Bank of New York Mellon v. Kolb, J.

J-A30045-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON F/K/A THE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
BANK OF NEW YORK, AS SUCCESSOR- PENNSYLVANIA
IN-INTEREST TO JPMORGAN CHASE
BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR
STRUCTURED ASSET MORTGAGE
INVESTMENTS II TRUST 2005-AR2,
MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH
CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-AR2
v.
JON D. KOLB, JENNIFER M. KOLB,
ESTHER N. KOLB, NORMAN JONATHAN
KOLB AND THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
APPEAL OF: JON D. KOLB, JENNIFER M.
KOLB, ESTHER N. KOLB, NORMAN
JONATHAN KOLB
No. 1309 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order March 19, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Civil Division at No.: 2012-10456-RC
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 18, 2015
Appellants, Jon D., Jennifer M., Esther N. and Norman Jonathan Kolb,
appeal from the order of March 19, 2014, which granted the motion for
summary judgment of Appellee, Bank of New York Mellon f/k/a The Bank of
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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New York, as successor-in-interest to JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., as
Trustee for Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2005-ar2,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-ar2, in this mortgage
foreclosure action. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
On April 14, 2004, Appellants, Jennifer and Jon Kolb, recorded a deed
conveying “an undivided one-half interest as tenants by the entirety jointly
and as joint tenants with rights of survivorship in two parcels . . . each” to
Appellants, Norman and Esther Kolb, and to Jennifer and Jon Kolb.
([Appellee]’s Supplemental Response in Opposition to [Appellants]’ Motion
for Summary Judgment, 2/21/14, at 2) (record citation omitted). On
December 30, 2004, Appellants recorded a second deed wherein they
conveyed the property back to Jon and Jennifer Kolb as tenants by the
entireties in fee. (See Memorandum of Law in Support of [Appellee]’s Reply
to [Appellants]’ Motion for Summary Judgment, 2/10/14, at unnumbered
page 1; see id. at Exhibit A).
On January 18, 2005, Appellee’s predecessor-in-interest, First Horizon
Home Loan Corporation, executed a mortgage with Jennifer and Jon Kolb.
(See Memorandum of Law in Support of [Appellee]’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, 11/21/13, at unnumbered page 1; see id. at Exhibit A). The
parties recorded the mortgage on February 7, 2005, at the Chester County
Recorder of Deeds. (See [Appellee]’s Supplemental Response in Opposition
to [Appellants]’ Motion for Summary Judgment, 2/21/14, at 2). On
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September 27, 2005, Jennifer and Jon Kolb again conveyed to all four
Appellants “one-half interest as tenants by the entirety jointly and as joint
tenants with right of survivorship” in the property. (Id.).
On January 17, 2009, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
(MERS) as nominee for the predecessor-in-interest assigned the mortgage to
The Bank of New York Mellon formerly known as The Bank of New York as
successor Trustee to JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Trustee. (See
Amended Complaint, 12/18/12, at Exhibit C). It recorded the assignment at
the Chester County Recorder of Deeds on September 24, 2009. (See id.).
On October 2, 2012, Appellee filed a complaint in mortgage foreclosure
against Appellants, alleging that Appellants had not made a payment on the
mortgage since 2009. (See Complaint, 10/02/12 at 4 ¶ 12). Appellants
filed preliminary objections on November 13, 2012, and Appellee filed an
amended complaint on December 18, 2012. Appellants again filed
preliminary objections on January 7, 2013, which the trial court overruled on
April 9, 2013. Appellants did not raise the issue of standing in either of the
preliminary objections. (See Preliminary Objections, 11/13/12, at
unnumbered pages 1-10; Preliminary Objections to Amended Complaint,
1/07/13, at 4-9).
The Bank of New York Mellon formerly known as The Bank of New York
as successor Trustee to JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Trustee recorded an
assignment of mortgage dated March 18, 2013, on April 4, 2013 at the
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Chester County Recorder of Deeds, wherein it assigned the mortgage to
Appellee. (See Memorandum of Law in Support of [Appellee]’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, 11/21/13, at Exhibit C). On May 6, 2013, Appellants
filed an answer and new matter, which did not raise the issue of standing.
(See Answer and New Matter, 5/06/13, at unnumbered pages 1-6).
Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment on November 21, 2013;
Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment on January 2, 2014. On
March 19, 2014, the trial court found in favor of Appellee and against
Appellants.
Appellants filed a timely appeal on April 17, 2014. On April 25, 2014,
the trial court ordered Appellants to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellants filed a timely
Rule 1925(b) statement on May 15, 2014. See id. On June 16, 2014, the
trial court issued an opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
On appeal, Appellants raise the following questions for our review.
1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in granting [Appellee’s]
[m]otion for [s]ummary [j]udgment and denying [Appellants’]
[m]otion for [s]ummary [j]udgment?
2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in ruling that [Appellants]
waived the argument that [Appellee] lacked standing to pursue a
foreclosure action against them?
3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in finding that [Appellee]
had standing, that is that [Appellee] had a right to relief in the
form of an in rem judgment against [Appellants]?
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4. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in finding that [Appellants]
Esther N. Kolb and [Norman] Kolb’s ownership interest in the
[p]roperty was subject to the [m]ortgage?
(Appellants’ Brief, at 5).
In their first claim, Appellants allege that the trial court erred in
granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment and denying their motion
for summary judgment. (See Appellants’ Brief, at 11). We find that
Appellants waived this claim.
Our scope and standard of review are settled.
Pennsylvania law provides that summary judgment may be
granted only in those cases in which the record clearly shows
that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving
party has the burden of proving that no genuine issues of
material fact exist. In determining whether to grant summary
judgment, the trial court must view the record in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all doubts
as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against
the moving party. Thus, summary judgment is proper only
when the uncontroverted allegations in the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions of record,
and submitted affidavits demonstrate that no genuine issue of
material fact exists, and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. In sum, only when the facts are so
clear that reasonable minds cannot differ, may a trial court
properly enter summary judgment.
. . . With regard to questions of law, an appellate court’s scope
of review is plenary. The Superior Court will reverse a grant of
summary judgment only if the trial court has committed an error
of law or abused its discretion. Judicial discretion requires action
in conformity with law based on the facts and circumstances
before the trial court after hearing and consideration.
Cresswell v. Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 820 A.2d 172, 177 (Pa. Super.
2003) (citation and emphasis omitted).
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Here, Appellants’ brief argument solely consists of a boilerplate
recitation of the standard of review for granting summary judgment and bald
statements that Appellee was not entitled to summary judgment while
Appellants were entitled to have either summary judgment granted in their
favor or a jury trial. (See Appellants’ Brief, at 11-12). There are no
citations to the record and Appellants fail to specify the basis for their claim
that the trial court erred in its decision to grant summary judgment. (See
id.). It is long-settled that failure to argue and to cite any authority
supporting the argument constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal. See
Jones v. Jones, 878 A.2d 86, 90 (Pa. Super. 2005). This Court will not act
as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. See
Bombar v. West American Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 78, 94 (Pa. Super. 2007).
When deficiencies in a brief hinder our ability to conduct meaningful
appellate review, we can dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to
be waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101. Because Appellants have failed to develop
their first issue, it is waived. See id.; see also Bombar, supra at 94;
Jones, supra at 90.
In their second claim, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in
finding that they had waived their argument that Appellee lacked standing to
pursue a foreclosure action against them because “the trial court . . .
misconstrue[d Appellants’] argument as being premised on lack of capacity
to sue, rather than being premised on lack of standing.” (Appellants’ Brief,
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at 12). Appellants contend that they cannot raise lack of standing in
preliminary objections and, thus, that they did not waive the claim by failing
to raise it in their preliminary objections. (See id. at 13). We disagree.
The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provide in relevant part,
“[p]reliminary objections may be filed by any party to any pleading and are
limited to the following grounds . . . lack of capacity to sue.” Pa.R.C.P.
1028(a)(5). While, as Appellants correctly note, (see Appellants’ Brief, at
13), Rule 1028 uses the language of “lack of capacity to sue” rather than
standing, we have stated that the two concepts are related and thus, like
lack of capacity to sue, the issue of standing is waived if not objected to at
the earliest possible time. See Hall v. Episcopal Long Term Care, 54
A.3d 381, 399 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 69 A.3d 243 (Pa. 2013)
(citation omitted) (standing and lack of capacity to sue are related concepts
and must be raised at earliest possible opportunity); see also Kuwait &
Gulf Link Transport Co. v. Doe, 92 A.3d 41, 45 (Pa. Super. 2014) (noting
that it is long-held that issue of standing is waived if not raised at first
opportunity). In Huddleston v. Infertility Center of America, Inc., 700
A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. 1997), this Court specifically held that a defendant
waived the issue of standing when she did not raise the issue in preliminary
objections. See Huddleston, supra at 457.
Here, as discussed above, Appellants did not raise the issue of
standing in either set of preliminary objections or in their answer and new
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matter. Appellants acknowledge that they raised the issue for the first time
[“i]n [t]he [s]ummary [j]udgment [p]leadings.” (Appellants’ Brief, at 12).
Thus, because Appellants did not raise the issue of standing at the earliest
possible opportunity, they waived the issue. See Huddleston, supra at
457; see also Kuwait & Gulf Link, supra at 45; Hall, supra at 399.
Accordingly, Appellants’ second claim must fail.
In their third issue, Appellants maintain that the trial court erred in
finding that Appellee had standing to pursue the mortgage foreclosure
action. (See Appellants’ Brief, at 13-17). However, because we have held
that Appellants waived the issue of standing, we decline to address the
merits of their third claim. See Southwestern Energy Production Co. v.
Forest Resources, LLC, 83 A.3d 177, 185 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal
denied, 96 A.3d 1029 (Pa. 2013) (declining to address merits of standing
claim when we found claim waived).
In their fourth issue, Appellants allege that “[t]he trial court erred in
entering an in rem judgment against . . . Appellants Norman Jonathan Kolb
and Esther N. Kolb, who were not parties to the mortgage.” (Appellants’
Brief, at 17). Appellants claim that “[a]s of January 18, 2005, the date of
the execution of the [m]ortgage, the owners of record of the [p]roperty were
Jon and Jennifer and Norman and Esther, not solely Jon and Jennifer.”
(Id.). However, we agree with the trial court that the record does not
support this purely factual assertion.
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The trial court discussed this issue as follows:
There are three [d]eeds in this action. Deed 1 was dated April
12, 2004 and recorded in the Chester County Recorder of Deeds
on April 14, 2004 at Instrument no. 10400216. Deed 1 conveys
an undivided one-half interest as tenants by the entirety jointly
and as joint tenants with right of survivorship in two parcels
each to Norman Kolb and Esther Kolb, his wife (Norman and
Esther) and Jon Kolb and Jennifer Kolb, his wife (John and
Jennifer). Deed 2 was dated December 30, 2004 and recorded
on February 7, 2005 at Instrument no. 10503145. Deed 2
transferred the parcels from Norman and Esther and Jon and
Jennifer to just Jon and Jennifer as tenants by the entireties.
The mortgage at issue was dated January 18, 2005 and recorded
on February 7, 2005 at Instrument no. 10503146. Therefore, at
the time the mortgage, was executed, the property was owned
only by Jon and Jennifer. We note that Deed 2 and the
mortgage were recorded on the same day and at the same time
as illustrated by the fact that the Instrument numbers are one
number apart. Therefore, it appears that deed 2 was executed
in connection with or in contemplation of, the mortgage. Deed 3
was dated September 27, 2005 and recorded on October 26,
2005 at Instrument no. 10589763. Deed 3 conveyed the parcels
from Jon and Jennifer back to Norman and Esther and Jon and
Jennifer. Deed 3 was clearly executed after the mortgage. In
addition, Deed 3 specifically states that the conveyance was
made “UNDER AND SUBJECT to all conditions and restrictions of
record.” Therefore, the interest conveyed to Norman and Esther
by Deed 3 was, in fact, subject to the mortgage.
(Trial Court Opinion, 6/16/14, at 5-6) (emphasis added). Our review of the
record supports the trial court’s holding that, at the time of entry into the
mortgage, Appellants Norman and Esther Kolb had no interest in the subject
property and that the transfer of partial ownership back to them was made
subject to the instant mortgage. Appellee properly named Norman and
Esther as defendants in this action because they currently hold an ownership
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interest in the property. See Pa.R.C.P. 1147(a)(3). Thus, Appellants’ fourth
claim lacks merit.
For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the trial court neither
abused its discretion nor made an error of law in granting summary
judgment in this matter. See Cresswell, supra at 177. Accordingly, we
affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/18/2015
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