Leoni, E. v. Leoni, G.

J-A24004-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
EUGENE P. LEONI, JR. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
GREGORY T. LEONI (AS THE EXECUTOR
OF THE ESTATE OF EUGENE LEONI, SR.)
AND MARIAN LEONI
Appellants No. 198 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered December 13, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No(s): 1989-01293
EUGENE P. LEONI, JR. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
GREGORY T. LEONI (AS THE EXECUTOR
OF THE ESTATE OF EUGENE LEONI, SR.)
AND MARIAN LEONI
Appellants No. 199 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered December 13, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No(s): 1989-01293
J-A24004-14
EUGENE P. LEONI, JR. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
GREGORY T. LEONI (AS THE EXECUTOR
OF THE ESTATE OF EUGENE LEONI, SR.)
AND MARIAN LEONI
Appellants No. 200 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered December 13, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No(s): 1989-01294
EUGENE P. LEONI, JR. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
GREGORY T. LEONI (AS THE EXECUTOR
OF THE ESTATE OF EUGENE LEONI, SR.)
AND MARIAN LEONI
Appellants No. 201 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered December 13, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No(s): 1989-01294
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED FEBRUARY 19, 2015
Appellants, Gregory T. Leoni (as the Executor of the Estate of Eugene
Leoni, Sr.) and Marian Leoni, appeal from the orders entered in the
___________________________
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, denying their motion to compel
distribution of escrow and termination of letters of credit and their separate
motion to vacate the court’s September 10, 2013 order that granted the
petition of Appellee, Eugene P. Leoni, Jr., and assessed interest on
previously awarded judgments. We affirm these orders and quash the
appeal in part.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
In 1989, Dr. Eugene Leoni, Sr. and his wife, Marian Leoni,
issued five confessed judgments in favor of three of their
four children, Nanette, [Appellee] Eugene Jr. and
[Appellant] Gregory, and against themselves as a plan to
protect their assets from creditors. On January 25, 1989,
the Judgments were entered in Montgomery County.
These judgments included two in favor of [Appellee] in the
amounts of $375,000.00 and $215,000.00, docketed as
89-01293 and 89-01294…. The Judgments were revived
once on [April 19, 1995]. Dr. Leoni died on August 18,
2006 and Gregory Leoni was named executor of his estate.
On November 1, 2006, [Appellee] filed praecipes for writs
of revival of the Judgments. These writs included a
request to record the Judgments in the judgment index,
which created liens against [Appellants’] real property
located in Montgomery County.1 [Appellants] opposed the
revival of the judgments.
1
Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 4303(a) which states:
Real property.―Any judgment or other order of
a court of common pleas for the payment of
money shall be a lien upon real property on
the conditions, to the extent and with the
priority provided by statute or prescribed by
General Rule adopted pursuant to section
1722(b) (relating to enforcement and effect of
orders and process) when it is entered of
record in the office of the clerk of the court of
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common pleas of the county where the real
property is situated, or in the office of the clerk
of the branch of the court of common pleas
embracing such county.
and Pa.R.C.P. 3023(a) which states:
Except as provided by subdivision (b), a
judgment when entered in the judgment index
shall create a lien on real property located in
the county, title to which at the time of entry is
recorded in the name of the person against
whom the judgment is entered.
A bench trial was held before the [trial court] on April 27,
2010 regarding the revival of the Judgments. On May 4,
2010, [the trial court] entered a Decision that revived the
Judgments in favor of [Appellee] and against [Appellants]
in the amounts of $375,000.00 and $215,000.00.
[Appellants] appealed that Decision to the Superior Court
on September 30, 2010. [Appellants] posted two
Irrevocable Standby Letters of Credit on November 17,
2010 as security in the amounts of $450,000.00 in the
case under docket number 1989-01293 and $258,000.00
in the case under docket number 1989-01294 during the
pendency of the appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1731 and
1734.2 On January 18, 2012, the Superior Court…affirmed
[the trial court’s] Decision and the resulting Judgments….
The Superior Court denied [Appellants’] request for
reargument. [Appellants’] Petitions for Allowance of
Appeal…were denied…. The case was remanded…back to
[the trial] court on December 4, 2012.
2
These numbers represent 120% of the Judgment
amounts pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1731(a) which states:
Except as provided by subdivision (b), an
appeal from an order involving solely the
payment of money shall, unless otherwise
ordered pursuant to this chapter, operate as a
supersedeas upon the filing with the clerk of
the [trial] court of appropriate security in the
amount of 120% of the amount found due by
the [trial] court and remaining unpaid. Where
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the amount is payable over a period of time,
the amount found due for the purposes of this
rule shall be the aggregate amount payable
within 18 months after entry of the order.
On January 3, 2013, [Appellee] filed a Motion to have
Prothonotary Direct Bank to Draw Down Irrevocable
Standby Letters of Credit in favor of [Appellee] pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1734. On March 20, 2013, [the trial] court
granted [Appellee’s] Motion and directed the Prothonotary
to collect the Irrevocable Standby Letters of Credit in the
aggregate amount of $708,000.00 and distribute same to
[Appellee]. On May 20, 2013, [Appellants] filed an
Emergency Motion to Stay Draw Down on Irrevocable
Standby Letters of Credit, claiming [Appellee was] not
entitled to the entire amount of the Standby Letters of
Credit, but solely the principal aggregate amount of the
Judgments equaling $590,000.00, without interest. On
May 23, 2013, the [trial court] ordered [Appellants] to file
a legal memorandum on the issue of whether [Appellee]
was entitled to interest on the Judgments. On May 30,
2013, [the trial] court ordered the immediate
disbursement of $590,000.00, said sum representing the
undisputed principal of the two Judgments. The principal
of the Judgments was paid to [Appellee] on June 18, 2013.
On August 5, 2013, [Appellee] filed a Petition to Assess
Interest from January 25, 1989 on the two Judgments
totaling $849,600.00. On September 10, 2013, … [the
trial] court granted said petition and assessed interest on
the Judgments in the amount of $849,600.00.
On September 16, 2013, [Appellants] filed a Motion to
Vacate Order of September 10, 2013….[1] On September
____________________________________________
1
In their motion, Appellants asserted Appellee “filed the instant Petition to
Assess Interest, notwithstanding the fact that the issue of interest was the
subject of [Appellants’] previously filed Emergency Motion to Stay Draw
Down on Irrevocable Standby Letters of Credit, and on which the parties had
already submitted legal memoranda pursuant to the [trial court’s] Order of
May 23, 2013.” (Motion to Vacate, filed 9/16/13, at 3; R.R. at 190a).
Appellants argued the trial court “has since never ruled on the issue of
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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18, 2013, the court stayed its order of September 10,
2013 and scheduled argument on the Motion to Vacate.
On October 15, 2013, [Appellants] filed a Motion to
Compel the Distribution of Escrow and Termination of
Letters of Credit…seeking the court to order (1) [Appellee]
and his assignee3 to enter satisfactions of the Judgments;
(2) [Appellee] and his assignee to pay the Estate of Marian
E. Leoni the sum of $5,900.00 (1% of $590,000.00) for
each day that the satisfactions have not been entered
since July 18, 2013; (3) the proceeds held in escrow by
City Line Abstract Company be distributed immediately to
Gregory T. Leoni and Nanette G. Leoni;[2] and (4) the
letters of credit issued by Ambler Savings Bank
immediately be terminated and cancelled.
3
On September 25, 2013, [Appellee] assigned his
rights, title and interest in the Judgments to SJL, 3
LLC, a Delaware limited liability company.
On December 1[3], 2013, the court entered an order which
denied [Appellants’] Motion to Vacate and [Appellants’]
Motion to Compel.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed April 8, 2014, at 1-4).
On January 9, 2014, Appellants timely filed two (2) notices of appeal
from the orders entered at docket No. 1293 of 1989. One notice of appeal
pertained to the order denying Appellants’ motion to vacate, and the second
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
interest since this component of [Appellants’] Emergency Motion has never
been listed for argument or hearing.” (Id. at 2; R.R. at 189a).
2
The funds held in escrow by City Line Abstract Company represented the
proceeds of a transaction where the Marian E. Leoni Trust and the Eugene P.
Leoni, Sr. Family Trust sold certain real property to Appellee. The parties
disputed whether the court’s September 10, 2013 order created a lien on the
property. Consequently, the parties “agreed to cause the liens, if any, of the
Judgments and the September 10 Order to be released from the Property
and any such liens shall attach to the Escrow Fund….” (Motion to Compel,
filed 10/15/13, at 2; R.R. at 319a).
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notice of appeal pertained to the order denying Appellants’ motion to
compel. That same day, Appellants filed two (2) notices of appeal from the
orders entered at docket No. 1294 of 1989, pertaining to the denial of the
same motions. On January 13, 2014, the court ordered Appellants to file a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b). Appellants timely filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on January 31,
2014. This Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte on March 12, 2014.
Appellants raise the following issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION OR ERROR OF LAW IN DENYING
[APPELLANTS’] MOTION TO VACATE ORDER OF
SEPTEMBER 10, 2013[?]
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION OR ERROR OF LAW IN DENYING
[APPELLANTS’] MOTION TO COMPEL THE DISTRIBUTION
OF [ESCROW AND] TERMINATION OF LETTERS OF
CREDIT[?]
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION OR ERROR OF LAW IN DENYING
[APPELLANTS’] MOTION TO VACATE ORDER OF
SEPTEMBER 10, 2013 WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING[?]
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION OR ERROR OF LAW IN DENYING
[APPELLANTS’] MOTION TO COMPEL THE DISTRIBUTION
OF ESCROW AND TERMINATION OF LETTERS OF CREDIT
WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING[?]
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION OR ERROR OF LAW IN DENYING
[APPELLANTS’] MOTION TO VACATE ORDER OF
SEPTEMBER 10, 2013 AND MOTION TO COMPEL THE
DISTRIBUTION OF ESCROW AND TERMINATION OF
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LETTERS OF CREDIT SINCE THE LIENS OF THE
JUDGMENTS OF [APPELLEE] WERE EXTINGUISHED WHEN
THEY WERE PAID IN FULL AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN
MARKED SATISFIED[?]
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION OR ERROR OF LAW IN DENYING
[APPELLANTS’] MOTION TO VACATE ORDER OF
SEPTEMBER 10, 2013 AND MOTION TO COMPEL THE
DISTRIBUTION OF ESCROW AND TERMINATION OF
LETTERS OF CREDIT SINCE [APPELLEE’S] JUDGMENTS
CANNOT BE AMENDED AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN PAID IN
FULL[?]
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION OR ERROR OF LAW IN DENYING
[APPELLANTS’] MOTION TO VACATE ORDER OF
SEPTEMBER 10, 2013 AND MOTION TO COMPEL THE
DISTRIBUTION OF ESCROW AND TERMINATION OF
LETTERS OF CREDIT SINCE THE LIENS OF THE
JUDGMENTS IN FAVOR OF GREGORY AND NANETTE WERE
SUPERIOR TO ANY PURPORTED LIENS CLAIMED BY
[APPELLEE?]
(Appellants’ Brief at 4). Appellants’ statement of questions involved,
however, does not correspond to the argument section of their brief. The
argument section is divided into six parts, addressing four distinct concerns:
1) whether the court erroneously refused to conduct oral argument on
certain filings; 2) whether the parties entered into a settlement agreement
in May 2013, whereby Appellants satisfied the judgments in favor of
Appellee by making a single payment of $590,000.00; 3) whether there is a
basis for the court to assess interest on the judgments; and 4) regarding the
funds held in escrow by City Line Abstract, whether the liens in favor of
Gregory and Nanette Leoni are superior to the liens in favor of Appellee.
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Consequently, we will consider these four distinct arguments in the same
order and as they appear in the body of Appellants’ brief.
In their first issue, Appellants complain the court denied them the
opportunity to present oral argument on their motion to compel distribution
and motion to vacate the order assessing interest on the judgments, even
though they timely requested argument. Citing Pa.R.C.P. 211, Appellants
insist they have the right to argue their motions. Appellants maintain, “The
presentation of issues and the resulting development of the record would
have assisted” the trial and appellate courts. (Appellants’ Brief at 17).
Appellants conclude the court committed reversible error by denying their
motions without oral argument. We disagree.
“[T]he interpretation and application of a Pennsylvania Rule of Civil
Procedure presents a question of law.” Barrick v. Holy Spirit Hosp. of the
Sisters of Christian Charity, 32 A.3d 800, 808 (Pa.Super. 2011), affirmed,
___ Pa. ___, 91 A.3d 680 (2014) (quoting Boatin v. Miller, 955 A.2d 424,
427 (Pa.Super. 2008)). “Accordingly, to the extent that we are required to
interpret a rule of civil procedure, ‘our standard of review is de novo, and
our scope of review is plenary.’” Barrick, supra (quoting Boatin, supra at
427).
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 211 governs requests for oral
argument as follows:
Rule 211. Oral Arguments
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Any party or the party’s attorney shall have the right to
argue any motion and the court shall have the right to
require oral argument. With the approval of the court, oral
argument may be dispensed with by agreement of the
attorneys and the matter submitted to the court either on
the papers filed of record, or on such briefs as may be filed
by the parties. The person seeking the order applied for
shall argue first and may also argue in reply, but such
reply shall be limited to answering arguments advanced by
the respondent. In matters where there may be more
than one respondent, the order of argument by the
respondents shall be as directed by the court.
Pa.R.C.P. 211.
Rule 211 gives every party or his attorney a qualified
right to make an oral argument on any motion. The court
by local rule may regulate the length of time of such
arguments. In a given case the local court may also
dispense with oral argument if it so desires and
dispose of the case on the record or upon briefs.
* * *
Since motions may be of numerous varieties, with many
degrees of supporting data (or lack of it), discretion must
lie with the trial judge to determine whether issues are
raised which can best be resolved by briefs and/or oral
arguments.
Gerace v. Holmes Protection of Phila., 516 A.2d 354, 359 (Pa.Super.
1986), appeal denied, 515 Pa. 580, 527 A.2d 541 (1987) (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis in original).
Instantly, Appellants concede the court allowed and received argument
on their motion to vacate the order of September 10, 2013. (See
Appellants’ Brief at 12.) Regarding Appellants’ motion to compel
distribution, Appellants filed the motion on October 15, 2013. The motion
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included a cover sheet with a specific request for oral argument as well as
numerous exhibits in support of Appellants’ claims. Further, Appellants’
claims in the motion to compel distribution overlapped with the issues raised
in their motion to vacate the order of September 10, 2013. On December 2,
2013, Appellee filed a response in opposition to the motion to compel
distribution, including a memorandum of law addressing Appellants’ claims.
Here, the court had an extensive record of filings, memoranda, and
exhibits to dispose of the claims in Appellants’ motion to compel distribution.
Therefore, the court found it could resolve Appellants’ motion to compel
without conducting oral argument. See Gerace, supra (holding plaintiffs
did not suffer prejudice due to court’s denial of oral argument prior to grant
of defendant’s summary judgment motion; parties had submitted extensive
depositions and affidavits, providing court with ample record of facts,
allegations, and legal positions at issue). Consequently, Appellants are not
entitled to relief on their first argument.
In their second dispute, Appellants assert the parties entered into a
settlement agreement on May 15, 2013. Pursuant to the terms of the
agreement, Appellants agreed to pay, and Appellee purportedly agreed to
accept, $590,000.00 on or before May 20, 2013. Appellants further contend
Appellee was supposed to file orders to satisfy the judgments upon receipt of
the payment. Appellants insist the payment of $590,000.00 to Appellee
satisfied the judgments in full, and Appellee should have marked the
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judgments as satisfied. Because Appellee failed to file the requisite
satisfactions, Appellants claim they are now entitled to liquidated damages.
On this basis, Appellants conclude the trial court should have ordered
Appellee to mark the judgments as satisfied and awarded Appellants
damages. We disagree.
“[T]he enforceability of settlement agreement is a matter to be
determined according to the principles of contract law.” Cawthorne v. Erie
Ins. Group, 782 A.2d 1037, 1038 (Pa.Super. 2001). “Basic contract law
directs that in order to constitute a contract there must be an offer on one
side and an acceptance on the other.” Id. “Until accepted in the mode and
manner expressly provided by the terms of the offer, there remains an
unaccepted offer which cannot, in itself, be considered a binding contract.”
Id. at 1038-39.
Instantly, Appellants attempted to prove the existence of a settlement
agreement by submitting a series of emails between counsel. In the first
email, sent at 1:01 p.m. on May 15, 2013, Appellants’ counsel stated:
As discussed, here are the Orders to Satisfy the judgments
captioned at Docket Nos. 1989-01293 ($375,000) and
1989-01294 ($215,000). This will confirm that you will be
signing these and filing them of record upon receipt of the
Estate’s check in the amount of $590,000, which you
asked to be in one check. We are making arrangements
accordingly, with the hope of forwarding the check on or
before May 20, 2013.
* * *
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(See Emergency Motion to Stay Draw Down, filed 5/20/13, at Exhibit E; R.R.
at 99a.)
At 1:12 p.m., Appellee’s counsel responded:
I will file Orders once the funds have cleared. The filing
will take place within one day of the funds clearing. Our
paralegals do this routinely. If there is any delay with the
check, let me know. Once the check has cleared, I will
advise you and [the accountant] in writing.
(Id.) At 3:39 p.m., Appellee’s counsel added:
I do want to be clear and clarify my prior email[.]
[Appellee] will always reserve all his rights to the interest
component that he is entitled to under the judgments. I
checked [the trial court’s] opinions, as we briefly
discussed, and, at first read, they appear to be silent on
the issue. That is the primary reason we would be drafting
and filing the appropriate Orders to reflect the payments.
Our filed Orders will reflect the payments received and
reserve our rights with respect to interest.
(Id.) Appellants’ counsel concluded the email exchange at 7:48 p.m.,
stating: “Left you a voicemail. To be clear―if the judgments are not
satisfied upon payment we will seek to recover statutory liquidated
damages.” (Id.)
Here, Appellee’s counsel did not expressly accept Appellants’ “offer” to
resolve the matter with one payment of $590,000.00. Appellee’s counsel
specifically sought to reserve his client’s right to pursue interest on the
judgments. On this record, Appellants failed to demonstrate an enforceable
settlement agreement, and they are not entitled to relief on their second
topic. See Cawthorne, supra.- 13 -
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In their third argument, Appellants rely on Appellee’s counsel’s
statements from the 2010 bench trial to support their assertion that
Appellee waived any claim to interest on the judgments. Appellants contend
Appellee sought only to revive the existing judgments from 1995, and
counsel’s cursory mention of interest amounted to an “afterthought” that
could not have preserved Appellee’s rights. Further, Appellants complain the
court erroneously determined that post-judgment interest is a matter of
procedure, and that it automatically accrues. Appellants insist Appellee
needed to include a separate claim for post-judgment interest in his writs of
revival. Appellants maintain that interest was not a component of the
judgments or the writs of revival; thus, Appellee was entitled to the face
amount of the judgments without an award of interest. Moreover,
Appellants argue that Appellee has already received a payment of
$590,000.00, representing the entire amount of the judgments, and the
court could not amend the judgments after Appellants provided full
payment. Appellants conclude the court should not have awarded post-
judgment interest to Appellee. We disagree.
Whether a trial court erred in awarding post-judgment interest
presents a question of law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope
of review is plenary. Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 946 A.2d
744 (Pa.Super. 2008). The Judicial Code governs the imposition of interest
on judgments as follows:
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§ 8101. Interest on judgments
Except as otherwise provided by another statute, a
judgment for a specific sum of money shall bear interest at
the lawful rate from the date of the verdict or award, or
from the date of the judgment, if the judgment is not
entered upon a verdict or award.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8101. “Judgments bear interest from the time obtained
until…satisfaction [is] made.” Koolvent Aluminum Awning Co. of
Pittsburgh v. City of Pittsburgh, 162 A.2d 256, 257 (Pa.Super. 1960).
“It is as distinctly a substantive part of the debt as if the obligation to pay it
was founded on a contract for interest.” Id.“Post-judgment interest does not serve to compensate the plaintiff for
any damages….” Lockley v. CSX Transp. Inc., 66 A.3d 322, 327
(Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 621 Pa. 667, 74 A.3d 127 (2013).
Rather, [p]ost[-]judgment interest serves two important
functions—it compensates the judgment creditor for the
loss of use of the money until the judgment is paid and it
acts as an incentive for the judgment debtor to pay the
judgment promptly.
Additionally, we note that three federal circuits have
viewed post-judgment interest as procedural. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit best explained
the characterization as follows.
Post[-]judgment interest has a substantive
characteristic because the applicable rate of interest
and rules of accrual can increase or decrease the
amount of a monetary award. But post[-]judgment
interest is better characterized as procedural
because it confers no right in and of itself. Rather, it
merely follows and operates on the substance of
determined rights. Post[-]judgment interest is
designed to compensate a successful plaintiff for the
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time between his entitlement to damages and the
actual payment of those damages by the defendant.
* * *
Based on the above considerations, we conclude that post-
judgment interest is a method by which rights…are
enforced.” We therefore agree…that post-judgment
interest is properly characterized as a matter of procedure,
rather than one of substantive law.
Id. (internal citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted).
Instantly, Dr. Leoni issued the two judgments in favor of Appellee,
totaling $590,000.00, on January 25, 1989. Dr. Leoni filed writs of revival in
1995. Appellee filed the current writ-of-revival actions on November 1,
2006. Significantly, Appellee’s praecipes for writ of revival for both
judgments requested the principal amounts “with interest from January 25,
1989.” (See Appellee’s Petition to Assess Interest and Authorize
Distribution, filed 8/5/13, at Exhibit C; R.R. at 167a, 170a.)
The matter proceeded to a bench trial where Appellee’s counsel
reiterated the demand for interest: “[W]hatever entitlement that [Appellee]
would have to interest[,] he would continue to have those rights, whatever
those rights may be.” (See Emergency Motion to Stay Draw Down at Exhibit
A; R.R. at 90a.) When viewed in context, we cannot agree with Appellants’
characterization of counsel’s statement as an “afterthought.” We conclude
Appellee’s actions throughout the proceedings made clear his right to post-
judgment interest.
Subsequently, the court found Appellee was entitled “to the immediate
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payment of the undisputed $590,000.00….” (See Order, dated 5/30/13, at
1; R.R. at 116a). The court added, “Nothing in this Order adjudicates any of
the parties’ claims with regard to post-judgment interest or any right to
have the judgments marked as satisfied.” (Id.) In a separate order, dated
May 23, 2013, the court directed Appellants to file a memorandum on the
issue of post-judgment interest. On August 5, 2013, Appellee filed his
petition to assess interest and authorize distribution. Pursuant to Section
8101, Appellee argued that interest on the judgments had accrued since
January 25, 1989, at six percent (6%) per year, until the court’s May 23,
2013 order. Appellee concluded Appellants owed $849,600.00 in interest on
the judgments. Ultimately, the court granted Appellee’s petition to assess
interest and awarded him $849,600.00 in interest.
Contrary to Appellants’ argument, the payment of the undisputed
$590,000.00 did not satisfy their obligation to Appellee. Appellee properly
pursued post-judgment interest to compensate him “for the time between
his entitlement to damages and the actual payment of those damages” by
Appellants. See Lockley, supra. On this record, the court committed no
error of law in awarding post-judgment interest to Appellee, and Appellants
are not entitled to relief on this claim. See Hutchison, supra.In their fourth and last argument on appeal, regarding the priority of
the parties’ liens against certain funds held in escrow by City Line Abstract,
Appellants contend the liens in favor of Gregory and Nanette Leoni are
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superior to any liens claimed by Appellee. Appellants insist their act of
posting security, in the form of the irrevocable standby letters of credit,
discharged the liens in favor of Appellee. Additionally, Appellants maintain
Gregory and Nanette Leoni revived their own liens in 2012, thereby
elevating the priority of their liens over the liens of Appellee. On this basis,
Appellants conclude the court should have granted their motion to compel
distribution of escrow and termination of letters of credit. We decline to
address the merits of Appellants’ argument at this time.
As a prefatory matter, we note:
Rule 341. Final Orders; Generally
(a) General rule. Except as prescribed in
subdivisions (d), and (e) of this rule, an appeal may be
taken as of right from any final order of an administrative
agency or lower court.
(b) Definition of final order. A final order is any
order that:
(1) disposes of all claims and of all parties; or
(2) is expressly defined as a final order by statute; or
(3) is entered as a final order pursuant to subdivision
(c) of this rule.
Pa.R.A.P. 341(a), (b).
Instantly, the trial court evaluated this issue as follows:
The parties’ respective claims regarding proceeds held in
escrow by City Line Abstract [have] not been adjudicated
by [the trial] court…. Both parties agree this issue is not
ripe and has not been adjudicated as reflected by
paragraph 14 of [Appellee’s] Motion to Authorize the
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Distribution of an Escrow Fund filed on February 26, 2014
and paragraph 14 of [Appellants’] answer to said motion
filed on March 11, 2014. There has been no evidence
proffered as to any judgments in favor of Nanette or
Gregory, or the liens that they created. Likewise, there
has been no evidence of record regarding the sale of any
of [Appellants’] property. This matter was first raised in
the Motion to Compel, which was combined with requested
relief regarding the Judgments and the interest thereon.
(See Trial Court Opinion at 8) (internal footnotes omitted). Our review of
the record confirms the court’s assertions.3 Moreover, the escrowed funds
relate to a real estate transaction involving Appellee and various family
trusts which are not parties to the current appeal. Issues concerning the
escrowed funds are, at best, tangential to Appellants’ claims regarding the
award of post-judgment interest to Appellee. For these reasons, we quash
the portion of the appeal relating to the escrowed funds. See Pa.R.A.P. 341.
Accordingly, we affirm the orders denying Appellants’ motion to
compel and separate motion to vacate. We quash that portion of the appeal
as it relates to the priorities of liens on the City Line Abstract escrow funds.
Orders affirmed; appeal quashed in part.
____________________________________________
3
In Appellee’s Motion to Authorize the Distribution of an Escrow Fund, he
stated: “The December 1[3], 2013 Orders did not facially adjudicate the
parties’ entitlement to the Escrow with City Line Abstract.” (See Motion,
filed 2/26/14, at 4; R.R. at 428a.) In Appellants’ answer, they also
conceded: “The Order denying the Motion to Compel the Distribution of
Escrow and Termination of Letters of Credit did not adjudicate the issue with
respect to the balance of the escrow with City Line Abstract.” (See Answer,
filed 3/11/14, at 5; R.R. at 460a.)
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J-A24004-14
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/19/2015
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