia. On August 8, 2012, a jury found
DEFENDANT guilty of Delivery of a Controlled Substance and not guilty
of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. We imposed a sentence of 2-4
years on DEFENDANT. At sentencing, when asked if he had anything to
say, DEFENDANT responded with; [t]hat I am remorseful. That I am
guilty." (8/8/2012 N.T. 3). DEFENDANT did not file an appeal.
On September 13, 201.3, DEFENDANT filed a Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. After a Hearing on April 3, 2014, we concluded that
DEFENDANT was not entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction Relief
Act, and we denied his Petition. DEFENDANT appealed to the Superior
Court on May 1, 20.14. We author this Opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925 to address DEFENDANT's appeal.
II. THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF ACT
The Post-Conviction Relief Act (hereafter "PCRA") provides a
process by which persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and
5
Circulated 01/13/2015 02:01 PM
persons serving illegal sentences can obtain relief. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542.
The PCRA is the exclusive method by which collateral relief may be
obtained in Pennsylvania. Commonwealth v. Chester, 733 A.2d 1242,
1250 (Pa. 1999). To be eligible for relief, a PCRA defendant must prove
the following elements by a preponderance of evidence:
(1) That he has been convicted of a crime under the laws of this
·:·; •.,Common.w.ealth.and th.at he is serving a·sBntence for that crime;
~
(2) That the conviction resulted from one of the enumerated errors
listed in § 9543(a)(2) of the PCRA;
(3) That the allegation of error has not previously been litigated or
waived; and
(4) That any failure to litigate the issue previously was not the result of
a rational, strategic, or tactical decision by the Defendant or his
counsel.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.
When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised,
additioMI principles apply'. Trial cciunsel is presum'ed :to b~ effective, ~nd .
the Defendant bears the burden of proving otherwise. Commonwealth v.
Lewis, 708 A.2.d 497, 500 (Pa.Super. 1998); Commonwealth v. Williams,
570 A.2d 75, 81 (Pa. 1990). In determining whether counsel rendered
ineffective assistance, the Court must first determine whether the issue
underlying. the claim of ineffectiveness has even arguable merit.
Commonwealth v. DiNicola, 751 A.2d 197, 198 (Pa.Super. 2000);
6
Circulated 01/13/2015 02:01 PM
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 588 A.2d 1303, 1305 (Pa. 1991). If the
. claim is without arguable merit, the Court's inquiry ends, as counsel will
not be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue. Id.
Even if the underlying claim is of arguable merit, the Defendant must
establish that the course of action chosen by counsel had no reasonable
basis designed to effectuate the Defendant's interest. Id. In addition, the
Defendant must· also establish that but for counsel's deficient
performance, the result of the trial would have been different. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
DEFENDANT's PCRA Petition sets forth two allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel. DEFENDANT first argues that TRIAL
COUNSEL was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal upon
DEFENDANT's request. DEFENDANT also argues that TRIAL COUNSEL
was ineffective for failing to properly cross examine and object to
testimony regarding the officer's buy money. More specifically,
DEFEN DANT stresses that the police recovered a $1.0.00 _bill from him,
,'-,:: .~'''~':''':~''., :",:,~-,' .~ . . . .-......- . - .
but the officer's buy money consisted of two $5.00 bills. After review of
the record, we conclude that DEFENDANT's arguments have no merit.
A. Failure to File a Direct Appeal
At his PCRA Hearing, DEFENDANT explained that he wrote a letter
to TRIAL COUNSEL asking him to file a direct appeal. (4/3/2014 N.T. 6-
7; Exhibit 1). He also explains that he spoke to TRIAL COUNSEL two
7
Circulated 01/13/2015 02:01 PM
weeks prior to his trial about his interest in filing a direct appeal.
(4/3/2014 N.T. 7). He therefore argues that because TRIAL COUNSEL
failed to file his appeal, he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
TRIAL COUNSEL testified that he remembered DEFENDANT
discussing hi's Post-Sentence' Motions and his desire to file an appeal
prior to trial. (4/3/2014 N.T. 11-12). However, he also remembered
spe.``jngtoDEf=.E;NPANJ the.day oUria.!., WILen DEFENDANT indicated
that he was dissatisfied with the verdict, TRIAL COUNSEL explained to
him that he could not then appeal the jury verdict; he could only appeal
the sentence. At that point, he asked DEFENDANT if he wanted to
appeal. DEFENDANT indicated that he did not wish to appeal, and that
he would accept the two year minimum sentence. (4/3/2014 N.T. 13-14).
TRIAL COUNSEL also testified that when he received
DEFENDANT's sentencing Order in the mail, he furnished it to
DEFENDANT along with a letter written in Spanish indicating that he had
10 days to file a Rule 720 Motion and 30 days to appeal. (4/3/2014 N.T.
11-12;, Exhibit 2). i TRIAL COUNSEL explained that he never received a
letter back from DEFENDANT, and had he received such a letter, he
would have taken action. (4/3/2014N.T. 13).
We find the testimony of TRIAL COUNSEL to be credible. It is'
evident that TRIAL COUNSEL and DEFENDANT discussed the issue of
an appeal on several occasions. TRIAL COUNSEL was clearly aware
that DEFENDANT was considering filing an appeal. However,
8
Circulated 01/13/2015 02:01 PM
DEFENDANT gave conflicting information regarding his desire to appeal.
In part because of this conflicting information, TRIAL COUNSEL wrote
and sent a letter to DEFENDANT advising him of his appeal options.
DEFENDANT never responded .. All of the above suggests that TRIAL
COUNSEL was ready and willing to file an appeal on DEFENDANT's
behalf at his request.
We conclude that TRIA.l COUNSEL never received instructions from
DEFENDANT to appeal at or following his sentencing hearing. We find
TRIAL COUNSEL's testimony on the appeal issue to be credible. We
reject the credibility of DEFENDANT's. claim that he mailed a letter
instructing TRIAL COUNSEL to appeal. Accordingly, DEFENDANT's first
PCRA issue will be denied.
B. Failure to Properly Cross Examine and Object to Buy Money
DEFENDANT argues that the he was not carrying two $5.00 bills at
the time of his arrest, and that the officers instead recovered a $10.00
bill from him, as indicated in the police report. (4/3/2014 N.T. 8). He
'.", ",
", ..
notes that the marked money used by Sgt. Hopkins consisted of two
$20.00 bills and two $5.00 bills, and therefore the fact that the officers
may have recovered a $10.00 bill from DEFENDANT is significant
because it indicates that Sgt. Hopkins may not have given DEFENDANT
the buy money as he testified. TRIAL COUNSEL did not object to Det.
Mong's testimony that he recovered two $5.00 bills from DEFENDANT's
person, nor did he cross examine the officers on the inconsistency
9
Circulated 01/13/2015 02:01 PM
between the police report and Det. Mong's testimony. Because of this,
DEFENDANT argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
At the PCRA Hearing, TRIAL COUNSEL explained that he did not
address the money denomination issue because he did not believe it had
any merit. (4/3/2014 N.T. 14). He explained that Det. Mong testified that
the officers recovered two $5:00 bills from DEFENDANT, and this
te~tjmon.y.JD.i;ltGJleJ;LJh.eexbjb.it .tbatwasproduce.d. of th.e recorded money.
(4/3/2014 N.T.15). TRIAL COUNSEL explained that in his experience,
cross examination of a minor discrepancy such as the reference to a
$10.00 bill in the police report "does not mean much to the jury."
(4/3/2014 N.T. 17). Therefore, given all of the evidence, he explained
that the better defense was that of mistaken identity. (4/3/2014 N.T. 16).
While we find that TRIAL COUNSEL could have cross examined the
police officers regarding the discrepancy, we conclude that such a line of
questioning would have been pointless. We note that the detectives
retained the money that was seized from DEFENDANT at the time of his
arrest. The physical money seized remains in the detective's file today
and a copy of the money seized from DEFENDANT at the time of his
arrest was contained in the discovery packet that was turned over to
defense counsel prior to trial. The file does not contain a $10.00 bill; it
contains the two $5.00 bills with recorded serial numbers. Thus,
physical evidence disclosed in discovery and available at trial supported
10
Circulated 01/13/2015 02:01 PM
the Commonwealth's argument that recorded buy money was in the
possession of DEFENDANT.
It is true that Det. Mong's police report erroneously referenced a
$10.00 bill instead of two $5.00 bills. It is also true that TRIAL
COUNSEL could have attempted to impeach Det. Mong with the error in
his report. However, Det. Mong discovered the error prior to trial and
communicated it to the District Attorney's Office. The prosecutor then
notified DEFENDANT prior to trial that the report narrative was
inaccurate. We are confident that under these circumstances, the jury
would have understood that sometimes typographical errors are made
and would have viewed counsel's efforts to focus on this issue as little
more than "grasping at straws."
What is clear is that the money seized from DEFENDANT was
retained as evidence. It was photocopied. The money was available for
inspection by the jury. Making a big deal of the discrepancy in cash
denominations would not have assisted DEFENDANT, and would have
served only to reinforce for the jury the importance of the recorded buy
money found in DEFENDANT's possession.
We do not find TRIAL COUNSEL to be ineffectiv.e for failing to cross
examine police regarding the discrepancy between the $10.00 mentioned
in the police report and the $5.00 bills that were retained as physical
evidence and clearly documented as the buy money seized from
DEFENDANT. Even assuming, arguendo, that TRIAL COUNSEL could
11
Circulated 01/13/2015 02:01 PM
somehow have been deemed negligent for failing to extensively cross-
examine police regarding the discrepancy in the report, we are confident
that such a line of questioning would have had no impact whatsoever on
the jury's verdict. Accordingly, DEFENDANT's second PCRA argument
was properly denied.
III. CONCLUSION
Neither of the PCRA issues presented by DEFENDANT have any
merit whatsoever. Based largely upon our credibility finding in favor of
TRIAL COUNSEL and against DEFENDANT, we conclude that
DEFENDANT never asked' TRIAL COUNSEL to appeal following his
sentencing. Thus, TRIAL COUNSEL cannot be deemed ineffective for
failing to file an appeal. With respect to cross-examination of police, we
conclude that it would have been pointless for TRIAL COUNSEL to cross-
examine pOlice officers regarding a typographical error in the police
report. This is especially true given that the actual funds seized from
DEFENDANT were available for presentgtion. at trial and wer,e
; 1
photocopied as evidence.
Based upon the foregoing, we reject all of DEFENDANT's PCRA
issues. It is with this comment that we will forward the above-referenced
file to the Pennsylvania Superior Court for its analysis.
12