Com. v. Gorham, L.

J-S40043-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
LAMONT CRANSTON GORHAM
Appellant No. 205 MDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order January 27, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0002412-2010
CP-36-CR-0003360-2010
CP-36-CR-0003520-2010
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and PANELLA, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED FEBRUARY 04, 2015
Appellant, Lamont Cranston Gorham, appeals from the order denying
post-conviction relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, entered January 27, 2014, by the Honorable
Dennis E. Reinaker, Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County. After
careful review, we affirm.
As we write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the
factual context and legal history of this case, we set forth only so much of
the procedural history as is necessary to our analysis.
Gorham was charged with several theft and robbery related counts.
On March 9, 2011, Gorham pled guilty to all charges pursuant to a
negotiated plea agreement. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Gorham was to
J-S40043-14
serve a total sentence of 13 to 26 years of incarceration. The
Commonwealth submitted to the trial court various documents associated
with the guilty plea, including the written guilty-plea colloquy signed by
Gorham. Finally, the trial court informed Gorham that he faced a potential
aggregate sentence of 117 years of incarceration.
During the sentencing hearing, which took place on May 18, 2011,
Gorham articulated for the first time his belief that the plea agreement
represented merely an upper limit for his sentence, and not a final
agreement of the length of the sentence. Thereafter, the trial court
explained to Gorham why he was incorrect and noted that Gorham had, in
fact, indicated in the written guilty-plea colloquy that he understood what his
maximum exposure was. Gorham lodged no further objection and he never
moved to withdraw his plea before sentencing. The trial court then
sentenced Gorham pursuant to the plea agreement.
Gorham then filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court, which
affirmed the judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Gorham, 1335
MDA 2011 (Pa. Super., March 16, 2012) (unpublished memorandum)
(Panella, J.). Gorham did not file a petition for allocator in our Supreme
Court. Thereafter, Gorham filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court
appointed counsel who subsequently filed an amended PCRA petition. An
evidentiary hearing occurred and the PCRA court denied relief on January
27, 2014. This timely appeal follows.
-2-
J-S40043-14
On appeal, Gorham raises a single issue for our review: “Whether
counsel was ineffective when he failed to competently advise the defendant
concerning the plea agreement of 13 to 26 years and failed to advise the
defendant that his scheduled sentencing had been accelerated by one day?”
Appellant’s Brief, at 4. In light of the numerous occasions in which Gorham
acknowledged his understanding of the maximum sentence, we cannot find
counsel ineffective.
Our standard of review regarding a PCRA court's denial of a petition for
post-conviction relief is well settled. We examine whether the determination
of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal
error. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 995 A.2d 1143, 1149 (Pa. 2010).
The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for
the findings in the certified record. See id. Our scope of review is limited to
the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record. See
Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Gorham’s only claim is that his counsel provided ineffective assistance
for not competently advising him about the sentencing parameters of his
guilty plea and for failing to notify him that his sentencing date had been
moved up by one day. This single claim is, in reality, two separate claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The first concerning advice about the guilty
plea and the second on the failure to notify Gorham that his sentencing date
had been moved up.
-3-
J-S40043-14
We presume that counsel is effective and Gorham bears the burden of
proving otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Steele, 961 A.2d 786, 796
(2008). To prevail on this claim, Gorham must plead and prove the following
three factors:
(1) That the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that
counsel’s course of conduct was without any reasonable basis
designed to effectuate his client’s interest; and (3) that he was
prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness, i.e. there is a reasonable
probability that but for the act or omission in question the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different
Commonwealth v. Lauro, 819 A.2d 100, 105-6 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citing
Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987)).
Additionally, “[i]t is also well-established that claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel in relation to a plea of guilt will provide a basis for
relief only if the appellant can prove that the ineffectiveness caused an
involuntary or unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v. D’Collanfield, 805
A.2d 1244, 1246-47 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted). In this regard,
“[a] defendant is bound by the statements made during the plea colloquy,
and a defendant may not later offer reasons for withdrawing the plea that
contradict statements made when he pled.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 48
A.3d 1275, 1277-78 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted).
In the instant case, it cannot be said that the ineffectiveness of
Gorham’s counsel rendered Gorham’s guilty plea involuntary or unknowing.
There is adequate evidence in the record to establish that Gorham knowingly
-4-
J-S40043-14
and voluntarily agreed to his plea bargain. First, during his guilty plea
hearing the following exchange occurred:
The Court: I believe the maximum sentences then would be up
to 117 years in prison and maximum fines of up to $180,000. Do
you understand that?
The Defendant: Yes, Sir.
N.T., Guilty Plea Hearing, 03/09/11 at 15-16 (emphasis added). Moreover,
Gorham also acknowledged his understanding of the maximum sentence in
the written guilty plea colloquy when answered in the affirmative next to the
following clause: “Do you understand that the total possible sentence that
you could receive for your plea today if you were sentenced to the maximum
and all sentences where consecutive would be 117 years and $180,000?”
Guilty Plea Colloquy, at 4. Furthermore, Gorham also answered in the
affirmative that he had sufficient time to review this information contained
within the plea and the attorney. See Guilty Plea Colloquy at 7.
Importantly, Gorham also answered the following in the affirmative: “If you
did not understand any part of this form, has your attorney explained it to
you so that you now understand?” Id. Finally, during the sentencing
hearing, Gorham’s attorney related that he had discussed the plea
agreement with Gorham several times, as they attempted to negotiate the
individual numbers. See N.T., Sentencing, 05/18/11, at 6-7.
-5-
J-S40043-14
Most importantly, at the PCRA hearing, Gorham admitted that he
understood that he was agreeing to a sentence of 13 to 26 years. See N.T.,
PCRA Hearing, 11/15/13, at 44-45.
In summary, there is a plethora of evidence on the record to
demonstrate that counsel for Gorham was effective in his assistance of
Gorham in relation to his guilty plea—and that Gorham knowingly and
voluntarily entered the plea. Therefore, Gorham fails to establish that his
underlying claim has arguable merit.
In Gorham’s second claim, he contends that trial counsel was also
ineffective when he did not inform him that his sentencing date had been
moved up by one day. However, even if it could be said that there was
arguable merit to the underlying claim, we find no prejudice has occurred.
While it is true that the sentencing hearing was moved up by one day
unbeknownst to Gorham, the Court accepted the plea deal and sentenced
Gorham according to the agreement. Thus, Gorham’s sentence was exactly
as it would have been had the sentencing occurred on the following day.
Accordingly, Gorham’s claim on appeal does not merit relief from this
court. Therefore, we must affirm the PCRA’s court denial of relief.
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
-6-
J-S40043-14
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/4/2015
-7-