A.M. v. T.V.

J-A01030-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
A.M., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
T.V. :
:
APPEAL OF: A.M. : No. 1408 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order July 28, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Beaver County,
Civil Division at No. 10796 of 2009
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DONOHUE and ALLEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 12, 2015
Appellant, A.M. (“Proposed Intervener”), appeals from the trial court’s
order dated July 28, 2014, denying her petition to intervene in this custody
matter between A.M. (“Father”) and T.V. (“Mother”). The Proposed
Intervener contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant her
standing to intervene based upon her in loco parentis relationship with S.M.
(“Child”). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s order.
The trial court summarized the relevant factual background of this
case as follows:
Proposed Intervener resides in Beaver County. She
is 30 years old and the estranged wife of [Father].
She began to see and date [Father] in and around
the summer of 2009 and came to know the [Child] at
that time. Proposed Intervener moved into the
residence with [Father] in January 2010 and married
him in May of 2010. Proposed Intervener did not
work and performed the caretaking responsibilities
for [Child] of whom [Father] had primary custody.
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[Mother] had limited partial custody in the beginning
that has increased over time.
While married, [Father] and Proposed Intervener had
a second child, who is not the subject of this custody
action. From January of 2010 through at least the
summer of 2013, Proposed Intervener was the
primary caregiver for [Child], and for the child of the
marriage after that [Child’s] birth. Proposed
Intervener testified that she is extremely close with
[Child] and established a bond with her.
[Father] testified and confirmed that Proposed
Intervener did care for both children while he worked
during the week. He also testified that he was very
involved in [Child’s] life and took most Fridays off to
spend time with [Child] and care for her in addition
to the weekend time that he spent with [Child].
[Father] testified that the parties separated in the
summer of 2013 and that Proposed Intervener no
longer cared for [Child] during the day after that
time. He stated that either his mother or sister
watched over and cared for [Child] from the summer
of 2013 forward. Interestingly, the parties continued
to live in the same residence after their separation in
2013 until the end of June, 2014, when the
relationship became so hostile that [Father] had to
move to his mother’s residence with [Child].
[Father] testified that he does not desire Proposed
Intervener to have a custodial relationship with
[Child] of his former relationship with [Mother].
Trial Court Opinion, 7/28/2014, at 1-2.
On July 21, 2014, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on
Proposed Intervener’s petition, receiving testimony from Proposed
Intervener, Father, and Mother. In an opinion and order dated July 28,
2014, the trial court denied Proposed Intervener’s petition. The trial court
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found that “at first glance, it appears that Proposed Intervener would have
standing on the basis that she did perform parental duties and assumed a
parental status with this [Child] for some period of time.” Id. at 4-5. The
trial court declined to grant standing to intervene, however, for two reasons.
First, citing Morgan v. Weiser, 923 A.2d 1183 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied,
932 A.2d 1289 (Pa. 2007), the trial court determined that “both natural
parents oppose intervention and a custodial relationship by the Proposed
Intervener with the [Child].” Id. at 5 (citing Morgan, 923 A.2d at 1187).
Second, the trial court indicated that intervention was not in the best
interests of Child, since it would “promote the concept that [Child] has two
mothers [and] will, in this [c]ourt’s estimation, only inhibit that renewed
relationship [with Mother] and serve to confuse the [Child].” Id. at 5-6.
Proposed Intervener filed a timely notice of appeal, raising a single
question for our consideration and determination:
Once loco parentis status is recognized, can it be
terminated simply by having both natural parents
oppose its continuance, especially without taking into
account the best interest of the child, in particular
the psychological bond with the person in loco
parentis?
Proposed Intervener’s Brief at 6.
Because the order in question relates to a child custody matter, we
apply the following well-established standard of review:
The scope of review applied by an appellate court to
a child custody order is of the broadest type; the
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appellate court is not bound by the deductions or
inferences made by the trial court from its findings of
fact, nor must the reviewing court accept a finding
that is not supported by competent evidence.
However, this broad scope of review does not vest
an appellate court with the duty or privilege of
making its own independent determination. An
appellate court may not interfere with the trial
court's factual conclusions unless they are
unreasonable in view of the trial court's factual
findings and thus represent an abuse of discretion.
Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 477 (Pa. Super. 2007); Jackson v.
Beck, 858 A.2d 1250, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2004).
In J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1318 (Pa. Super. 1996), where
this Court reversed a trial court’s decision to deny in loco parentis status to a
domestic partner, we offered the following insight on intervention in child
custody cases:
The concept of standing, an element of justiciability,
is a fundamental one in our jurisprudence: no
matter will be adjudicated by our courts unless it is
brought by a party aggrieved in that his or her rights
have been invaded or infringed by the matter
complained of. The purpose of this rule is to ensure
that cases are presented to the court by one having
a genuine, and not merely a theoretical, interest in
the matter. Thus the traditional test for standing is
that the proponent of the action must have a direct,
substantial and immediate interest in the matter at
hand.
In the area of child custody, principles of standing
have been applied with particular scrupulousness
because they serve a dual purpose: not only to
protect the interest of the court system by assuring
that actions are litigated by appropriate parties, but
also to prevent intrusion into the protected domain
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of the family by those who are merely strangers,
however well-meaning.
Id. at 1318–19.
Persons other than the natural parents are considered “third parties” in
custody disputes. Gradwell v. Strausser, 610 A.2d 999, 1001 (Pa. Super.
1992). Except in dependency proceedings, third parties lack standing to
seek custody as against the natural parents unless they can demonstrate a
prima facie right to custody. Id. at 1002. A third party in loco parentis
possesses a prima facie right to custody sufficient to confer standing to
litigate questions of custody of the child for whom he or she has cared.
McDonel v. Sohn, 762 A.2d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2000); 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
5324(2).1
Our Supreme Court has defined in loco parentis status as follows:
The phrase “in loco parentis” refers to a person who
puts oneself in the situation of a lawful parent by
assuming the obligations incident to the parental
relationship without going through the formality of a
legal adoption. The status of ‘in loco parentis'
embodies two ideas; first, the assumption of a
1
§ 5324. Standing for any form of physical custody or legal custody.
The following individuals may file an action under this chapter for
any form of physical custody or legal custody:
* * *
(2) A person who stands in loco parentis to the child.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(2).
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parental status, and, second, the discharge of
parental duties.
T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 917 (Pa. 2001) (citing Commonwealth ex
rel. Morgan v. Smith, 241 A.2d 531, 533 (Pa. 1968)); see also Peters v.
Costello, 586 102, 110, 891 A.2d 705, 710 (Pa. 2005) (“The term in loco
parentis literally means ‘in the place of a parent.’”) (citing Black's Law
Dictionary (7th Ed. 1991) at 791). Moreover,
The in loco parentis basis for standing recognizes
that the need to guard the family from intrusions by
third parties and to protect the rights of the natural
parent must be tempered by the paramount need to
protect the child's best interest. Thus, while it is
presumed that a child's best interest is served by
maintaining the family's privacy and autonomy, that
presumption must give way where the child has
established strong psychological bonds with a person
who, although not a biological parent, has lived with
the child and provided care, nurture, and affection,
assuming in the child's eye a stature like that of a
parent. Where such a relationship is shown, our
courts recognize that the child's best interest
requires that the third party be granted standing so
as to have the opportunity to litigate fully the issue
of whether that relationship should be maintained
even over a natural parent's objections.
T.B., 786 A.2d at 917 (quoting J.A.L., 682 A.2d at 1319-20). The rights
and liabilities arising out of an in loco parentis relationship are, as the words
imply, exactly the same as between parent and child. Id.
As this Court has recognized, stepparents may be uniquely qualified to
attain in loco parentis status to their stepchildren. In J.A.L., Judge Beck
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discussed at some length the issue of stepparents’ standing in custody
disputes:
Although the requirement of in loco parentis status
for third parties seeking child custody rights is often
stated as though it were a rigid rule, it is important
to view the standard in light of the purpose of
standing principles generally: to ensure that actions
are brought only by those with a genuine, substantial
interest. When so viewed, it is apparent that the
showing necessary to establish in loco parentis
status must in fact be flexible and dependent upon
the particular facts of the case. Thus, while
unrelated third parties are only rarely found to stand
in loco parentis, step-parents, who by living in a
family setting with the child of a spouse have
developed a parent-like relationship with the child,
have often been assumed without discussion to have
standing to seek a continued relationship with the
child upon the termination of the relationship
between the step-parents. Where the issue of a
step-parent's standing has been directly addressed
by this court, standing has been found to exist
because the step-parents stood in loco parentis to
the child or children in question.
In addition, we have suggested that where a
petitioner who is not biologically related to the child
but has established a parent-like relationship with
the child seeks not to supplant the natural parent,
but only to maintain his relationship with the child
through reasonable visitation or partial custody, his
burden to establish standing is easier to meet.
In today's society, where increased mobility,
changes in social mores and increased individual
freedom have created a wide spectrum of
arrangements filling the role of the traditional
nuclear family, flexibility in the application of
standing principles is required in order to adapt
those principles to the interests of each particular
child. We do not suggest abandonment of the rule
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that a petitioner for custody who is not biologically
related to the child in question must prove that a
parent-like relationship has been forged through the
parties' conduct. However, we hold that the fact that
the petitioner lived with the child and the natural
parent in a family setting, whether a traditional
family or a nontraditional one, and developed a
relationship with the child as a result of the
participation and acquiescence of the natural parent
must be an important factor in determining whether
the petitioner has standing.
J.A.L., 682 A.2d at 1320-21 (citations omitted).
Since this Court decided J.A.L., Pennsylvania appellate courts have
frequently recognized that stepparents stand in loco parentis to their
stepchildren. S.A. v. C.G.R., 856 A.2d 1248, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(stepmother “lived with and parented this child since birth, developing her
role as his mother with the participation and acceptance of C.R.”); Liebner
v. Simcox, 834 A.2d 606, 610 (Pa. Super. 2003) (stepfather was in loco
parentis); Bupp v. Bupp, 718 A.2d 1278, (Pa. Super. 1998) (where
stepfather assumed the role of father from the time of child’s birth, including
diapering, feeding, and playing with the child, in loco parentis standing was
established); Karner v. McMahon, 640 A.2d 926, 930 (Pa. Super. 1994)
(“Upon an independent review of the record, we agree with the conclusion of
the trial court that stepfather has assumed primary parental responsibility
for the children since 1989 to the present.”); see also Parton v. Parton,
36 Pa.D. & C.4th 241, 244 (Monroe County, 1996) (stepfather “raised them,
fed them, bathed them, played with them, attended their little league
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games, disciplined them and helped them with their homework, all things a
parent would do. He was there for them.”). Most recently, in D.G. v. D.B.,
91 A.3d 706 (Pa. Super. 2014), this Court reaffirmed the basic principle in
J.A.L. that in loco parentis status may be appropriate where the petitioner
“lives with the child and a natural parent as a family unit.” Id. at 709.
In the present case, based upon the evidence presented, the trial court
determined that Potential Intervener had satisfied the fundamental
requirements for in loco parentis status as established by our Supreme Court
in T.B., namely that “she did perform parental duties and assumed a
parental status with this [Child] for some period of time.” Trial Court
Opinion, 7/28/2014, at 4-5. Our review of the certified record on appeal
reflects that this determination is supported by competent evidence.
Proposed Intervener lived with Father, Child, and (later) the couple’s child as
a family unit from January 2010 until at least the summer of 2013.2 N.T.,
7/21/2014, at 8-22. Proposed Intervener testified that she was Child’s
primary caretaker during that time period, including up to 98% of the time
spent “in the role of raising” Child, especially since Father worked on
weekdays, spent time working on projects in the garage when at home, and
took frequent business trips. Id. at 10, 20. She also indicated that she was
“extremely bonded” with Child (who called her “mom”) in precisely the same
2
During this period of time, Child (born in December 2006) was between
three and six years old.
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manner as with her own child. Id. at 11 (“We have … a parent/child
bond.”).3 Emails from Father predating his separation from Proposed
Intervener thanked her for “raising our children” and “being a good mother”
to Child, and expressed his concern that if they divorced Child “will lose the
woman that has been her mother for all of the life that she can remember.”
Id. at 18-19.
Father offered conflicting testimony, emphasizing the extent of his
contact with Child (including weeknights and on weekends) and describing
Proposed Intervener as a “mere caretaker.” N.T., 7/21/2014, at 30-31;
Father’s Brief at 8. Father admitted, however, that his explanation to Child
for the presence of both Mother and Proposed Intervener was that “she had
two moms.” N.T., 7/21/2014, at 31. In sum, the certified record contains
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s decision that Proposed
Intervener had performed parental duties and assumed a parental status
with Child, and thus established prima facie in loco parentis status. Trial
Court Opinion, 7/28/2014, at 4-5.
The trial court nevertheless declined to confer standing on Potential
Intervener for two reasons. First, the trial court recognized that a third
3
Proposed Intervener complains that the trial court did not permit her to
introduce evidence of her bond with Child. Proposed Intervener’s Brief at
10. Our review of the record, however, reflects that after some initial
hesitation, the trial court decided to grant “some leeway” and permitted the
introduction of substantially all of the proffered evidence. N.T., 7/14/2014,
at 11-15. Proposed Intervener has not identified any specific evidence the
trial court excluded.
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party cannot place herself in loco parentis “in defiance of the parents’
wishes,” Morgan, 923 A.2d at 1187, and noted that here both natural
parents testified they oppose intervention into Child’s custody proceeding.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/28/2014, at 5. Second, the trial court decided that
intervention by Potential Intervener would not be in Child’s best interests, in
part because “the concept that [Child] has two mothers” would be confusing
to her. Id. at 5-6.
We cannot agree that either of these reasons constitutes a sufficient
basis for denying standing to Potential Intervener on the facts presented.
While we agree that a third party cannot place herself in loco parentis “in
defiance of the parents’ wishes,” this principle has no application in this
case. In Liebner, this Court emphasized that the “defiance” of the natural
parents must have been to the creation of a parent/child bond with the
third party, rather than with continuation of the relationship once
established (i.e., after the onset of custody litigation). Liebner, 834 A.2d at
610. Specifically, we held that whether the stepparent has standing
depends upon whether she “lived with the child and the natural parent in a
family setting, irrespective of its traditional or nontraditional composition,
and developed a relationship with the child as a result of the participation
and acquiescence of the natural parent.” Id. We rebuffed any suggested
that in loco parentis relationship, once established, could be lost by a
subsequent change in circumstances, including the eventual separation
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and/or divorce of the natural parent from the petitioning step-parent. Id. at
611 (“We also reject Mother’s argument that even if Michael had obtained in
loco parentis status, such status has been lost by a change in circumstances,
namely the parties’ separation and Mother’s remarriage.”); see also
McDonel, 762 A.2d at 1106 (refusing to apply the “defiance” principle
because “[natural father] initially denied paternity, had little contact with
C.S., and no contact with the [third party petitioners] and so could not have
been an obstruction to the … developing relationship with C.S.”).
The cases in which standing has been denied by application of the
“defiance” principle all reflect a well-established and clearly expressed
objection/refusal by one or both of the natural parents to the development
of a parent/child relationship from the outset of the petitioner’s relationship
with the child. In Morgan, we concluded that the child’s legal guardians
never permitted petitioner “to assume parental status or discharge parental
duties.” Morgan, 923 A.2d at 1188. To the contrary, we highlighted that
even petitioner acknowledged that the guardians’ ”long-standing opposition
to [his] exercise of rights toward [child] have been hostile and aggressively
absolute.” Id. at 1189. Similarly, in J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261 (Pa.
Super. 2006), we reversed a grant of in loco parentis status because “the
facts of this case show unequivocally that Father at no time participated or
acquiesced in gestational carrier’s assuming custody of the triplets.” Id. at
1275 (emphasis in original). And in B.A. ex rel. v. C.E., 599 A.2d 545
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(Pa. 1999), our Supreme Court reversed a grant of in loco parentis status
since the natural father had consistently opposed the adoption of his child
and had actively sought custody of the child “from shortly after the child was
born until the present.” Id. at 550.
In this case, the trial court found that both Father and Mother
currently “oppose intervention and a custodial relationship by the Proposed
Intervener.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/28/2014, at 5. It made no finding of
fact, however, that either parent4 objected (or expressed any contrary
wishes) to the establishment of a parent/child relationship between Proposed
Intervener and Child. The above-cited evidence (including the emails and
Father’s own testimony) reflects that Father actively participated in the
formation of a close bond between Proposed Intervener and Child. See,
e.g., N.T., 7/14/2014, at 18-19, 30. While Mother testified that she never
“intended to relinquish any custodial rights” to Proposed Intervener, id. at
40, she did not offer any basis upon which to conclude that she ever
expressed, either by hostile word, act, or deed, any objection to the
parent/child relationship during the relevant time period. Even though
Mother, unlike Father, did not actively participate in the development of the
4
Actions in defiance of the wishes of either natural parent will defeat in loco
parentis status. B.A., 569 A.2d at 550. The consent of one parent to a
parental role for the petitioner is insufficient. Id. at 551 (Nigro, J.,
concurring) (“The stakes are simply too high and the rights of the non-
consenting parent too substantial to allow one parent to confer in loco
parentis status on a third party.”).
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parental relationship now at issue, by her silence she clearly acquiesced to
it.
This Court has stressed that “[t[he law simply cannot permit a third
party to act contrary to the natural parent’s wishes in obtaining custody and
then benefit from that defiant conduct in a subsequent custody action.”
J.F., 897 A.2d at 1275-76. Here, however, the evidence in the certified
record does not reflect that Proposed Intervener’s relationship with Child
developed “contrary to the wishes of either natural parent” or as a result of
any “defiant conduct” on her behalf. Instead Proposed Intervener’s
relationship with Child developed with the participation of Father and the
acquiescence of Mother. As a result, the trial court erred in refusing to
recognize Proposed Intervener’s in loco parentis status on this basis.
Finally, the trial court decided that granting in loco parentis standing
to Proposed Intervener would not be in Child’s best interests, both because
it would interfere with Child’s developing relationship with Mother and
because having “two mothers” would be confusing to Child. Trial Court
Opinion, 7/28/2014, at 5-6. While the trial court’s attention to the best
interests of the child is certainly appropriate in child custody cases, it was
misplaced at this stage of the proceedings. As our Supreme Court reminded
in T.B., where (as here) the existence of an in loco parentis relationship is
shown, “our courts recognize that the child's best interest requires that the
third party be granted standing so as to have the opportunity to litigate fully
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the issue of whether that relationship should be maintained even over a
natural parent's objections.” Child’s best interests will be the guiding
principle when the trial court makes its eventual custody decision -- after all
of the parties to these proceedings (including Proposed Intervener) have a
full and fair opportunity to present his or her case for continuing involvement
in Child’s life.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/12/2015
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